Operation Shingle

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You have new messages (last change).


Operation Shingle
Part of World War II
Date January 22, 1944
Location Anzio and Nettuno, Italy
Result Operation successful; VI Corps established beachhead; Battle of Anzio followed.
Combatants
United States,
United Kingdom		 Germany
Commanders
Harold Alexander
Mark W. Clark
John P. Lucas
Lucian Truscott		 Albert Kesselring
Eberhard von Mackensen
Strength
22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns		 22 Jan 1944: 20,000 soldiers
End May: 135,000 soldiers
Casualties
Up to May 22: 29,200 combat casualties (4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded, 6,800 prisoners or missing)[1] Up to May 22: 27,500 (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, and 4,500 prisoners or missing)[1]
Italian Campaign
Invasion of Sicily – Invasion of Italy – Armistice with Italy – Winter Line – San Pietro – Anzio – Monte Cassino – Gothic Line

Operation Shingle (January 22, 1944), during the Italian Campaign of World War II, was an Allied amphibious landing against Axis forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno, Italy. The operation was commanded by Major General John P. Lucas and was intended to outflank Germany forces of the Winter Line and enable an attack on Rome. The resulting combat is commonly called the Battle of Anzio.

Contents

[edit] Introduction

At the end of 1943, following the Allied invasion of Italy, Allied forces were bogged down at the Gustav Line, a defensive line across Italy south of the strategic objective of Rome. The terrain of central Italy had proved ideally suited to defence, and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring took full advantage. A number of Allied proposals were made to break the stalemate, but Winston Churchill's idea for "Operation Shingle" was initially looked upon with disdain by General George Marshall, who was more concerned with planning a massive Normandy invasion than listening to Churchill's ideas about amphibiuous operations. Only after Churchill made a personal plea was the idea accepted by Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin welcomed any major allied offensive that could take pressure off of the Eastern Front. A major attack in the South by the U.S. Fifth Army, commanded by General Mark Clark, would draw Germany's depleted forces away from the area around Rome, and from the hills between Rome and the coast. This would make possible a surprise landing by Fifth Army's U.S. VI Corps under the command of Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas in the Anzio/Nettuno area, and a rapid advance into the Alban Hills to cut German communications and "threaten the rear of the German XIV Panzer Corps" under General Frido von Senger und Etterlin.

[edit] The plan

Planners argued that if Kesselring (in charge of German forces in Italy) pulled troops out of the Gustav Line to defend against the Allied assault, then Allied forces would be able to break through the line; if Kesselring did not pull troops out of the Gustav Line, then Operation Shingle would threaten to capture Rome and cut off the German units defending the Gustav Line. Should Germany have adequate reinforcements available to defend both Rome and the Gustav Line, the Allies felt that the operation would nevertheless be useful in engaging forces which could otherwise be committed on another front. The operation was officially cancelled on December 18, 1943. However, it was later reselected and executed.

Mark Clark did not feel he had the numbers on the southern front to exploit any breakthrough. His plan therefore was relying on the southern offensive drawing Kesselring's reserves in and providing the Anzio force the opportunity to break inland quickly. However, his written orders to Lucas did not really reflect this: Lucas was to "seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio...." when he was "to advance to the Alban Hills". It is likely that the caution displayed by both Clark and Lucas was to some extent a product of Clark's experiences at the tough battle for the Salerno beach head and Lucas' natural caution stemming from his lack of experience in battle.

Lucas did not have full confidence in either his superiors or the operational plan. A few days prior to the attack, he wrote in his diary, "Unless we can get what we want, the operation becomes such a desperate undertaking that it should not, in my opinion, be attempted." and "[The operation] had a strong odour of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur was still on the coach's bench." The "amateur" can only have referred to Winston Churchill, architect of the disastrous Gallipoli landings of World War I, and personal advocate of Shingle.

[edit] Availability of naval forces

One of the problems with the plan was the availability of landing ships. The American commanders in particular were determined that nothing should delay the Normandy invasion and the supporting landings in southern France (Operation Dragoon). Operation Shingle would require the use of landing ships necessary for these operations. Initially Shingle was to release these assets by January 15. However, this being deemed problematic, President Roosevelt granted permission for the craft to remain until February 5.

Only enough tank landing ships (LSTs) to land a single division were initially available to Shingle. Later, at Churchill's personal insistence, enough were made available to land two divisions. Allied intelligence thought that five or six German divisions were in the area although U.S. 5th Army intelligence severely underestimated the German 10th Army's fighting capacity at this time, believing many of their units would be worn out after the defensive battles fought since September.

[edit] Allied Force Composition

Allied forces in this attack consisted of 5 cruisers, 24 destroyers, 238 landing craft, 62+ other ships, 40,000 soldiers, and 5,000+ vehicles.

The attack consisted of three groups:

[edit] British Force ('Peter' Beach)

This force attacked the coast 10 km north of Anzio.

[edit] Northwestern U.S. Force ('Yellow Beach')

This force attacked the port of Anzio. There had been plans to use the 504th Parachute Infantry Battalion in an airborne attack north of Anzio, however these plans were scrapped.

[edit] Southwestern U.S. Force ('X-Ray' Beach)

This force attacked the coast 6 km east of Anzio.

[edit] The Southern Attack

The Fifth Army's attack on the Gustav Line began on 16 January 1944 at Monte Cassino. Although the operation failed to break through, it did succeed in part in its primary objective. General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, commanding the Gustav Line, called for reinforcements, and Kesselring transferred the 29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions from Rome. For more details of these actions, see Battle of Monte Cassino.

[edit] Initial Landings

Force dispositions at Anzio and Cassino January / February 1943
Force dispositions at Anzio and Cassino January / February 1943

The landings began on January 22, 1944.

Although resistance had been expected, as seen at Salerno during 1943, the initial landings were essentially unopposed, with the exception of desultory Luftwaffe strafing runs.

By midnight, 36,000 soldiers and 3,200 vehicles had landed on the beaches. 13 Allied troops were killed, and 97 wounded; about 200 Germans had been taken as POWs.[2] The 1st Division penetrated 3 km inland, the Rangers captured Anzio's port, the 509th PIB captured Nettuno, and the 3rd Division penetrated 5 km inland.

In the first days of operations the Command of the Italian resistance movement had a meeting with the Allied General Headquarters: it offered to guide the Allied Force in the Alban Hills territory, but the Allied Command refused the proposal.

[edit] After the landings

It is clear that Lucas's superiors expected some kind of offensive action from him. The point of the landing was to turn the German defences on the Winter Line taking advantage of their exposed rear and hopefully panicking them into retreating northwards past Rome. However, Lucas instead poured more men and material into his tiny bridgehead, and strengthened his defences.

Winston Churchill was clearly displeased with this action. "I had hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale," he said.

Lucas's decision remains a controversial one. Noted military historian John Keegan wrote, "Had Lucas risked rushing at Rome the first day, his spearheads would probably have arrived, though they would have soon been crushed. Nevertheless he might have 'staked out claims well inland.'" As noted above, Lucas did not have confidence in the strategic planning of the operation. Also, he could certainly argue that his interpretation of his orders from Gen. Mark Clark as quoted above was not an unreasonable one. With two divisions landed, and facing two or three times that many Germans, it would not have been unreasonable for Lucas to consider the beachhead insecure. But according to Keegan, Lucas's actions "achieved the worst of both worlds, exposing his forces to risk without imposing any on the enemy." Lucas was relieved of his command on 23 February, to be replaced by General Lucian Truscott.

[edit] The Response of Axis Forces

Kesselring was informed of the landings at 0300 hours on January 22. Although the landings came as a complete surprise, Kesselring had made contingency plans to deal with possible landings at all the likely locations. All the plans relied on his divisions each having previously organised a motorised rapid reaction unit (kampfgruppe) which could move speedily to meet the threat and buy time for the rest of the defenses to get in place.[3] At 0500 he ordered the kampfgruppe of 4th Parachute Division and the Hermann Göring Division to defend the roads leading from Anzio to the Alban Hills via Campoleone and Cisterna whilst his plans expected some 20,000 defending troops to have arrived by the end of the first day. In addition, he requested that OKW send reinforcements and in response to this they ordered the equivalent of more than three divisions from France, Yugoslavia, and Germany whilst at the same time releasing to Kesselring a further three divisions in Italy which had been under OKW's direct command.[4] Later that morning, he would order Generaloberst Eberhard von Mackensen (Fourteenth Army) and Gen. von Vietinghoff (Tenth Army - Gustav Line) to send him additional reinforcements.

The German units in the immediate vicinity had in fact been dispatched to reinforce the Gustav Line only a few days earlier. All available reserves from the southern front or on their way to it were rushed toward Anzio; these included the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and 71st Infantry Divisions, and the bulk of the Luftwaffe's Hermann Göring Panzer Division. Kesselring initially considered that a successful defence could not be made if the Allies launched a major attack on the 23rd or 24th. However, by the end of the 22nd, the lack of aggressive action convinced him that a defence could be made. Nevertheless, few additional defenders arrived on the 23rd although the arrival on the evening of the 22nd of General Alfred Schlemm and his 1st Parachute Corps headquarters brought greater organisation and purpose to the German defensive preparations. By the 24th, however, the Germans had over 40,000 troops in prepared defensive positions.[5]

Three days after the landings, the beachhead was surrounded by a defence line consisting of three Divisions: The 4th Parachute Division to the west, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division to the center in front of Alban Hills, the Hermann Göring Panzer Division to the east.

The Wehrmacht's 14th Army, commanded by Gen. von Mackensen, assumed control of the defence on 25 January. Elements of eight German divisions were employed in the defence line around the beachhead, and five more divisions were on their way to the Anzio area. Kesselring ordered an attack on the beachhead for 28 January, though it was postponed to 1 February.

Further troop movements brought Allied forces total on the beachhead to 69,000 men, 508 guns and 208 tanks by January 29, whilst the total defending Germans had risen to 71,500.[6] Lucas initiated a two-pronged attack on 30 January. While one force was to cut Highway 7 at Cisterna (Battle of Cisterna) before moving east into the Alban Hills, a second was to advance northeast up the Via Anziate towards Campoleone. In heavy fighting British 1st Division made ground but failed to take Campoleone and ended battle in an exposed salient stretching up the Via Anzinate. On the right, three Ranger battalions made a daring covert advance towards Cisterna but when daylight arrived they were engaged and cut off. Of the Of the 767 men in the 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions, 6 returned to the Allied lines and 743 were captured.[7]

On February 3, the German forces counterattacked. By now they numbered some 100,000 troops organised into two Army Corps, the 1st Parachute Corps under Schlemm and the LXXVI Panzer Corps under Lieutenant-General Traugot Herr.[8] Once more the fighting was fierce and the Allied forces, now totalling 76,400, gave ground and by February 10 had been pushed out of the salient.

On February 16 the Germans launched a new offensive (Operation Fischfang) down the line of the Via Anziate. By the 18th, after desperate fighting, the Allies' Final Beachhead Line (prepared defenses more or less on the line of the original beachhead) was under attack. However, a counter-attack using VI Corps' reserves halted the German advance and Fischfang petered out with both sides exhausted. During Fischfang the Germans had sustained 5,400 casualties, the Allies 3,500. Both had suffered 20,000 casualties each since the first landings.[9]

Despite the exhausted state of the troops, Hitler insisted that 14th Army should continue to attack. Consequently a further assault was mounted on February 29, this time on LXXVI Panzer Corps' front around Cisterna. This push achieved little except to generate a further 2,500 casualties for the 14th Army.[10]

[edit] Stalemate

By now both sides had realised that no decisive result could be achieved until the spring and reverted to a defensive posture involving aggressive patrolling and artillery duels whilst they worked to rebuild their fighting capabilities. In anticipation of events in the following spring, Kesselring ordered the preparation of a new defence line, the Caesar C line, behind the line of beachhead running from the mouth of the river Tiber just south of Rome through Albano, skirting south of the Alban Hills to Valmontone and across Italy to the Adriatic coast at Pescara, behind which 14th Army and, to their left, 10th Army might withdraw when the need arose.[11] Meanwhile, Lucian Truscott, who had been promoted from the command of U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to replace Lucas as commander of VI Corps on February 22, worked with his staff on the plans for a decisive attack as part of Operation Diadem which General Harold Alexander, commander of Allied forces in Italy, was planning for May and which would include a major offensive on the Gustav Line (which was later to be called the fourth Battle of Cassino). By late May there were some 150,000 Allied troops in the bridgehead[12] including 5 U.S. and 2 British divisions facing 5 German divisions. The German divisions were well dug into prepared defenses but were weak in officer and NCO numbers and by the time of the late May offensive lacked any reserves (which had all been sent south to the Gustav fighting).[13]

The Allied breakout from Anzio and advance from the Gustav Line May 1944
The Allied breakout from Anzio and advance from the Gustav Line May 1944

Despite Alexander's overall plan for Diadem requiring VI Corps to strike inland and cut Route 6, Clark asked Truscott to prepare a number of alternatives and be ready to switch from one to another at 48 hours notice. Of the four scenarios prepared by Truscott Operation Buffalo called for an attack through Cisterna, into the gap in the hills and to cut Route 6 at Valmontone. Operation Turtle on the other hand foresaw a main thrust to the left of the Alban Hills taking Campoleone, Albano and on to Rome. On May 5 Alexander selected Buffalo and issued Clark with orders to this effect.[14]

However, Clark was determined that VI Corps should strike directly for Rome as evidenced in his later writing: "We not only wanted the honour of capturing Rome, but felt that we deserved it...Not only did we intend to become the first army to seize Rome from the south, but we intended to see that people at home knew that it was the Fifth Army that did the job, and knew the price that had been paid for it.".[15] He argued to Alexander that VI Corps did not have the strength to trap the German 10th Army and Alexander, instead of making his requirements clear, was conciliatory and gave the impression that a push on Rome was still a possibility if Buffalo ran into difficulties.[16] On May 6 Clark informed Truscott that "..the capture of Rome is the only important objective and to be ready to execute Turtle as well as Buffalo".[17]

Truscott's planing for Buffalo was meticulous: British 5th Division and 1st Division on the left were to attack along the coast and up the Via Anziate to pin the German's 4th Parachute, 65th Infantry and 3rd Panzergrenadier in place whilst the U.S. 45th Infantry, 1st Armored and 3rd Infantry Divisions would launch the main assault, engaging the German 362nd and 715th Infantry Divisions and striking towards Campoleone, Velletri and Cisterna respectively. On the Allies' far right the 1st Special Service Force would protect the U.S. assault's flank.[18]

[edit] Breakout

At 0545 on May 23 1,500 Allied artillery pieces commenced bombardment. Forty minutes later the guns paused as attacks were made by close air support and then resumed as the infantry and armour moved forward.[19] The first day's fighting was intense: 1st Armored Division lost 100 tanks and 3rd Infantry Division suffered 955 casualties, the highest single day figure for any U.S. Division during World War II. The Germans suffered too, with 362nd Infantry Division estimated to have lost 50% of its fighting strength.[20]

Mackensen had been convinced that the Allies' main thrust would be up the Via Anziate and the ferocity of the British feint on the 23rd and 24th did nothing to pursade him otherwise. Kesselring, however, was convinced that the Allies' intentions were to gain Route 6 and ordered the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, resting 150 miles away at Livorno[21], to Valmontone to hold open Route 6 for the Tenth Army, now on the retreat up this road from Cassino.[22]

In the afternoon of May 25 Cisterna finally fell to 3rd Division who had had to go house to house winkling out the German 362nd Infantry which had refused to withdraw and, as a consequence, had virtually ceased to exist by the end of the day. By the end of the 25th, 3rd Infantry were heading into the Velletri gap near Cori and elements of 1st Armored had reached within 3 miles of Valmontone and were in contact with units of the Herman Göring Division which were just starting to arrive from Leghorn[21]. Although VI Corps had suffered over 3,300 casualties in the three days fighting, Operation Buffalo was going to plan and Truscott was confident that a concerted attack by 1st Armored and 3rd Infantry Divisions the next day would see his troops astride Route 6.[23]

The final move on Rome
The final move on Rome

On the evening of May 25 Truscott received new orders from Clark via his Operations Officer, Brigadier Don Brand. These were, in effect, to implement Operation Turtle and turn the main line of attack ninety degrees to the left. Most importantly, although the attack towards Valmontone and Route 6 would continue, 1st Armored were to withdraw to prepare to exploit the planned breakthrough along the new line of attack leaving 3rd Division to continue towards Valmontone with 1st Special Service Force in support.[24] Clark informed Alexander of these developments late in the morning of May 26 by which time the change of orders was a fait accompli.[25]

At the time, Truscott was shocked, writing later "...I was dumbfounded. This was no time to drive to the north-west where the enemy was still strong; we should pour our maximum power into the Valmontone Gap to insure the destruction of the retreating German Army. I would not comply with the order without first talking to General Clark in person. ...[However] he was not on the beachhead and could not be reached even by radio....such was the order that turned the main effort of the beachhead forces from the Valmontone Gap and prevented destruction of the German Tenth Army. On the 26th the order was put into effect.".[26] He went on to write "There has never been any doubt in my mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to the north-west on May 26, the strategic objectives of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was a poor compensation for this lost opportunity".[27]

On May 26, whilst VI Corps was initiating its difficult maneuver, Kesselring threw elements of 4 divisions into the Velletri gap to stall the advance on Route 6. For four days they slugged it out against 3rd Division until finally withdrawing on May 30, having kept Route 6 open and allowed 7 divisions from 10th Army to withdraw and head north of Rome.[28]

On the new axis of attack little progress was made until 1st Armored were in position on May 29, when the front advanced to the main Caesar Line defences. Nevertheless, an early breakthrough seemed unlikely until on May 30 Major-General Fred Walker's U.S. 36th Division found a gap in the Caesar Line at the join between 1st Parachute Corps and LXXVI Panzer Corps. Climbing the steep slopes of Monte Artemisio they threatened Velletri from the rear and obliged the defenders to withdraw. This was a key turning point and von Mackensen offered his resignation which Kesselring accepted.[29]

Raising the pressure further, Clark assigned U.S. II Corps which, fighting its way along the coast from the Gustav Line had joined up with VI Corps on May 25, to attack around the right hand side of the Alban Hills and advance along the line of Route 6 to Rome.

On June 2 the Caesar Line collapsed under the mounting pressure and 14th Army commenced a fighting withdrawal through Rome. On the same day Hitler, fearing another Battle of Stalingrad, had ordered Kesslering that there should be "no defence of Rome".[30] Over the next three days the rearguards were gradually overwhelmed and Rome was entered in the early hours of June 5 with Clark holding an impromptu press conference on the steps of the Town Hall on the Capitoline Hill that morning. He ensured the event was a strictly American affair by stationing military police at road junctions to refuse entry to the city by British military personnel.[31]

[edit] Epilogue

Although controversy continues regarding what may have happened had General Lucas been more aggressive from the start, most commentators agree that the initial Anzio plan was flawed, questioning whether the initial landing of just over two infantry divisions with no supporting armour had had the strength to achieve the objective of cutting Route 6 and then holding off the inevitable counter-attacks which would come as Kesselring re-deployed his forces. What is clear is that because of Clark's change of plan, Operation Diadem (during which U.S. 5th and British 8th Armies sustained 44,000 casualties) failed in its objective of destroying the German 10th Army and condemned the Allies to a further year of brutal combat notably around the Gothic Line from August 1944 to May 1945.

Churchill however, defended the Anzio operation.[32] In his view, sufficient forces were available. He had clearly made great political efforts to procure certain resources, especially the extra LSTs needed to deliver a second division to shore, but also specific units useful to the attack such as U.S. 504th Parachute Regiment. He argued that even regardless of the tactical outcome of the operation, there was immediate strategic benefit with regard to the wider war. Following the landings, the German High Command dropped plans to transfer five of Kesselring's best divisions to North West Europe. This gave obvious benefit with regard to the upcoming Operation Overlord. Churchill also had to ensure the British dominated forces in Italy were contributing to the war at a time when the Russians were suffering tremendous losses on the Eastern Front.

[edit] Trivia

  • The current Contoller of BBC Radio 1 Andy Parfitt's father, John Raymond Parfitt was part of the British force landing at Anzio. He was shot in the head and badly wounded on or near his birthday in early February

[edit] Bibliography

  • Gerhard Muhm : German Tactics in the Italian Campaign , http://www.larchivio.org/xoom/gerhardmuhm2.htm
  • Gerhard Muhm : La Tattica tedesca nella Campagna d'Italia, in Linea Gotica avanposto dei Balcani, (Hrsg.) Amedeo Montemaggi - Edizioni Civitas, Roma 1993
  • Clayton D. Laurie. CMH Online bookshelves: WWII Campaigns, Anzio 22 January - 22 May 1944. Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-19. 
  • Gliederung und Kriegstagebuck 14. Armee (From January to May 1944) (War diary of 14th German Army Corps)
  • Fred Majdalany (1957). Cassino: Portrait of a Battle. Longmans, Green & Co Ltd., London. 
  • LLoyd Clark (2006). Anzio: The Friction of War. Italy and the Battle for Rome 1944. Headline Publishing Group, London. ISBN 978 0 7553 1420 1. 

[edit] References and footnotes

  1. ^ a b CMH Pub 100-10, p116
  2. ^ CMH Publication 72-19, p9
  3. ^ Lloyd Clark, p83
  4. ^ Lloyd Clark, p101
  5. ^ Lloyd Clark, p123
  6. ^ Lloyd Clark, p134
  7. ^ Lloyd Clark, p146
  8. ^ Lloyd Clark, p158
  9. ^ Lloyd Clark, pp175-197
  10. ^ Lloyd Clark, pp209-216
  11. ^ Lloyd Clark, pp219-220
  12. ^ Lloyd Clark, p281
  13. ^ Lloyd Clark, p271
  14. ^ Lloyd Clark, pp271-272
  15. ^ Lloyd Clark, p272
  16. ^ Lloyd Clark, p273
  17. ^ Lloyd Clark, p273
  18. ^ Lloyd Clark, p277
  19. ^ Lloyd Clark, pp281-2
  20. ^ Lloyd Clark, p287
  21. ^ a b Livorno is referred to as "Leghorn" in contemporary Allied maps and documents
  22. ^ Lloyd Clark, p291
  23. ^ Lloyd Clark, p300
  24. ^ Lloyd Clark, p301
  25. ^ Lloyd Clark, p302
  26. ^ Majdalany, p256
  27. ^ Majdalany, p259
  28. ^ Lloyd Clark, p304
  29. ^ Lloyd Clark, p307
  30. ^ Lloyd Clark, p311
  31. ^ Lloyd Clark, pp309-319
  32. ^ Churchill, Winston: The Second World War, Volume 5, p436

[edit] Battles of Operation Shingle

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

The author William Woodruff, who fought in the battle, published "The Battle for Anzio" in the Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), Summer 1995.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org../../../o/p/e/Operation_Shingle_cbc9.html"