Noumenon

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The noumenon (plural: noumena) classically refers to an object of human inquiry, understanding or cognition. The term is generally used in contrast with, or in relation to, "phenomenon" (plural: phenomena), which refers to appearances, or objects of the senses.

The philosopher Immanuel Kant used the term noumenon more-or-less synonymously with the phrase thing in itself (German: Ding an sich).^[1]

Contents 1 Etymology 2 Kant's usage 2.1 Overview 2.2 Noumenon and the thing-in-itself 2.3 Positive and negative noumena 2.4 The noumenon as a limiting concept 3 Criticisms of Kant's noumenon 3.1 Schopenhauer's critique 3.2 Nietzsche's critique 3.3 Criticism via the scientific method 4 Influences on later philosophy 5 Notes 6 External links 7 See also

[edit] Etymology

"Noumenon" is the neuter form of the present passive participle of "noein", which in turn originates from "nous" (roughly, "mind"). Noumenon is linguistically unrelated to "numinous," a term coined by Rudolf Otto and based on the Latin numen (deity).

[edit] Kant's usage

[edit] Overview

Noumenon came into its modern usage through Immanuel Kant. The etymology of the word derives from the Greek nooúmenon (thought-of) and ultimately reflects nous (mind). Noumena is the plural form. Noumenon ("Ding an sich", or "thing-in-itself") is distinguished from phenomenon ("Erscheinung"), the latter being an observable event or physical manifestation capable of being observed by one of the five human senses. The two words serve as interrelated technical terms in Kant's philosophy. As expressed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, human understanding is structured by "concepts of the understanding", or innate categories that the mind utilizes in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience.^{[citation needed]}

By Kant's account, when we employ a concept of some type to describe or categorize noumena (the objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis of the workings of the world), we are in fact merely employing a way of describing or categorizing phenomena (the observable manifestations of those objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis). Kant posited a number of methods by which human beings make sense out of the interrelationships among phenomena: the concepts of the transcendental aesthetic, as well as that of the transcendental analytic, transcendental logic and transcendental deduction.^[2][3][4] Taken together, these "categories of understanding" are Kant's description of the sum of human reasoning that can be brought to bear in attempting to understand the world in which we exist (that is, to understand, or attempt to understand, "things in themselves"). In each instance the word "transcendental" refers to the process that the human mind uses to increasingly understand or grasp the form of, and order among, phenomena. Kant was asserting that to "transcend" a direct observation or experience is to use reason and classifications to strive to correlate with the phenomena that are observed. By Kant's view, humans can make sense out of phenomena in these various ways, but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual objects and dynamics of the natural world. In other words, by Kant's Critique, our minds may attempt to correlate in useful ways, perhaps even closely accurate ways, with the structure and order of the various aspects of the universe, but cannot know these "things-in-themselves"(noumena) directly. Rather, we must infer the extent to which thoughts correspond with things-in-themselves by our observations of the manifestations of those things that can be seen, heard, touched, smelled and/or tasted, that is, of phenomena.^[5][6]

According to Kant, objects of which we are sensibly cognizant are merely representations of unknown somethings—what Kant refers to as the transcendental object—as interpreted through the a priori or categories of the understanding. These unknown somethings are manifested within the noumenon—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself". '.^{[citation needed]} Kant was arguing, in part, that the categories of the understanding are required for our sensible understanding of things-in-themselves, the pre-existence of which is a requisite for the function of these categories.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Noumenon and the thing-in-itself

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon", and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous. However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only loosely synonymous^[7][8], and other scholars also argue that they are not identical ^[9] Schopenhauer criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". Opinion is of course far from unanimous.^[10]Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and thing-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

"...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears." ^[11]

..but much more doubtful about noumena:

"But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition". ^[12]

[edit] Positive and negative noumena

Kant also makes a distinction between positive and negative noumena^[13]

"If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term".^[14]

"But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term."^[15]

(emphasis added).

The positive noumena, if they existed, would roughly correspond with Plato's Forms or Idea — immaterial entities which can only be apprehended by a special, non-sensory, faculty: "intellectual intuition".^[16]

Kant doubts that we have such a faculty, and therefore dismisses positive noumena:

Since, however, such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience. Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, could not in the least apply to them. That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense.^[17]

[edit] The noumenon as a limiting concept

Even if noumena are unknowable, they are still needed as a limiting concept, ^[18], Kant tells us. Without them, there would be only phenomena, and since we have complete knowledge of our phenomena, we would in a sense know everything. In his own words:

"Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge".^[19]

"What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something".^[20]

Furthermore, for Kant, the existence of a noumenal world limits reason to what he perceives to be its proper bounds, making many questions of traditional metaphysics, such as the existence of God, the soul, and free will unanswerable by reason. Kant derives this from his definition of knowledge as "the determination of given representations to an object."^[21] As there are no apparent appearances of these entities in the phenomenal, Kant is able to make the claim that they cannot be known a mind that works upon "such knowledge that has to do only with appearances."^[22] These questions are ultimately the "proper object of faith, but not of reason."^[23]

[edit] Criticisms of Kant's noumenon

[edit] Schopenhauer's critique

Schopenhauer claimed that Kant used the word incorrectly. He explained in "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy", which first appeared as an appendix to The World as Will and Representation:

"But it was just this difference between abstract knowledge and knowledge of perception, entirely overlooked by Kant, which the ancient philosophers denoted by noumena and phenomena. (See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I, Chapter 13, ' What is thought (noumena) is opposed to what appears or is perceived (phenomena).' ) This contrast and utter disproportion greatly occupied these philosophers in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of the Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later the scholastics in the dispute between nominalism and realism, whose seed, so late in developing, was already contained in the opposite mental tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant who, in an unwarrantable manner, entirely neglected the thing for the expression of which those words phenomena and noumena had already been taken, now takes possession of the words, as if they were still unclaimed, in order to denote by them his things-in-themselves and his phenomena." ^[24]

[edit] Nietzsche's critique

Nietzsche, having been profoundly influenced by Schopenhauer's work, went on to criticise Kant's noumenon on slightly different grounds; he later similarly criticised Schopenhauer's work: he found fault in the noumenon's lack of definite properties and its complete inability to interact with other things. Nietzsche argued that a thing in itself would necessarily be outside of any causal chain since it cannot interact with any other things without demonstrating other properties than being the "ground of being". He and later philosophers argued that the noumenon is of an utterly indeterminate nature and that any discussion that does not treat it as such thus cannot, in fact, be a discussion of the noumenon. In demonstrating any definite properties, the noumenon would cease to be so. Nietzscheanistic criticism of the noumenon found, for example, in his Beyond Good and Evil, was arguably a precursor of elements of later formulations of the scientific method: both rely on the precise definition of observed phenomena:

"The scientific method depends upon increasingly more sophisticated characterizations of subjects of [its] investigation,"^[25]

and Nietzsche provided such increasingly-sophisticated characterization of the noumenonon throughout the body of his work by explaining its numerous influences on, and connections with, other ideas. An example of such characterization can be found in his criticisms of materialistic atomism and what he called "soul-atomism", which followed his assertion of the impossibility of synthetic judgments a priori in the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil:

"[I]t is high time to replace the Kantian question, 'How are synthetic judgments a PRIORI possible?' by another question, 'Why is belief in such judgments necessary?'--in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, [...] synthetic judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all [...]"^[26]

Nietzsche then asserts that "the atomism of the soul" is connected with a belief in the existence of the thing in itself. He then attempts precisely to define that particular type of atomism:

"Let it be permitted to designate by [the atomism of the soul] the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science!".^[27]

In arguing that the concept of the noumenon negatively influenced other ideas in specific ways, Nietzsche specifically characterized it in those ways.

Just as much as Nietzsche was critical of the inobservable, he was a proponent of falsifiability in all theories: while arguing against what he held to be the negative influence of the Kantian noumenon in the philosophy and science of his day, Nietzsche roughly approximated the scientific philosopher Karl Popper's assertion that falsifiability was the basis of scientific knowledge:

"One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."^[28]

Nietzsche wrote in the eighteenth section of the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil that

"It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds."^[29]

[edit] Criticism via the scientific method

The scientific method similarly eliminates the thing in itself from any theory via attempting to construct an experiment to prove or disprove its existence. Since no aspect of an existent thing in itself can possibly be quantified, multiple observers cannot ever be sure that they are looking at the same data "supporting" its existence, and thus no such experiment could possibly be replicated even if it could conceivably be formulated. Thus, experimental proof or empirical evidence of the noumenon cannot be demonstrated by anyone to anyone else, and there can never be any compelling scientific evidence for its existence.

Similarly, however, there can never be experimental proof or empirical evidence denying the existence of the noumenon. Indeed, Kant's work in the first Critique is largely concerned with the nature of proof and evidence, seeking in his transcendental logic the construction of a means of proving claims without (and beyond) the need for empirical evidence.

Also, if there is not noumenon, then every scientist is acquainted only with their own personal phenomena. However, science assumes that a single mind-independent world is being studied, and that assumption of mind-independence seems to include or imply the assumption that phenomena have causes which are not themselves phenomena. Thus, science does not need to prove what it has already assumed.

[edit] Influences on later philosophy

References to indeterminate things like the noumenon are widely scattered in philosophy. Discussions of "l'art pour l'art", for example, reflect a loop in the definition of art's purpose similar to the causal loop^{[citation needed]} generated by a thing in itself. More importantly, qualia are akin to noumena in that they are considered to be unquantifiable, indeterminate, indescribable, and, by their proponents, essential to consciousness (the "ground of being"). Any incommunicable feeling or any inexpressible thing would relate strongly to the idea of the noumenon in that all share this indeterminacy: discussions of "properties" of things in themselves are necessarily fruitless, since to bear any metaphorical fruit in such discussions the thing in itself would necessarily have to interact with observable phenomena. Any description of the noumenon, including Kant's, would be a property of it; it is always only descriptible in terms of observable or deductible phenomena. Quantifiability, or at least precise definition, are essential to productive philosophical and scientific discussion; in its indeterminacy of definition, the thing in itself was in the opinion of many later philosophers a blunder in Western philosophy; however, it influenced various works by Hegel, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, etc., and, by extension, any work influenced by them, and so on.

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Immanuel Kant (1781) Critique of Pure Reason, for example in A254/B310,P362(Guyer and Wood), "The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself [...]"; But note that the terms are not used interchangeably throughout. The first refernce to thing-in-itself comes many pages (A30) before the first to noumenon (A250). For a secondary or tertiary source, see: "Noumenon" in Encyclopedia Britannica [1]
2. ^ The Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Critique of Pure Reason: Theme and Preliminaries", p308 ff.
3. ^ The Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Transcendental Aesthetic", p310 ff.
4. ^ The Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Pure Concepts of the Understanding", p311 ff.
5. ^ See, e.g., The Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Critique of Pure Reason: Theme and Preliminaries", p308 ff.
6. ^ See also, e.g., The Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Pure Concepts of the Understanding", p311 ff.
7. ^ "Noumenon: the name given to a thing when it is viewed as a transcendent object. The term 'negative noumenon' refers only to the recognition of some­thing which is not an object of sensible intuition, while 'positive noumenon' refers to the (quite mistaken) attempt to know such a thing as an empirical object. These two terms are sometimes used loosely as synonyms for 'transcendental object' and 'thing in itself', respectively. (Cf. phenomenon.)" - Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms
8. ^ Thing in itself: an object considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions under which a subject can gain knowledge of it. Hence the thing in itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)" - Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms
9. ^ Oizerman, T. I., “Kant's Doctrine of the "Things in Themselves" and Noumena”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, Mar., 1981, 333-350.
10. ^ "Other interpreters have introduced an almost unending stream of varying suggestions as to how these terms ought to be used. A handful of examples will be sufficient to make this point clear, without any claim to represent an exhaustive overview. Perhaps the most commonly accepted view is expressed by Paulsen, who equates 'thing in itself' and 'noumenon', equates 'appear­ance' and 'phenomenon', distinguishes 'positive noumenon' and 'negative noumenon', and treats 'negative noumenon' as equivalent to 'transcendental object' [P4:148-50,154-5,192]. Al-Azm and Wolff also seem satisfied to equat­e 'phe­no­menon' and 'appearance', though they both carefully distinguish 'thing in itself' from 'negative noumenon' and 'positive noumenon' [A4:520; W21:165, 313-5; s.a. W9:162]. Gotterbarn similarly equates the former pair, as well as 'thing in itself' and 'positive noumenon', but distinguishes be­tween 'transcen­dental object', 'negative noumenon' and 'thing in itself' [G11: 201]. By contrast, Bird and George both dis­tinguish between 'appearance' and 'phenomenon', but not between 'thing in it­self' and 'noumenon' [B20:18,19, 53-7; G7:513-4n]; and Bird sometimes blurs the dis­tinction between 'thing in itself' and 'transcendental object' as well.[2] Gram equates 'thing in itself' not with 'noumenon', but with 'phenome­non' [G13:1,5-6]! Allison cites different official meanings for each term, yet he tends to equate 'thing in itself' at times with 'negative noumenon' and at times with 'transcendental object', usu­ally ignoring the role of the 'posi­tive noumenon' [A7:94; A10:58,69]. And Buchdahl responds to the fact that the thing in itself seems to be connect­ed in some way with each of the other ob­ject-terms by re­garding it as 'Kant's umbrella term'.[3]" Stephen Palmquist on Kan't object terms
11. ^ Critique of Pure Reason Bxxvi-xxvii.
12. ^ Critique of Pure Reason A256,B312,p273(NKS)
13. ^ Mattey, G.J
14. ^ Critique of Pure Reason A250/B307,P267(NKS)
15. ^ Critique of Pure Reason A250/B30,P2677(NKS)
16. ^ "The noumena are ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’, which exist in a realm beyond space and time." University of Leeds course notes
17. ^ Critique of Pure Reason B309,P270(NKS)
18. ^ Allison, H. - Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism, and Transcendental Idealism - MS Word
19. ^ Critique of Pure Reason A253/B310
20. ^ Critique of Pure Reason A256/B312,P273
21. ^ Critique of Pure ReasonB/137,P156
22. ^ Critique of Pure ReasonB/xx.,P24
23. ^ Rohmann, Chris. "Kant" A World of Ideas: A Dictionary of Important Theories, Concepts, Beliefs, and Thnkers. Ballantine Books, 1999.
24. ^ The World as Will and Representation(vol. 1, Dover edition 1966, ISBN 0-486-21761-2 p. 476-477)
25. ^ Wikipedia on scientific method
26. ^ Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 1. section 11.
27. ^ Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil Chapter 1. Section 12.
28. ^ Popper, K. Science: Conjectures and Refutations
29. ^ Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil. Chapter 1, Section 18.

[edit] External links

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Kant's metaphysics.
• Glossary of Kant's technical terms
• Overview of various scholar's interpretaions of Kant
• Article from undergraduate journal Noesis
• Lecture notes by G.J Mattey

[edit] See also

• Hypokeimenon
• Phenomenon
• Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy
• Transcendental idealism
• Unobservables