Lufti Bin Swei Lagha

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Lufti Bin Swei Lagha is a citizen of Tunisia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] Lagha's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 660. The Department of Defense reports that he was born on November 28, 1968 in Tunis, Tunisia.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Allegations

During the winter and spring of 2005 the Department of Defense complied with a Freedom of Information Act request, and released five files that contained 507 memoranda which each summarized the allegations against a single detainee. These memos, entitled "Summary of Evidence" were prepared for the detainee's Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The detainee's names and ID numbers were redacted from all but one of these memos, when they were first released in 2005. But some of them contain notations in pen. Approximately four dozen of the memos have a notation specifying the detainee's ID number. One of the memos had a notation, in pen, specifying Lagha's detainee ID.[2] The allegations he would have faced, during his Tribunal, were:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
  1. The detainee traveled from Italy to Afghanistan via Iran arriving in April 2001, after being inspired to perform jihad.
  2. The detainee associated with several Tunisians at a cultural center in Northern Italy, and frequented elements of the Jama'at al Tablighi [sic].
  3. Among those who frequented the cultural center was at least one individual that belonged to a terrorist network that ensures financial support to terrorist groups while also actively recruiting for Usama Bin Laden sponsored training camps in Afghanistan.
  4. Jama'at al Tablighi [sic], a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
  5. The detainee was sent by the head of the terrorist network for military training in Afghanistan. He traveled, with a companion, to Afghanistan in early 2001.
  6. This companion is a member of the terrorist network and a convicted terrorist.
  7. The detainee received training at a paramilitary training camp.

[edit] Testimony

There is no record that Lagha chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Lagha were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[3]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stole a boat to enter Italy illegally with an Egyptian and another Tunisian.
  2. After arriving in Italy, the detainee used a false identification card.
  3. The detainee traveled from Italy to Afghanistan via Iran arriving in April 2001 after being inspired to perform jihad.
  4. The detainee paid cash for his tickets to Afghanistan and took $2,500 U.S. currency with him.
  5. The detainee was recruited at a mosque in Italy. The recruiter provided him a travel route and a Tunisian contact in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  6. The Tunisian contact ran a training camp near Lake Duruanta prior to 2001. The contact owned a house which was co-located with the former training camp.
  7. The Tunisian contact took care of the detainee's accommodations for six months. During this time, the detainee became acquainted with two other Tunisian nationals.
  8. One of these Tunisians is a reported member of the terrorist group GIA (Armed Islamic Group).
  9. The other had an extremist group [sic] which operated in Darunta and was connected to a known terrorist group, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
  10. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin [sic] are designated terrorist organizations. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They have staged attacks in an attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was trained to use and automatic Austrian rifle in the Tunisian military.
  2. The detainee was sent by the head of a terrorist network for military training in Afghanistan in early 2001.
  3. This companion is a member of a terrorist network and a convicted terrorist.
  4. The detainee received training at a paramilitary training camp.
c. Connection/Associations
  1. The detainee associated with several Tunisians at a cultural center in Northern Italy and frequeented elements of the Jama'at al Tablighi.
  2. Jama'at al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
  3. Among those who frequented the cultural center was at least one individual that belonged to a terrorist network that ensures financial support to terrorist support to terrorist groups while also actively recruiting for Usama Bin Laden sponsored training camps in Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee was hired by an individual who ran a Cultural Center in Milan.
  5. The institute and the individual who ran the institute are linked to various Islamic extremist groups.
  6. The detainee knew an alleged al Qaida member in Europe who frequented a mosque in Milan.
  7. The detainee saw members of the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
d. Intent
After his arrest, the detainee told others that he was coming from the mountains of Tora Bora.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

  • Detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan as a tourist.
  • During his stay in Afghanistan, the detainee said that he spent his time fishing and recreating, and remained in Jalalabad the entire time. Once the war started he left Afghanistan.
  • Detaniee stated that he is a Sunni but he does not practice any particular belief system in Islam. He does not follow any particular person. He thinks al Qaida's belief system is strange and that they are not good.
  • Detainee stated that he doesn't have anything against the United States and he has no affiliation or knowledge of Usama bin Laden [sic].
  • Detainee claimed he never was a fighter, never took up arms against the Americans or anyone else, and never trained in a camp in Afghanistan.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ CSRT Summary of Evidence memoranda (.pdf) prepared for Lufti Bin Swei Lagha's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 15, 2004 - page 143
  3. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Lufti Bin Swei Lagha Administrative Review Board, May 2, 2005 - page 45