Mohammed Sulaymon Barre

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Mohammed Sulaymon Barre (born December 27, 1964) is from Somaliland, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] His detainee ID number is 567. He was born in Burco, Somaliland.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Barre chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[2]

Barre's Tribunal convened on October 29, 2004.^[3]

[edit] Witness requests

Barre had requested the testimony of three witnesses.

Abdul Aziz Al Matrafi, alleged to have been one of the founders of al Wafa, a charity accused of ties to terrorism, declined to testify on Barre's behalf.

The other two witnesses Barre had requested were also detainees he was told were associated with al Wafa. He had requested their testimony to establish that he was not associated with al Wafa. But, he withdrew his requests after his Personal Representative met with them, and they stated they weren't associated with al Wafa either. The transcript does not record their names or ID numbers.

[edit] Allegations

The allegations against the detainees was always supposed to be read out to the detainee at the beginning of the Tribunal. Most detainees were invited to hear the alledgations read out again, one at a time, giving them an opportunity to respond to each allegation in turn. Most of the transcripts of detainees who agreed to this offer contained the allegations as they were read aloud. Barre's transcript does not record whether this offer was made to him. And the allegations against him are not recorded in the transcript. However some of the allegations are paraphrased in the questions and answers exchanged.

a. -- The general summary of the allegations that establish an association with terrorism were missing from the transcript. --

1. ...traveled from Somalia to Pakistan in 1994.
2. ...worked for the Dehabshiil Company ^[sic].
3. ...alleges that since his phone number was found on a suspicious list he has ties to al Wafa.

[edit] Testimony

Barre described the circumstances under which he traveled to Pakistan.^[2] His country was in the middle of a civil war. He was a student, and he was cut off from his family. The area where he lived was a battleground, and when he fled the United Nations helped him relocate to an official refugee camp in Pakistan. After some years in Pakistan he started working for the Dehabshiil Company.

The Dehabshiil Company is a money transfer company that allows Somalian expatriates to transfer money to and from Somalia. Barre said that the company had multiple offices, around the world, whereever there were a large number of Somalian expatriates. The company had internet sites, and his name and email address were listed on the site, to help customers contact him. Barre questioned whether his company could be on the list of organizations suspected of ties with terrorism, because the USA had taken no steps to shut down the Dehabshiil Company's offices in the USA.

Barre pointed out that his phone number was readily available on the internet. He argued that if someone associated with al Wafa had written down his phone number did not mean he had been involved in a questionable money transfer, or even that the al Wafa suspect had taken the next step, and actually phoned him.

Barre's Personal Representative provided the Tribunal with printouts from the then current Dehabshiil web-site.^[4] The printouts confirmed Barre's account that Dehabshiil was a legitimate organization that continued to operate legally in the USA, and that the phone numbers and email addresses of the agents were available on the web-site. The Dahabshiil web-site currently has a prominent anti-money-laundering policy.^[5]

[edit] Barre's account of his capture and the conditions of his detention

According to Barre, he had been visited by Pakistani intelligence officers three times before he was taken into custody. Barre said he wasn't worried by these interviews because he knew he hadn't done anything wrong. He was taken into custody, from his home, around 3am, November 1, 2001.

Barre said that he was treated humanely during his first four months in Pakistani custody. His interrogators said that the large number of international calls was what had drawn suspicion on him, but it was readily explained by the nature of his work. He thought his release was imminent.

However, rather than being released he was blindfolded and transferred to American custody, with three other men. Barre told his Tribunal he believed he was sold for a bounty, based on trumped up allegations.

He spent time in American prisons in Kandahar and then Bagram, where he was tortured:

"They interrogated me and one of the interrogators told me I was from al-Wafa and I needed to confess to that. You have no choice. I told them it wasn't true. They pressured me. They were whispered something then spoke to the guard. The guard came in, grabbed me by my neck and threw me. He took me in a bad way to isolation. AH my blankets, except one, were taken from me. It was freezing cold. They didn't feed me lunch and sometimes they didn't feed me twice. At night it is very cold and if you don't eat dinner it gets colder. This torture lasted fifteen to twenty days. My feet and hands were swollen. I wasn't able to stand because I was in so much pain. I asked for treatment and an interrogator brought a nurse and asked if I wanted treatment. They told me they could cut my legs to stop the pain. They did this so I would confess to the accusations that I didn't do. Nothing happened. After the torture ended, I met another interrogator who told me- injustice was done to me and I didn't have anything to do with this. He said he would do a report so I could go home. He told me I would be released. Suddenly, I was taken back to Kandahar and then to Cuba. The investigations and interrogations continue to this day and the accusation is still made against me. During the time I was here, the interrogators have never accused me of being from al-Wafa. When my Personal Representative gave me the Unclassified Summary I thought the accusation was cleared up until I saw it back on the paper."

Many other detainees have reported extremely abusive interrogation techniques being practiced at Bagram. Two prisoners died as a direct result of the abusive techniques practiced there.

Main article: Bagram torture and prisoner abuse

The transcripts of some other detainees who reported torture or abuse record their Tribunal's President advising them that the abuse they reported would be drawn to the attention of the appropriate military authorities. Barre's transcript does not record any reaction from the Tribunal's officer to his account of his abuse.

[edit] Barre's response the questioning from the Tribunal's officers

The Tribunal's President asked Barre: "Were you aware of the Due Diligence Policy after the 11 September attacks?" -- When Barre didn't understand, he rephrased his question: "Did you received ^[sic] training on 'Know Your Customer' procedures?"

Barre replied that he had not received this training. He suggested that the training might have happened following his capture. He said, "...the orders usually came to me via the fax.machine."

Barre said his immediate supervisor was the company's President, a man named Mohammed Said.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Barre chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[6]

The factors favoring continued detention were always further classified into sub-categories, and numbered within those sub-categories. The categories and numbering weren't preserved in Barre's transcript.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

• The detainee worked for the Dahabshiil Company in Karachi, Pakistan.
• Dahabshiil is closely related to Al-Barakat, a Somali financial company designated by the United States Government as a terrorist finance facilitator. Following Al-Barakaat’s designation and shutdown, Dahabshiil took over much of Al-Barakaat’s business.
• The detainee was identified as a member of the non-governmental organization al Wafa.
• The al Wafa organization has been identified as a terrorist organization on the United States’ State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion list.
• The non-governmental organization al Wafa reportedly was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahidin.
• The detainee received a Tablighi Jamiat Visa ^[sic] to Pakistan.
• Jama’at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization that is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, to include ^[sic] members of al Qaida.
• The detainee ran an illegal money transfer business out of his home.
• Some of the detainee’s counterparts in the United States did not have licenses. They were operating illegally, also out of their houses. In addition, there was reason to believe that the detainee had contact with people involved in the support network for al Qaida.
• The detainee lied to obtain his three-month Pakistani visa.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.

The detainee, during his oral Combatant Status Review Tribunal statement, stated that he had no knowledge of al Wafa until he entered prison in Pakistan.

[edit] Barre's Response to the factors

[edit] Barre's refugee status

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees wrote the Pentagon, on December 20, 2006, seeking information on why Barre, and another man were being detained in Guantanamo.^[7] The UNHCR had not known until December 2006 that the Americans were holding internationally recognized refugees in Guantanamo. Barre was granted UN refugee status in Pakistan in 1994. Mammar Ameur was granted UN refugee status in Pakistan in 1996. A third captive, Fethi Boucetta, was one of the 38 captives who was determined not have been an "enemy combatant" after all.

[edit] Al Barakat removed from the USA's watchlist of organizations tied to terrorism

One of the justifications for Barre's continued detention was that American intelligence analysts suspected that Dershabiil, the Somalia-based hawala he worked for had ties to Al Barakat, another Somalia-based hawala that had its assets frozen, and some of its agents arrested, because it was suspected of laundering money for terrorists. On August 28, 2006 the BBC reported that Al Barakat had been removed from the US terrorist organization watchlist.^[8] The BBC's report stated that al Barakat made the watchlist because American intelligence analysts had suspected it had been used to finance the 9-11 hijackers, but that the 911 Commission had investigated this theory and found it baseless. Some al Barakat agents were also individually listed as suspected terrorist. The owner of al Barakat, Ahmed Nur Ali Jimaale, said that the company's agent in Sweden was the last to be cleared of suspicion.

[edit] References

1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b} Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 30-37
3. ^ Guantanamo Bay Panel Hears Three Cases, mirror of Associated Press, October 29, 2004
4. ^ Dahashiil's web-site
5. ^ Dahabshiil's anti-money-laundering policy
6. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 144-156
7. ^ Carol Rosenberg. "U.N. refugee agency seeking information on 2 detainees", Kansas City Star, Monday January 29, 2007. Retrieved on February 7.
8. ^ "US ends Somali banking blacklist", BBC, August 28, 2006. Retrieved on February 24.