Nuclear programme of Iran

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Nuclear program of Iran
Nuclear power plant in Busher

Articles
This article is about Iran's nuclear power programme. For information about allegations of Iran developing nuclear weapons, see Iran and weapons of mass destruction

The Iranian nuclear programme was launched in the 1950s with the help of the United States. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the government temporarily disbanded the programme, and then revived it with less Western assistance than during the pre-revolution era. Iran's current effort includes several research sites, a uranium mine, a nuclear reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include a uranium enrichment plant. The Iranian government asserts that the programme's goal is to develop nuclear power plants, and that it plans to use them to generate 6,000 MW of electricity by 2010.[1] The U.S. and some other nations' officials say the programme covers an attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran's officials have categorically denied these accusations.[2] As of 2006, nuclear power does not contribute to the Iranian energy grid.

Gawdat Bahgat, the Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania states that Iranian's nuclear programme is formed by three forces: 1. perception of security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States 2. domestic economic and political dynamics 3. national pride. [2]

Bahgat makes the following four remarks regarding the Iranian nuclear programme: [2]

  • "Iranian officials express little confidence in the international community."[2] Because:
  • Under political pressure from Washington, many signed, commercial deals with the Iranian nuclear authority were either rejected or withdrawn.[2]
  • During the war between Iran and Iraq, the larger and more populous Iran had the upper hand. "To close this geographic and demographic gap, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and civilians. These chemical weapons killed or injured thousands of Iranians and played a major role in turning the war in favour of Iraq. The international community did little to condemn Iraq or to protect Iran and was notably indifferent. This indifference has reinforced the Iranian view that “Iran is fully justified to arm itself with nuclear weapons for defence and deterrence.” The Gulf war (1990–91) has further confirmed Iran’s conviction. As Shahram Chubin asserts, “Iran has learned from its war with Iraq that, for deterrence to operate, the threatening state must be confronted with the certainty of an equivalent response. The threat of in-kind retaliation (or worse) deterred Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in Desert Storm; it appears that the absence of such a retaliatory capability facilitated its decision to use chemical weapons against Iran."[2]
  • Although Iran feels the need to be self-sufficient, "foreign assistance has played a crucial role in building Iran’s nuclear programme."[2]
  • Most of the information regarding Iran's nuclear capability is classified and thus one can not make accurate assessments. "However, based on open sources, most analysts believe that Tehran has developed a significant indigenous nuclear infrastructure. Its programme is more advanced than Libya’s prior to 2003, but less developed than that of North Korea." [2]
  • "Despite long-time accusations that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons,no one has produced a 'smoking gun.' However, the scope and long secrecy of Iranian nuclear activities have led many observers to conclude that Iran is pursuing such capability."[2]

Contents

[edit] History

 The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.
Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: "A quarter of Iran's Nuclear Energy scientists are women." The photograph shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of Tehran's research reactor.
Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: "A quarter of Iran's Nuclear Energy scientists are women." The photograph shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of Tehran's research reactor.

[edit] U.S.-Iran nuclear co-operation in the 1950s and 60s

The foundations for Iran's nuclear programme were laid after a 1953, CIA-supported coup deposed democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and brought Shah (King) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power. By 1957, the West judged the regime sufficiently stable and friendly that nuclear proliferation would not become a threat.

That year, a civil nuclear co-operation programme was established under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. In 1959, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established, run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a U.S.-supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, which became operational in 1967 and was fuelled by highly enriched uranium.[3] Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. With the establishment of Iran's atomic agency and the NPT in place, the Shah approved plans to construct, with U.S. help, up to 23 nuclear power stations by the year 2000.

Gawdat Bahgat, a professor of Middle Eastern Studies states that "Despite assertions that Iran’s nuclear programme under the Shah was only for peaceful purposes, some sources claim that the Shah intended to build nuclear weapons capability. In the mid-1970s, the Shah was quoted as saying that Iran would have nuclear weapons 'without a doubt and sooner than one would think.' The Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies claims that the Western intelligence community 'had long suspected that the Shah’s nuclear scientists conducted research into military applications.'...despite these speculations on the Shah’s intentions, it is important to point out that in 1974, when the AEOI was established, the Shah called for making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons-free zone (MENWFZ)."[2]

[edit] U.S.-Iran nuclear co-operation in the 1970s

In March 1974, the Shah envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out, and declared, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants."[4] Bushehr would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In 1975, the Bonn firm Kraftwerk Union AG, a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196 MWe nuclear generating units was subcontracted to ThyssenKrupp, and was to have been completed in 1981.

"President Gerald Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete 'nuclear fuel cycle'."[5] At the time, Richard Cheney was the White House Chief of Staff, and Donald Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense. The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."

Iran, a U.S. ally then, had deep pockets and close ties to Washington. U.S. and European companies scrambled to do business there.[6]

Then-United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in 2005, 'I don't think the issue of proliferation came up'.[5] As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran signed in 1968, their program would have been under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection.

[edit] After the 1979 Revolution

After the 1979 Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear programme using indigenously-made nuclear fuel, and in 1983 the IAEA even planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Programme to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the programme under U.S. pressure.[7] The revolution was a turning point in terms of foreign co-operation on nuclear technology.

Another result of the 1979 Revolution was France's refusal to give any enriched uranium to Iran after 1979. Iran also didn't get back its investment from Eurodif. The joint stock company Eurodif was formed in 1973 by France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. In 1975 Sweden’s 10% share in Eurodif went to Iran as a result of an arrangement between France and Iran. The French government subsidiary company Cogéma and the Iranian Government established the Sofidif (Société franco–iranienne pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium par diffusion gazeuse) enterprise with 60% and 40% shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25% share in EURODIF, which gave Iran its 10% share of Eurodif. Reza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory, to have the right of buying 10% of the production of the site.

The U.S. was also paid to deliver new fuel and upgrade its power in accordance with a contract signed before the revolution. The U.S. delivered neither the fuel nor returned the billions of dollars payment it had received. Germany was paid in full, totaling billions of dollars, for the two nuclear facilities in Bushehr, but after three decades, Germany has also refused to export any equipment or refund the money.[8] Iran's government suspended its payments and tried refunding the loan by making pressure on France by handling militant groups, including the Hezbollah who took French citizens hostage in the 1980s. In 1982, president François Mitterrand refused to give any uranium to Iran, which also claimed the $1 billion debt. In 1986, Eurodif manager Georges Besse was assassinated; the act was allegedly claimed by left-wing militants from Action Directe. However, they denied any responsibility during their trial.[9] In their investigation La République atomique, France-Iran le pacte nucléaire, David Carr-Brown and Dominique Lorentz pointed out toward the Iranian intelligence services' responsibility. More importantly, they also showed how the French hostage scandal was connected with the Iranian blackmail. Finally an agreement was found in 1991: France refunded more than 1.6 billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif, a Franco-Iranian consortium shareholder to 25% of Eurodif. However, Iran abstained itself from asking for the produced uranium.[10][11]

Kraftwerk Union, the joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken who had signed a contract with Iran in 1975, fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had received $2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West. The French company Framatome, a subsidiary of Areva, also withdrew itself.

In 1984, Kraftwerk Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran-Iraq War continued. In April of that year, the U.S. State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons programme." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel."

The Bushehr reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes between March 24, 1984 to 1988 and work on the nuclear programme came to a standstill. In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards new partners for its nuclear programme; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.

According to a report by the Argentine justice, Iran signed three agreements with Argentina in 1987-88. Argentina has had a National Atomic Energy Commission since 1950, and completed its first nuclear reactor, Atucha I in 1974 and Embalse in 1984, a year after the return to democracy. The first Iranian-Argentine agreement involved help in converting a nuclear reactor in Tehran so that it could use 20%-enriched uranium (ie, low-grade uranium that cannot be used for weapons production) and indicates that it included the shipment of the 20%-enriched uranium to Iran. The second and third agreements were for technical assistance, including components, for the building of pilot plants for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication. Under US pressure, assistance was reduced, but not completely terminated, and negotiations with the aim of re-establishing the three agreements took pace from early 1992 to 1994.[12]

According to IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming, IAEA inspectors visited Iran's uranium mines in 1992.

In 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially-complete Bushehr plant,[13] installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor, with completion expected in 2007. There are no current plans to complete the Bushehr II reactor.

In 1996, the U.S. tried, without success, to block the People's Republic of China from selling to Tehran a conversion plant. The PRC also provided Iran with gas needed to test the uranium enrichment process.

[edit] 2000 - August 2006

Seen here in this ISNA footage is Gholam Reza Aghazadeh and AEOI officials with a sample of Yellowcake during a public announcement on the April 11, 2006, in Mashad that Iran had managed to successfully complete the fuel cycle by itself.
Seen here in this ISNA footage is Gholam Reza Aghazadeh and AEOI officials with a sample of Yellowcake during a public announcement on the April 11, 2006, in Mashad that Iran had managed to successfully complete the fuel cycle by itself.

On August 14, 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a prominent Iranian dissident, revealed the existence of two unknown nuclear sites: a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz (part of which is underground), and a heavy water facility in Arak.

The IAEA immediately sought access to these facilities and further information and cooperation from Iran regarding its nuclear program.[14] According to arrangements in force at the time for implementation of Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA,[15] Iran was not required to allow IAEA inspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material is introduced into that facility. At the time, Iran was not even required to inform the IAEA of the existence of the facility. This 'six months' clause was standard for implementation of all IAEA safeguards agreements until 1992, when the Board of Governors decided that facilities should be reported during the planning phase, even before construction began. Iran was the last country to accept that decision, and only did so February 26, 2003, after the IAEA investigation began.[16]

France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the "EU-3") undertook a diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear programme. On October 21, 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign Ministers issued a statement[17] in which Iran agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional Protocol, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities. The EU-3 in return agreed to discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its nuclear power programme, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern technology. Iran signed an Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, and agreed to act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA reported November 10, 2003,[18] that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored." Iran was obligated to inform the IAEA of its importation of uranium from China and subsequent use of that material in uranium conversion and enrichment activities. It was also obligated to report to the IAEA experiments with the separation of plutonium. A comprehensive list of Iran's specific "breaches" of its IAEA safeguards agreement, which the IAEA described as part of a "pattern of concealment," can be found in the November 15, 2004 report of the IAEA on Iran's nuclear programme.[19] On the question of whether Iran had a nuclear weapons program, the IAEA reported in November 2003 that it found "no evidence" that the previously undeclared activities were related to a nuclear weapons programme, but also that it was unable to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful. The IAEA remains unable to draw such a conclusion.

The IAEA Board of Governors eventually concluded that Iran's safeguards "breaches" and "failures" constituted "non-compliance" with its safeguards agreement. However, the Board deferred a formal decision on this for nearly two years, until September 24, 2005,[20] in order to encourage Iran to cooperate with the EU-3 diplomatic initiative. The Board deferred the formal report to the UN Security Council, required by Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute,[21] for another five months, until February 27, 2006.[22]

EU three.
EU three.

Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, on November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment programme (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) after pressure from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European Union (EU) (known in this context as the EU-3). The measure was said at the time to be a confidence-building measure, to continue for some reasonable period of time (six months being mentioned as a reference). On November 24, Iran sought to amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four days later.

In early August 2005, Iran removed seals on its uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan[13], which UK officials termed a "breach of the Paris Agreement"[14] though a case can be made that the EU violated the terms of the Paris Agreement by demanding that Iran abandon nuclear enrichment [15]. Several days later, the EU-3 offered Iran a package in return for permanent cessation of enrichment. Reportedly, it included benefits in the political, trade and nuclear fields, as well as long-term supplies of nuclear materials and assurances of non-aggression by the EU (and not the US),[16]. Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran's atomic energy organisation rejected the offer, terming it "very insulting and humiliating"[17] and other independent analysts characterised the EU offer as an "empty box". These developments coincided with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and the appointment of Ali Larijani as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator [18].

In September 2005, IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei reported that “most” highly-enriched uranium traces found in Iran by agency inspectors came from imported centrifuge components, validating Iran's claim that the traces were due to contamination. Sources in Vienna and the State Department reportedly stated that, for all practical purposes, the HEU issue has been resolved.

In January 2006, James Risen, a New York Times reporter, alleged in his book State of War that in February 2000, a U.S. covert operation - code-named Operation Merlin - had backfired. It originally aimed to provide Iran with a flawed design for building a nuclear weapon, in order to delay the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons programme. Instead, the plan may have accelerated Iran's nuclear programme by providing useful information, once the flaws were identified [19].

On February 4, 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27-3 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa) to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The measure was sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China, agreed to referral only on condition that the council take no action before March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria and Cuba.[23][24]

In late February, 2006, IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei raised the suggestion of a deal, whereby Iran would give up industrial-scale enrichment and instead limit its programme to a small-scale pilot facility, and agree to import its nuclear fuel from Russia. The Iranians indicated that while they would not be willing to give up their right to enrichment in principle, they were willing to consider the compromise solution. However in March 2006, the Bush Administration made it clear that they would not accept any enrichment at all in Iran.

On April 11, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium. President Ahmadinejad made the announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city of Mashhad, where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to 3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges. At this level, it could be used in a nuclear reactor if enough of it was made; uranium for a nuclear bomb would require around 90% enrichment and many thousands of centrifuges to be built and operated.

On April 13, 2006, After US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said (on Wednesday, April 12 2006) the Security Council must consider "strong steps" to induce Tehran to change course in its nuclear ambition; President Ahmadinejad vowed that Iran won't back away from uranium enrichment and that the world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium."

On April 14, 2006, The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a series of analysed satellite images of Iran's nuclear facilities at Natanz and Esfahan.[25] Featured in these images is a new tunnel entrance near the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site. In addition, a series of images dating back to 2002 shows the underground enrichment buildings and its subsequent covering by soil, concrete, and other materials. Both facilities were already subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.

Iran responded to the demand to stop enrichment of uranium August 24, 2006, offering to return to the negotiation table but refusing to end enrichment.[26]

Qolam Ali Hadad-adel, speaker of Iran's parliament, said on August 30, 2006, that Iran had the right to "peaceful application of nuclear technology and all other officials agree with this decision," according to the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency. "Iran opened the door to negotiations for Europe and hopes that the answer which was given to the nuclear package would bring them to the table.""[26]

[edit] August 31, 2006 and later

[edit] United States
  • President George W. Bush insisted on August 31, 2006 that "there must be consequences" for Iran's defiance of demands that it stop enriching uranium. He said "the world now faces a grave threat from the radical regime in Iran. The Iranian regime arms, funds, and advises Hezbollah."[27] The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency issued a report saying Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities, a United Nations official said. The report by the International Atomic Energy Agency opens the way for U.N. Security Council sanctions against Tehran. Facing a Security Council deadline to stop its uranium enrichment activities, Iran has left little doubt it will defy the West and continue its nuclear programme.[26]
  • A congressional report released on August 23rd made many allegations that have been strongly disputed by the IAEA calling it "erroneous" and "misleading".""[28]
  • John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said on August 31, 2006 that he expected action to impose sanctions to begin immediately after the deadline passes, with meetings of high-level officials in the coming days, followed by negotiations on the language of the sanctions resolution. Bolton said that when the deadline passes "a little flag will go up." "In terms of what happens afterward, at that point, if they have not suspended all uranium enrichment activities, they will not be in compliance with the resolution," he said. "And at that point, the steps that the foreign ministers have agreed upon previously ... we would begin to talk about how to implement those steps." The five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Germany, previously offered Iran a package of incentives aimed at getting the country to restart negotiations, but Iran refused to halt its nuclear activities first. Incentives included offers to improve Iran's access to the international economy through participation in groups such as the World Trade Organization and to modernise its telecommunications industry. The incentives also mentioned the possibility of lifting restrictions on U.S. and European manufacturers wanting to export civil aircraft to Iran. And a proposed long-term agreement accompanying the incentives offered a "fresh start in negotiations."[26]

[edit] Iran
  • "They should know that the Iranian nation will not yield to pressure and will not let its rights be trampled on," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told a crowd August 31, 2006 in a televised speech in the northwestern Iranian city of Orumiyeh. In front of his strongest supporters in one of his provincial power bases, the Iranian leader attacked what he called "intimidation" by the United Nations, which he said was led by the United States. Ahmadinejad criticised a White House rebuff of his offer for a televised debate with President Bush. "They say they support dialogue and the free flow of information," he said. "But when debate was proposed, they avoided and opposed it." Ahmadinejad said that sanctions "cannot dissuade Iranians from their decision to make progress," according to Iran's state-run IRNA news agency. "On the contrary, many of our successes, including access to the nuclear fuel cycle and producing of heavy water, have been achieved under sanctions." Iran has been under IAEA investigation since 2003, with inspectors turning up evidence of clandestine plutonium experiments, black-market centrifuge purchases and military links to what Iran says is a civilian nuclear programme.[26]
  • Iran insists enrichment activities are intended for peaceful purposes, but much of the West, including the United States, allege that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The August 31, 2006 deadline calls for Iran to comply with U.N. Resolution 1696 and end its nuclear activities or face the possibility of economic sanctions. The United States believes the council will agree to implement sanctions when high-level ministers reconvene in mid-September, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said. "We're sure going to work toward that [sanctions] with a great deal of energy and determination because this cannot go unanswered," Burns said. "The Iranians are obviously proceeding with their nuclear research; they are doing things that the International Atomic Energy Agency does not want them to do, the Security Council doesn't want them to do. There has to be an international answer, and we believe there will be one."[26]
  • On October 23, 2006, he told a crowd on the outside of Tehran that "The enemies, resorting to propaganda, want to block us from achieving (nuclear technology)," "But they should know that today, the capability of our nation has multiplied tenfold over the same period last year."[29]

[edit] United Nations
  • The IAEA has condemned the US over a report written by a congressional committee on the nuclear situation in Iran. The leaked report was called erroneous and misleading in a letter sent to Peter Hoekstra. Allegations in the report of why an inspector was dismissed were branded outrageous and dishonest. One unnamed western diplomat called it deja vu of the false reports made by the US administration to justify the invasion of Iraq.[30]
  • IAEA officials complain that most U.S. intelligence shared with the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency about Iran's nuclear programme proved to be inaccurate, and none has led to significant discoveries inside Iran.[31]

[edit] United Nations sanctions

World powers have sought to impose sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with IAEA Board resolutions requiring a "voluntary" suspension of enrichment. On 23 December 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1737, banning the supply of specific nuclear materials and technology to Iran, and freezing the assets of individuals and companies linked to Iran's nuclear programme. The resolution also specifies that if Iran fails to suspend nuclear enrichment, further nonmilitary sanctions may follow. The language of the resolution is lighter than that sought by the United States, and was changed in response to Chinese and Russian concerns.[32] On 24 March 2007, further to Resolution 1737, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1747.

[edit] Nuclear power as a political issue

Iran's nuclear programme has become political in two ways: local and international. Iranian politicians use it as part of their populist platform, and there is international speculation about Iran's possible use of nuclear technology. Iran is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it ratified in 1970 — however, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes that recent Iranian non co-operation makes it impossible to conduct adequate inspections to ensure that the technology is not being diverted for weapons use.[citation needed]

[edit] Iran's nuclear programme and the NPT

Main article: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Iranian nuclear programme has been controversial although the development of a civilian nuclear power programme is explicitly allowed under the terms of the NPT, there have been allegations that Iran has been illicitly pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, in violation of the NPT. (See Iran and weapons of mass destruction)

The Iranian government says it sees nuclear power as a way to modernise and diversify its energy-sources, other than its large oil and gas reserves. The Iranian public, nearly all political candidates, and the current government are unified on this point: Iran should be developing its peaceful nuclear industry.[33][34] In addition, it states that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa saying that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons was forbidden under Islam.[35]

Any use outside peaceful energy production would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran ratified in 1970. Some of Iran's leaders before the revolution have also expressed their support in this regard. Ardeshir Zahedi for example, who signed Iran into the NPT during the Pahlavi dynasty, in an interview in May 2006, voiced his support for Iran's Nuclear Programme stating it as an "inalienable right of Iran".[36]

The current US administration, France, Germany, and Great Britain have stated that Iran's nuclear programme has been suspicious.[37]

These allegations prompted an investigation last year by the IAEA which found no evidence of a nuclear weapons programme, although the level of co-operation by the Iranians was strongly criticised.[38][39] Traces of enriched uranium and plutonium have been found recently in Iran – although a senior UN official cautioned against reading too much into the new finds, as they could be produced by peaceful nuclear activities.[40]

[edit] Views on Iran's Nuclear Power Program

[edit] The Iranian viewpoint

Iran says [20] that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly-industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts severely harms Iran's environment. Additionally, Iran wishes to diversify its sources of energy. Iran's oil reserves are currently estimated at 133 billion barrels, at a current pumping rate of 1.5-1.8 billion barrels per year. This is only enough oil to last the next 74-89 years assuming pumping rates are steady and additional reserves are not found. In taking a stance that the Shah expressed decades ago, Iranians feel its valuable oil should be used for high-value products, not simple electricity generation. "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants."[citation needed] Iran also faces financial constraints, and claims that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, let alone pay for the power plants.[citation needed] Roger Stern from Johns Hopkins University partially concurred with this view, projecting that due to "energy subsidies, hostility to foreign investment, and inefficiencies of its [Iranian] state-planned economy", Iranian oil exports would vanish by 2014–2015, although he notes that this outcome has "no relation to 'peak oil.'"[21]

Dr. William O. Beeman, Brown University's Middle East Studies program professor, who spent years in Iran, says that the Iranian nuclear issue is a unified point of their political discussion:

"The Iranian side of the discourse is that they want to be known and seen as a modern, developing state with a modern, developing industrial base. The history of relations between Iran and the West for the last hundred years has included Iran's developing various kinds of industrial and technological advances to prove to themselves--and to attempt to prove to the world--that they are, in fact, that kind of country."

The nuclear-power issue is exactly that. When Iranians talk about it, and talk about the United States, they say, "The United States is trying to repress us; they're trying to keep us down and keep us backward, make us a second-class nation. And we have the ability to develop a nuclear industry, and we're being told we're not good enough, or we can't". And this makes people furious--not just the clerical establishment, but this makes the person on the street, even 16- and 17-year-olds, absolutely boil with anger. It is such an emotional issue that absolutely no politician could ever back down on this question. [21]

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear programme using indigenously-made nuclear fuel, and in 1983 the IAEA even planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Programme to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the programme under U.S. pressure.

Iran also believes it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a right which in 2005 the U.S. and the EU-3 began to assert had been forfeited by a clandestine nuclear programme that came to light in 2002. In fact, Iran's enrichment programme was openly discussed on national radio, and IAEA inspectors had even visited Iran's uranium mines [16]. ([24]) Iranian politicians compare its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nuclear-armed nations that have not signed the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Each of these nations developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968 [25], India by 1974 [26] and Pakistan by 1990 [27]. There is no provision in the Non-Proliferation Treaty or anywhere else that allows Non-Proliferation Treaty rights to be declared as forefeited, and indeed other US-allied nations which where caught conducting secret nuclear experiments have not been declared as having forfeited their NPT rights.

The Iranian authorities assert that they cannot simply trust the United States or Europe to provide Iran with nuclear energy fuel, and point to a long series of agreements, contracts and treaty obligations which were not fulfilled. [22] Developing nations say they don’t want to give up their rights to uranium enrichment and don’t trust the United States or other nuclear countries to be consistent suppliers of the nuclear material they would need to run their power plants. [23]

[edit] US and Western European viewpoints

Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruction

The views of the US government and several major European nations is that Iran's primary goal is not nuclear power but rather nuclear weapons. They cite Iranian support for Hezbollah and the Iraqi Insurgency,[41] ideological intolerance towards Israel's existence, and pursuit of long-range missile technology capable of reaching anywhere in the Middle East.

[edit] Israeli viewpoint

Main article: Iran-Israel relations
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The view of many Israelis matches the view held by the US and many European countries.[42] Iran is perceived as "an existential threat", and anti-Israeli views expressed by Iranian religious and political leaders are often compared to Nazi ideology. See Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Israel for an example.

[edit] The Declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement

On September 16, 2006, in Havana, Cuba, all of the 118 Non-Aligned Movement member countries, at the summit level, declared that they were supporting Iran's nuclear programme for civilian purposes in their final written statement.[43] That is a clear majority of the 192 countries comprising the entire United Nations and representing 55% of the world population.

[edit] Nuclear facilities in Iran

[edit] Anarak

Anarak has a waste storage site, near Yazd.

[edit] Arak

Arak was one of the two sites exposed by a spokesman for the MEK terrorist group in 2002. Iran is constructing a 40 MWt heavy water moderated research reactor at this location, which should be ready for commissioning in 2014.[44][45] In August 2006, Iran announced the inauguration of the Arak plant for the production of heavy water. Under the terms of Iran's safeguards agreement, Iran was under no obligation to report the existence of the site while it was still under construction since it was not within the 180-day time limit specified by the safeguards agreement. This reactor is intended to replace the life-expired 1967 Tehran Nuclear Research Center research reactor, mainly involved in the production of radioisotopes for medical and agricultural purposes.[46]

[edit] Ardakan

Construction of a nuclear fuel site at Ardakan is reportedly scheduled to be finished in mid-2005.

[edit] Bonab

The Atomic Energy Research Center at Bonab is investigating the applications of nuclear technology in agriculture. It is run by the AEOI.

[edit] Bushehr

Iran will commisision its first nuclear power plant in Bushehr by the end of 2007 (construction 95% complete)
Iran will commisision its first nuclear power plant in Bushehr by the end of 2007 (construction 95% complete)

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Facility (28.83484° N 50.89356° E) is located 17 kilometres south of the city of Bushehr (also known as Bushire), between the fishing villages of Halileh and Bandargeh along the Persian Gulf.

On June 29, 2004, IAEA Director General Mohammad El-Baradei announced that the Bushehr reactor was "not of international concern" since it was a bilateral Russian-Iranian project intended to produce nuclear energy. The reactor is under full IAEA safeguards.

The facility was the idea of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out. He wanted a national electrical grid powered by clean nuclear power plants. Bushehr would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In August 1974, the Shah said, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants".

In 1975, the Bonn firm Kraftwerk Union AG, a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196 MWe nuclear generating units was subcontracted to ThyssenKrupp AG, and was to have been completed in 1981.

Kraftwerk Union was eager to work with the Iranian government because, as spokesman Joachim Hospe said in 1976, "To fully exploit our nuclear power plant capacity, we have to land at least three contracts a year for delivery abroad. The market here is about saturated, and the United States has cornered most of the rest of Europe, so we have to concentrate on the third world."

Kraftwerk Union fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had received $2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which paralysed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West.

In 1984, Kraftwerk Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran-Iraq war continued. In April of that year, the U.S. State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons programme." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel."

The reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes from 1984 to 1988, during the Iran-Iraq war. Shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear programme was stopped until the end of the war.

In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards partners for its nuclear programme; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.

In 1995 Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially-complete Bushehr plant, installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor, with completion expected in 2007.[47] The Russian state-controlled company Atomstroyexport (Atomic Construction Export), an arm of Russia's atomic energy ministry, MinAtom, is constructing the plant.

Under an agreement reached in September 2006, fuel deliveries to Bushehr are scheduled to start in March 2007 and the plant is due to come on stream in September 2007.[48]

On February 20th, 2007, according to Russian officials, it was reported that the opening of Bushehr could be delayed because Iran has fallen behind with the payments. A top Iranian nuclear official denied this. [24]

[edit] Chalus

In 1995 Iranian exiles living in Europe claimed Iran was building a secret facility for building nuclear weapons in a mountain 20 kilometres from the town of Chalus.[49] In October 2003 Mohamed ElBaradei announced that "In terms of inspections, so far, we have been allowed to visit those sites to which we have requested access". It therefore appears the allegations about the Chalus site were unfounded.[50]

[edit] Isfahan

The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan is a nuclear research facility that currently operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI.[51]

The Uranium Conversion Facility at Isfahan converts yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride. As of late October 2004, the site is 70% operational with 21 of 24 workshops completed. There is also a Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) located nearby that produces the necessary ingredients and alloys for nuclear reactors.[52]

Zirconium Production Plant, Isfahan.
Zirconium Production Plant, Isfahan.

[edit] Karaj

The Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Hashtgerd was established in 1991 and is run by the AEOI. [25]

[edit] Lashkar Abad

Lashkar Abad is a pilot plant for isotope separation. Established in 2002, the site was first exposed by Alireza Jafarzadeh in May 2003 which led to the inspection of the site by the IAEA. Laser enrichment experiments were carried out there, however, the plant has been shut down since Iran declared it has no intentions of enriching uranium using the laser isotope separation technique.[26] In September 2006, Alireza Jafarzadeh claimed that the site has been revived by Iran and that laser enrichment has been taking place at this site.SPC

[edit] Lavizan

( 35°46′23″N, 51°29′52″E) All buildings at the former Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center site were demolished between August 2003 and March 2004. Environmental samples taken by IAEA inspectors showed no trace of radiation. The site is to be returned to the City of Teheran.[53]

According to Reuters, claims by the US that topsoil has been removed and the site had been sanitized could not be verified by IAEA investigators who visited Lavizan:

Washington accused Iran of removing a substantial amount of topsoil and rubble from the site and replacing it with a new layer of soil, in what U.S. officials said might have been an attempt to cover clandestine nuclear activity at Lavizan. Former U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, Kenneth Brill, accused Iran in June of using "the wrecking ball and bulldozer" to sanitize Lavizan prior to the arrival of U.N. inspectors. But another diplomat close to the IAEA told Reuters that on-site inspections of Lavizan produced no proof that any soil had been removed at all.

[edit] Natanz

( 33°43′24.43″N, 51°43′37.55″E) is a hardened Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) covering 100,000 square metres that is built 8 meters underground and protected by a concrete wall 2.5 meters thick, itself protected by another concrete wall. In 2004, the roof was hardened with reinforced concrete and covered with 22 metres of earth. The complex consists of two 25,000 square meter halls and a number of administrative buildings. This once secret site was one of the two exposed by Alireza Jafarzadeh in 2002. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visited the site on 21 February 2003 and reported that 160 centrifuges were complete and ready for operation, with 1000 more under construction at the site.[54] Under the terms of Iran's safeguards agreement, Iran was under no obligation to report the existence of the site while it was still under construction. More details: Proposed Israeli Nuclear First Strike on Natanz Facility.

[edit] Parchin

The Parchin Military Complex is not a nuclear site. This was confirmed on 1 November 2005, when the IAEA was given access to the site and environmental samples were taken. Inspectors did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited, and the results of the analysis of environmental samples did not indicate the presence of nuclear material.[55]

[edit] Saghand

( 32°28′45″N, 55°24′30″E) Location of Iran's first uranium ore mines, expected to become operational by March 2005. The deposit is estimated to contain 3,000 to 5,000 tons of uranium oxide at a density of about 500 ppm over an area of 100 to 150 square kilometers. [27]

[edit] Tehran

The Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) is managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). It is equipped with a U.S.-supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor capable of producing 600 g of plutonium annually in spent fuel. 17 years production would be sufficient to make a single atomic bomb, however storage of the waste is closely monitored by the IAEA and extracting the plutonium is not possible while Iran maintains its status as a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The Plasma Physics Research Center of Islamic Azad University operates a Tokamak fusion reactor designated Iran Tokamak 1 (IR-T1).[56]

[edit] Yazd

Yazd Radiation Processing Center is equipped with a Rhodotron TT200 accelerator, made by IBA, Belgium, with outputs of 5 and 10MeV beam lines and a maximum power of 100KW. As of 2006 the centre is engaged in geophysical research to analyze the mineral deposits surrounding the city and is expected to play an important role in supporting the medical and polymer industries.[57]

[edit] Iran starts building home-made atomic plant

On March 6, 2007, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization declared that Iran has started construction of a domestically built nuclear power plant with capacity of 360 MW in Darkhovin, in southwestern Iran.[58]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Nuclear Power Plants Will Generate 6,000MW by 2010. Iran Daily. Retrieved on April 25, 2006.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Gawdat Bahgat, Iranian Studies, volume 39, number 3, September 2006
  3. ^ Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance. U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration.
  4. ^ Iran Profile - Nuclear Chronology 1957-1985. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved on May 18, 2006.
  5. ^ a b Dafna Linzer (March 27, 2005). Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy. Washington Post.
  6. ^ . Farhang Jahanpour (November 6, 2006). Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Program (1957-present). Oxford Research GroupDr.
  7. ^ Cyrus Safdari (November 2005). Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons. Le Monde diplomatique.
  8. ^ Gordon Prather (December 27, 2005). ElBaradei Isn't Perfect. Antiwar.com.
  9. ^ (French) "Jean-Louis Bruguière, un juge d’exception", Voltaire Network, April 29, 2004.
  10. ^ (French) Dominique Lorentz (November 11, 2001). La république atomique. Le Monde.
  11. ^ "Iskandar Safa and the French Hostage Scandal", Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, February 2002.
  12. ^ Argentina's Iranian nuke connection, Asia Times, November 15, 2006 (English)
  13. ^ http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html
  14. ^ For a summary see [1]
  15. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf
  16. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf
  17. ^ http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml
  18. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
  19. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83.pdf
  20. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf
  21. ^ http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html#A1.12
  22. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf
  23. ^ "Iran reported to Security Council", BBC News, 2006-02-04. Retrieved on February 4, 2006.
  24. ^ {{cite press release|publisher=International Atomic Energy Agency|date=2006-04-02|title=Resolution GOV/2006/14 of the Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf |format=PDF
  25. ^ Brannan, Paul (2006). ISIS Imagery Brief: New Activities at the Esfahan and Natanz Nuclear Sites in Iran (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). Retrieved on May 1, 2006.
  26. ^ a b c d e f Bush: Iran's defiance will bring 'consequences', August 31, 2006, CNN
  27. ^ President Bush's speech of 8/31/2006
  28. ^ US Iran report branded dishonest, September 09, 2006, BBC
  29. ^ Ahmadinejad: Iran's Nuke Capability Up, October 23, 2006, Associated Press
  30. ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5346524.stm
  31. ^ http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/02/25/MNGGKOAR681.DTL&feed=rss.news
  32. ^ "UN passes Iran nuclear sanctions", BBC News, BBC, 2006-12-13. Retrieved on December 23, 2006.
  33. ^ [2]
  34. ^ [3]
  35. ^ http://www.iran-daily.com/1383/2143/html/national.htm
  36. ^ [4]
  37. ^ Talks Turn Toward Iran, North Korea
  38. ^ [5]
  39. ^ [6]
  40. ^ New nuke material found in Iran
  41. ^ http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/middleeast/11cnd-weapons.html?hp&ex=1171256400&en=5d356debadef0bd5&ei=5094&partner=homepage
  42. ^ [7]
  43. ^ Iran Wins Backing From Nonaligned Bloc. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (2006). Retrieved on September 29, 2006.
  44. ^ [8]
  45. ^ [9]
  46. ^ INFCIRC/696. IAEA (6 March 2007). Retrieved on March 24, 2007.
  47. ^ "Iran urges Russia to speed up Bushehr nuclear plant work", Forbes, 2006-05-12. Retrieved on June 3, 2006.
  48. ^ "Iran urges Russia to speed up Bushehr nuclear plant work", Xinhua News Agency, 2007-02-21. Retrieved on February 21, 2007.
  49. ^ Tehran's Magic Mountain. US and World News Report (1995). Retrieved on May 28, 2006.
  50. ^ IRAN TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS EVEN ON MILITARY SITES. Iran Press Service. Retrieved on August 26, 2006.
  51. ^ [10]
  52. ^ [11]
  53. ^ Iran tried to acquire nuclear equipment at suspect Lavizan site: UN agency. Iran Focus. Retrieved on April 23, 2006.
  54. ^ Pike, John (2006). Natanz [Kashan]. GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved on May 28, 2006.
  55. ^ Transparency Visits and Discussions (PDF). Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency (2006). Retrieved on May 28, 2006.
  56. ^ Dr. Farhang Jahanpour (2006). Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Program. Oxford Research Group. Retrieved on September 25, 2006.
  57. ^ Yazd Radiation Processing Center (YRPC). Nuclear Threat Initiative (2006). Retrieved on September 25, 2006.
  58. ^ [12]

[edit] Notes

Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis by Siddharth Varadarajan, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/09/21/stories/2005092105231000.htm

Iranian Ambassador Javad Zarif's statement to the UN Security Counsel http://www.un.int/iran/statements/securitycouncil/articles/69.pdf

[edit] External links

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