Mutual assured destruction

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Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of strong weapons is essential to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the use of the very same weapons. The strategy is effectively a form of Nash Equilibrium, in which both sides are attempting to avoid their worst possible outcome — nuclear annihilation.

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[edit] Theory

The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants' total and assured destruction. It is now generally assumed that the nuclear fallout or nuclear winter resulting from a large scale nuclear war would bring about worldwide devastation, though this was not a critical assumption to the theory of MAD.

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with secondary forces (second strike) resulting in the destruction of both parties. The payoff of this doctrine is expected to be a tense but stable peace.

The primary application of this doctrine started during the Cold War (1950s to 1990s) in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the two power blocs while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s and as of 2007 the US and Russia (former USSR) are on relatively cordial terms, the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction certainly continues to be in force although it has receded from public discourse.

Proponents of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full scale nuclear exchange (as a functioning state). Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile silos, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

This MAD scenario is often known by the euphemism nuclear deterrence. The term deterrence was first used in this context after World War II; prior to that time, its use was limited to legal terminology.

[edit] History

[edit] Pre-1945

Echoes of the doctrine can be found in the first document which outlined how the atomic bomb was a practical proposition. In March 1940, the Frisch-Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combatting an enemy with nuclear weapons.

[edit] Early Cold War

In August, 1945, the United States ended World War II with the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Four years later, on August 9, 1949, the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapons. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the Convair B-36, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States was one of "massive retaliation", as coined by President Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, which called for massive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union truly developed an understanding of the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic missile submarine forces and work on Soviet ballistic missile submarines began in earnest. For the remainder of the Cold War, although official positions on MAD changed in the United States, the consequences of the second strike from ballistic missile submarines was never in doubt.

The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. With a MIRV payload, one ICBM could hold many separate warheads. MIRVs were first created by the United States in order to counterbalance Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems around Moscow. Since each defensive missile could only be counted on to destroy one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads (as with early MIRV systems) meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. One of the largest U.S. MIRVed missiles, the LG-118A Peacekeeper, could hold up to 10 warheads, each with a yield of around 300 kilotons - all together, an explosive payload equivalent to 230 Hiroshima-type bombs. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the technology available, leaving only the threat of retaliatory attack as a viable defensive option.

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. If we assume that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralising the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo. In this case, the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. It is because of this that this type of weapon was banned under the START II agreement.

In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, NATO planned to use tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons against Soviet forces, tactical or otherwise, was grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike. In effect, if the Soviet Union invaded Europe, the United States would stop the offensive with tactical nuclear weapons. Then, the Soviet Union would respond with a full-scale nuclear strike on the United States. The United States would respond with a full scale nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. As such, it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with apocalyptic conclusions.

[edit] Second strike capability

It was only with the advent of ballistic missile submarines, starting with the George Washington class in 1959, that a survivable nuclear force became possible and second strike capability credible. This was not fully understood until the 1960s when the strategy of mutually assured destruction was first fully described, largely by United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

In McNamara's formulation, MAD meant that nuclear nations either had first strike or second strike capability. A nation with first strike capability would be able to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another nation and thus prevent any nuclear retaliation. Second strike capability indicated that a nation could uphold a promise to respond to a nuclear attack with enough force to make such a first attack highly undesirable. According to McNamara, the arms race was in part an attempt to make sure that no nation gained first strike capability.

An early form of second strike capability had already been provided by the use of continual patrols of nuclear-equipped bombers, with a fixed number of planes always in the air (and therefore untouchable by a first strike) at any given time. The use of this tactic was reduced however, by the high logistic difficulty of keeping enough planes active at all times, and the increasing priority given to ICBMs over bombers (which might be shot down by air defenses before reaching their targets).

Ballistic missile submarines established a second strike capability through their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary - it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for example, a missile bunker with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their long range, high survivability and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were a credible means for retaliation even after a massive first strike.

[edit] Late Cold War

The original doctrine of U.S. MAD was modified on July 25, 1980 with U.S. President Jimmy Carter's adoption of countervailing strategy with Presidential Directive 59. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Russian population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total destruction of the USSR (and the USA). This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the Reagan Administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (nicknamed "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the USA.

SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies (including Margaret Thatcher) because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD. If America had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first strike capability which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics (including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist Andrei Sakharov) as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications.

[edit] Post Cold War

The fall of the Soviet Union has reduced tensions between Russia and the United States and between the United States and China. Although the administration of George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002, they claim that the limited national missile defense system which they propose to build is designed only to prevent nuclear blackmail by a state with limited nuclear capability and is not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.

While relations have warmed and a nuclear exchange is increasingly unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the post Cold War era has had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine. An article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that the United States could carry out a nuclear first strike on Russia and would "have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM." This was attributed to reductions in Russian nuclear stockpiles and the increasing inefficiency and age of that which remains. Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that U.S. is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy.[1]

However, in a followup article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including a U.S. official (the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy) who began by writing that "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record."[2] Regarding reductions in Russian stockpiles, another response stated that "a similarly one-sided examination of [reductions in] U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait".

As usual, a situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries, since Russia might feel forced to attempt a similar action first.

An outline of current United States nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence" in 1995.

[edit] MAD as official policy

Whether or not MAD was ever the officially accepted doctrine of the United States military during the Cold War is largely a matter of interpretation. The term MAD was not coined by the military but was, however, based on the policy of "Assured Destruction" advocated by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the 1960s. The U.S. Air Force, for example, has retrospectively contended that it never advocated MAD and that this form of deterrence was seen as one of a number of options in U.S. nuclear policy. Former officers have emphasized that they never felt as limited by the logic of MAD (and were prepared to use nuclear weapons in smaller scale situations than "Assured Destruction" allowed), and didn't deliberately target civilian cities (though they acknowledge that the result of a "purely military" attack would certainly devastate the cities as well). MAD was implied in a number of U.S. policies and used in the political rhetoric of leaders in both the USA and the USSR during many periods of the Cold War.

India and Pakistan are currently in a situation of mutually assured destruction. Both countries possess powerful nuclear weapons which can cause large scale destruction; this did not, however, prevent the Kargil war in 1999. Whether MAD has been responsible for current peace in the region has been a topic of debate.

[edit] Criticism and challengeable assumptions

Critics of the MAD doctrine note the similarity between the acronym and the common word for insane. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence depends on several challengeable assumptions:

Second-strike capability

  • A first strike must not be capable of preventing a retaliatory second strike or else mutual destruction is not assured. In this case, a state would have nothing to lose with a first strike; or might try to preempt the development of an opponent's second-strike capability with a first strike.

Perfect detection

  • No false positives (errors) in the equipment and/or procedures that must identify a launch by the other side. The implication of this is that an accident could lead to a full nuclear exchange. During the Cold War there were several instances of false positives, as in the case of Stanislav Petrov.
  • No possibility of camouflaging a launch. (ex: a launch from open ocean)
  • No alternate means of delivery other than a missile. For example, no covertly-placed devices in the target nation.
  • Perfect attribution. If there is a launch from the Sino-Russian border, it could be difficult to distinguish which nation is responsible and, hence, which nation to retaliate against.

Perfect rationality

  • No "rogue states" will develop nuclear weapons. Or, if they do, they will stop behaving as rogue states and subject themselves to the logic of MAD.
  • No rogue commanders will have the ability to corrupt the launch decision process.
  • All leaders with launch capability care about the survival of their subjects.
  • No leader with launch capability would strike first and gamble that the opponent's response system would fail.
  • No person possessing nuclear weapons capability will have a belief system that offers him peace and reward in an afterlife if he dies in a nuclear war of his own volition.

Inability to defend

  • No shelters sufficient to protect population and/or industry.
  • No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial protective gear. In fact, the development of an effective missile defense would render the MAD scenario obsolete as destruction would no longer be assured.

[edit] MAD in popular culture

The concept of MAD has been explored in numerous novels, television programmes and motion pictures.

The idea is central to the plot of the 1964 Stanley Kubrick film Dr. Strangelove, which deals with the notion of a "rogue commander" attacking on his own accord, as well as the concept of a "doomsday device" which will destroy the entire planet if attacked. The doomsday device was not an effective MAD device because the Soviets had not yet announced its existence to the Americans; they were "waiting for the Party Congress."

MAD is mentioned briefly in the Megadeth song Sweating Bullets. "Speak of mutually assured destruction?/Nice story ... Tell it to Reader's Digest !!!". The song is about Dissociative Identity Disorder which the narrator seems to have (Dave Mustaine) as he has a conversation with himself.

In the 1964 film Fail Safe directed by Sidney Lumet, American planes are sent to deliver a nuclear attack on Moscow, as a result of an electrical malfunction. An agreement is reached between the US President and Soviet Premier for mutual destruction of New York City as a proportional response to the destruction of Moscow.

In a 1967 episode of Star Trek: The Original Series, The Doomsday Machine, the Enterprise plays a game of cat and mouse with a deadly machine that consumes and destroys entire planets. The episode hypothetizes that the machine was designed for mutual assured destruction and further that the existence of one of these devices implies that there is another (presumably launched by the other side).

In the 1983 TV movie The Day After it is understood that the US have inflicted equal or even greater damage to the USSR resulting in a very quick ceasefire accord between the two ravaged superpowers. Dr. Huxley then quotes Albert Einstein : I do not know with what weapons World War 3 will be fought, but World War 4 will be fought with sticks and stones.

The graphic novel Watchmen, written by Alan Moore between 1986 and 1987, holds MAD as one of its main themes, as the novel takes place in an alternate 1985 where the United States and Russia are on the brink of a nuclear war presumed likely to result in the end of the world.

The self proclaimed "Gods of Electronic Rock and Roll", Sigue Sigue Sputnik, released their second album in 1988 entitled Dress for Excess. Track nine from this album is called M*A*D*-(Mutual Assured Destruction) and starts out with the Leonard Nimoy dialog (from Star Trek) explaining the M.A.D. doctrine.

In Westwood's Studios 1996 hit computer game Command & Conquer: Red Alert, the Soviet side has a M.A.D. Tank, that charges up on deployment. Upon releasing a seismic wave, it deals damage to all vehicles and buildings within range, both friend and foe, and destroys itself in the process.

In the August 22, 2006 episode of Eureka (TV series), two characters accidentally activate a forgotten death ray which was designed by the man who came up with—and almost won a Nobel Prize for—the theory of MAD. The death ray was designed to hit a mirror on the moon which would then focus the beam on its intended target.

Introversion Software's computer game Defcon is focused on the concept of nuclear war, and - in line with the concept of MAD - it is associated with the phrases "Nobody wins, but maybe you can lose the least" and "everybody dies".

The motion-picture WarGames also explores the concept with the creation of a computerized defense mechanism called W.O.P.R. (War Operations Planned Response, nick-named Joshua) that is programed by the Americans to respond through Artificial Intelligence to a full-scale nuclear attack. When a computer hacker accidentally simulates a Soviet nuclear launch the computer decides that sometimes the only winning move is NOT TO PLAY.

The 2000 film Thirteen Days directed by Roger Donaldson is set during the two-week Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962, and centers on how close the US administration came to ordering an attack on Cuba in response to presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba.

In the 2003 documentary film The Fog of War directed by Errol Morris, former US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara reflects on decisions during his time as Secretary. In referring to the Cuban Missile Crisis McNamara finds out years later that Fidel Castro was expecting the US to use nuclear weapons against Cuba, and he (Castro) had approval to employ a nuclear response, which he intended to use in case of a US attack. McNamara states "rational individuals... came this close (holding his fingers close together) to total destruction of their societies - and that danger exists today".

In Blackadder Goes Forth, Captain Blackadder, George and Baldrick have a discussion about how the Great War began. and Blackadder rounds the conversation off, saying: "The idea was that there would be two superpowers, us, France and Russia on one side, Germany and Austro-Hungary on the other, and we would form two massive military superpowers, that we would act as each others' deterrent, so there could never be a war. There was only one problem with the plan."

George: "What's that sir?"

Captain Blackadder: "It was bollocks."

In 2007's Silent War series from Marvel Comics, The Sentry (Robert Reynolds) discusses with King Blackbolt of the Inhumans about the potential for MAD if the superhumans of Earth and the Inhumans were to fight.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Keir A. Leber and Daryl G. Press The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, pp 42-55.
  2. ^ Peter C. W. Flory Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy? Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006

[edit] External links

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