Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom

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United Kingdom
Nuclear program start date:	April 10, 1940
First nuclear weapon test:	October 2, 1952
First fusion weapon test:	May 15, 1957
Last nuclear test:	November 26, 1991
Largest yield test:	3 Mt (April 28, 1958)
Total tests:	45 detonations
Peak stockpile:	350 warheads (1970s)
Current stockpile:	c. 200 warheads
Maximum missile range:	13,000 km/8,100 mi
NPT signatory:	Yes (1968, one of five recognized powers)

The United Kingdom was the third country to test an independently developed nuclear weapon in October 1952. It is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the UK ratified in 1968. The UK is currently thought to retain a weapons stockpile of around 200 operational nuclear warheads.

Since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, the US and UK have cooperated extensively on nuclear security matters. The so-called special relationship between the two countries has involved the exchange of classified scientific information and nuclear materials such as plutonium. Britain has not run an independent weapons delivery programme since the cancellation of the Blue Streak missile in the 1960s, instead pursuing joint development of American delivery systems, designed and manufactured by Lockheed Martin, and fitting them with warheads designed and manufactured by the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment.

In contrast with the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the United Kingdom currently operates only a single nuclear deterrent system since decommissioning its tactical WE.177 free-falling nuclear bombs in 1998. The present system consists of four Vanguard class submarines armed with up to 16 Trident missiles, which each carry nuclear warheads in up to 8 MIRVs, performing both strategic and sub-strategic deterrence roles.

While a firm decision has yet to be taken on the replacement of the UK's nuclear deterrent the manufacturer of the UK's warheads, AWE, is currently undertaking research which is largely dedicated to providing new warheads^[1] and on 4 December 2006 the Prime Minister Tony Blair announced plans for a new class of nuclear missile submarines.^[2]

[edit] Number of warheads

Faslane Naval Base, HMNB Clyde, Scotland. Home of the Vanguard class submarines which carry the UK's current nuclear deterrent.

In the Strategic Defence Review published in July 1998, the British Government stated that once the Vanguard submarines became fully operational (the fourth and final one, Vengeance, entered service on 27 November 1999), it would "maintain a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads".^[3] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has estimated the figure as about 165, consisting of 144 deployed weapons plus an extra 15 percent as spares.^[4]

At the same time, the British Government indicated that warheads "required to provide a necessary processing margin and for technical surveillance purposes" were not included in the "fewer than 200" figure.^[5] However, as recently declassified archived documents on Chevaline make clear, the 15% excess (referred to by SIPRI as for spares) is normally intended to provide the 'necessary processing margin', and 'surveillance rounds do not contain any nuclear material, being completely inert. These surveillance rounds are used to monitor deterioration in the many non-nuclear components of the warhead, and are best compared with inert training rounds. The SIPRI figures correspond accurately with the official announcements and are likely to be the most accurate. The Natural Resources Defense Council speculates that a figure of 200 is accurate to within a few tens,^[6] and the World Almanac speculates there is a potentially much higher quantity of 200-300, but does not provide hard evidence. Experience with earlier weapons has shown speculation in this area to be inaccurate and has invariably been proved wrong.

[edit] Weapons tests

Different sources give the number of test explosions that the UK has conducted as either 44^[7][8] or 45.^[9][10] The 23 or 24 tests from December 1962 onwards were in conjunction with the United States at their Nevada test site^[11] with the final test being the Julin Bristol shot which took place on 26 November 1991.^[12] The apparently low numbers of British tests is misleading when compared to the large numbers of tests carried out by the US, the Soviet Union, China, and especially France; because the UK has had extensive access to US test data, obviating the need for UK tests: and an added factor is that many tests required are for 'weapon effects tests'; tests not of the nuclear device itself, but of the nuclear effects on hardened components designed to resist ABM attack. Many such tests were unrecorded as British because they were "piggybacked" onto tests of US weapons that were to be done anyway, with or without the UK "piggybacks". Numerous such 'effects' tests were done in support of the Chevaline programme especially; and there is some evidence that some were permitted for the French programme to harden their RVs and warheads; because most French tests being under the ocean floor, access to measure 'weapon effects' was nigh impossible.^[13] An independent test programme would see the UK numbers soar to French levels. The British government signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963^[14] along with the United States and the Soviet Union which effectively restricted it to underground nuclear tests by outlawing testing in the atmosphere, underwater or in space. It signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996^[15] and ratified it on 6 April 1998,^[16] having passed the necessary legislation on 18 March 1998 as the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and Inspections) Act 1998.

[edit] Nuclear defence

[edit] Warning systems

This solid-state phased array radar in North Yorkshire is a UK-controlled early warning station and part of the American-controlled Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.

See also: Four minute warning, RAF Fylingdales, Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, and National Missile Defense

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The UK has relied on the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and, in later years, Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites for warning of a nuclear attack. Both of these systems are owned and controlled by the United States, although the UK has joint control over UK based systems. One of the four component radars for the BMEWS is based at RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire.

In 2003 the British government stated that it will consent to a request from the US to upgrade the radar at Fylingdales for use in the US National Missile Defense system.^[17]

Nevertheless, missile defence is not currently a significant political issue within the UK. The ballistic missile threat is perceived to be less severe, and consequently less of a priority, than other threats to its security.^[18]

Civil defence booklet produced in the UK. Online version.

[edit] Attack scenarios

During the cold war a significant effort by government and academia was made to assess the effects of a nuclear attack on Britain. A major government exercise, Square Leg, was held in September 1980 and involved around 130 warheads with a total yield of 200 megatons. This is probably the largest attack that the apparatus of the nation state could survive in some limited form. Observers have speculated that an actual exchange would be much larger with one academic describing a 200 megaton attack as an "extremely low figure and one which we find very difficult to take seriously".^[19] In the early 1980s it was thought an attack causing almost complete loss of life could be achieved with the use of less than 15% of the total nuclear yield available to the Soviets.^[19]

[edit] Civil defence

Main articles: civil defence and Protect and Survive

During the cold war, various governments developed civil defence programmes aimed to prepare civilian and local government infrastructure for a nuclear strike on Britain. The most famous such programme was probably the series of booklets and public information films entitled Protect and Survive. But no British government has ever put more than a minimal effort into Civil Defence, recognizing the reality that deep shelter for a protracted period of time for more than a tiny part of the population is not a practical proposition for any state, and especially a small, heavily-populated island such as Britain. Such efforts as were made were merely a gesture to popular sensibilities.

The booklet contained information on building a nuclear refuge within a so-called 'fall out room' at home, sanitation, limiting fire hazards and descriptions of the audio signals for attack warning, fall-out warning and all clear. It was anticipated that families might need to stay within the fall-out room for up to fourteen days after an attack almost without leaving it at all.

[edit] Weapons programmes

See also History of nuclear weapons

Britain worked in partnership with the United States and Canada on the Manhattan Project, resulting in the development of the first nuclear weapons, and the first-ever nuclear detonation at the Trinity test of 16 July 1945.

[edit] Tube Alloys and Manhattan Project

Main articles: Tube Alloys and Manhattan Project

British nuclear weapons had their genesis in the Second World War when the United Kingdom worked on development of an atomic bomb, initially on their own under the cover name of Tube Alloys but later as a partner in the American Manhattan Project. The Manhattan Project resulted in the two nuclear weapons dropped on Japan which led to that country's unconditional surrender.

[edit] Post-war development programme

The United Kingdom started independently developing nuclear weapons again shortly after the war. Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee set up a cabinet sub-committee, GEN.75 (and known informally as the "Atomic Bomb Committee"), to examine the feasibility as early as 29 August 1945. It was US refusal to continue nuclear cooperation with Britain after World War II (due to the McMahon Act of 1946 restricting foreign access to US nuclear technology) which eventually prompted the building of a bomb:

A nuclear program started in 1946 under the control of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, that was civilian in character, but was also tasked with the job of producing the fissile material, initially only plutonium 239, that was expected to be required for a military programme. It was based at two former airfields, Harwell (then in Berkshire now in Oxfordshire) and Risley in Cheshire. Risley became the headquarters of the Industrial Division of UKAEA, and there were other sites under its control, notably the Calder Hall reactors at Windscale (later Sellafield) used to produce weapons grade Pu-239. The first British nuclear pile, GLEEP, went critical at Harwell on 15 August 1947. When AWRE was established at Aldermaston, it was the Weapons Division of the (civilian) UKAEA, not being subsumed into the Ministry of Defence until the 1970s.

William Penney, a physicist specialising in hydrodynamics was asked in October 1946 to prepare a report on the viability of building a British weapon. He had joined the Manhattan project in 1944, and had been in an observation plane that accompanied the Nagasaki bomber, and had also done damage assessment on the ground following Japan's surrender. He had subsequently participated in the American Operation Crossroads test at Bikini Atoll. As a result of his report, the decision to proceed was formally made on 8 January 1947 at a meeting of the GEN.163 committee of six cabinet members, including Prime Minister Clement Attlee with Penney appointed to take charge of the programme.

The project was hidden under the name High Explosive Research or HER and was based initially at the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) at Fort Halstead in Kent,^[22] but in 1950 moved to a new site at AWRE Aldermaston in Berkshire. A particular problem was the McMahon Act. Although British scientists knew the areas of the Manhattan Project in which they had worked well, they only had the sketchiest details of those parts which they were not directly involved in. With the start of the Cold War there had been some warming of nuclear relations between the British and American governments, which led to hopes of American cooperation. However these were quickly dashed by the arrest in early 1950 of Klaus Fuchs, a Soviet spy working at Harwell. Plutonium production reactors were based at Windscale, later known as Sellafield in Cumberland (now in Cumbria) and construction began in September 1947, leading to the first plutonium metal ready in March 1952.

[edit] First test and early systems

Main articles: Operation Hurricane, Blue Danube (nuclear weapon), and Blue Peacock

Britain's first nuclear test, Operation Hurricane, in 1952.

A Blue Danube bomb. The airman that stood alongside to give the photograph some scale has been cropped from this picture. The girder from which the weapon is suspended would measure at least six feet from ground level. The first Blue Danube weapons issued to the RAF were of 10-12 kt yield, approx the same yield as the Hiroshima bomb, although that was much smaller, being of a gun-type, whereas Blue Danube was of the implosion type similar to the Nagasaki bomb. This Blue Danube airframe design was used to house all the devices detonated at Christmas Island in the Operation Grapple tests.

The first British weapon test, Operation Hurricane, was detonated below the frigate HMS Plym anchored in the Monte Bello Islands on 2 October 1952. This led to the first deployed weapon, the Blue Danube free-fall bomb, in November 1953. It was very similar to the American Mark 4 weapon in having a 60 inch diameter, 32 lens implosion system with a levitated core suspended within a natural uranium tamper. The warhead was entombed within a bomb carcass measuring 62 inches dia and 24 feet long, and being so large, could only be carried by the V-Bomber fleet.

A nuclear landmine dubbed Brown Bunny, later Blue Bunny, and finally Blue Peacock that used the Blue Danube warhead was developed from 1954 with the goal of deployment in the Rhine area of Germany. The system would have been set to an eight-day timer in the case of invasion of Western Europe by the Soviets but was cancelled in February 1958 with only two built. It was judged that the risks posed by the nuclear fallout and the political aspects of preparing for destruction and contamination of allied territory were simply too high to justify. A more usual reason for cancellation revealed by numerous archived declassified documents was that the Army felt it was too unwieldy and diverted their efforts into a successor, Violet Vision, based on the smaller successor to Blue Danube, Red Beard. None were ever built, the Army instead receiving U.S. ADMs or Atomic Demolition Munitions under the established procedures for supply of Nato allies from U.S. stocks held in U.S. custody in Europe. A sea mine based on the Blue Danube warhead and codenamed Cudgel was also envisaged for delivery by midget submarines, referred to by naval sources as "sneak craft"; perhaps reflecting a belief that these craft were really rather ungentlemanly methods of waging war. None were built.

A gaseous diffusion plant was built at Capenhurst, near Chester and started production in 1953 producing low enriched uranium (LEU). By 1957 it was capable of annually producing 125 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The capacity was further increased and by 1959 it may have been producing as much as 1600 kg per year [1]. At the end of 1961, having produced between 3.8 and 4.9 tonnes of HEU it was switched over to LEU production for civil use. Additional plutonium production was provided by eight electricity generating Magnox reactors at Calder Hall and Chapelcross which started operating in 1956 and 1959 respectively.

[edit] Thermonuclear weaponry

Main articles: Operation Grapple, Yellow Sun, and Blue Steel missile

The detonation by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union of thermonuclear devices alarmed the British government of Winston Churchill and a decision was made on 27 July 1954 to begin development of a thermonuclear bomb, making use of the more powerful nuclear fusion reaction rather than nuclear fission. There was little or no dissent in the House of Commons.

A Blue Danube bomb released from a Valiant bomber at 500 knots at 45'000ft would accelerate to a terminal speed of 2'100 feet per sec (approx Mach 2.2). In this photo the fins are not yet extended to 1.6 times diameter to quickly stabilize the bomb into a predictable ballistic trajectory. Fusing was by means of a barometric 'gate' to switch on the radar altimeter controlled firing circuit powered by 6-volt lead-acid accumulators. These bomb casings were used for all the air-drop tests at Christmas Island and Maralinga, Australia. Detonation was approx 52 seconds after release from the aircraft.

The Economist, The New Statesmen and many left-wing newspapers supported the government's policy of nuclear deterrence as a means of reducing the size of conventional forces. Their view (in 1954-55) is fairly summarised as being not opposed to nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, but in their view that of the United States would suffice, and that of the costs of the 'nuclear umbrella' was best left to be borne by the United States alone. Their attitudes to nuclear weapons have changed somewhat since then.^[24]

The first prototype, Short Granite, was detonated on 15 May 1957 in Operation Grapple, with disappointing results at 300 kt, when the target requirement was one megaton. A further test of Purple Granite yielded less at 200 kt. Further testing in 1958 got performance up to the requirement, but none were ever deployed, because the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement intervened, making fully developed and Service engineered designs available more quickly, and more cheaply. The first of these was the U.S. Mk-28 weapon which was anglicised and manufactured in the UK as Red Snow and quickly deployed as Yellow Sun Mk.2 in the V-bomber fleet. Red Snow became the warhead of choice for the Blue Steel stand-off missile and some of the Skybolt missiles intended for carriage by the V-bombers. Under the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement 5.4 tonnes of UK produced plutonium was sent to the U.S. in return for 6.7kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of HEU over the period 1960-1979, replacing Capenhurst production, although much of the HEU was used not for weapons, but as fuel for the growing UK fleet of nuclear submarines, both of the Polaris variety and others numbering approx twelve.

Fifty-eight Blue Danube bombs were produced, although archived declassified files indicate that only a small proportion of these were ever serviceable at any one time. It remained in service until 1963, when it was replaced by Red Beard, a smaller tactical boosted-fission weapon that used the same fissile core as Blue Danube and was deployed on many smaller aircraft than the V-bombers, both ashore and at sea aboard five carriers. Stocks of Red Beard were maintained in Cyprus, Singapore, and a smaller number in the UK

The Orange Herald spherical warhead seen here suspended inside the centre-section frame of a Blue Danube bomb casing. The Green Grass Interim Megaton Weapon would appear very similar when installed in Violet Club. The nose and tail of the bomb attached to the two circular frames. Blue Danube was very similar but a larger sphere.

After the detonation of U.S. and Soviet thermonuclear weapons the UK deployed an Interim Megaton Weapon in the V-bomber fleet until a true thermonuclear weapon could be devised from the Christmas Island tests. This never tested interim weapon derived from the Orange Herald warhead tested at Christmas Island on 31 May 1957 yielding 720 kt ^[25] known as Green Grass was merely a very large unboosted pure fission weapon yielding 400 kt. It was the largest pure fission weapon ever deployed by any nuclear state. Green Grass was deployed first in a modified Blue Danube casing and known as Violet Club. A later variant was deployed in a Yellow Sun Mk.1 casing. A true thermonuclear device was planned for the later Yellow Sun Mk.2 bomb, and after the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement the choice fell on a U.S. Mk.28 warhead manufactured in Britain and known as Red Snow. This Red Snow warhead was also fitted in the Blue Steel, an air-launched stand-off missile which remained in service until Dec 1970. It was to have been replaced by Skybolt air-launched ballistic missiles purchased from the United States, and the British consequently cancelled their Blue Steel extended range upgrade and Blue Streak ballistic missile projects, because of changing military perceptions of the vulnerability of these Blue Streak land-based liquid-fuelled missiles that were so close to Soviet missile launch sites in Eastern Europe. Similar changed military perceptions led to the removal of Thor IRBM missiles in the UK; and Jupiter IRBMs in Italy and Turkey; although the Turkish sites were implicated in an alleged deal following the Cuban Missile Crisis. To British consternation, and considerable protests, the incoming Kennedy administration cancelled Skybolt at the end of 1962 because it was believed by the U.S. Secretary of State for Defense, Robert McNamara, that other delivery systems were progessing better than expected, and a further expensive system was surplus to U.S. requirements.

The Polaris A1 or A2 missile, seen here on a launch pad in Cape Canaveral, was a submarine-launched ballistic missile purchased from the US. The UK purchased the A3T variant, the final production model, that incorporated hardened missile electronic components to resist ABM attack in the boost phase, although neither the three re-entry vehicles or British-manufactured warheads were hardened, leading to the Chevaline programme.

[edit] Polaris

Main articles: Polaris Sales Agreement, UGM-27 Polaris, Chevaline, and Resolution class submarine

After the cancellation of Skybolt, the British purchased Polaris missiles for use in British-built ballistic missile submarines. The agreement between President Kennedy and Harold Macmillan, the Polaris Sales Agreement, was announced on December 21, 1962 and HMS Resolution sailed on her first Polaris-armed patrol on 14 June 1968.^[26] In the 1970s the UK Polaris RVs and warheads were vulnerable to the Soviet ABM screen concentrated around Moscow, and the UK developed a Polaris improved-front-end (IFE) codenamed Chevaline, designed to counter this ABM defence which threatened to completely nullify an independent British deterrent posture. When Chevaline became public knowledge in 1980, it generated huge controversy as it had been kept secret by the four governments of Wilson, Heath, Wilson (again) and Callaghan, whilst costs rocketed; admittedly during a period of high inflation; until disclosed by the Thatcher government. By the time it entered service in 1982 it had cost approx £1bn. The final Polaris/Chevaline patrol took place in 1996, two years after the first Trident-carrying submarine sailed on its first patrol.

As well as the establishment at Aldermaston, the UK nuclear weapons programme also has a factory at Burghfield nearby which assembled the weapons and is responsible for their maintenance, and had another in Cardiff which fabricated non-fissile components and a 2000 acre (8 km²) test range at Foulness. Since 1993 the sites have been managed by private consortia. The Foulness and Cardiff facilities closed in October 1996 and February 1997 respectively.

[edit] Trident

Main article: British Trident system

Britain's current delivery system, the Trident missile, being launched from a submarine.

The UK currently has four Vanguard class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident missiles. The principle of operation is based on maintaining deterrent effect by always having at least one submarine at sea, and was designed for the Cold War period. One submarine is normally undergoing maintenance and the remaining two in port or on training exercises. It has been suggested that British ballistic missile submarine patrols are coordinated with those of the French.^[27]

Each submarine carries 16 Trident II D-5 missiles, which can each carry up to twelve warheads. However, the British government announced in 1998 that each submarine would carry only 48 warheads, an increase of 50% over the 32 warheads carried by Trident's predecessor, Chevaline, (halving the limit specified by the previous government), which is an average of three per missile. However one or two missiles per submarine are probably armed with fewer warheads for "sub-strategic" use causing others to be armed with more; but this is speculative.

The British-designed warheads are thought to be selectable between 0.3 kt, 5-10 kt and 100 kt; the yields obtained using either the unboosted primary, the boosted primary, or the entire "physics package"; although it must be stressed that these yields and similar data are entirely speculative. The true position is unlikely to be known with certainty for many years; as was the case with the misplaced speculation about the earlier Chevaline programme; only now becoming publicly known. Although Britain designed, manufactured and owns the warheads, there is evidence that the warhead design is similar to, or even based on, the US W76 warhead fitted in some US Navy Trident missiles, with design data being supplied by the United States through the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement.^[28][29] The United Kingdom owns 58 missiles which are shared in a joint pool with the United States government and these are exchanged when requiring maintenance with missiles from the United States Navy's own pool and vice versa.

Until August 1998, the UK also retained the WE.177 nuclear weapon manufactured in the 1960s, in air-dropped free-fall bomb and depth charge versions. This left the four Vanguard class submarines, which replaced the Polaris ones in the early 1990s, as the United Kingdom's only nuclear weapons platform. It has been estimated by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the United Kingdom has built around 1,200 warheads since the first Hurricane device of 1952. In terms of number of warheads, the British arsenal was at its maximum size of about 350 in the 1970s, but this figure does not include the large numbers of US-owned warheads, bombs, nuclear depth bombs supplied from US stocks in Europe for use by NATO allies. At its peak, these numbered 327 for the British Army of the Rhine in Germany alone.

Vanguard Class Submarine

[edit] Replacement for Trident

Main article: British replacement of the Trident system

A decision on the replacement of Trident was made on the 4th December 2006.

Tony Blair has told MPs it would be "unwise and dangerous" for the UK to give up its nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister outlined plans to spend up to £20bn on a new generation of submarines for Trident missiles.

He said submarine numbers may be cut from four to three, while the number of nuclear warheads would be cut by 20% to 160.

Mr Blair said although the Cold War had ended the UK needed nuclear weapons as no-one could be sure another nuclear threat would not emerge in the future.

[edit] Timeline

The timeline below shows the development of warheads, nuclear delivery systems and nuclear infrastructure in the UK between 1940 and 2006. Delivery systems are charted to indicate when they were in active service. This does not include development time or decommissioning. Similarly, power plants are charted from when they became active, rather than the date of commissioning or construction. At the end of 1961, the Capenhurst reactor was switched back to low enriched uranium production for civil use. The Magnox electricity producing power stations could produce Plutonium for use in the UK military nuclear programme. Seven other Magnox reactors came online between 1964 and 1971 (see List of Magnox reactors in the UK), although these weren't necessarily used to generate material for warheads.

ROF Cardiff was used as part of the nuclear programme from 1961 until its closure in 1997. The Burghfield site was built in 1941 and used for the nuclear programme from the early 1950s to this day. It is now called AWE Burghfield rather than ROF Burghfield.

[edit] Deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons

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Until 1992 UK forces also deployed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons as part of a U.S.-UK dual-key NATO nuclear sharing role [2] [3]. The weapons deployed included nuclear artillery, nuclear demolition mines and warheads for Corporal and Lance missiles in Germany; theatre nuclear weapons on RAF aircraft; Mark 101 nuclear depth bombs on RAF Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft, later replaced by a modern successor, the B-57 deployed on RAF Nimrod aircraft. The Lance missiles were purchased in 1975 [4], to replace Honest John missiles which had been bought in 1960 [5]; and were themselves a replacement for the U.S. Corporal missiles deployed in Germany by the Royal Artillery. Not generally recognised is the fact that the Royal Artillery deployed a numerically greater quantity of US nuclear weapons than the RAF and Royal Navy combined, peaking at 277 in 1976-78; with a further 50 ADMs deployed with another British Army unit, the Royal Engineers, peaking in 1971-81.^[30]

[edit] Research and development facilities

[edit] Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston

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Main article: Atomic Weapons Establishment

The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston (formerly the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston) is situated just 7 miles north of Basingstoke and approximately 14 miles south-west of Reading, Berkshire, near a village called Aldermaston, bordering with Tadley. It was built in 1949 on the site of a former World War II Royal Air Force base and converted to nuclear weapons research, design and development in the 1950s. Although some early test devices were probably assembled on this site, final assembly of Service-engineered weapons takes place at the nearby site of Burghfield.

[edit] Royal Ordnance Factories, Cardiff and Burghfield

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Other nuclear weapons sites could be found in Cardiff and Burghfield near Reading, Berkshire. These were the only two Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF) not privatised in the 1980s.

ROF Cardiff, which closed in 1997, was involved in nuclear weapons programmes since 1961. The site was used for the task of recycling old nuclear weapons and precisely shaping uranium 235 (U235) and metallic beryllium components for the boosted fission devices used as primaries or 'triggers' in modern thermonuclear weapons.^[31]

[edit] Politics, decision making and nuclear posture

[edit] Nuclear posture

UK nuclear posture during the cold war was informed by interdependence with the United States. Operational control of the UK Polaris force was assigned to SACLANT, while targeting policy for its missiles was determined, as for the V-bomber force before it, by NATO's SACEUR, while maintaining an independent wholly-British targeting policy for some circumstances when a critical national emergency required it to be used alone, without the UK's NATO allies.^[32][33] In these circumstances, the 'Moscow criterion' referred to the ability of the UK to strike back at the highly-centralised Soviet decision-making apparatus concentrated in the Moscow area, intended to destroy the ability of the Soviet leadership to remain in control of a Soviet Union otherwise untouched. The early beginnings of studies to increase the likelihood of successful penetration of the Polaris warheads to Moscow can be traced back to 1964, ^[34]before the Polaris system was deployed, in order to preserve this capability in the face of anti-ballistic missile batteries around Moscow. These studies later materialised as Chevaline. ^[35][36]

The UK has relaxed its nuclear posture since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Labour government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review made a number of reductions from the plans announced by the previous Conservative government:^[37]

• The stockpile of "operationally available warheads" was reduced from 300 to "less than 200"
• The final batch of missile bodies would not be purchased, limiting the fleet to 58.
• A submarine's load of warheads were reduced from 96 to 48. This reduced the explosive power of the warheads on a Vanguard class Trident submarine to "one third less than a Polaris submarine armed with Chevaline." However, a fact that the 1998 Strategic Defence Review glosses over is that 48 warheads per Trident submarine represents a 50% increase on the 32 warheads per submarine of Chevaline. Total explosive power has been in decline for decades as the accuracy of missiles has improved, therefore requiring less power to destroy each target. Trident can destroy 48 targets per submarine, as opposed to 32 targets that could be destroyed by Chevaline.
• Submarines missiles would not be targeted, but rather at several days "notice to fire."
• Although one submarine would always be on patrol it will operate on a "reduced day-to-day alert state". A major factor in maintaining a constant patrol is to avoid "misunderstanding or escalation if a Trident submarine were to sail during a period of crisis."

Current British posture as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998^[38] is as it has been for many years. Only the delivery methods have changed. Trident SLBMs still provide the long-range strategic element as they have done for some years. Until 1998 the free-fall WE.177A, WE.177B and WE.177C bombs provided an aircraft-delivered sub-strategic option in addition to their designed function of tactical battlefield weapons. With the retirement of WE.177, a sub-strategic warhead is stated by Ministers to be incorporated into some (but not all) Trident missiles deployed. The exact mix of weapons on each submarine is unknown as is the numbers and warhead yield. Current British thinking^{[citation needed]} is that the capacity to launch a very limited strike is a more credible deterrent in the current world situation than use of a MIRVed strategic system.

[edit] The special relationship

Main article: Special relationship

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The 1958 'Agreement For Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes' also known as the 'Mutual Defence Agreement' was renewed in 1994 and again in 2005.^[39]

[edit] Parliament and civil society

See also: Politics of the UK

The UK's possession of nuclear weapons has appeared essential for successive governments in order to maintain the UK's diplomatic influence abroad; and this policy has had continuous majority support in the population, despite a large number of people opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons. For thirteen years from 1945 until 1958, four years after the first US thermonuclear test in 1952, there was no significant opposition to nuclear weapons in Britain. All significant parts of the Press representing all shades of opinion supported the government's policy, and continued to do so when in 1954 the British government decided to develop and test a thermonuclear weapon. One newspaper, the Guardian, not noted for its support for the then government, or of nuclear weapons in later years, urged the government to go further and develop ballistic missiles, rather than rely on bombers for delivery.^[40] Only in 1958 did the Committee of 100 initiate the first large scale protest with its Aldermaston March. Successive Labour governments, while paying lip-service to nuclear disarmament issues have resolutely maintained and renewed the UK's nuclear forces, with majority popular support. Polaris, Chevaline and the early planning for Trident conducted by the Callaghan Labour government are testament to that. Callaghan went further; he ensured that his government's planning papers for Trident were made available ostensibly 'on national security grounds' to the successor Thatcher government. A most unusual departure from the usual Civil Service procedure. A later Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock, although a supporter of unilateral nuclear disarmament, changed his stance after the arrival of the Gorbachev regime, on the grounds that a negotiated reduction in nuclear arms was then possible. Perhaps Kinnock also had understood the reality; that a unilateralist Labour Party would never be elected to government. The New Labour administration of Tony Blair also recognised that reality. In the near future, decisions about the replacement of Trident will need to be made (because of the long lead time before a replacement could enter service). It seems that the current Labour government will decide to replace Trident - although some believe that there may be some legal issues relating to the non-proliferation treaty. More likely, because the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement often referred to as the 1958 Bi-lateral, is still in force (and renewed 2005) and pre-dates the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it will be used to justify further legal purchases from the U.S., and further exchanges of data.

The current Trident system cost £12.6bn (at 1996 prices) and costs £280m a year to maintain. Options for replacing Trident range from £5bn for the missiles alone to £20-30bn for missiles, submarines and research facilities. At minimum, for the system to continue safely after around 2020, the missiles will need to be replaced.[6]

[edit] Legality

Main article: International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

On 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".^[41] The Advisory Opinion states that the threat or use of any existing nuclear weapon is unlawful as it would be in violation of the following articles of international law:

• The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, because nuclear weapons would cause unnecessary suffering (paragraphs 72, 75 and 77 of the advisory opinion);
• The Martens Clause, 1899, because the use of nuclear weapons would cause humanity not to remain under the protection of international law (78);
• The Hague Conventions, 1907, because nuclear weapons would cause unnecessary suffering and the inviolability of neutral nations could not be guaranteed (88);
• The UN Charter, 1945, because the use of nuclear weapons would not be proportionate (48);
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, because long-lasting effects of radioactive contamination would interfere with the right to life and health (35);
• The Geneva Conventions, 1949, because the wounded, sick, infirm, expectant mothers, civilian hospitals and medical staff could not be guaranteed protection (81);
• The First and Second Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 (directly brought into United Kingdom Law through the 1995 Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act), because the missiles would cause massive incidental losses of civilian lives and severe environmental damage (27, 31, 75, 84, 85).

[edit] See also

• Nuclear testing
• Nuclear disarmament
• United Kingdom and weapons of mass destruction
• Threads (A fictional film about the effects of nuclear war on the United Kingdom)
• The War Game (An earlier, documentary-style, TV film, also dealing with the effects of nuclear attack on the United Kingdom, that was made in 1965 and banned from being broadcast until the mid 1980's)
• Government White Paper Cm 6994 The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (December 2006)

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

• Paul Rogers, "Possible Nuclear Attack Scenarios on Britain", Proceedings of the Conference on Nuclear Deterrence, Implications and Policy Options for the 1980s, International Standing Conference on Conflict and Peace Studies, London, 1982.
• Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb. The official history up to the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. Copyright MoD. Published Palgrave 2001. ISBN 0-312-23518-6 in North America, ISBN 0-333-94742-8 outside North America.
• Humphrey Wynne, RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces, their origins, roles and deployment, 1946-69. The documentary history. Copyright MoD. Published 1997 by The Stationary Office. ISBN 0-11-772833-0
• Roy Dommet, The Blue Streak Weapon. Prospero, refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
• George Hicks and Roy Dommet, History of the RAE [Farnborough] and Nuclear Weapons. Prospero, refereeed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
• Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Symposium on Chevaline 2004, ISBN 1-85768-109-6. See note on sources at Talk:Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
• Dr Frank Panton, The Unveiling of Chevaline. Prospero, the refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
• Dr Frank Panton, Polaris Improvements and the Chevaline Programme. Prospero, the refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2004.
• Dr Peter Jones, Director AWE (Ret), The Chevaline Technical Programme. Prospero, the refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.

[edit] External links

• British Nuclear Policy, BASIC
• Table of UK Nuclear Weapons models
• Trident: the done deal, Robert Fox, New Statesman, 13 June 2005
• Text of the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and Inspections) Act 1998
• Nuclear Notebook: British nuclear forces, 2001, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2001.
• The United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Programme, UK Ministry of Defence, 4 September 2001
• British Nuclear Forces, 2005, by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2005.
• Britain's secret nuclear blueprint The Sunday Times, March 12, 2006
• Revealed: UK develops secret nuclear warhead by Michael Smith, The Sunday Times, March 12, 2006
• http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/nuclear_history/glossary.pdf