Talk:Operation Goodwood

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as pojnted out. the loss ratio of tanks meant attritionaly it was a ver y suucsesful operation. much more than it is generaly given credit. given the strenthg of the german resistance.

Especialy as the germans took 15,000 or so infantry casulties themselves. it's not normal to have the defender taking more casulties than the attacker. (Rich tea man)

This article makes Goodwood appear much more successful than it was. Since the Second Army's mission was not accomplished, it's hard to see how it can possibly be described as anything other than a failure, albeit a failure with the positive side-effect of continuing the German focus on the eastern flank. The statement that Goodwood made Cobra more likely to succeed is true, but on its own Goodwood was a German defensive success. DMorpheus 17:27, 22 November 2005 (UTC)
Reading part of von Kluge's letter to Hitler, the Germans themselves thought they could not survive many such "defensive successes". Throughout the war, German troops, dug-in and organised, showed themselves to be brave and intelligent fighters - this is what all Allied commanders from Tunisia to the Hurtgen Forest found. Normandy was an attritional battle, Goodwood just one phase of this. Montgomery's real problem was his relationships with fellow commanders and his need to play a PR game. Folks at 137 13:09, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
Perhaps we could then best describe this as a Pyrrhic victory for the Germans then? Oberiko 23:13, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
My sense, based largely on Colonel D'Este's work, is that it wasn't a 'phyrric victory' at all. It was, fundamentally, a lousy plan with many details poorly thought out and poorly executed. The Germans achieved a defensive success without even having to redeploy any major reserves. So on the tactical level it was a German success. On the strategic level, of course the Germans were playing a game they could not win, but that assessment has little to do with Goodwood itself. I think the article as it stands is quite good in explaining this. DMorpheus 15:03, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

The whole article could do with some proper referencing. There are two levels that need sorting out: what were the strtegic objectives (Montgomery)? How was the battle conducted (Dempsey)? It should be remembered that Montgomery had the same relation to Goodwood as he had to Cobra. The original plan was for the left side of the Battle of Normandy to be attritional, not a 'breakthrough'. Is there any verifiable evidence that this was discarded?MAG1 17:55, 6 June 2006 (UTC)

You've raised important but difficult points. Reading D'Este (Decision in Normandy) or Eisenhower's Lieutenants, the evidence shows that under the original plan Montgomery in fact intended to break out in the east using the 2nd Army. D'Este in particular does a good job showing how Montgomery's later statements made it appear that he had intended a "pivoting" operation in the east with a breakout in the west. D'Este shows this was improvisation (and there's nothing wrong with that, by the way - this is not intended as criticism of Montgomery). Eisenhower's Lieutenants provides a lot of evidence to support this also. For example, from D-Day onwards the buildup of armored units was front-loaded for 2nd Army but not 1st Army.
The strategic objectives would be quite difficult to sort out due to the irregular communications with SHAEF. The operations orders to 2nd Army do not agree with the messages sent to Eisenhower's HQ.
You are absolutely correct to remind us that Montgomery was in command of all ground units, not just 2nd Army; US 1st Army was a part of 21st Army Group at the time. Perhaps in deference to national politics, Montgomery did allow Bradley on a much longer leash than Dempsey, but the formal relationship was identical.
Of course all this is why folks like us have been arguing about this for 60 years ! ;)

[edit] Oberiko mental problems

Dont listen this guy. He have serious mental problems and traumas with world war 2 articles. The first german victory he see in an infobox means for him German Phyrric Victory. So oberiko is better to increase your medication or finish reading the article. Germany lost 100 tanks, but U.S 400. Thats means that the pyrric victory was Allied. But it was neither a victory.Germany stopped the Operation, soo..... Whats your point???

Please review your facts. Goodwood was an Anglo-Canadian effort - no US ground involvement. The German success was that the British attack was held. The Allied success was that SS forces intended to be used against the US were committed in the "wrong" place and kept there. Many Allied troops committed in Normandy were green, ie inexperienced, whereas the Germans were politically committed, skilled and defenders in defensive heaven. It was a slogging match.Folks at 137 15:23, 18 July 2006 (UTC)

Hmm.. thats sounds rare. try to read at the article of Operation Cobra there is a line in wich indicates what iam saying. take a look.

Ok - Goodwood is described as "... British Breakout Attempt: Goodwood". It's mentioned because of its impact on the German deployment and thus on the success of Cobra. Folks at 137 06:52, 19 July 2006 (UTC)

You are valorating Operation Goodwwod because you know the clear results of Operation Cobra. The operation itself was bad, cobra solved the problem.

[edit] Objectives

I have been doing some reading, and it may have been improvised, but they all agree that Goodwood was not intended to be a breakthrough: the important things were to secure Caen and ensure that the German forces were committed. Furthermore, Cobra and Goodwood were coordinated, it was not some sort of race to a breakout. I have changed the article accordingly. MAG1 17:37, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Not all sources agree, as you and I have discussed previously. Caen was not secured. The Germans stayed where they were already. They had little choice about committing most of their armor to the eastern flank. No unit moved out of the US 1st Army front to the British 2nd Army front because of Goodwood. DMorpheus 15:53, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

Hi, nice to hear from you again. I am not being argumentative for the sake of it, but I have been doing some reading (and my ideas are changing: the improvisational nature of the campaign is much clearer to me now). On the objectives thing, lots of proper histories come to a conclusion that a breakthrough was the fundamental objective of the battle. The suggestion that rang truest for me was that Dempsey was keen on a breakthrough, but Montgomery was sceptical and saw it as having the more limited objectives (hence the scaling back of operation objectives in the days before the battle, and his instructions to Dempsey to suck in more German armies).

Operations Atlantic and Goodwood resulted in the ejection of the Germans from Caen and the capture and occupation of the high ground to the south overlooking the city. You would not have wanted to buy property there, but that sounds a pretty large increase in security to me.

Before the battle there were uncommitted German divisions in Normandy. As a result of the operation these armies were committed to the east of the theatre.

MAG1 19:48, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

Tracked down D'Este today, and though I have not been able to read it fully, he seems to say the same thing viz. Dempsey was optimistically hoping for a breakthrough; Montgomery would have welcomed this, but his realistic aims were to consolidate the position around Caen and draw in the German reserves; however, for his own purposes he misled SHAEF by communicating the optimism upwards. MAG1 17:19, 27 July 2006 (UTC)


Would it help to post part of Montgomery's July 15th directive that sets out the intentions of Goodwood both for VIII Corps and II Canadian Corps? It might put paid to doubts about the operation's goals and the breakout controversy. BobFish 20:23, 24 October 2006 (UTC)