Operation Searchlight
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| Operation Searchlight | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Bangladesh Liberation War | |||||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||||
| Bengali units of Pakistan Army and civilian volunteers | Pakistan Armed Forces | ||||||||
| Commanders | |||||||||
| Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed (April 17 -December 16)
Col(ret). M A G Osmani "Operation Jackpot": |
Lt. General Tikka Khan (March - September) Lt. General A. A. K. Niazi |
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| Strength | |||||||||
| Bengali Forces: 6,000 Bengali soldiers from East Bengal Regiments[2]
Paramilitary Forces: |
Pakistan Army: 14th Infantry Division, estimated 18,000+ soldiers,[4] 1 armored regiment (75 M-48 Chaffee Tanks).
Paramilitary Forces: ~2,000 East Pakistan Rifles,[5] unknown number of Mujahids. Reinforcements: 9th and 16th Infantry divisions from W. Pakistan Pakistan Navy: 4 Gunboats and 1 Patrol Boat,[6] 1 Destroyer.[7] |
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| Casualties | |||||||||
| Mukti Bahini: NA*, ~several thousand, ~4,000+[8] POWs. | ~6,000 KIA and wounded[9] a few POWs. | ||||||||
| Civilian death toll: estimated several thousands Bengali civilians. | |||||||||
Operation Searchlight was a planned pacification carried out by the Pakistan Army to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971.[10] Ordered by the government in West Pakistan, this was seen as the sequel to Operation Blitz that was launched in November 1970. The killings which began on 25 March 1971 sparked the Bangladesh Liberation War and which lead to the deaths of between 26,000 as reported by Pakistan on one hand (by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission)[11] and up to three million by Bangladesh on the other hand, (From 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, mentioned on several occasions that at least three million died).[12][13][14] The international media and reference books in English have also have published figures which vary greatly: varying from 5,000–35,000 in Dhaka, and 200,000–3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole.[15][16]
The original plan envisioned taking control of the major cities on March 26, and eliminating all opposition within one month. The prolonged resistance by Bengali forces and civilians was not anticipated by the Pakistani Generals. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last town in Bengali hands in mid May. The aftermath would continue until Pakistani Army unconditionally surrendered to the Mukti Bahini and the Indian forces in December 16, 1971. The operation also began the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities. This systematic killings only served to enrage the Bengalis which ultimately resulted in the secession of East Pakistan later in the same year. After the defeat of the Pakistan Army, there was a call to try nearly 200 POWs for war crimes, but none of the soldiers or officers involved were tried for war crimes.
Contents |
[edit] Background
After the Awami League had won a majority in the 1970 elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power based on the Six Point Programme. When Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, prostponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March on February 28, 1971, things came to a boil in the then East Pakistan. Clashes between civilians and the Pakistani Army, and between Bengali and Bihari communities erupted. Yahya Khan flew to Dhaka to hold talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League in Mrach, and was later joined by Bhutto in Dacca. Awami League launched a program of non cooperation while the talks were being held, which was so successful that the authority of Pakistan government became confined to the cantonments and government institutions in East Pakistan.[17] Unwilling to transfer power to the Awami League, or lose face by backing down, the Pakistani generals decided on a military crackdown.[18]
[edit] The Operational Plan
[edit] The Planning Process
The plan was drawn up in March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raza, GOC 14th Division, and Major General Rao Farman Ali, as a result of a meeting between Pakistani army staff on the 22nd of February.[19] Senior Pakistani officers in East Pakistan who were unwilling to support any military attack on civilians, Lt. Gen Shahabzada Yakub Khan, GOC East Pakistan, and the governor Vice Admiral Ahsan, were relieved of their duties. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan became the Governor and GOC of East Pakistan.
On March 17, General Khadim Hussain Raza was given the go ahead via telephone by General Hamid, COS Pakistan Army, to plan for the crackdown. On the morning of March 18, General Raza and Major General Rao Farman Ali put the details to paper at the GOC's office at Dacca cantonment. The plan was written on a light blue office pad with a lead pencil by General Farman.
General Farman wrote out the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim dealt with the distribution of forces and perticular tasks of the brigades and other units. The plan contained 16 paragraphs spread over 5 pages. It was assumed that the Bengali Army and other military units will revolt at the onset of operations.[20] To minimise that risk, it was suggested that all Bengali units under arms should be disarmed and the political leadership arrested during their meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves were earmarked.
The handwritten plan was read out to General Hamid and Lt. General Tikka Khan on the 20th of March at the flag staff house. General Hamid objected to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units but approved the disarming of EPR, armed police and other para-military formations. Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed.[21]Major General A.O. Mitha, Maj. Gen. Qamar Ali Mirza, and Brig. Harrison later arrived from West Pakistan to arrange the logistical details, mainly because the non cooperation program was hampering the food supply.[22]
The amended plan was approved and the operational plan was distributed to various area commander on the 24th and the 25 March daytime, when a group of Pakistani Generals, accompanied by General Hamid, COS of the army, and General Mittha, the Quartermaster General, and Col. Saadullah, Principal Staff Officer, visited the major garrisons via helicopter and personally briefed the garrison commanders or senior West Pakistani officers on the operation. Secrecy was strictly maintained, only a few Lt. Colonels learned about the plan beforehand on a need to know basis. Although some Bengali officers had become suspicious of the all West Pakistani officer briefings, no one outside the briefings learned the details beforehand.
The Operation was to start on the night of 25 March, 1971 in Dacca, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone to start their operations. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by General Khadim himself. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff was present in the 31st field command center, to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division.
[edit] Major Components of the Plan
[edit] Operational Premises
As outlined by the Pakistani planners, the operation aimed to eliminate the Awami League apparatus and any civilians and personnel of the armed forces supporting the Awami League movement in defiance of Martial Law. Cunning, surprise, deception and speed was emphasised as crucial for success. Use of free and greater force was authorised. Search and assault of civilian areas and Hindu areas also were authorised.
[edit] Requirements for Success
1. The military will launch the operation simultaneously all across Bangladesh.
2. Maximum number of political and student leaders, and those among cultural organizations and teaching staff to be arrested.
3. Operation must achieve 100% success in Dhaka. Dhaka University would be occupied and searched.
4. Free and greater use of fire authorised for securing cantonmets.
5. All internal and international communications will be cut off including Telephones, TV, Radios, Telegraphs, transmitters.
6. All East Pakistani (Bengali) troops will be neutralised by sizing Kotes and ammunition.
7. To deceive the Awami League, Yahia Khan may pretend to continue the dialogue, even if Mr. Bhutto disagrees, agree to Awami League demands.
The designated areas of offensive operations under that plan were Dacca, Khulna, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Saidpur and Sylhet, areas where West Pakistani army units were concentrated. Pakistani Army and paramilitary elements in other areas in East Pakistan were to maintain control of their respective areas and await reinforcements. Once Dhaka had been secured, the 9th and 16th divisions from Pakistan were to be airlifted to Bangladesh as reinforcements. Cities with airfields (Chittagong, Syhlet, Jessore, Rangpur, Comilla) would be reinforced via C-130 airplanes or heliborne troops directly from Dhaka. Although the plan did not specify the time needed to subdue the province, it was assumded that after the arrest of teh political leadership and disarming of the Bengali military and paramilitary units, the civilians would be terrorised into submitting to the martial law within a week.[23] Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan estimated that no resistance will remain after April 10th.[24]
[edit] East Pakistan: Disposition of Forces
The Pakistan Army had only one division stationed in Bangladesh in February 1971: The 14th Infantry division. The division had 4 infantry brigades attached to it, instead of the normal 3 brigades. The 57th infantry brigade (Under Brig. Jahanzab Arbab) was stationed in Dhaka, the 53rd (Brig. Iqbal Shafi) was in Comilla, the 23rd (Brig. Abdullah Khan Malik) in Rangpur and the 107th (Brig. S.M. Durrani) was in Jessore. Brig. Mazoomdar, a Bengali, was in command of Chittagong area. Normally each brigade had 3 to 4 infantry battalions and a field artillery regiment attached to it in addition to various support troops. After the Pakistanis decided on military action, 2 infantry formations, the 13th Frontier Force and the 22nd Baluch was flown to Dhaka from West Pakistan. The 16th infantry division in Queta was ordered to prepare to move to East Pakistan in mid February. To maintain secrecy, no major reinforcements were initially sent to the other garrisons before March 25.
[edit] Regular Army Units
Pakistani army had 12 infantry regiments made of purely Pakistani personnel (Punjabi, Baluch, Pathan and Sindhi) stationed in Bangladesh before March 25, 1971. There were also 5 field artillery regiments, a light anti aircraft regiment, a commando battalion (the 3rd), all of which contained a majority of Pakistani personnel, were based in Bangladesh. The only armoured regiment, the 29th Cavalry, was a mixed unit. 20% of the East Pakistan Rifels (EPR) personnel were also made of West Pakistanis. The support elements of the various units and cantonments were mixed. The unit commanders and a majority of the officers were of West Pakistani origin.
Pakistan Air Force had 20 F-86 Saber Jets and 3 T-33 Trainers at Dhaka Airbase . The Army aviation wing had a squadron of helicopters posted in East Pakistan. C-130 Herucles planes were transferred to Dhaka for the operation from West Pakistan.
The Pakistani Navy had 4 Gunboats (Rajshahi, Jessore, Comilla and Sylhet) a patrol boat (Balaghat) and the destroyer PNS Jahangir in East Pakistan. PNS Babur would visit East Pakistan after the operation started. Major bases were in Chittagong and Mongla.
[edit] Pakistan Army Bengali Units in East Pakistan
There were 6 regular army Bengal infantry regiments present in Bangladesh in March 1971. The 1st East Bengal Regiment (EBR) was in Jessore attached to the 107th brigade. The 2nd EBR was in Joydevpur north of Dhaka, attached to the 57th Brigade. The 3rd EBR was in Saidpur as part of the 23rd Brigade, and the 4th EBR was in Comilla with the 53rd Brigade. The 8th EBR was preparing to ship to West Pakistan and was at 75% strength in Chittagong. The East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC) in Chittagong housed the newly raised 9th EBR, and a total of 2,000 troops. The 10th EBR, a training unit, was in Dhaka cantonment with the 14th Division. Bengali officers commanded the 1st, 2nd and the 10th EBR. Commanding officers of the other units were Pakistani.
[edit] Other Bengali Forces
The East Pakistan Police was majority Bengali, with some Pakistani officers. East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), a 15,000 strong (80% Bengali)[25] force, was divided into 17 operational wings under 7 sectors and deployed around the country. EPR HQ and 2,500 troops were posted in Dhaka. Majority of the EPR officers were from West Pakistan, on deputation from the regular army.
[edit] Dispersion of Bengali Units before March 25
Denied permission by General Hamid to disarm the regular Bengali army units enmass before the crackdown, the Pakistani command employed other ploys to minimise the threat of these formations.
Brig. Mozumdar was relieved of his post on the 24th of March. Bengali units were sent out of the cantonments, or were broken into smaller units and deployed away from each other, and cut off from the main radio and wireless communication grid before or on the 25th of March. Bengali officers were sent on leave, or were posted away from command centers or units directly involved in the operation. In some cases, West Pakistani officers took over command of Bengali formations. Some soldiers were sent on leave, and some were disarmed on various pretexes whenever possible without raising alarm ("The Rape of Bangladesh", Anthony Mascarnehas, Viks Press, Delhi, 1983).
The 1st EBR (at 50% strength), was sent out of Jessore cantonment to Chaugacha near the border for winter training, where they stayed until March 29. Companies of the 2nd EBR was disbursed around areas outide Dhaka and their radio communication net was shut off. 3rd EBR had its companies disbursed in Ghoraghat, and in Parvatipur outside the Saidpur cantonment. 4th EBR units were deployed between Brahmanbaria and Shamshernagar. Thus the possibility of organised resistance from the regular Bengali units on the 25th of March was minimised through a pre-planned well executed strategy. Only in Chittagong the regular army Bengali units stayed in their respective bases.
West Pakistani EPR troops were posted in the cities whenever possible, while Bengali troops were sent to the borders. Most EPR units were away from the main action areas, and would need at least a day to reach the major cities. The EPR wireless net was shut off on the night of March 24 or 25th.
[edit] Operation: March 25/26 to April 10
This is a brief description of the units engaged and the result of the Pakistani military action from March 25 until April 10, when it was supposed to end. This only covers event in the areas that were the major focus of Operation Searchlight, not the whole of East Pakistan. In some areas, Pakistani assault and mass murders started clashes with the Bengali forces on the 25th of March. In other areas, no clashes took place until as late as the 30th of March.
[edit] Dacca
Pakistani Forces: The headquarters of the 14th division and the 57th brigade was located in Dhaka cantonment. The regular army units present were: 18th and 32nd Punjab regiment, the 13th Frontier Force regiment, 22nd Baluch regiment, 43th Light Ack-Ack regiment, elements of the 3rd Commando Battalion, and the 31st Field Artillery Regiment. PAF personnel were stationed at the Tejgaon airport. Also, a squadron of at least 14 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29th Cavalry regiment was stationed in Dhaka.
Bengali Forces: The 10th Bengal regiment was stationed in the Dacca cantonment. EPR HQ had 2,500 (The 11th, 13th and 16th wings plus the Dacca sector and EPR HQ wings) at Pilkhana and posted around the city. Rajarbag police line had at least 2,000 armed police. 2nd EBR was stationed in various locations north of the city. There was also some lightly armed Awami League volunteers in Dacca.
Operational Facts: The Army had a 6 hour deadline to secure the city. The 13th FF maintained the security of the cantonment and the 43 light Ack Ack took over airport security during the operation. Pakistani Army quickly shut off all communication channels in Dacca before commencing the operation. The commandos easily captured Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the beginning of the crackdown, but most of the Awami League senior leadership managed to evade capture and leave the city by the 27th of March. The 10th Bengal was easily disarmed in the cantonment and later eliminated. Awami League volunteers had put up makeshift barricades in the streets, but these did not cause any significant delay to the Pakistani troop movements. The volunteers manning the barricades were the first to be shot by the troops.
The 22nd Baluch, stationed at the EPR HQ, suddenly attacked and subdued the disorganised resistance of the EPR at Pilkhana after an all night battle. Contingents from the 18th and 32nd Punjab regiments assaulted the Dhaka University area and killed unarmed students present in the halls, and also some professors, then moved on to attack the Hindu areas and the old town. The Police at Rajarbag, aided by AL volunteers, put up a stout resistance, but was eventually overcome and scattered. Pakistani forces had used artillery and armour liberally, disregarding civilian safety altogether. The city was secured before dawn and a curfew was imposed. Surviving EPR and police fled the city. Captured Bengali soldiers, EPR and Police personnel were executed or improsioned without trial. From March 26th to April 6th, PIA Boeings and C 130 Transports would fly the 9th and 16th division (5 Brigade Hqs, 16 infantry battalions) to Dacca,[26] and elements of these formations will be flown to various locatins in East Pakistan to reinforce Pakistani garrisons.
The 2nd EBR, under Major Shafiullah, would revolt on the 27th of March and regroup at Mymensingh on the 30th of March. EPR 2nd wing had destroyed the Pakistani forces at Mymenshigh on the 28th of March. Maj. Shafiullah would plan an attack on Dhaka, but cancell the plan on the 31st of March and join the forces of Khaled Mosharraf in Comilla. Pakistani forces would launch probing attacks towands Tangail and Mymensingh, which would not fall until thye 15th of April, and also send the newlly arrived 27th brigae to attack the 2nd EBR positions near Bhairab Bazar.
[edit] Chittagong
Pakistani Forces The only West Pakistani army unit in Chittagong was the 20th Baluch regiment (Commander: Lt. Col Fatami), minus its advance party, and a company from the 31st Punjab and a company from the 3rd Commando battalion. There was also a section of 6 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29 Cavalry present in Chittagong. The Pakistani Navy (Under Commodore Mumtaz) and the PAF had an unknown number of personnel at the naval base and at the airport. Also, some commandos were operating in civilian clothing in the city.[27] EPR had about 300 Pakistani troops in Chittagong EPR HQ. The Destroyer PNS Jahangir and the gunboat PNS Rajshahi was also present in Chittagong. Lt Col. Abdul Aziz Sheikh (West Pakistani) commanded the EPR.
Bengali Forces East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC - Commanded by Lt. Col. Shaigri- Pakistani) housed 2,000 Bengali troops, including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 8th EBR (Lt. Col. Janjua, Pakistani) was at 75% strength stationed outside the cantonment. EPR had some 1,500 Bengali troops in the Chittagong area (600 in Chittagong city itself), with the 11th, 14th and the 17th wings (at Kaptai) and the sector HQ wing.
Operational Facts The Pakistanis took and control and retained possession of the cantonment, the naval base and the airport throughout the operation. Communication networks were partially shut down before the attack. The 20th Baluch launched a surprise attack on the EBRC, killing/captuing more than 1,000 Bengali troops and scattering the rest. The 8th EBR (Under Major Ziaur Rahman) left the city after learning of this attack, and did not take part in the battles in Chittagong.
EPR troops, under Captain Rafiqul Islam, revolted (after learning of the crackdown in Dhaka) and took control of parts of the city and held the areas until April 3. This is the only instance were Bengali units managed to launch a preemptive strike against the Pakistanis during the operation. They had managed to arrest all the Pakistani EPR soldiers (300-500) posted at the EPR HQ. Pakistani reinforcements coming from Comilla (Under Brig. Iqbal Shafi) were ambushed at Kumira, 12 miles north of the city by the EPR troops. By the 27th of March, most of Bengali troops outside Chittagong city had assembled near the Kalurghat bridge, away from the battle in the city, where Major Zia set up command. The Kalurghat Radio station was used to declare the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which operated until March 31, when it was silenced by air strikes.
The Pakistani force ambushed at Kumari made contact with the troops in Chittagong on the 29th of March. Using artillery, naval guns and airstrikes, Pakkistani troops took effective control of the city by April 3rd, and by April 6th,[28] all Bengali troops had left the city to take position in 2 areas, at Kalurghat (1, 000+ Bengali troops of the EPR and EBR), and to north of the city, cutting the Chittagong-Comilla highway link. By the 10h of April, Pakistani troops were poised to launch a three pronged coordinated attack to drive the Bengali troops from their positions.
[edit] Comilla
Pakistani Forces 53rd Brigade HQ (Brig. Iqbal Shafi) was located in Comilla, which contained with 24th Frontier Force regiment (Lt. Col. Shahpur Khan), 3rd Commando Battalion minus elements, the 53rd Field Artillery Regiment, 2 120 mm Mortar batteries, the 40th Field ambulance troops and Engineering company troops were also in Comilla cantonment.
Bengali Forces 4th EBR (Lt. Col. Khijir Hayat - Pakistani) was concentrated in Brahmanbaria, 50 miles to the north of Comilla. Support and supply troops were in Comilla cantonment. EPR 1st wing HQ was in Comilla and units were posted around Akhaura to the north east of the city.
Operational Facts The Pakistanis easily arrasted and imprisoned/executed all Bengali troops in Comilla cantonment, then wiped out the police in Comilla city on the 26th of March. The EPR HQ wing was warned and most managed to escape the slaughter. A convoy of 80 to 100 vehicles bearing the 24th FF, mortar batteries, commando troops and the engineers started for Chittagong after Comilla was secured. This column was ambushed by the EPR 12 miles from Chittagong on the 26th of March evening. 4th EBR foiled a plot to disarm their Bengali officers, and under Maj. Khaled Musharraf, revolted on the 27th of March. They took over areas immediately north and south of Comilla with the aid of EPR troops and civilian volunteers.
Pakistanis maintained control of the city and the airfield throughout the operation. By April 10th, Bengali troops still controlloed major cities in Comilla, Noakhali and Syhlet.
[edit] Sylhet
Pakistani Forces The 31st Punjab regiment minus 1 company was in located Syhlet. This unit was attached to the 53rd brigade.
Bengali Forces Sector EPR troops, EPR 3rd and 12th wings were stationed in and around Syhlet. EPR sector HQ was in Sylhet city. There was also some police personnel in the city.
Operational Facts The Pakistanis maintained control of the airfield and the cantonment. There were sporadic clashes around the city, which the Pakistanis abonduned on April 7th to take up position in the airfield. They would remain surrounded until mid April by Bengali forces when the Pakistanis, reinforced via air transport by the 313th brigade, counterattacked. Major C.R, Dutta commanded the Bengali forces, with Major Shafiullah comannding in the area between the commands of C.R. Dutta and Khaled Musharraf in Comilla.
[edit] Jessore
Pakistani Forces The 107th Brigade HQ was in Jessore. It had the 26th Baluch regiment, the 27th Baluch regiment minus a company, elements of the 22nd FF, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and elements of the 24th Field Artillery Regiment and various support and supply formations attached to the brigade.
Bengali Forces The 1st EBR (Lt. Col. Rezaul Jalil - Bengali) was in winter training away from the cantonment. Other than support and supply troops in the cantonment, there was armed police in the city. EPR sector HQ was located nearby. 7th Field ambulence was in the cantonment.
Operation Facts No clashes took place in Jessore cantonment or city during March 25-27th. 1st EBR (at 50% strength) returned to the cantonment on the 29th of March, unaware of the crackdown in Dhaka. When ordered to disarm, this unit revolted, and lost more than 50% of it's present strength before breaking out of the cantonment. Pakistanis maintained full control of the airfield, and the cantonment without any problems. After clashes with sector EPR troops Pakistani troops left the city. Jessore cantonment and airfield (used to receive reinforcements via air from April 66th) would be surrounded by Bengali forces made up of EPR troops and Bengali volunteers until early April. Efforts to break out of Jessore or receive supplies from Khulna were foiled by Bengali forces. By the 10th of April, this scenario had not changed.
[edit] Khulna
Pakistani Forces The 22 Frontier Force regiment (75% strength) was posted in Khulna, attached to the 107th brigade.
Bengali Forces 5th EPR wing HQ and Police and Bengali civilian volunteers. EPR companies were posted outside Khulna city.
Operational Facts Pakistani forces maintained their positions throughout the operation, arresting the Bengali EPR personnel in Khulna on the 25th of March. EPR forces sporadically attacked, without gaining any ground. Pakisani efforts to reinforce Jessore from Khulna failed.
[edit] Khushtia
Pakistani Forces A Company from the 27th Baluch.
Bengali Forces EPR 4th Wing, armed Police and Bengali volunteers.
Operational Facts The Pakistani company took control of the town on march 26th. EPR trops, under the command of Maj. Abu Osman Chowdhury, were joined by police and civilian volunteers, and wiped out the Pakistani troops by the 30th of March. Kusthia would remain under Bengali control until April 16th.[29]
[edit] Rajshahi
Pakistani Forces The 25th Punjab regiment (Lt. Col. Shafqat Baluch) minus 1 company, attached to the 23rd brigade. Pakistani EPR troops from EPR sector HQ.
Bengali Forces EPR 6th at Nababganj to the west and 7th wing at Naogaon to the north of Rajshahi, EPR sector HQ troops at Rajshahi, police and Bengali volunteers.
Operational Facts' The 25th Punjab sent a company to Pabana to the east to take control of that town. 25th Punjab drove the police out of the city on the 27th of March. Pakistani EPR troops relocated to the cantonment of the same day. Bengali EPR troops and Bengali volunteers under Maj. Nazmul Huq would surround the Pakistanis in the cantonment on the 28th of March, taking over most of the city and inflicting severe casualties. The Pakistani company at Pubna was wiped out by March 29. Rajshahi woul remain in Bengali hands until April 15th.[30]
[edit] Rangpur-Saidpur
Pakistani Forces HQ of the 23rd Brigade was at Rangpur. A small cantonment was located at Saidpur. Most of the 26th FF, and the 29th Cavalry (55 Tanks, 50% Bengali personnel) was at Rangpur. A company of the 26th FF was at Dinajpur. 23rd Field was in Saidpur with a detachment in Bogura. Both cantonments had support and supply units stationed in their premises.
Bengali Forces 3rd EBR HQ was in Saidpur, with 2 companies in Ghoraghat and 1 in Parvatipur, south west and south east of Rangpur respectively. 3 EPR wings were stationed at Thakurgaon (9th Wing), Dinajpur (8th Wing and sector HQ) and Rangpur (10th Wing).
Operational Facts Pakistani troops attacked the EPR sector HQ and took over Rangpur on the 26th of March after most EPR troops left for Lalmanirhut. 3rd EBR elements and Bengali troops were attacked at Saidpur on the 31st of March, and survivors joined the EPR at Dinajpur. The 26th FF had attacked the EPR at Dinajpur on the 28th but were driven out by the 31st of March. Thakurgaon was freed by the EPR 8th wing on the 28th of March.Bengali personnel of 29th cavalry were disarmed and arrested after the 31st of March and executed. Bengali troops took control of Bogura on the 28th of March, Pakistani survivors fled to Rangpur.
Pakistani forces maintained control of Saidpur and Rangpur throughout the operation. Heliborne forces from Dhaka reinforced these bases.[31], and an attack was launched to retake Lalmonirhut on April 1st, which fell on April 4th. This enabled C 130 Heracles planes to fly in further reinforcements. Pakistani forces spread ot from Saidpur to the west, north and south, and by April 10th, had retaken some of the minor towns in Bengali hands.
[edit] Aftermath
By the dawn of 27th of March, Pakistani forces had gained control of Dhaka, Rangpur, Saidpur, Comilla, Jessore, Pabna, Kushtia, Khulna and Sylhet. Their forces had gained partial control of Chittagong and Rajshahi. The vital airfields and all the cantonments remained under Pakistani control, while the rest of the province was unoccupied. By using their superiority of weapons and command of air ruthlessly and with little regard for civilian safety, often targeting civilian areas to spread terror, the Pakistani army managed to take control of the whole country by mid June, 1971.
[edit] Evaluation and Importance
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- Pakistan army was able to maintain operational security for the most part. They also moved 2 whole infantry divisions (the 9th and the 16th) to Bangladesh in a span of 4 weeks through air after March 26. Given the fact that flights over India were banned at the time, this is no mean logistical feat.
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- The disorganised initial resistance of Bengali units were crushed and by mid June, and the country was in Pakistani hands. As the insurgent activity slacked off in July, Pakistanies could claim the country was almost "normal". On the surface, Operation Searchlight had achieved most of it's goals.
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- The Pakistanis failed to capture the Awami League political leaders during the operation, which was a crucial part of the plan. The political leadership moved to India, and using their networks and popular support in Bangladesh, effectively organized the insurgency. Also, The Indians had a structured organization to channel aid through, which eliminated the chance of various resistance groups competing for their support. And as elected members of parliament, The Awami League could claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people, thus enhancing their credibility in the international circles. The army officers worked under the civilian leaders, so there was no struggle for power in the resistance. While the civilian leadership ran the administration and coordinated logistics, the army personnel fought the war and trained the freedom fighters.
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- Pakistani planners had assumed that if the political leadership was captured, the Bengali armed units disarmed, and the civilians sufficiently terrorized, after a month no organized resistance would remain in East Pakistan. Their assumptions proved wrong in course of events. The political leadership escaped to organize resistance and lobby for international support, Bengali soldiers formed the core of the armed resistance, and civilians, despite the terror campaign, supported the insurgency with logistics, intelligence and volunteers for the irregular warfare.
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- There was no backup plan. Anticipating a relatively quick success, Pakistani planners did not plan for a long irregular war or the eventual Indian involvement. This proved to be their undoing in the long run. Firstly, Pakistan had no regular troops to spare after stationing 4 divisions in Bangladesh by November 1971. They needed to maintain parity with the Indian army in the west. Also, with the EPR and police defecting, a large number of para military units were needed to police the country. Siddique Salik estimated that Pakistan needed at least 250,000 to 300,000 troops, but even after organizing the Razakars (estimated strength 40,000), Pakistan could field only 150,000 (45,000 regular army, rest para-military units) soldiers in Bangladesh.
The eventual strain of combating the insurgency caused Pakistan to attack India on the 3rd of December, 1971, in a vain hope that by militarily defeating India they can stop Indian support for Bangladesh Mukti Bahini. This directly led to the liberation of Bangladesh by the 16th of December.
[edit] References
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p90, ISBN 984-05-1373-7
- ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War, p33 ISBN 984-401-322-4
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p66, ISBN 984-412-033-0
- ^ Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Kakeem Arshad, The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier’s Narrative, p20, Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-579778-7
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p66, ISBN 984-412-033-0
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p135
- ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War, p135 ISBN 984-401-322-4
- ^ Hamdoor Rahman Commission Report, Chapter IV, paragraph II
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p274, ISBN 984-412-033-0
- ^ Sarmila Bose Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971: Military Action: Operation Searchlight Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, October 8, 2005
- ^ Hamoodur Rahman Commission, Chapter 2, Paragraph 33
- ^ "3 MILLION Slaughtered Sheik MUJIB Charges 'Greatest Massacre'" The Portsmouth Herald, Monday, January 17, 1972, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
- ^ Y C Rossiter Carriculum as Destiny: Forging National Identity in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh(PDF) 2003, Page 174 footnote 261
- ^ F. Hossain Genocide 1971 Correspondence with the Guinness Book of Records on the number of dead
- ^ Matthew White's Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century
- ^ Virtual Bangladesh : History : The Bangali Genocide, 1971
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p48-51 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p48-51 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p 57, ISBN 9-844-12033-0
- ^ Witness to Surrender, Salik, Siddiq, p63-64 ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Witness to Surrender, Salik, Siddiq, p63-64 ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War, p27, ISBN 9-844-01322-4
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p57 ISBN 9-844-12033-0
- ^ Pakistan Defence Journal, 1977, Vol 2, p2-3
- ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War p69 ISBN 9-844-01322-4
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p90 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p61 ISBN 9-844-12033-0
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p86 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p90 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p90 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
- ^ Qureshi, Maj. Ge. Hakeem Arshad, The 1071 Indo-Pak War: a Soldier's Narrative, p55 id = ISBN 0-19-579778-7
[edit] Sources
- Salik, Siddiq (1997). Witness to Surrender. ISBN 9-840-51374-5.
- Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR (2004). Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation. The University Press Limited. ISBN 9-840-51532-2.
- Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2003). The Indo Pak War of 1971: A Soldiers Narrative. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-579778-7.
- Islam, Major Rafiqul (2006). A Tale of Millions. Ananna. ISBN 9-844-12033-0.
- Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M (2006). Bangladesh at War. Agamee Prakshani. ISBN 9-844-01322-4.
- Rahman, Md. Khalilur (2006). Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan. Shahittha Prakash. ISBN 9-844-65449-1.
- Mukul, M. R. Akthar (2004). AMI Bijoy Dekhechi. Sagar Publishers. ISBN 9-844-5200-5.
[edit] Further reading
- Chowdhury, Debasish Roy; 'Indians are bastards anyway' in the Asia Times Online June 23, 2005. Mentions Operation Searchlight in paragraph eight.
- Hasan, Khalid; Indian scholar sifts 1971 fact from fiction in the Daily Times December 18, 2005.
- Lamb, Scott; Genocide since 1945: Never Again? in Der Spiegel online January 26, 2005. See the section "Bangladesh, 1971".
