Talk:Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin
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[edit] Vatutin's Genious
The article states:
"On March 28, 1943, Vatutin took command over Voronezh Front, preparing for the momentous Battle of Kursk. Starting with this battle, Vatutin achieved marked superiority in generalship over Manstein because of his innovative approaches to operational and tactical techniques. In the battle of Kursk, he rejected conventional echeloning of armies; his innovative deployment allowed him not only to skilfully conduct defense against the technically superior Germans but also to quickly switch from defense to offense. Following the Soviet victory at Kursk, Vatutin surprised Manstein who believed that the Red Army was too weak to go on the offense, and captured Belgorod." (my italics)
At Kursk the situation was this:
The Soviets were fighting a defensive battle - the stronger form of war. The Soviets knew the German plan to attack and kept this fact hidden from the Germans. So they had the element of surprise. The Soviets had plenty of time to prepare the battle. The Soviets outnumbered the Germans 1:1,6 in men The Soviets outnumbered the Germans 1:1,33 in tanks The Soviets outnumbered the Germans 1:1,2 in aircraft The Germans were (arguably) technically superiour.
Now, there's no arguing who won the battle. However, there are some interesting matters to consider: German losses were 50.000. The Soviets 180.000. That's a ratio of 1:3,6 German tank losses were 300. The Soviets lost 1.600. Thats a ratio of 1:5,3 German air Losses were 200. The Soviets lost 1.000. That's a ratio of 1:5
If one considers the fact that the russians had numerical superiority on all counts, were fighting a defensive battle AND had the element of surprise, isn't it interesting how the germans lost no more than a third of what the russians did, in the "German Kursk" campaign?
And more interesting, as stated above, Vatutin achieved marked superiority in generalship over Manstein
Now, what does the numbers say about Vatutin's superiority in generalship over Manstein?
To me, it seems that someone is a fan of Vatutin, and not so much of the fighting men of the Red Army, who bled him a victory over a clearly inferiour, surprised enemy.--Nwinther 13:21, 15 January 2007 (UTC) ++++++++++++++ Nwinther made a very intelligent observation. Vatutin indeed has strong fans. Among them the leading American historians of the Eastern Front David Glantz and Richard Armstrong.
[edit] Start rating
I have given this article a start rating based mainly on the lack of references. If a good amount of references are found to back up the claims of this article, it would be a good contender for a B rating - • The Giant Puffin • 10:36, 27 February 2007 (UTC)
