Network-centric warfare
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Network-centric warfare (NCW), now commonly called network-centric operations (NCO), is a new military doctrine or theory of war pioneered by the United States Department of Defense. NCW/NCO is an emerging theory of war in the information age that seeks to translate an information advantage into a competitive warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces allowing new forms of organizational behavior. [1] This "networking" utilizes information technology via a robust network to allow increased information sharing, collaboration, and shared situational awareness, which, theoretically allows greater self-synchronization, speed of command, and mission effectiveness. The theory hypothesis has four basic tenets:
- A robustly networked force improves information sharing;
- Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness;
- Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; and
- These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is a term used in the United Kingdom and elsewhere for a similar doctrine.
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[edit] Background and history
Network centric warfare can trace its immediate origins to 1996 when Adm. William Owens introduced the concept of a “system of systems” in a paper of the same name published by the Institute National Security Studies. Owens described the serendipitous evolution of a system of intelligence sensors, command and control systems, and precision weapons that enabled enhanced situational awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment. The same year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released Joint Vision 2010, which introduced the military concept of Full-spectrum dominance. Full Spectrum Dominance described the ability of the US military to dominate the battlespace from peace operations through to the outright application of military power that stemmed from the advantages of information superiority.
As a distinct concept, however, NCW first appeared publicly in a 1998 US Naval Institute Proceedings article by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Gartska. The concepts were later given greater depth in the book, “Network Centric Warfare” coauthored by Gartska, David S. Alberts (Director of Research, OASD-NII), and Fred Stein of the Mitre Corporation. Published by the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), the book derived a new theory of warfare from a series of case studies on how business was using information and communication technologies to improve situation analysis, accurately control inventory and production, as well as monitor customer relations.
NCW was followed in 2001 by Understanding Information Age Warfare (UIAW), jointly authored by Alberts, Gartska, Richard Hayes of Evidence Based Research and David S. Signori of RAND. UIAW pushed the implications of the shifts identified by NCW in order to derive an operational theory of warfare. Starting with a series of premises on how the environment is sensed, UIAW posits a structure of three domains. The “physical domain” is where events take place and are perceived by sensors and individuals. Data emerging from the physical domain is transmitted through an “information domain”. Data is subsequently received and processed by a “cognitive domain” where it is assessed and acted upon. The process replicates the “observe, orient, decide, act” loop first described by Col. John Boyd of the USAF.
The last publication dealing with the developing theory of network centric warfare appeared in 2003 with “Power to the Edge”, also published by the CCRP. Power to the Edge is a more speculative work and easily the most revolutionary in terms of its implications for military operations. It suggests that modern military environments are far too complex to be understood by any one individual, organisation, or even military service. Modern information technology permits the rapid and effective sharing of information to such a degree that “edge entities” or those that are essentially conducting military missions themselves, should be able to “pull” information from ubiquitous repositories, rather than having centralised agencies attempt to anticipate their information needs and “push” it to them. This would imply a major flattening of traditional military hierarchies, however. It is not yet clear whether the vision of Power to the Edge is realisable, although Alberts and Hayes argue in the book that the establishment of the Global Information Grid is the first step to accomplishing it.
Network-centric warfare/operations is a cornerstone of the ongoing transformation effort at the Department of Defense initiated by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. It is also one of the five goals of the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
See Revolution in Military Affairs for further information on what is now known as "defense transformation" or "transformation".
[edit] Related technologies and programs
The US DoD has mandated that the Global Information Grid (GIG) will be the primary technical framework to support NCW/NCO. Under this directive, all advanced weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centers are eventually to be linked via the GIG. The term system of systems is often used to describe the results of these types of massive integration efforts.
The topic Net-Centric Enterprise Services addresses the applications context of the GIG.
A number of significant U.S. military programs are taking technical steps towards supporting network-centric warfare. These include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the United States Navy and the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in the United States Army.
Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) provides, for all phases of the acquisition of net-centric solutions, actionable guidance that meets DoD Network-Centric Warfare goals. The guidance in NESI is derived from the higher level, more abstract concepts provided in various directives, policies and mandates such as the Net-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model (NCOW RM) and the ASD(NII) Net-Centric Checklist.
[edit] Doctrinal tenets of network-centric warfare
The doctrine of NCW for the United States armed forces draws its highest level of guidance from the concept of "team warfare", meaning the integration and synchronization of all appropriate capabilities across the various services, ranging from Army to Air Force to Coast Guard. This is part of the principle of joint warfare.
The tenets of NCW (Alberts, 2002, pp. 7-8) are:
- Tenet 1: A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
- Tenet 2: Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness.
- Tenet 3: Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.
- Tenet 4: These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
[edit] Some architectural and design challenges
- The complexity of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) offers insight into the challenges of integrating numerous different communications systems into a unified whole. It is intended to be a software-defined radio for battlefield communications that will be backwards compatible with a very large number of other military and civilian radio systems.
- The problem of coordinating bandwidth usage in a battlespace is a significant challenge, when every piece of mobile equipment and human participant becomes a potential source (or relay) of RF emissions.
- It is difficult to efficiently transfer information between networks having different levels of security classification. Although multi-level security systems provide part of the solution, human intervention and decision-making is still needed to determine what specific data can and cannot be transferred.
- Accurate locational awareness is limited when maneuvering in areas where Global Positioning System (GPS) coverage is weak or non-existent. These areas include inside buildings, caves, etc. as well as built-up areas and urban canyons, which are also the settings for many modern military operations. Much work on reliable fusion of positional data from multiple sensors remains to be done.
- Providing secure communications in NCW/NCO is difficult, since successful key management for encryption is typically the most difficult aspect of cryptography, especially with mobile systems. The problem is exacerbated with the need for speedy deployment and nimble reconfiguration of military teams, to respond to rapidly changing conditions in the modern battlespace.
[edit] International activities
There is significant need to harmonize the technical and operational aspects of net-centric warfare and net-centric operations among multiple nations, in order to support coalition activities, joint operations, etc. STANAG is the coordinating vehicle for establishing shared technical standards among NATO nations.
See also Partnership for Peace for information on extending coordination efforts to non-NATO nations that are keen to support MOOTW (military operations other than war) activities, such as international peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, etc.
[edit] Supporting comments
"With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective ... In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps, grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen." [1] -- Vice President Richard Cheney .
"Net-centric warfare's effectiveness has greatly improved in 12 years. Desert Storm forces, involving more than 500,000 troops, were supported with 100 megabit per second (Mbit/s) of bandwidth. Today, OIF forces, with about 350,000 warfighters, had more than 3,000 Mbit/s of satellite Bandwidth, which is 30 times more bandwidth for a force 45 percent smaller. U.S. troops essentially used the same weapon platforms used in Operation Desert Storm with significantly increased effectiveness." [2]
[edit] Contradictory views
"Our incipient NCW plans may suffer defeat by [adversaries] using primitive but cagey techniques, inspired by an ideology we can neither match nor understand; or by an enemy who can knock out our vulnerable Global Positioning System or use electromagnetic pulse weapons on a limited scale, removing intelligence as we have construed it and have come to depend upon. Fighting forces accustomed to relying upon downlinks for information and commands would have little to fall back upon." -- Charles Perrow, Information Assurance, National Defense University, May 2003
The aspiration of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to embrace NCW is outlined in the document ADF Force 2020. This vision has been criticized by Aldo Borgu, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). By developing interoperability with U.S. systems, in his view, the three arms of the Australian Defence Force could end up operating better with their sister United States services than with each other. See Max Blenkin, AAP General News (Australia), 9/17/2003.
Network Centric Warfare is often criticized by proponents of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) doctrine. These criticisms are often based on a perceived focus on technical solutions, expensive and “legacy” (Cold War era) platforms, and transformation policies; allegedly at the expense of ignoring current operational needs and funding.
The spirit of unity afforded by NCW comes at a price of dealing with individual differences. One might be forgiven for concluding from the tenets that one only has to provide the underlying communication infrastructure, and the rest will follow, tending to “… dramatically increase military effectiveness”. Each of the four tenets may in fact stifle military effectiveness.
We might view the NCW tenets as being like a lie to children. Simplifications allow for a first step in explanation on matters of great complexity to an immature audience. But strong simplifications are usually wrong; the issue is how badly and what decisions are made on their naïve basis? These over-simplifications have another insidious property, in that they appeal to the dreams of the military society. The NCW tenets promise to fulfil military dreams – the dream of omnipresence, the dream of omniscience, the dream of empowerment, the dream of omnipotence: and ‘all’ that is required to achieve it is the "field of dreams", namely investment in a network.
In the first tenet, networks are to deliver the "dream of omnipresence". The telecommunications industry records a litany of expensive failed attempts to predict markets by adopting the engineer’s field of dreams approach, advocated by the first tenet, and described by Alberts et al (1999) as "the entry fee". Just as more and better telecommunications networks and services do not make for assured societal uptake or profits for telecommunications companies, more and better networks in military operations do not necessarily lead to improved military effectiveness. Further, the call for strict adherence to an "architectural approach" to building the network means a focus on information architectures (products) rather than architecting information. The development of a "structured, disciplined and consistent framework" of standards compliant operational, systems and technical view products and plans, gives a false sense of confidence. These products do not imply that the information system design can be uniquely understood by any given designer or result in a consistent design, nor do they in any way guarantee the security, correctness or feasibility of even static and very simple networks. If these architectures were to provide such design guidance they would need to be underpinned by quantitative elements such as design equations, performance proofs, supporting analysis, models, simulations, design heuristics, et cetera…
So, the value of communication networks depends upon how they are used. The perceived wisdom is that shared situation awareness will result (tenet 2) by using the communication networks to disseminate a "common operating picture" (COP). This exhorts the "dream of omniscience". The track information and associated “dots on maps” displays currently associated with a COP, only address the perception aspect of situation awareness. They identify some objects of interest in space and time, but they fail to disclose the significance of those situations (comprehension), and they fail to identify the consequence of those situations for our own intent (projection). Inconsistencies are inevitable in any NCW system. The "common as consistency" (see consistency proof) approach of pretending that they will not occur is an untenable solution. Treating "common as consistency" mistakes consistency for unity and lacks robustness because consistency eliminates diversity.
Tenet 3 exhorts the "dream of empowerment". A significant problem with NCW is that no-one ever says how the self-synchronisation (tenet 3) of capability is to be done?
Given the significant shortcomings in effectiveness identified individually for each of the first three tenets, there appears to be little hope that the fourth tenet, the "dream of omnipotence" representing the collective sequence or product of the first three, could be afforded anything other than a more pessimistic assessment. Further, it is unclear from tenet 4 what effective really means. There is no notion of intentions explicitly evident in the NCW thesis. Considering the NCW genesis in information superiority, we might look to this as a source for understanding effectiveness, but would be disappointed to find, of course, that possessing information superiority alone does not ensure mission effectiveness. Indeed, possessing firepower superiority alone does not ensure mission effectiveness, either.
[edit] See also
- Office of Force Transformation
- Command and Control Research Program
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration (OASD/NII)
- Net-Centric Enterprise Services
- Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations
- Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare
- Ubiquitous command and control An evolution of the NCW thesis developed by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation
- British Military Intelligence Systems in Northern Ireland
- Battlespace
- Swarming (Military)
[edit] References
Alberts, D.S., Garstka, J.J., Stein, F.P., (2000) Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, CCRP Publ., 2nd Edition (Revised). Aug 1999, Second Print Feb 2000.
Alberts, D.S., (2002), Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military, Washington, DC, CCRP Publications. First published 1996.
- ^ STSC Crosstalk
- ^ "Net-Centric Warfare Is Changing the Battlefield Environment", Lt. Gen. Harry D. Raduege Jr., Defense Information Systems Agency
[edit] External links
- The OASD-NII Command and Control Research Program (CCRP)
- IDGA's Network Centric Warfare: The world's largest annual gathering of NCW experts
- NCOW Wiki Network-Centric Operations Warfare Wiki
- Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI)
- Network Centric Warfare Solutions - Aeronautics Defense Systems
- NCW related article on Crosstalk - Defense Software Engineering Journal
- Army War College article: Principles of Warfare on the Network-Centric Battlefield
- http://www.globalsecurity.org
- NCW Topics on Defense Update
- C4I.org - Computer Security & Intelligence
- Network Centric Warfare on APA
- Network-Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC)
- Ericsson white paper: C4ISR for Network-Oriented Defense
- Understanding Network Centric Warfare
- Launching a new kind of warfare
- High-Tech Military in Due Course
- U.S. Air Force prepares to fight in cyberspace
- Swedish Defence Materiel Administration Network Based Defence site, including published technical documentation.
