Panjshir offensives
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| Part of the Soviet war in Afghanistan | |||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||
 Soviet Union, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan |
Afghan Mujahideen | ||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Various | Ahmad Shah Masoud | ||||||
| Soviet war in Afghanistan |
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| Storm-333 – Khost – Panjsher I-IX – Maravar – Zhawar – Magistral – Hill 3234 – |
The Panjshir offensives(Russian:Пандшерская операция - Panjsher Operations) were a series of battles between the Soviet Army and groups of Afghan Mujahideen under Ahmad Shah Masoud for the control of the strategic Panjshir Valley, during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the period from 1980 to 1985. These battles saw some of the most violent fighting of the whole war, but despite nine attacks the Soviets and their Afghan communist allies were not able to subdue the Panjshir.
[edit] The Panjshir: a strategic objective
The Panjshir valley lies 70 km north of Kabul, in the Hindu Kush mountains, not far from the Salang pass, which connects Kabul to the northern areas of Afghanistan and further on to Uzbekistan, then part of the Soviet Union. As such it was an ideal stronghold for the Mujahideen, who could easily launch attacks and ambushes against the Soviet convoys bringing supplies to the 40th army stationed in Afghanistan. The pressure on the logistic system determined the Soviet command to try and wrest control of the valley from the rebels.
[edit] Timeline
[edit] 9 April, 1980 - 1st Panjshir offensive
[edit] Autumn, 1980 - 2nd Panjshir offensive
[edit] March 3-4 , 1981 - 3rd Panjshir offensive
The first three offensives were of limited scope: the Mujahideen weren't strong enough to confront the Soviet army in the open, they were scattered in small groups and blended in with the local population. Instead they waited until the Soviets left to resume their activities.
[edit] September 6, 1981 - 4th Panjshir offensive
During this attack, to avoid losing vehicles to land mines, the Soviets sent their sapper units to clear the way in front of the main force. This tactic proved costly, and the attack force penetrated only 25 km into the valley before retiring, after having suffered 100 casualties[1].
[edit] May 16, 1982 - 5th Panjshir offensive
The first major offensive was carried out by a force of 12,000 soldiers under the command of General N.G. Ter-Grigoryan supported by 104 helicopters and 26 airplanes[2]. The main assault began on the night of May 16, after an intense aviation and artillery bombardment. While motorized rifle battalions, preceded by reconnaissance units, attacked the dominating features at the entrance of the valley, airborne units were airlifted by helicopter behind the main Mujahideen defenses. Massoud had expected an attack similar to the last ones and this innovative tactic enabled the Soviets to penetrate deeply into the valley. They established three main bases at Rukha, Bazarak and Anava. Massoud reacted by dividing his forces into smaller groups that fought the Soviets all down the valley. During this offensive the Soviets suffered up to 3,000 casualties, and 1,000 Afghan Army soldiers defected to the Mujahideen[3].
Despite early successes, the Soviets quickly realized that their heavily fortified bases only gave them control over the valley floor, while the surrounding heights were still held by the Mujahideen. For this reason they decided to launch a sixth offensive.
[edit] August- September, 1982 - 6th Panjshir offensive
The sixth offensive consisted of a series of sweeps conducted by motorised units and by airborne Spetsnaz commandos, launched from their bases in the Panjshir, to find and destroy the Mujahideen hideouts. It was accompanied by a heavy aerial bombardment of villages suspected of harbouring rebel groups, notably carried out by Tu-16 and Su-24 bombers flying from inside the Soviet Union. Despite bitter fighting, the Soviets were unable to eradicate the Mujahideen, and the battle soon developed into a stalemate.
To prove they were still capable of carrying out offensive operations the Mujahideen attacked the Afghan Army outpost at Saricha, which they captured along with 80 prisoners and 8 tanks, despite having to cross a minefield[4]. This operation, along with the continued harassment of Soviet garrisons and resupply convoys, convinced them that they could not defeat Masoud, and that they must negotiate a truce with him. In December 1982, for the first time a ceasefire was concluded with the Mujahideen, lasting 6 months, and later extended to 2 years. Negotiated by Massoud in person with a colonel of the GRU, Anatoly Tkachev[2], the agreement stipulated that Soviet troops should evacuate the Panjshir, except for a small garrison at Anava, whose access was controlled by the Mujahideen. The area covered by the ceasefire included the Panjshir valley, but not the Salang pass, where fighting continued[5].
Masoud took advantage of the truce to extend his influence over areas that had until then been held by hostile factions loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-islami party, like in Andarab. He also strengthened his defenses in five subsidiary valleys as well as in the Panjshir, permitting a defense in depth.
[edit] 19 April to September 1984 - 7th Panjshir offensive
In February 1984, Konstantin Chernenko replaced Yuri Andropov as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While Andropov had supported the ceasefire, Chernenko, a disciple of Brezhnev, believed that the guerillas should be rooted out through military action, an opinion which he shared with Babrak Karmal, president of the DRA. As a result a new offensive was planned, which, in Karmal's words, should be decisive and merciless, and in order to destroy the Panjshir valley bases, all those living there should be killed[2].
However, some Soviets, who were supporters of Andropov, disagreed with this policy, and they gave Masoud advance warning of the attack[6]. Through this channel, and thanks to his agents in the DRA government Masoud had a precise idea of the Soviet plans, and he was able to counter them. To do this he decided to evacuate all the inhabitants from the Panjshir to his other bases, leaving only ambush parties to delay the Soviet advance. All the roads, villages and helicopter landing zones were heavily mined.
11,000 Soviet and 2,600 Afghan soldiers, under Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov participated in the offensive, supported by 200 airplanes and 190 helicopters. On April 22, after a two-day bombardment of the region with heavy bombers, they advanced rapidly into the Panjshir. Much of the valley was occupied, but the Soviets paid a heavy price; many soldiers were killed by mines and in ambushes. During one battle, on April 30 in the Hazara valley, the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was decimated: the losses of Soviet troops were estimated at 60 killed[7].
For the Soviets, the operation was partly successful - some of the infrastructure of the Mujahideen, created in the time of the truce in 1982-1983, was destroyed. Babrak Karmal completed a propaganda visit of the Panjshir, which for some time had become a safe zone. However, it quickly became apparent that most of Masoud's forces had escaped the onslaught, and were still able to carry out their harassment tactics. Eventually, in September, the Soviet-DRA forces once again evacuated the Panjshir valley[8].
[edit] 1985 - 8th and 9th Panjshir offensives
The last offensives were organised on a different model: out of 20,000 troops engaged, only 10% were Soviets. The main assault force was composed of Afghan army soldiers and pro-communist militias. These forces attacked all of Masoud's bases, not only the Panjshir. In some areas, such as Andarab, they enjoyed some success, but as a rule, these offensives failed like the previous ones.
- From 1986
No more large-scale operations were carried out against Masoud's forces.
[edit] References
- ^ Davies, Will & Shariat, Abdullah(2004); Fighting Masoud's war; Lothian books ISBN 0-7344-0590-1, p.168
- ^ a b c Lyakhovskiy, Aleksandr. Ахмад Шах(Russian). http://artofwar.ru/. Retrieved on 2007-03-23.
- ^ Baumann, Robert. Compound War Case Study: The Soviets in Afghanistan. http://www.globalsecurity.org/. Retrieved on 2007-03-25.
- ^ Davies & Shariat p.186
- ^ Davies & Shariat p.197
- ^ Davies & Shariat p.213
- ^ Knyazev, Nikolai. Гибель 1-го батальона 682-го мотострелкового полка 30 апреля 1984 года, ущелье Хазара (Панджшер)(In Russian). http://artofwar.ru/. Retrieved on 2007-03-23.
- ^ Amstutz, J. Bruce(1986); Afghanistan the first five years of Soviet occupation; NDU Press; ISBN-10: 0788111116, p. 133
