Military doctrine

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Military doctrine is a level of military planning between national strategy and unit-level tactics, techniques, and procedures. It provides a shared way of thinking about military problems, but does not direct how military problems will be solved. It does not provide specific steps to solve a problem, nor does it direct a commander to take any action. Commanders are always expected to exercise their own judgment in carrying out their missions.

Doctrine may be shared among the armed services of a nation as well as be specific to a branch. In addition, doctrine may be shared between several nations.

In general, doctrinal documents state:

  • A nation's national military objectives
  • The general mission of the armed service or branch ("who we are")
  • General concepts of how this service or branch shall perform its mission ("what we do")
  • Concerns and cautions in carrying out this mission ("how we should do it")
  • Historical examples ("how we did it in the past")

Military doctrine changes, or should change, as the nature of warfare and the specific threat to a nation changes.

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[edit] Relationship between doctrine and strategy

The relationship between military doctine and national security strategy is highly complex. In principle, military doctine should complement national security. However, in practice changing or implementing a military doctrine is a highly complex and time consuming activity that can take years or decades, and hence the same military doctine is often used to attempt to support radically different security strategies.

In addition, the question of what a nation should do is often influenced by what it can do, so in this sense military doctine often influences security strategy.

[edit] Sources of United States doctrine

United States military doctrine is specified in a set of documents which are intended to support the National Security Strategy of the United States. America's military doctrine is spelled out in the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Most Modern US doctrine is based around the Rapid Dominance doctrine, better known as Shock and Awe. Created by the National Defense University, Shock and Awe is based on "overwhelming decisive force" to dominate and paralyze an enemy force and weaken its will to fight. This doctrine was first unveiled in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The Department of Defense publishes Joint Publications which state all-services doctrine. The current basic doctrinal publication is Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations.

Headquarters, United States Air Force, publishes current USAF doctrine. The lead agency for developing Air Force doctrine is Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center; the Air Staff International Standardization Office works on multinational standardization, such as NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), and agreements between the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies and Navies (ABCA) that affect the Air Force. Currently the basic Air Force doctrinal documents are the 10-series of Air Force publications.

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for developing Army doctrine. TRADOC was developed early in the 1970s as a response to the American Army's difficulties in the Vietnam War, and is one of the reforms that improved Army professionalism. Currently the basic Army doctrinal document is Field Manual 1, "The Army".

The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) Doctrine Department coordinates development, publication, and maintenance of United States Navy doctrine. Currently the basic unclassified naval doctrinal documents are Naval Doctrine Publications 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6.

Headquarters, United States Coast Guard, published Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, which is the source of USCG doctrine.

[edit] Military Doctrine in the Soviet Union

The Soviet meaning of military doctrine was much different from U.S. military usage of the term. Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Grechko defined it in 1975 as 'a system of views on the nature of war and methods of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and army for war, officially adopted in a given state and its armed forces.' In Soviet times, theorists emphasised both the political and 'military-technical' sides of military doctrine, while from the Soviet point of view, Westerners ignored the political side. However the political side of Soviet military doctrine, Western commentators Harriet F Scott and William Scott said, 'best explained Soviet moves in the international arena'.[1]

The Soviet Army, especially during and after World War II had the commissar system in place. Any mid-level to senior officer would be paired up with a commisar, or zampolit of the same rank who could countermand any of the officer's orders. (This is clearly depicted in the book Hunt for the Red October in which the commander of the submarine Marko Ramius is forced to work with, but later kills his commissar equivalent Political Officer Ivan Yurevich Putin.)

These men ensured the military was under the thumb of the Party, but they also provided a serious tactical liability due to the fact they had no real military ability. Zampolits also worked directly for Moscow and the Kremlin so they were not held responsible for military failure the way the actual commander would be.

Another function of comissars was to enforce Soviet will on the soldiers.

Soviet military doctrine could be flexible and original, but the large numbers of conscripts and the casualties of World War II often led to an inflexibility of tactics.

[edit] British Army doctrine

British Army doctrine is prepared under the supervision of the Chief of the General Staff. Currently the basic doctrinal document is Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine, published in 1996.

[edit] See also

[edit] References and links

  1. ^ Scott and Scott, 1979, p.37,59
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