Operation Grand Slam

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Grand Slam is virtually synonymous with the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. It refers to an audacious plan drawn up by the Pakistani Army, in May 1965, to attack the vital Akhnoor Bridge in Jammu and Kashmir, which was not only the lifeline of an entire infantry division in Jammu and Kashmir but could also be used to threaten Jammu, an important logistical point for Indian forces. The operation ended in a failure for Pakistan Army as the stated military objectives were not achieved and subsequently were forced to retreat following a counter attack by the Indian Army.

1 Background
2 Execution
3 Conclusion
4 External links

[edit] Background

Following the "Rann of Kutch" affair, which was seen as a military victory for Pakistan (it resulted in minor territorial gains for her following a boundary award later in 1968), the political atmosphere in Pakistan was jubilant. Believing the Indians to be badly demoralised and that the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir would revolt against them with a little help, the military dictator General Ayub Khan gave his approval for Operation Gibraltar, a plan to provoke uprisings in Jammu and Kashmir by infiltrating teams of military personnel to conduct sabotage and prod the Kashmiri people against Indian forces. The infiltration started in the first week of August 1965, as Pakistani infantry infiltrated the border in teams of twos and threes, eventually swelling to more than 6,000 in number.

Identifying the insurgents as Pakistan Army regulars, India quickly crushed them by bringing in additional troops. The local populace also refused to cooperate with the regulars and in some cases worked against them. India further surprised Pakistan by launching attacks on the logistical bases of the insurgents in Pakistan-held Kashmir, destroying them and making major territorial gains.

In order to ease the pressure off the 12th Division which was having difficulty in holding up against repeated Indian attacks and partly to remove the supposed threat to the important city of Muzaffarabad, resulting from the loss of strategic areas like Hajipir pass, in Pakistan-held Kashmir to Indian forces, the Pakistani Army executed Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1 September 1965.

[edit] Execution

The Akhnoor sector was lightly defended by four infantry battalions and a squadron of tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the AMX-13 tanks were no match for the Pakistani Patton tanks. Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces had to retreat from their defensive positions.

On the second day of the attack the GOC of the 7th Division Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, commanding the attack, was replaced by General Yahya Khan, which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this decision show confusion among the Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also helped the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3 September, the Indian forces in the sector were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days while not having the strength to launch attacks of their own. As the attack carried on for two more days without any significant gains in territory, the Indian Army managed to muster enough forces to open up a new front, on 6 September, across the sensitive state of Punjab in Pakistan. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realising the gravity of the threat, the Pakistani Army had to stop her thrust into Indian-held Kashmir and divert her forces to counter the Indian incursion.

[edit] Conclusion

Analysts on both sides of the border believe that if the operation were to have proceeded according to plan without any interruption, it would have been the unprecedented success the Pakistani Army always dreamed of having against their arch rivals. Pakistan would have made significant territorial gains in Indian-Administered Kashmir which might have allowed her to bargain from a position of strength in the peace talks, sponsored by the Soviet Union at Tashkent. However, the Pakistani military leadership failed to execute the plans effectively, and the operation produced negative results for Pakistan Army.

The operation was marred by bad decisions made not only by the Pakistani Army GHQ but also by individual commanders. In spite of having the advantage of making preparations to advance along this sector with superior military forces for over 3 months and achieving strategic surprise, the attack was slowly bogged down due to lackadaisical attitude by Pakistani officers on the battlefield and by the Pakistani GHQ who underestimated India's will to fight, believing that one blow would be sufficient for her morale to collapse.