Operation Jackpot
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Operation Jackpot was the codename assaigned to 2, possibly 3 operations launched by the Indian Army and the Bangladesh forces during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The original Operation Jackpot was the logistical and training operation set up under the Indian Army Eastern Command to aid the Mukti Bahini led insurgency.[1] The Naval commando operation that sabotaged Pakistani ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Naryanganj on the 16th of August is known in Bangladesh as Operation Jackpot.[2] Finally, the operational plan of Lt Gen Sagat Singh, commanding the Indian Army IV corps and Mukti Bahini personnel against Pakistani forces defending the eastern sector (Syhlet, Comilla, Noakhali and Chittagong districts) during December 3-16 may have been named Operation Jackpot.[3]
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[edit] Operation Jackpot: Indian Army Operation for aiding Mukti Bahini
[edit] Introduction
After the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight in a bid to curb all resistance (political and otherwise), the Indian government decided to open the borders to admit Bengali refugees and the Bengali resistance fighters in March, which was ratified in the parliament on July 29.[4] By mid May, the Pakistan Army had occupied all major towns and had driven the battered remnants of the Mukti Bahini across the border into India, forcing the Mukti Bahihi to switch to guerrilla warefare. The Indian BSF (Border Security Force) had given supplies locally to the Mukti Bahini since April, had even made some incursions across the border,[5] but these efforts had been disorganised, uncordinated and inadequate to meet the needs of the Mukti Bahini.
[edit] The Operational Setup
On May 15th,[6] Indian Army took over the task of aiding the Mukti Bahini, setting up a coordinated enterprise under the Eastern Command for meeting the logistical and training needs and to some extent lend operational support and planning advice.[7] The operation was codenamed Operation Jackpot, initially commanded by Maj. Gen. Onkar Singh Kalkat and after 2 months by Maj. Gen. B.N. 'Jimmy' Sarcar. The border areas around Bangladesh was divided into 6 logistical sectors, each commanded by a Brigadier.[8]
The Indian logistical sectors for this operation were: Alpha (HQ: Murti Camp, West Bengal, C.O Brig. B.C. Joshi), Bravo (HQ: Rajgaunj, West Bengal, C.O Brig. Prem Singh,), Charlie (HQ: Chakulia, Bihar, C.O. Brig. N.A. Salik), Delta (HQ: Devta Mura, Tripura, C.O Brig. Sabeg Singh), Echo (HQ: Masimpur, Assam, C.O Brig. M.B. Wadh), and Foxtrot, (HQ: Tura, Meghalaya, C.O.) Brig. Sant Singh). Through this network Mukti Bahini sector commanders communicated with the Bangladesh Forces Headquarters in Kolkata and coordinated all supply, training and operational efforts for the war. Lt Gen J.S. Aurora, commander of Eastern Command, was closely involved in the operation.
[edit] Effectiveness and Importance
Despite the limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport system, remoteness of the guerrilla bases, unavailability inadequacy of proper supplies,[9] and the decision of Bangladesh High Command to put the maximum number of guerrillas into battle in the minimum time possible (often after 4/6 weeks training, often resulting in only 50% of the personnel reciving firearms initially),[10] the operation was effective enough to support the 30,000 regular soldiers (8 infantry battalions, and sector troops) and 100,000 guerrillas that Bangladesh eventually fielded in 1971, and help run a Mukti Bahini campaign that destroyed or damaged at least 231 bridges, 122 railway lines and 90 power stations,[11] while killing 237 officers, 136 JCOs/NCOs and 3,559 soldiers,[12] of the Pakistan army and an unspecified nunber of EPCAF and Police and an estimated 5,000 Razakar personnel[13] during the period of April-November. The Mukti Bahini efforts also demoralised the Pakistani Army to the extent that by November they left their bases only if need arose.[14] The contribution of the Mukti Bahini to the enevtual defeat of Pakistan was enormous,[15] which would not have been as effective without the aid of Operation Jackpot.
[edit] Operation Jackpot: Bangladesh Naval Commando Operation on August 16th, 1971
[edit] Prelude
After the Pakistani Amry had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, Bangladesh forces entered a period of reorganization to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces during June/July of 1971. As the pace of operations slacked off, the civilian morale was adversely affected,[16] which prompted Pakistani authorities claiming that the situation was normal in East Pakistan. 2 specific operations were launched in response, 1)Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (Ex SSG commando) of Sector 2, and the simultaneous mining and damaging of ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Narayanganj on the 16th of August, which known in Bangladesh and international media as ‘’Operation Jackpot’’.
[edit] Setup and Training
The river transport system was vital for economic activity given the primitive state of the road and railways system of the then East Pakistan. Indian planners, in conjunction with Mukti Bahini, planned to disrupt the system through sabotage operations using naval commandoes.
Indian trainers setup a secret camp codenamed C2P in Plassy, West Bengal on May 23[17] to train volunteers selected from various Mukti Bahini sectors (Bangladesh was divided in 10 operational sectors for Mukti Bahini operations)for this purpose. Initially 300 volunteers were chosen,[18] ultimately 499 commandoes were trained in the camp. The course included swimming, survival training, using limpet mines, hand to hand combat and navigation. By August 1971, the first batch of commandoes were ready for operation.
[edit] The Operation
The operation was planned in the last week of September, under tight security. Information on river tides, weather and Pakistani infrastructure and deployment was collected through the Mukti Bahini. Selected commandos were sent from C2P to forward bases in Tripura and West Bengal, where a final briefing was given to them. Mukti Bahini in Sector 1 assisted the group going to Chittagong, Sector 2 aided the groups going to Chandpur and Naryanganj and Sector 9 assisted the group targeting Mongla. Each commando carried a pair of fins, a knife, a limpet mine, and swimming trunks. Some had compasses, 1 in 3 commandos had sten guns and hand grenades, the group leaders carried a transistor radio. All the groups carried their own equipment to their targets and after entering Bangladesh between August 3/9, reached their destinations by August 12th, using the local Mukti Bahini network of safehouses. A pair of songs was played in India Radio (Akashbani)at specific times to convey the intended signal for commencing the operations.[19] The first song was played on the 13th of August, the second on the 14th. The result of this operation was:
Chittagong: 60 commandos were sent, out of which 31 finally took part in the sabotage operation on the 16th. Between 1:45 to 2:15AM explosions sank the MV Al-Abbas, the MV Hormuz and the Orient barge no.6, sinking 19,000 tons of arms and munitions.
Chandpur: 18 out of 40 commandos finally took part in the operation. 3 steamers/barges were damaged or sunk.
Narayanganj: 20 commandos conducted the sabotage operation. 4 ships were sunk or damaged.
Mongla: 20 commandos managed to damage 6 foreign owned ships.
The simultaneous attacks on Pakistani shipping assets on August 16th destroyed the myth of normalcy in East Pakistan when the news was flashed in the international media.
| Operation Jackpot | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Bangladesh Liberation War | |||||||||
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| Commanders | |||||||||
| Lt. General Sagat Singh |
Maj. General A. Majid Kazi Maj. General Rahim Brig. General Ataullah |
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| Strength | |||||||||
| Bangladesh Army: Z Force Brigade, K Force Brigade, S Force Brigade Sector Troops: 6,400 Guerillas: from Mukti bahini Sectors 1-5[21] Indian Army : IV Corps. |
Pakistan Army: 14th Infantry Division 39th Ad hoc Infantry Division 97th Independent Infantry Brigade Paramilitary Forces: EPCAF 2 Sector HQ wingss, 6 operational Wings[22] |
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[edit] Operation Jackpot?
The Plan of operation by the Indian Army IV corps (8 Mountain Div., 23 Mountain Div., 57 Mountain Div. and "Kilo Force") and the Bangladesh forces (8 infantry battalions, and guerrillas and sector troops of Sector 1-5 of Mukti Bahini) may have been codenamed ‘’’Operation Jackpot’’’. The opposition forces included the Pakistani 14th infantry division defending Syhlet, Maulaviabazar and Akhaura, the 39th adhoc division in Comilla, Laksham and Feni and the 97th independent infantry brigade stationed in Chittagong. Indian army had supported [[Mukti Bahini efforts to sieze sailents in the Eastern border from November 21, 1971. After Pakistan launched airattacks on India on December 3rd, Indian army crossed the border into Bangladesh. By the end of the war on 16th December, 1971, the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini had isolated and surrounded the remnants of the 14th division in Syhlet and Bhairabbazar, the 39th division was cornered in Comilla and Chittagong, with all other areas of Syhlet, Comilla, Noakhali and Chittagong clear of enemy forces. Part of the corps and Mukti Bahini forces had crossed the Meghna river using the "Meghna Heli Bridge" and using local boats collected by Mukti Bahini to drive towards Dhaka when the Pakistani army surrendered.
[edit] References
- ^ Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, p 90
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 265
- ^ Bangladesh at War, Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M. Bir Uttam, p 211
- ^ Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, p 42
- ^ Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, p 36/37
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 211
- ^ Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, p 90
- ^ Bangladesh at War, Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M. Bir Uttam, p 159
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 215
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 288
- ^ Witness To Surrender, Salik, Brigadier Siddiq, p 101
- ^ Witness To Surrender, Salik, Brigadier Siddiq, p 118
- ^ Witness To Surrender, Salik, Brigadier Siddiq, p 105
- ^ Witness To Surrender, Salik, Brigadier Siddiq, p 101
- ^ Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, p 174
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 292
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 265
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 265-68
- ^ A Tale of Millions, Islam, Major Rafiqul Bir Uttam, p 263-65
- ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M. Bangladesh At War, p90, ISBN 984-401-322-4
- ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p229, ISBN 984-412-033-0
- ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender At Dacca: The Birth of A Nation, p190, ISBN 984-05-1395-8
[edit] Sources & Further Reading
Salik, Brigadier Siddiq (1977). Witness to Surrender. ISBN 9-840-51373-7.
- Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR (2003). Surrender at Dacca: The Birth of A Nation. The University Press Limited. ISBN 9-840-51395-8.
- Islam, Major Rafiqul (2006). A Tale of Millions. Ananna Publishers. ISBN 9-844-12033-0.
- Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M. (2005). Bangladesh at War. ISBN 9-844-01322-4.
- Rahman, Khalilur (2006). Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan. ISBN 9-844-65449-1.
- Mukul, M.R. Akther (2005). Ami Bijoy Dekhechi.
