Operation Flash

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Flash
Part of the Croatian War of Independence
Date May 1 - May 3, 1995 Location Croatia Result Decisive Croatian victory
Combatants
Croatia	Republic of Serbian Krajina
Commanders
Croatian Military Command
Strength
7,200 soldiers	5,000 soldiers
Casualties
55 killed, 162 wounded	250 killed, 1,500 POW

Croatian War of Independence
Plitvice Lakes – Borovo Selo – Vukovar – The Barracks – Dubrovnik – Gospić – Otkos 10 – Škabrnja – Vukovar massacre – Orkan 91 – Miljevci – Maslenica – Medak Pocket – Flash – Storm

Operation Flash (Croatian: Operacija Bljesak) was a brief and successful offensive conducted in the beginning of May 1995 by the Croatian Army, which removed Serb Krajina forces from the small pocket in Western Slavonia.

The offensive was part of the later stages of the Croatian War of Independence (Domovinski rat, Homeland war) and seen as a precursor for larger, more ambitious and more decisive Operation Storm.

Contents 1 Origins 2 Timeline 3 Aftermath 4 References 5 External links

[edit] Origins

Taking the example of ethnic Serbs in northern Dalmatia, Lika, Banovina and Kordun, ethnic Serbs in Western Slavonia, took part in the rebellion against the Croatian government that would result in creation of the so-called RSK. The area under rebel control was known as the Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia (Srpska Autonomna oblast Zapadna Slavonija). It was proclaimed in August 1991, during the escalation of the conflict, and formally joined the rest of rebel areas later in the year.

Initially, the territory of the so-called SAO Western Slavonia was relatively large and the rebel forces could theoretically advance north to the Hungarian border and sever the link between Zagreb and Osijek. In such case the Virovitica-Sisak-Karlovac-Karlobag line would have been established, fulfilling the stated aim of Greater Serbian nationalists led by Vojislav Šešelj.

In reality, the territory of the so-called SAO Western Slavonia was mostly comprised of hills and forests with relatively poor communication infrastructures. Establishing and maintaining a base for such ambitious operations required more resources than the Serbian government was willing or able to invest. As a result, the so-called SAO Western Slavonia didn't receive as much support from the Yugoslav People's Army as other parts of the RSK did. Most of its forces were comprised of local militias, poorly trained, lightly armed and unable to match their Croatian counterparts.

This situation became apparent in late 1991 when local Croatian forces, armed and equipped from the captured JNA garrison in nearby Varaždin, conducted a series of offensives which ultimately reduced so-called SAO Western Slavonia to a relatively small pocket centered around Okučani. It is believed that the Sarajevo armistice in January 1992 saved the forces of the so-called Serb Krajina from being pushed across the River Sava and the so-called SAO Western Slavonia from disappearing altogether.

The position of the rebel area in Western Slavonia became even more precarious with the escalation of war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina. It became quite clear that the position of the rebels in Western Slavonia in such circumstances was untenable in the long run. Veljko Džakula and a group of other local rebel Serb politicians in 1992 and 1993 started secret negotiations with the Croatian government about eventual peaceful transfer of the rebel areas in Western Slavonia under Croatian authority.

Although Džakula was ultimately arrested by the authorities of the so-called RSK and replaced by hardliners, UN negotiators saw this development as an encouraging sign that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could be ended peacefully. The authorities of Croatia and the rebel areas in Western Slavonia were encouraged to take part in various confidence building programs like family reunions. Some of those programs began to bear fruit in late 1994. The most spectacular was the opening of the Zagreb-Županja Motorway for Croatian traffic.

In late April 1995 there was an inter-ethnic incident which resulted in the deaths of a number of Croats and Serbs and in the disruption of the motorway. Hrvoje Sarinic, Franjo Tudjman's former Cabinet Chief, confirmed under cross-examination at the Milosevic trial a transcript detailing the then Croatian leadership's plan to stage an incident as a pretext[1] for the offensive on May 1st, although no linkage was shown to the abovementioned incident. Hrvoje Sarinic, as a witness at the same trial, downplayed the significance of such a plan, pointing out there were many incidents daily, and to his own exepriences at being refused entry on the motorway, problems with reopening the oil pipeline, and finally stating that he was "very astonished that any incident was needed, because it was quite legitimate to free part of the country that had been occupied"[2].

[edit] Timeline

On the early morning of May 1st, Croatian Army forces (which included the elite 3rd and 5th Guards Brigades) and Special Police units began their advance from three directions. Over 7,200 soldiers and policemen participated in the operation.

Rebel forces were quickly overwhelmed and in a few hours time local commanders and civilian authorities issued orders for evacuation across the River Sava into Republic of Srpska.

By the afternoon of May 2nd all rebel forces were evacuated and the Croatian Army had achieved all of its initial aims. One large group of rebel soldiers and civilians, including Džakula, failed to evacuate and had to surrender near Pakrac. The operation produced a total of around 1,500 Serbian POWs, the largest capturing of an enemy force to date in the war.

The forces of the so-called RSK also launched a retaliatory action against random Croatian targets by launching a number of cluster shells on Zagreb. On May 2nd, the targets included the Strossmayer promenade, Petrinjska street and the Stara Vlaška street where a tram full of passengers was hit, while on May 3rd shelling damaged the children's hospital in Klaić street and the Croatian National Theatre building. The result was 6 civilians being killed and 174 injured. On that very same day the leader of the so-called RSK, Milan Martić publicly took responsibility for the shelling, and that statement is now basis for his war crimes indictment at ICTY.

Otherwise, the Serb forces didn't react to the Operation Flash, and neither did those in the RSK or elsewhere.

[edit] Aftermath

Initially, Croatian authorities reported that Croatian Army and police units had 55 fatalities during the course of the operation. In 2000, the official quote was that 33 members of the army and 9 members of the special police units were killed, and that 162 were injured. The government refused to publish a list of these casualties and only spoke in general numbers, causing some public outcry.

The outcome of the operation was not surprising, considering the huge disparity in numbers, equipment, training and, ultimately, morale between two opposing sides. However, it proved to be major boost for Croatian Army and it tested procedures and tactics that would be employed in Operation Storm with even more spectacular results.

The UNPROFOR also removed itself from the former UNPA Sector West, but did not make any effort to oppose the Croatians since the October 1993 Security Council resolution affirmed that the United Nations Protected Areas were an integral part of the Republic of Croatia.

Among Serbs in the so-called RSK and the Republic of Srpska, Operation Flash caused huge demoralisation. The 500 km² of the so-called SAO Western Slavonia was not only the first major part of the so-called RSK to be erased from the maps; it also proved the untenability of the Greater Serbian project under the new circumstances. Rebel Serbs from Western Slavonia not only failed to get support from Serbia proper, but also from Republic of Srpska.

Operation Flash is also notable for the professional conduct of Croatian military and police. There were very few reports about reprisals and/or atrocities against POWs or ethnic Serb civilians, which later represented a sharp contrast to the more controversial aftermath of Operation Storm. The U.N. Secretary General at the time, Yasushi Akashi said that "massive" human right abuses have taken place during the offensive. A subsequent and in-depth Human Rights Watch investigation showed there were only isolated incidents and criticized the Secretary General for his preemature and counterproductive statement.^[1]

The Croatian Government's commission on missing and captured persons composed a list of 168 fatalities together with places of burial, of which 79 bodies were identified. Veritas, a Serbian organization for gathering evidence on human rights violations in the Krajina and Croatia composed its own list which has another 113 people listed as missing as a result of the Operation Flash.

[edit] References

[edit] External links

• The Police and Military Operation Action "Flash"