Metapolitefsi

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The Metapolitefsi (Greek: Μεταπολίτευση, translated as polity or regime change) refers to the period in Greek history after the fall of the Greek military junta of 1967-1974 and includes the transitional period from the fall of the dictatorship to the Greek legislative elections of 1974 as well as the democratic period immediately after these elections.

The long course towards the metapolitefsi began with the disputed liberalization plan of George Papadopoulos, the head of the military dictatorship. This process was opposed by prominent politicians, such as Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Stephanos Stephanopoulos. Papadopoulos' plan was halted with the Athens Polytechnic uprising, a massive demonstration of popular rejection of the Greek military junta, and the counter coup staged by Dimitrios Ioannides.

Ioannidis' failed coup d'état against the elected president of Cyprus, Makarios III, and the subsequent Turkish invasion resulted in the fall of the dictatorship and the appointment of an interim government, known as the "national unity government", led by former prime minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis. Karamanlis legalized the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and formed a new party named New Democracy, which won the elections of 1974.

[edit] Prologue

[edit] Papadopoulos' liberalization process: The metapolitefsi that never was

A metapolitefsi that failed: Spyros Markezinis taking the oath of office during Papadopoulos' attempt at metapolitefsi under the watchful eyes of George Papadopoulos. Vice President Odysseas Angelis is also present at the ceremony

In September 1973, George Papadopoulos, the head of the military junta that took power in 1967, initiated an attempt at metapolitefsi or process of liberalisation, aiming to legitimize his government and rehabilitate its image as an international pariah. Feeling confident of his grasp on power after six years of dictatorship (during which he appointed himself to a multitude of high echelon government positions including Regent), he appointed Spiros Markezinis as Prime Minister of Greece, entrusting him with the task of leading Greece to parliamentary rule. Papadopoulos however proposed a constitution that accorded far greater powers to the President of Greece (a position Papadopoulos also held) than those of the Parliament.^[1][2]

Under the condition that Papadopoulos would curtail any military interference that could hinder the process, Spiros Markezinis was the only old guard politician prepared to assist in the controversial mission of helping the transition to some form of parliamentary rule.^[2] Having secured quasi-dictatorial presidential powers under the new constitution, Papadopoulos not only acquiesced but ordered a wide range of liberalization measures, including the abolision of martial law, the easing of press censorship and the release political prisoners.^[1][2]

Ostensibly free elections were announced soon after, in which political formations including part of the traditional left, but not the Communist Party of Greece (which was banned during the Greek Civil War), were expected to participate.^[2]

Papadopoulos failed to convince the better part of the old political elite, including politicians such as Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, to participate in his liberalization attempt. Most old guard politicians could not condone the fact that some of their colleagues were to remain excluded from the political process. Moreover, they were opposed to the concentration of powers delegated to the President,^[2] and resented having been demonized by Papadopoulos' junta as palaiokommatistes (meaning antiquated party men) during the previous six years.

[edit] A nervous transition

A transition from one form of government to another, especially from dictatorship to democracy, is typically difficult and fraught with uncertainty and anxiety for the country that undertakes it. Greece's transition was no different as the military, political elites and students sought to affirm their respective positions in society. In particular, the student movement in Greece had been repressed by the dictatorship and student activists were marginalized and suppressed in the name of anti-communism. Early student activism during the dictatorship included the self-immolation in 1970 of Geology student Kostas Georgakis in Genoa, Italy, in protest against the junta. His action served to demonstrate the depth of the resistance and resentment against the regime.

Student activism in Greece was traditionally strong and, unlike in some dictatorships where democracy was a distant dream, had a long and established record of action in democratic times and, more importantly, it possessed the memory of past democratic action. In addition, the stiff constraints imposed by the rigid and artificial Papadopoulos transition upon the democratic body politic of Greece antagonized not only the politicians but also the intelligentsia, whose primary exponents were the students.^[1][2]

Not unexpectedly, in November 1973 the Athens Polytechnic uprising broke out starting with the usual student protest tactics such as building occupations and radio broadcasts. The student uprising is believed to have been spontaneous, and not orchestrated by any particular political group in Greece. In fact, a smaller uprising had preceded it two weeks earlier at the Athens Law School and it was still active even as events at the Polytechnic were unfolding.^[3]

Unlike a previous strike in the Athens law school in February 1973, prior to their liberalisation attempt, where the regime negotiated at length with the students and bloodshed was avoided, in November 1973 the regime made no attempt to negotiate with the students.^[1] At the same time the students taking part in the smaller law school demonstration moved into the Polytechnic, as the events there gathered momentum.^[3]

[edit] Tragedy as political experiment: A turning point

The end of the Papadopoulos liberalization experiment: An AMX 30 tank standing in front of the Athens Polytechnic. Eventually, this vehicle would crush the campus gates on November 17, 1973, putting a violent end to the student uprising and ending hopes of a peaceful democratic transition.

In normal (democratic) times, such a protest might have been defused using tactics based on usual historical precedents such as negotiations with student leaders, and failing that, resorting to using normal crowd control methods followed by more negotiations, as the regime had done with the law students some weeks before.^[1]

However, this student protest happened in the middle of the uncertain political experiment of transition from dictatorship to democracy. Given that the main engineer of the transition, Papadopoulos, did not have much experience in democratic transitions, the unfolding events were hard to predict or manage for everyone involved.

In failing to negotiate, the junta made martyrs out of the Polytechnic students. This in turn gave the student protest momentum and it eventually evolved into a near-universal demonstration against the dictatorship. At that point, the transitional government panicked,^[2] sending a tank crashing through the gates of the Athens Polytechnic. Soon after that, Markezinis himself had the humiliating task to request Papadopoulos to re-impose martial law.^[2] The student protests were the first sign that Papadopoulos' attempt at "liberalisation" in Greece had begun to fail.

The inherent contradictions of the coup, carefully suppressed during the dictatorship, became much more visible during the regime's attempt at democratisation.^[4] In its strident anti-communism, the junta was opposed by large sections of Greek society which wished to overcome the trauma of the Greek Civil War. Despite his best intentions, Papadopoulos had to be divisive and anti-communist from the beginning because otherwise his coup d'état would not have made sense.^[5]

[edit] Back to (dictatorial) orthodoxy

The events at Athens Polytechnic unfolded precisely as the dictatorship's more staunch members had hoped.^[1] Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, leader of a junta within the junta, was disdainful of Papadopoulos, his perceived move to democracy, and his pursuit of a foreign policy more independent of the United States.^[1]

Ioannides, a man with an established anti-democratic record,^[6] seized the opportunity. On 25 November 1973 he used the uprising as a pretext to stage a counter coup that overthrew Papadopoulos and put an abrupt end to Markezinis' attempt at transition to democratic rule. In fact, his coup was planned months prior to the events at the Polytechnic.^[1]

Ioannidis proceeded to arrest Markezinis and Papadopoulos, cancelled the elections, reinstated martial law and appointed General Phaedon Gizikis, as the new president.

Unlike Papadopoulos, Ioannides was not particularly concerned with legal or democratic processes. He was prepared for a dictatorship of thirty or more years.^[1] Being a more orthodox dictator and thinking in simpler terms than Papadopoulos, he solved the dilemma on how to achieve a democratic transition in a simpler way: he dropped the plan completely.^[7]

[edit] The new junta: Enter Ioannides

Left to right: Gizikis, Papadopoulos and Ioannides in happier times

Previous to seizing power, Ioannides preferred to work in the background and he never held any formal office in the junta. Now he was the de facto leader of the regime.^[6][8] The new government pursued an aggressive internal crackdown and an expansionist foreign policy.

[edit] The Ioannidis method

At his frequent press conferences during his rule, Papadopoulos often used the patient in a cast analogy to describe his assault on the body politic of Greece. He usually answered questions on the topic of democratic transition from the press by referring to the patient analogy in a humourous and jovial manner.^[9] He used to say that he put the patient (Greece) in a cast ("ασθενή στον γύψο" literally: patient in gypsum) so that he could fix her skeletal (implying political) structure.^[10] This analogy aside, Papadopoulos at least indicated his intention of ending military rule once the political system had recovered to his satisfaction and that the treatment would progress on some legal and political basis.^[7]

In contrast, Ioannides did not talk to the press and did not offer any analogies for his proposed treatment. But through his actions one can determine that the cast analogy did not serve his purposes any longer. Ioannidis therefore abandoned the patient in a cast analogy that Papadopoulos offered in order to make a political statement that no democratic transition would take place during his tenure in power. This also indicated that Ioannides was not concerned about legal formalities.^[7]

[edit] Inside the ESA chambers

Ioannides' main instrument of fear was the dreaded interrogators of the Greek Military Police (EAT/ESA, Greek: ΕΑΤ/ΕΣΑ:^[7] Ειδικόν Ανακριτικόν Τμήμα Ελληνικής Στρατιωτικής Αστυνομίας translated as: Special Interrogation Unit of the Greek Military Police). Using EAT/ESA offices and prison cells as torture chambers he launched an all out assault on Greek civil society.^[11][7]

He moved quickly to stifle any dissent and re-instituted repressive measures such as censorship, expulsions, arbitrary detentions and torture, performing these with far greater rigour than Papadopoulos regime.^[7] Gone was the usual anti-communist pretext. Artists, painters, intellectuals who had publicly expressed anti-junta sentiments or created a work that criticized the junta, were automatically dispatched to the nearest neighbourhood EAT/ESA centre. Ioannides' government possessed all the hallmarks of a police state.

People were held incommunicado and without EAT/ESA notifying anyone for weeks or months on end and were only allowed limited communication thereafter with their families through the Greek Red Cross, a function that it normally performs in wartime and for enemy prisoners. Loud music blared from the detention centres in order to suppress the screams of the victims.^[7]

However, according to Ioannides, his regime was successful. Unlike Papadopoulos who tried to take the patient out of the cast, under Ioannidis the vital signs of the Greek body politic were barely perceptible.

[edit] Foreign policy by coup

Having successfully terrorized the population, the "junta nova" tried to realise its foreign policy ambitions by launching a military coup against President Makarios III of Cyprus. Gizikis, as usual, obliged by issuing the order for the coup on Ioannides' behalf. ^[12]

Makarios was at the time both Archbishop and President of Cyprus. He was deposed by military coup on July 15, 1974 and replaced by Nikos Sampson. However the coup backfired as Turkey reacted with Operation Atilla on July 20; the Turkish invasion of Cyprus had began.

This military disaster for Greece was the final straw for Ioannides who had already instigated or participated in three coups in seven years, a record in modern Greek history.

[edit] The post invasion paralysis and the Metapolitefsi paradox

Immediately after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus the dictators, not expecting such a disastrous outcome, finally decided that Ioannides' approach was catastrophic for the interests of the country. The complete rationale for their subsequent actions, even to this day, is not known. Analysis of their motives can improve with time as new details come to the fore.

However indications of panic and indecision were manifestly evident from the reaction of the Greek public as they raided supermarkets fearing an all out war with Turkey and sensing the inability of the junta to govern, as well as the anxious attempts of the junta members to communicate with and surrender power to the very same members of the democratic Establishment of Greece that they had demonized and maligned as palaiokommatistes (meaning old party system men) for seven years.

They had also worked hard during their seven years in power to create a New Greece (Νέα Ελλάδα) under the slogan of Ellas Ellinon Christianon (translated as Greece of the Christian Greeks,^[10] completely devoid of any link with the old party system and its politicians .^[13] Now they were ready to relinquish this vision to the old guard.

This paradox is at the centre of the phenomenon known as Metapolitefsi.

[edit] Deus ex machina

Konstantinos Karamanlis arrives in Athens on the French Presidential jet, courtesy of French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to assume the leadeship of government of national unity that would lead to free elections. He is greeted by a jubilant crowd of supporters craving for the restoration of democratic rule.

Greece is the birthplace of the Theatre as well as Democracy. In ancient theatrical plays every time the plot got too tangled for a rational resolution, catharsis (Greek for cleansing i.e. resolution as in cleaning up the mess) came in the form of a god (Deus ex machina (translated from Latin as God from the machine)), that descended from above with the aid of mechanical devices such as levers, cranes and pulleys i.e. from a machine, and dispensed resolution to even the most complex of predicaments.

The post-invasion plot of the Greek political scene in 1974 resembled that of an ancient drama.^[5]

It also came with its own Deus ex machina (Greek: Από μηχανής Θεός). The machine this time was more modern, it was a jet and there was no actor but a well trusted and famous politician. The function however was the same: Catharsis.^[5]

[edit] Prelude to Catharsis

Following the Cyprus invasion by the Turks, the dictators finally abandoned Ioannides and his policies. On the July 23, 1974, President Gizikis called a meeting of old guard politicians, including Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Spiros Markezinis, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Evangelos Averoff and others. The heads of the armed forces also participated in the meeting. The agenda was to appoint a national unity government that would lead the country to elections.^[13]

Former Prime Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos was originally suggested as the head of the new interim government. He was the democratically elected Prime Minister originally deposed by the dictatorship and a distinguished veteran politician who had repeatedly criticized Papadopoulos and his successor. Raging battles were still taking place in Cyprus' north when Greeks took to the streets in all the major cities, celebrating the junta's decision to relinquish power before the war in Cyprus could spill all over the Aegean.^[13] But talks in Athens were going nowhere with Gizikis' offer to Panayiotis Kanellopoulos to form a government.^[13]

Metapolitefsi at its dawn: Junta President Phaedon Gizikis and the heads of the armed forces convene with old guard politicians to relinquish power to democratic rule.

Nonetheless, after all the other politicians departed without reaching a decision, Evangelos Averoff remained in the meeting room and further engaged Gizikis. He insisted that Constantine Karamanlis, prime minister of Greece from 1955 to 1963, was the only political personality who could lead a successful transition government, taking into consideration the new circumstances and dangers both inside and outside the country. Gizikis and the heads of the armed forces initially expressed reservations, but they finally became convinced by Averoff's arguments.^[13] Admiral Arapakis was the first, among the participating military leaders, to express his support for Karamanlis. After Averoff's decisive intervention, Gizikis decided to invite Karamanlis to assume the premiership. Throughout his stay in France, Karamanlis was a thorn at the side of the junta because he possessed the credibility and popularity they lacked both in Greece and abroad and he also criticized them very often. Now he was called to end his self imposed exile and restore Democracy to the place that originally created it.^[13]

Upon news of his impending arrival cheering Athenian crowds took to the streets chanting: "Ερχεται! Ερχεται!" "Here he comes! Here he comes!"^[13] Similar celebrations broke out all over Greece. Athenians in the thousands also went to the airport to greet him.^[14]

Karamanlis returned to Athens on the French President's Lear Jet made available to him by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a close personal friend, and was sworn-in as Prime Minister under President Phaedon Gizikis who remained temporarily in power for legal continuity reasons.

Despite being faced with an inherently unstable and dangerous political situation, which forced him to sleep aboard a yacht watched over by a naval destroyer for several weeks after his return, Karamanlis moved swiftly to defuse the tension between Greece and Turkey, which came on the brink of war over the Cyprus crisis, and begin the process of transition from military rule to a pluralist democracy.^[3]

[edit] Metapolitefsi through Democracy: The transition that worked

[edit] Strategy of democratization

Metapolitefsi day one: Konstantinos Karamanlis taking the oath of office during metapolitefsi under the watchful eyes of Phaedon Gizikis on 24th July 1974 at 4:15 a.m. Ironically, they stand at the same place and in the same hall Markezinis stood less than a year before during his swearing in ceremony

The events that led to metapolitefsi and the traditional weaknesses of the Greek political and social institutions were not conducive to a comprehensive strategy towards democracy.^[15] The civil society was not prepared to articulate a transition strategy "from below" and the groups of resistance were fragmented, despite their political glamor. Therefore the transition process became a "from above" project, whose weight had to fall on the shoulders of Karamanlis.^[15]

Karamanlis first legalized the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) that was constantly demonized by the junta, cleverly using this political move as an easy differentiator between the stubborn junta rigidity on the matter that smacked of totalitarianism and his own realpolitik approach honed by years of practicing democracy. The legalization of the Communist Party was also meant as a gesture of political inclusionism and rapprochement. At the same time Karamanlis also freed all political prisoners and pardoned all political crimes against the junta.^[4] This approach was warmly received by the people, long weary of junta divisive polemics. Following through with his reconciliation theme he also adopted a measured approach to removing collaborators and appointees of the dictatorship from the positions they held in government bureaucracy, and, wanting to officially inaugurate the new democratic era in Greek politics as soon as possible, declared that elections would be held in November 1974, a mere four months after the collapse of the Régime of the Colonels. This statesmanlike approach pleased the right as well as the left and greatly lowered the political temperature of the country. It is also another reason why the Democracy driven metapolitefsi worked.

In the legislative election of 1974, Karamanlis with his newly formed conservative party, not coincidentally named New Democracy (Greek: Νέα Δημοκρατία), transliterated in English as: Nea Demokratia) obtained a massive parliamentary majority and was elected Prime Minister. The elections were soon followed by the 1974 plebiscite on the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the Third Hellenic Republic, the televised 1975 trials of the former dictators who received death sentences for high treason and mutiny that were later commuted to life incarceration.^[16] The adoption of the Constitution of 1975 by the newly elected Hellenic Parliament solemnized the new era of democratic governance. The parliamentary committee that proposed the draft constitution was presided by Constantine Tsatsos, an Academician, former minister and close friend of Karamanis, who served as the first elected President of Greece (after metapolitefsi) from 1975 to 1980.

[edit] First years after transition

New Democracy went on to win the Greek legislative election, 1977, and Karamanlis continued to serve as Prime Minister until May 10, 1980, when he succeeded Tsatsos as President of Greece and then cohabited for four years (1981-1985) with his fierce political opponent and leader of PASOK, the Greek socialist party, prime minister Andreas Papandreou. PASOK and Papandreou captured the sizeable center-left current in Greece, which emerged from fragmented resistance groups that were active during the dictatorship.

The political and social views expounded by PASOK were in antithesis to the centre-right policies followed by the conservative government of ND (1974-1981). According to Ino Afentouli, the political expression of the metapolitefsi, namely the coming to power of a conservative leader such as Karamanlis, did not correspond to the changes which had in the meantime befallen Greek society. Thereby, this current often opposed ND's governments, disdained the old centrist political elite expressed by Center Union - New Forces (and its leader Georgios Mavros) and prompted the rise to power of PASOK and Papandreou in the elections of 1981.^[17] Since 1974 Papandreou challenged Karamanlis' choices and objected to his dominant role in defining post-1974 democracy, while others political forces of the opposition, such as Center Union - New Forces and EDA occasionally offered him an inconsistent support, especially during 1974-1977.^[15]

In the elections of 1981 Papandreou used as slogan the catch word change (Greek: αλλαγή). Some analysts, including Afentouli, regard PASOK's victory under Papandreou as a culmination of the metapolitefsi of 1974, given that the fall of the junta had not been accompanied by the rise of new political powers, but rather by the resumption of power by the old guard politicians.^[17] However Karamanlis' substantial contribution to metapolitefsi is widely acknowledged.

[edit] Citations and notes