NSC 162/2
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The United States National Security Council document NSC 162/2 of 30 October 1953 defined Cold War policy during the Eisenhower administration – the New Look national security policy. NSC 162/2 stated that the United States needs to maintain "a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power", and that the United States "will consider nuclear weapons as available for use as other munitions."
Even though NSC 162/2 did not explain the details of the Massive Retaliation theory, as it became known to the public, the document was received to have major policy implications, especially after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on 12 January 1954, where he stated: "A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him... He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive... The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."
His statement was generally interpreted to mean that, if the Soviet Union or Communist China were to attack any country of the 'Free World', the United States would strike back with nuclear weapons, but not necessarily in the theatre of war, but possibly in the Russian or Chinese heartlands. Such interpretations were subsequently strengthened, for example in an article by Vice President Richard M. Nixon in The New York Times on 14 March, 1954: "Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars, we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we choose."
Only in April, Dulles made an effort to weaken the rhetoric in a Foreign Affairs article: "It should not be stated in advance precisely what would be the scope of military action if new aggression occurred... That is a matter to which the aggressor had best remain ignorant. But he can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this respect is ours and not his."
