Mozambican Tupolev Tu-134 air disaster
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The Mozambican presidential Tupolev Tu-134A aircraft crashed just inside South African territory on 19 October 1986. The aircraft was carrying Mozambican president Samora Machel and 33 others on a flight from Zambia to the Mozambique capital Maputo when it crashed in the Lebombo Mountains. Nine passengers survived the crash, but President Machel and twenty-four others died, including ministers and officials of the Mozambique government.
While there was widespread suspicion — both nationally and internationally — that the apartheid regime was implicated in the crash, no conclusive evidence to this effect has yet emerged.
[edit] South African actions prior to crash
1984
South Africa's State Security Council (SSC) meeting in January 1984 minuted a discussion of their Mozambican working group, which included General Jac Buchner and Major Craig Williamson, where assistance to RENAMO was discussed as a means of overthrowing the FRELIMO government of Mozambique. The TRC later included this minute as circumstantial evidence in their inconclusive report.
On 16 March 1984, the Nkomati Accord was signed at Komatipoort between South Africa and Mozambique. A clause in this agreement prohibited support of third-party resistance groups. In his commentary on the accord, South African foreign minister Pik Botha admitted in an SABC television interview that South Africa had offered limited support to RENAMO in the past.
1986
Around October 14, 1986 Mozambique was sharply criticised by South African general Magnus Malan for allegedly allowing terrorists to enter South Africa from its territory. Mozambique later cited these remarks as evidence to implicate South Africa in the air crash.
On October 18, 1986 Pik Botha and a number of high-ranking security officials met at Skwamans, a secret security police base shared with military intelligence (MI) operatives halfway between Mbuzini and Komatipoort. The meeting broke up later that day, and Botha departed in a small aircraft. This would later be revealed by a former MI officer at the 2001 TRC hearings.
[edit] Return from Zambia
On October 19, 1986 President Samora Machel returned from an international meeting in Zambia on Flight C9-CAA of the presidential Tupolev Tu-134A aircraft. Flight C9-CAA was approaching Maputo in the first hour after sunset and the flight crew were in relaxed discussion with one another, as revealed by the flight recorder.
[edit] A 37º turn
Around 19:10, 11 minutes prior to impact, at a height of 19,000ft the presidential aircraft made a 37º turn to the right, and headed in the wrong direction of Matsapa, Swaziland. The navigation facility for this turn was never identified. None of the crew, however, identified the facility to one another or to Maputo air traffic control. Rather than continuing over the Mozambican plain to Maputo’s airport near sea level, flight C9-CAA then headed towards the mountainous Lebombo region on the South African border.
The Soviet investigation team would later offer this deviation as evidence that the crew were led astray by a possible ‘decoy navigation beacon’. The Mozambican investigation team then pointed to the South African military camp near the crash site as the likely source, where they also claimed an electric generator was present. South Africa in turn identified the tents in question as a volleyball facility for soldiers.
[edit] Disorientation and confusion
Maputo air traffic control was said to have cleared the aircraft for a descent to 3,000ft, an altitude above any mountains of the region. While descending the pilot, Yuri Novodran, was alleged (by the South African-appointed Margo Commission) to have taken a rigid view as to the location of the airport and declined the indirect approach suggested by his crew.
Novodran, unable to discern the runway lights at Maputo Airport, decided they were not switched on and informed the air traffic controller: ‘Check your runway lights’. The controller misinterpreted this as “I check your lights” or “I see you”, and continued to clear the aircraft for landing. The Margo Commission concluded this was another alleged instance of pilot error.
[edit] Descent and impact
At 19:19:55, 1:45 minutes before impact, the aircraft descended to under 3,000ft. The Margo Commission concluded this was before clearance for landing was received. The aircraft continued to descend at regular intervals toward 2,000ft and lower altitudes for a direct approach to the runway without visual contact. The ground proximity warning system was activated but was ignored by the crew, because they believed they were in relatively flat territory. The Soviet investigation team later declared this to be a reasonable decision.
Flight C9-CAA then entered a military and operational zone in South Africa (a "special restricted airspace") which was under twenty-four hour radar surveillance by the sophisticated South African Plessey AR3-D radar system. However, no warning that the plane was off course or in South African airspace was given to the aircraft. This was revealed at the TRC hearings in 2001.
At 19:21:40 the aircraft made controlled impact with level ground at 230 knots at about 1,969ft altitude. The point of impact is near Mbuzini in the Lebombo Mountains of South Africa. The first witnesses at the crash scene were reported to have been Mozambican soldiers. According to the next day’s SABC news report, president Machel died instantly when the aircraft crashed. 24 other persons also died and 9 survived.
Captain Marques’s Boeing Flight C9-BAA approached Maputo 14 minutes behind Flight C9-CAA and apparently encountered no confusing radio beacon.
[edit] South African response
South Africa’s minister of Law and Order, Louis LaGrange, contacted South African foreign minister, Pik Botha, at 4:30 on October 20, 1989 to inform him of the crash. A Beeld newspaper report, however, claimed it was the SAP.
LaGrange revealed that ‘30 to 40 persons’ may have died which may include president Samora Machel and suggested ‘very sensitive handling’ of the situation. Pik Botha relayed the information to prime minister P.W. Botha and together they decided that Pik Botha should visit the scene as a matter of urgency.
In accordance with the South African Air Control Act, aircraft accidents are required to be investigated by the SA Department of Transport. Thus Pik Botha consulted Hendrik Schoeman of the Department of Transport, once Machel’s death was confirmed. After Botha and Schoeman had visited the crash site, Botha cited ‘special circumstances’, and other international protocols, as reasons to become involved.
[edit] On site investigation
The Mozambican government was informed of the situation and invited to send representatives to the border town of Komatipoort. Mozambican minister Sergio Viera joined Pik Botha at Komatipoort from where they departed by SAAF helicopter. The helicopter was only able to transport one of two members of the Civil Aviation Bureau, Mr. Pieter de Klerk, who was asked to offer guidance on site.
On arrival, Mozambican minister Sergio Viera asked for the documents that were taken from the aircraft to be handed to him. The SA commissioner of police, Johann Coetzee, had already made copies of these, and the documents were transferred to Viera. The SABC was permitted to take photos at the scene and to do on location reports, the only news agency allowed to do so. The South African government claimed that the Civil Aviation Bureau had no complaints about procedures followed at the site. Nonetheless, the flight and data recorders were removed by the South African Police who later refused to release them for independent inspection.
[edit] South African meddling
On the day after the crash, October 20, Mozambique and South Africa agreed that an international board of inquiry should be established with the participation of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Chicago Convention determined that South Africa, as the state on whose territory the crash had occurred, would head the investigation. South Africa was obliged to work in partnership with the state of ownership (Mozambique) and the state of manufacture (Soviet Union).
Twelve days following the crash, at 18:00 on 31 October 1986, Pik Botha convened an interdepartmental government meeting, nominally to discuss progress with the investigation, or more likely - after being accused by Hendrik Schoeman - of meddling with the investigation.
After the meeting, Pik Botha made press announcements to the effect that the aircraft was fitted with antiquated instruments and that tests on two dead crewmembers revealed excess alcohol content in their bloodstream. Pik Botha was reported to have told Lothar Neethling of the SAP to withhold the flight and black box recorders from inspection by both international and Civil Aviation Bureau investigators. Soviet and Mozambican investigators were thus placed at a disadvantage in their investigations.
[edit] Joint investigations
Director Rennie van Zyl of the Civil Aviation Bureau then served a writ on Botha and the SAP, and received the two recorders unceremoniously at 15:45 on November 11, 1986. The three international teams signed a protocol of secrecy on November 14, 1986 as Botha’s selective announcements were straining relations between the teams and governments. This allowed the teams to agree on the procedures they were to follow.
Nevertheless Botha reported to Beeld newspaper on November 24, 1986 that he had listened to Maputo air traffic control’s recordings and studied a transcription of them. These he acquired from Foreign Affair’s representative in the South African team.
[edit] The Margo Commission
The South African government established the Margo Commission, chaired by judge Cecil Margo, to investigate the accident. Pik Botha realised that negative international opinion was escalating around the matter and decided to appoint three international members of high standing to the commission. They were:
- US astronaut Frank Borman
- Geoffrey Wilkinson, former head of the British Department for Transport’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch
- Sir Edward Eveleigh, former chief justice of the British court of appeal
[edit] Margo Commission findings
The Margo commission’s findings were based mainly on the flight recorders, testimony by South African officials and the technical report submitted by the SA investigation team. The Soviet investigation team refused to take part in any public testimony and the Mozambican team also withdrew at the last moment.
The flight recorders gave excellent results, the cabin recorder especially revealing much about the interactions between crew members. The investigation was however delayed for several weeks by South African police general Lothar Neethling's refusal to hand the recorders over after he had seized them at the scene of the crash.
The commission also levelled criticism at Pik Botha for ‘ignoring civil aviation acts’. Botha was further accused of preventing aviation officials from reaching the crash site and of illegally transferring bodies to Mozambican officials. This was claimed to result in the loss of documents essential to a successful investigation.
The commission nevertheless concluded that:
- "the aircraft was airworthy and fully serviced,
- there is no evidence of sabotage or outside interference,
- the cause of the accident was that the flight crew failed to follow procedural requirements for an instrument let-down approach,
- the crew continued to descend under visual flight rules in darkness and some cloud without having contact with the minimum assigned altitude,
- the crew also ignored the Ground Warning Proximity alarm."
The Margo report was accepted by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
[edit] TRC report 2001
Fifteen years after the crash, in 2001, a special investigation into Machel's death was carried out by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC investigation was criticized for taking place in camera and without any aviation specialist being present. The testimony was further lead by a prominent radio journalist rather than a judge.
The TRC's investigation was inconclusive but pieces of circumstantial evidence were however collected, which led to questions concerning a number of Margo Commission findings. After testimony related to a ‘radio beacon in the mountains’ the TRC report concluded that the questions of a false beacon and the absence of a warning from the South African authorities would require further investigation by an appropriate structure.
[edit] Other investigations
- Independent investigation
Mozambique contracted an independent Canadian investigator. He questioned the theory that a radio beacon could be responsible for directing the aircraft on a wrong trajectory.[citation needed]
- South African Scorpions investigation
The Scorpions, a South African special police unit, reported in June 2003 that their investigation did not find evidence for South African complicity.[citation needed]
- 2006 SA Government investigation
The South African minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula asked on February 2, 2006 for the Machel death crash inquiry to be reopened. He told reporters in parliament that all of South Africa's law enforcement agencies were expected to be involved in the probe, in co-operation with their Mozambican counterparts.
- Soviet report
The Soviet delegation believed their expertise and experience were being undermined by the South Africans. They advanced the theory of complicity of South African security forces and the intentional diversion of the plane by a decoy navigation beacon, using technology supposedly provided by Israeli intelligence agents. It rejected the finding of the Margo Commission concerning the aircraft's ground proximity warning alarm.
- Graça Machel
Machel's widow, Graça Machel, who married Nelson Mandela in 1998, is convinced the air crash was no accident and has dedicated her life to tracking down her late husband's killers.
[edit] References
- Beeld newspaper, November 24, 1986
- Final Postponement, Reminiscences of a crowded life, C. Margo (Johannesburg: JonathanBall, 1998) ISBN 186842071X
- A Morte de Samora Machel, João M. Cabrita (Maputo: Novafrica, 2005)
- Mail & Guardian, online edition, February 10, 2006
- C9-CAA se doodsvlug sal altyd bly spook. Die mites oor Machel. Beeld newspaper, October 20, 2006
- Sonder bewyse sal Machel-omstredenheid net voortduur. Beeld newspaper, October 25, 2006
