Operation Battleaxe

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You have new messages (last change).
Operation Battleaxe
Part of World War II, Western Desert Campaign

Soldiers of the 4th Indian Division decorate the side of their lorry "Khyber Pass to Hell-Fire Pass".
Date June 15 – June 17, 1941
Location Cyrenaica, Libya
Result Operation failure, Axis victory
Combatants
Panzer Army Africa British XIII Corps
Commanders
Erwin Rommel Archibald Wavell
Noel Beresford-Peirse
Strength
13,000 infantry 20,000+ infantry
200 medium tanks[1]
Casualties
700 Germans + unknown Italians[2]
12 tanks[3]
10 aircraft		 960 (122 killed[4])
91 tanks[5]
36 aircraft
Western Desert Campaign
Compass – Sonnenblume – Tobruk – Brevity – Battleaxe – Crusader – Gazala – Bir Hakeim – 1st Alamein – Alam Halfa – Agreement – 2nd Alamein

Operation Battleaxe, also known as the Battle of Sollum, was a British Army operation during the Second World War in June, 1941 with the goal of clearing Eastern Cyrenaica of German and Italian forces. One of the main benefits of this would be the lifting of the Siege of Tobruk.

The operation did not succeed though, as the initial armoured assault was repulsed by well placed static defenses and the Germans mounted an effective counter-attack which pushed the British forces back to their initial positions. The failure of this operation led to the replacement of General Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East.

Contents

[edit] Prelude

[edit] Rommel's offensive and the siege of Tobruk

Soon after the arrival of German forces (Afrika Korps) in Tripoli, Libya, German General Erwin Rommel, though ordered to remain on the defensive, quickly captured the British front line position at El Agheila and then went on an offensive which, in less than two months, had reached as far as Sollum, Egypt. The sole remaining Allied position in Libya was the heavily fortified port of Tobruk, which Rommel had surrounded and begun to siege.

On April 20th, as a response to Rommel's rapid gains and siege on Tobruk, Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered that a British sea convoy (codenamed Tiger) carrying tanks and fighter aircraft was to take a more direct, and dangerous, route to supply Wavell faster. These forces were then to be used in a major counter-offensive.

The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Army High Command), concerned by Rommel's audacity, had sent down General Friedrich Paulus to investigate the situation. Paulus, after witnessing one of Rommel's costly failed attempts to assault Tobruk, sent off a report to OKW describing Rommel's position as weak, with critical shortages of both fuel and ammunition. In response to this, and with the imminent invasion of the Soviet Union, Field Marshall Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, ordered Rommel not to advance further or attack Tobruk again; he was to hold his position and conserve his forces.

Via Ultra intercepts, the British also received Paulus' report and Churchill, believing that one strong push would dislodge German forces, began to increase the pressure on General Wavell, to go on the offensive immediately.

[edit] Operation Brevity

Main article: Operation Brevity

Wavell soon prepared Operation Brevity, a limited operation with the intention of seizing the Sollum and Halfaya passes along with Fort Capuzzo, advancing on to Sidi Aziez, then possibly driving on to relieve Tobruk. This operation would also secure a foothold for the larger Operation Battleaxe to launch from once the Tiger convoy arrived. Brevity began on May 15th, and looked initially successful, with Fort Capuzzo and Halfaya Pass captured. Soon after though, Rommel counterattacked and by the 27th had recaptured all the territory that Brevity had won.

[edit] Preparations

Though Brevity had failed to yield any territory to the British, it showed Rommel that his front line defenses were quite easily capable of being breached. Anticipating further British assaults from Egypt, Rommel used the lessons he had learned from his ineffective attacks on Tobruk and proceeded to create a line of fortified positions from Halfaya to Sidi Azeiz,[6] placing a number of anti-tank guns and anti-tank mines on the Halfaya Pass and on Point 208 (just west of Fort Capuzzo on the Hafid Ridge). In command of Axis forces at Halfaya, Rommel assigned Captain Wilhelm Bach, leader of the infantry regiment which had taken part in the operation to recapture it. The primary responsibility of the frontier defense though was charged to the 15th Panzer Division.

On May 12, three days prior to the launch of Brevity, the Tiger convoy arrived in Alexandria carrying 238 tanks (21 Mark VIC light tanks, 82 cruiser tanks (including many of the new Crusaders) and 135 Matilda infantry tanks[7]) and 43 Hawker Hurricane fighters. These tanks arrived with many mechanical faults (including a lack of sand filters for the engines) on arrival and required extensive servicing.[8] They were used to rebuild the 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats), which had been previously dissolved, with the light and cruiser tanks going to the Seventh Armoured Brigade and the infantry tanks going to the Fourth Armoured Brigade.

Considerable pressure was again being put on Wavell to launch the assault as soon as possible. With Crete having fallen to the Germans on June 1st, the Luftwaffe now had new airfields available to threaten Allied shipping in the area and protect supply convoys to their troops in Cyrenaica; delaying the attack could therefore mean facing a stronger German opposition.[9] The attack was scheduled originally to start on June 7th,[10] but this date was pushed back to the 15th.

In regards to intelligence, Wavell's information was poor due to shortages of proper equipment and trained pilots needed for photographic reconnaissance, what information he did have incorrectly indicated that 2/3 of the German's tank strength was situated around Tobruk, which would have placed him at a decisive advantage on the frontier region.[11]

[edit] Plans

The plan for Battleaxe was similar to that of Brevity and was comprised of three phases. In the first phase, the Indian 4th Infantry Division were to capture Sollum and Fort Capuzzo; the Fourth Armoured Brigade were to support the 4th Indian Division, advancing on their western flank towards Halfaya Pass; and the remainder of the 7th Armoured Division covered the far west flank and made towards the Hafid Ridge in an attempt to outflank Fort Capuzzo from the south. In the second phase, the 7th Armoured Division, rejoined with the Fourth Armoured Brigade, would continue on north and relieve Tobruk. In the third phase, the 7th Armoured Division, joined by the Tobruk garrison, would press the offense westwards, driving the Germans back. These forces would be accompanied by fourteen squadrons from the Royal Air Force (six fighter, four medium bomber and four night bomber),[12] though they would only join just prior to the start of Battleaxe. Leading the operation would be Lieutenant General Noel Beresford-Peirse, commander of the British XIII Corps (Western Desert Force).

On the German side, due to weaknesses in the 7th Armoured Division's signals security, Rommel had nine hours advanced knowledge of the operation, including dispositions, concerns and intentions.[13] With this information, he placed the 5th Light Division to the south of Tobruk, ready to use it against either the Sollum area or on Tobruk itself depending on the situation; Rommel also ordered a large artillery bombardment of Tobruk the night before the operation was to begin in order to prevent the Tobruk garrison from breaking out.[14]

[edit] Compromising factors

Wavell had many reasons to be pessimistic about the outcome of Battleaxe. A dispatch sent from him to Chief of the Imperial General Staff John Dill on May 28th was as follows:

All available strength, which will be deciding factor, is being put into "Battleaxe". Various difficulties are delaying reconstitution 7th Armoured Division. Earliest date for beginning of forward move from Matruh will be June 7th, and may be later.
2. I think it right to inform you that the measure of success which will attend this operation is in my opinion doubtful. I hope that it will succeed in driving the enemy west of Tobruk and re-establishing land communications with Tobruk. If possible we will exploit success further. But recent operations have disclosed some disquietening features. Our armoured cars are too lightly-armoured to resist the fire of enemy fighter aircraft, and, having no gun, are powerless against the German eight-wheeled armoured cars, which have guns and are faster. This makes reconnaissance difficult. Our infantry tanks are really too slow for a battle in the desert, and have been suffering considerable casualties from the fire of the powerful enemy anti-tank guns. Our cruisers have little advantage in power or speed over German medium tanks. Technical breakdowns are still too numerous. We shall not be able to accept battle with perfect confidence in spite of numerical inferiority, as we could against the Italians. Above factors may limit our success. They also make it imperative that adequate flow of armoured reinforcements and reserves should be maintained.[15]

Additionally, with the rush to start the operation as soon as possible, Wavell was only able to allocate five days to his tank crews to familiarize themselves with the vehicles from the Tiger convoy, including the brand new Crusader tank which had never been used in combat before.[16] Communications for the British forces would also be a source of trouble, especially as Beresford-Peirse made his headquarters at Sidi Barrani, about sixty miles (five hours of driving time) from the Libyan border where most of the action would take place.[17]

Topping things off for Wavell, neither of his two divisions involved were at full strength. The 4th Indian Infantry Division only had one of its own brigades, the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade. It's other two, the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade and the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, were respectively in Syria and East Africa; this was somewhat alleviated by the attachment of the 22 Guards Brigade. With regards to the 7th Armoured Division, its 7th Armoured Brigade was functioning with only two instead of three regiments, only one of which, the 6th Royal Tank Regiment, was using the new Crusader tanks while the other, the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, was using various older reconditioned cruisers.[18]

For Rommel, his primary concern was more of a logistical nature:

Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack, for we knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge then by tactical requirements.[19]

[edit] The battle

[edit] Day one: the British attack

[edit] Day two: the attack stalls

[edit] Day three: the British retreat

[edit] British attack

Early on, the 4th Indian Division was having success, and it quickly took Fort Capuzzo and fended off a German counter-attack. However, British tanks which went into Halfaya Pass (now becoming known as Hellfire Pass) were ambushed.

The Desert Fox had deployed a battery of 88 mm anti-tank guns and some Italian 100/17 field guns in Hellfire Pass and dug them into the sand, effectively making a coat of camouflage around them. As the British tanks entered the pass, the nearly invisible Axis guns opened fire, destroying all but one of the tanks. This Axis success is usually ascribed to the German 88s alone, but the Italian field guns played also an important role in it. Later on, Rommel highly praised both the German (the famous Captain Wilhelm Bach) and the Italian (Major L. Pardi) artillery commanders.

The tanks sent to engage Panzer's at Hafid Ridge didn't do much better. Instead of the Panzer's they expected to meet, they were met with a barrage of anti-tank artillery fire.

By June 16 at noon, 75% of the 200 British tanks deployed in Battleaxe were destroyed.

[edit] German counter-attack

Following the disasters at Hellfire Pass and Hafid Ridge, Rommel decided to attack the already weakened British forces. He assigned his Panzer Division to attack Fort Capuzzo from the north, and he also ordered his Light Division to go east to surround Beresford-Peirse and his Armoured Division.

General Wavell, Britain's Commander-in-Chief Middle East, saw defeat coming and ordered all units to retreat. Battleaxe had officially ended now as an extremely expensive failure.


[edit] References

  1. ^ The North African Campaign 1940-43, pg. 122
  2. ^ The North African Campaign 1940-43, pg. 130. There was also a substantial, but unrecorded, number of Italian casualties.
  3. ^ 50 German tanks were knocked out, but since the Germans held the area they were able to recover and repair a great deal of them; doing the same with disabled British tanks (The North African Campaign 1940-43, pg. 130)
  4. ^ The Second World War: A Complete History, pg. 192
  5. ^ Churchill states the losses as "29 cruisers and 58 'I' [infantry] tanks" (The Grand Alliance, pg. 307); General GF Jackson states them at 27 cruisers and 64 'I' tanks (The North African Campaign 1940-43, pg. 130)
  6. ^ The North African Campaign 1940-43, pg. 121
  7. ^ Strategy and Tactics: Tank Warfare, pg. 75
  8. ^ The War in the Desert, pg. 70
  9. ^ Tobruk 1941 - The Desert Siege, pg. 189
  10. ^ The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, pg. 135
  11. ^ The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, pg. 135
  12. ^ The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, pg. 135
  13. ^ Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays, pg. 222
  14. ^ Afrikakorps, pg. 52
  15. ^ The Grand Alliance, pg. 304
  16. ^ Afrikakorps, pg. 54
  17. ^ Afrikakorps, pg. 56
  18. ^ The North African Campaign 1940-43, pg. 126
  19. ^ The Rommel Papers, pg. 141

[edit] External links

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org../../../o/p/e/Operation_Battleaxe_0749.html"
In other languages