Talk:Land value tax

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

	This article is within the scope of WikiProject Taxation, an effort to create, expand, organize, and improve Tax related articles to a feature-quality standard.

Contents 1 Pros and Cons 2 Polluter tax 3 Urban sprawl 4 Some new players 5 Background 6 Australian perspective 7 Two rates 8 12/06 Cleanup 9 Open Spaces 10 NPOV 11 Loss of Asset Value 12 Problem with "claimed disadvantages"

[edit] Pros and Cons

If it's so good, why is it used in so few places? To put it another way, I imagine there must be arguments that are used to argue against its introduction. Right or wrong, they must belong in this article to give it a neutral point of view... or did I miss something? Notinasnaid 07:21, 27 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The main reason that it's not in more widespread use is that it shifts the burden of taxes from the general population to the landowning fraction. They are aware that while it is easy to avoid many other kinds of tax by accounting methods, it is very difficult to avoid Land tax unless one sells the land. Since land is a very stable asset and since rents can be a very lucrative source of income, they are unwilling to do so. Generally these are legislators, or at the least, well connected people who are able to effectively lobby against its introduction. In Britain, for instance, I believe that this has happened twice. In the early 1900s the landowners of the House of Lords induced a constitutional crisis over a budget which contained Land Tax proposals. That episode led to reform of the House of Lords but achieved its aim of suppressing the tax. In the late 1930s, a second attempt to pass Land Tax legislation was successful and I am fairly sure that the legislation remains on the statute books. However the regulations to put it into action have never been issued and so to all intents and purposes the legislation might as well not exist. I can only speculate as to the reasons. -- Derek Ross | Talk

Interesting. But surely there are arguments against (specious or otherwise) that are regularly produced against it, and these belong in a balanced discussion? (I can think of some, but I am not an economist, so I'd rather not originate them for what should be a research article. (I could question, for instance, why a struggling farmer should pay more tax, while a successful software developer living in a one bedroom flat should pay less. But I have no idea if this is a commonly advanced argument, or how the LVT advocates would respond). Notinasnaid 17:52, 27 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Funny you should say that. It is indeed a commonly advanced argument by the opponents of LVT. In fact that very argument was used in the 1920s to remove taxation from agricultural land in Britain. The proponents of the measure stated that removing rates (a form of Land-based taxes) from agricultural land would help small and struggling farmers by reducing their overheads. This sounds reasonable and the measure was passed. However it did not act as stated; in fact it had a bad effect on the farmers concerned, most of whom are tenant farmers. The small tenant farmers saw their rents rise to absorb the money which used to be taken in taxation. They also saw the price of freehold farmland rising because of the greater profits which could now be made by renting land to farmers and were thus even less able to buy their own land than before. The only beneficiaries of the change in taxation were the landowners which is precisely what anyone would expect of this type of change.

The small farmer thing is a bit of red herring though, since rural land is generally low value compared to urban land and thus LVT on it would be low too unless you owned a lot in which case you would not be a small farmer. The biggest slice of LVT would be expected to come from the highly desirable land in the centre of cities rather than from the vast swathes outside it. Small shopkeepers in the city centre are a much bigger target for LVT than small farmers because of the high value of plots in city centres. However a small shopkeeper is almost invariably a tenant too, so raising or lowering LVT will have the same effect for them as for small farmers; ie as their LVT goes up, their rents will fall to fill the gap and vice-versa.

As to why successful software developers in one bedroom flats should be particularly favoured, it could be argued that such a person is being highly productive and yet very efficient in their use of economic resources. Practically all of their output is due to their own efforts and very little due to the natural productivity of the land, so why should they be taxed ? On the other hand the output of a landlord is buildings (and maintenance of them if the tenant has a good lease) but not the land on which the buildings are built, so they are relatively inefficient in terms of economic production. -- Derek Ross | Talk 23:03, 2004 Aug 27 (UTC)

I think this demonstrates my original point - the article as it is written is does not reflect a neutral point of view (NPOV), because it does not present any of the common arguments against. Notinasnaid 08:20, 28 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Understood. I'll try to add them then. However it is difficult for me as a proponent of LVT to add arguments against without rebutting them (since I consider most of them to be specious). I'll see what I can do though. -- Derek Ross | Talk 18:23, 2004 Aug 28 (UTC)

Honestly, I've never seen a criticism of the LVT which didn't show a gross misunderstanding of what it is or what it does. But oh well. Criticism is criticism. I believe I remember something about Murray Rothbard writing a rebuttal of the LVT. I don't have the link to it, but the Geolibertarian FAQ addresses some of his points and gives a good counter-rebuttal. --Paradigm 14:30, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Marx's criticism of land tax (as anything more than one of the measures to be imposed during the move to communism) was relatively influential - he argues that "The whole thing is...simply an attempt, decked out with socialism, to save capitalist domination and indeed to establish it afresh on an even wider basis than its present one." He also opposes the way that land value tax emphasises the value of land - arguing that "Theoretically the man [Henry George] is utterly backward! He understands nothing about the nature of surplus value and so wanders about in speculations which follow the English model but have now been superseded even among the English, about the different portions of surplus value to which independent existence is attributed--about the relations of profit, rent, interest, etc. His fundamental dogma is that everything would be all right if ground rent were paid to the state." See Marx's letter at [1] Marx's critique would probably be worth mentioning here. Jon

I too am an advocate of LVT, but the article seems to me to fail NPOV. Criticisms are bracketed by advocacy and rebuttal, there are citations missing for some claims, and the language used is definitely not neutral. Can anyone help with a re-write? Fatfingers 02:46, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Polluter tax

I removed the following because despite its claim, it does not describe a form of LVT

Another variation of Land Value taxation with broad support among economists is levying taxation upon polluting businesses.

The point about a bit of land (or radio spectrum or other analogous resource) is that there is a fixed quantity and thus taxation can have no effect on the supply. The number of polluting businesses, on the other hand, is not fixed and thus increased pollution-based taxation should affect the number (most likely by reducing it). -- Derek Ross | Talk 16:08, 2005 Jan 24 (UTC)

If I may suggest a compromise: a polluter tax can be seen as a form of LVT if it is implemented as a charge for holding tradeable emission permits. Pm67nz 10:10, 25 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I see what you mean but a tax on tradeable emission permits is rather different from a tax on polluting businesses. I might well buy tradeable emission permits for speculative reasons, if I thought that they were about to increase in value, even though I did not own a polluting business, so a tax on them isn't directly a tax on pollution. A tax on the permits would make speculation in them less attractive though. -- Derek Ross | Talk 16:17, 2005 Jan 25 (UTC)

OK, true, it's the limit on the number of permits that limits pollution, not the tax on the permits. Pm67nz 22:15, 25 Jan 2005 (UTC)

So land value tax may have no connection to land at all? Now I'm really confused? What is it then, just a general handle for ideologically sound taxation systems? Notinasnaid 11:00, 25 Jan 2005 (UTC)

No. Land value tax is a tax on the undeveloped market value of land, plain and simple. What makes it special is that the rental value of the land isn't affected by the tax rate. That makes LVT economically neutral. By which I mean that it doesn't harm the economy in the way that income tax or sales tax does -- income tax and sales tax both cause unemployment. Now there are a few other resources whose rental value is not affected by the tax rate such as radio frequency spectrum. You can apply the same type of tax to them. As a shorthand people often call these types of tax LVT because there isn't a special name for the type of tax and because LVT is the best known example. But the advantages of these taxes have nothing to do with being ideologically sound. In fact there may well be "ideologically sound" taxes which do not resemble LVT. The advantages of LVT and similar taxes are that they don't damage free market economies like most other taxes do. -- Derek Ross | Talk 16:17, 2005 Jan 25 (UTC)

Agreed, though I have to add that some supporters of LVT do see it in ideological/ethical terms, so what to include in "the advantages of these taxes" are could be considered a matter of opinion (I think that is handled OK on the Georgism page). Also many (most?) possible LVT-like taxes do fall under the definition of land (economics), which is close to the concept of "things of which there is a fixed supply". Pm67nz 22:15, 25 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Fair enough. I see what you mean about what constitutes an advantage being a matter of opinion. -- Derek Ross | Talk 00:51, 2005 Jan 26 (UTC)

I really cannot see the relevance of including spectrum/polluter taxes in this article. Perhaps someone can point this out more clearly - otherwise I propose the paragraph be removed. CustardJack 11:49, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC)

It's already been explained. Land, in economic terms, means the entire material universe outside of ourselves, and therefore includes both the radio sprectrum and the sky.

[edit] Urban sprawl

I am very new to the LVT concept but I like what I have read so far, but I can't see how it prevents something like urban sprawl - if LVT is lower for some attractive countryside land (being used for a park for instance) than the same size land closer to a city then what is to prevent manufacturing businesses (say) moving to the countryside so they can pay less tax? Yes, they are perhaps further from their markets, so incurr that cost, but when global transport is so cheap that hardly seems like a barrier. Yes, land planning rules/zoning could prevent the movement but as we know it doesn't seem that difficult for powerful lobby groups/organisations to effect zoning changes...Likewise for residential property, would not the rent someone pays for an appartment in the city be much more than the rent they would pay in a country area? Therefore inducing more people to move to the country, accelerating sprawl?

AndyB 10:55, 3 May 2005 (UTC)

Well, there is more to transport costs than monetary costs. Time can form an important element too. Speedy delivery becomes more difficult as one moves further from centres of development. This is why companies are prepared to pay high rents to be right next to an airport when they could save money by renting a factory on a site even a little further from the airport. If they need that fast transport link, they're not going to relocate to the cheap farmland or forest at the end of a 10 mile track, unless they save an enormous amount of rent/land tax. That's why less attractive cities use subsidies or tax holidays to try and attract businesses (and why the businesses often shut up shop as soon as the subsidies stop).

Land tax shouldn't really affect sprawl one way or the other, so planning controls would still have a place if you wanted to try to reduce sprawl or whatever. I think that I can explain why. First the manufacturing businesses. You suggest that they would move to the countryside to pay less tax. It sounds plausible but remember that Land tax is basically identical to rent on a one-for-one replacement basis. So you could equally well ask, "what is to prevent manufacturing businesses moving to the countryside so they can pay less rent ?". (Note that even businesses which own their own land pay a form of rent in the shape of the lost interest from the money which they had to spend to buy the land). The straight answer is "nothing... but other factors such as availability of skilled manpower, speedy access to markets, etc. are very important". Different businesses will have different reasons for not moving to the country and the reasons that they are prepared to pay a higher rent will be the same as the ones why they would be prepared to pay a higher land tax whether those reasons are transport related or not. Just as businesses don't all rush off to the country to pay less rent at the moment, they won't do so in order to pay less land tax.

A similar argument applies to residential sprawl. Ideally we all want to live close to our place of work. Much as we may love the countryside, no one enjoys driving for two hours to get to work or to get home, and most of us are prepared to pay a premium in higher rent/mortgage/land tax to cut that time. The actual cost of transport may be low but personal time is valuable too. How much we are prepared to pay depends on our personal circumstances of course. This is one reason why rents and land prices for residential properties tend to rise as one approaches downtown in most cities. Once again if we note that rents/interest payments/Land taxes play identical roles in personal finances we can see that introducing land tax will not change the factors which encourage/discourage urban sprawl. -- Derek Ross | Talk 15:49, May 3, 2005 (UTC)

It may help to remember that in the specific case of rental property it is the landowner who pays LVT rather than tenant. The reason that the landowner can't pass the LVT on to the tenants by raising the rent is that landowners are assumed to have raised the rent as high as the market will bear for their particular property whether they pay LVT or not. If they try to raise it any higher, they won't get a tenant and will have to pay LVT in any case, so it becomes important that their property is let as soon as possible and as much as possible. It makes a lot less sense to keep a property empty while waiting for a tenant who will pay a very high rent since the cost of doing so may itself be high to the landowner in an area where land is expensive. This is the reason why LVT does not affect rents when it is introduced (although it does reduce the cost of land in expensive areas because less money can be made by renting it). -- Derek Ross | Talk 18:49, May 3, 2005 (UTC)

+++++

This tax was advocated by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution in 1789. Hamilton writing in the Federalist #36 gives the argument. It was probably known to Franklin and certainly known by Jefferson as ambassadors to France from whence it sprang via Quesnay and Turgot. Jefferson brought Du Pont to this country to promote the idea.

Douglas Boyd, KYMAK agent http://www.geocities.com/douglas36601/pax.html 68.17.111.216 18:16, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Some new players

I thought it might be creative to see if we might open up this good collaborative exercise and bring in the hundred or so members of a discussion group of the first rank (I think I can safely say) that has LVT and value capture (sadly still a null set here]] as its object the Land Café (you can get there by going first to The Commons, then clicking the left menu links, Collaborative Programs/Land etc. I have written a personal note to them today, and we shall see what this new blood might bring in to this important forum It is such an important matter, that I would very much hope that we shall collectively aim at getting it noted as one of the very strong entries in this weird place. ericbritton 09:17, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't understand your directions for The Commons. What are we supposed to click on? I don't see "Collaborative Programs/Land". I'm mostly interested in LVT as an urban planning tool. Luciuskwok 19:47, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

Sorry not to have been sufficiently clear. Let me try it again: (1) http://www.ecoplan.org, (2) left menu: Collaborative Programs; then (3) Land/Value Capture; finally (4) Land Cafe. And there if you sort trhough a bit you will see quite a fair level of discourse on LVT et al. (You might also wish to use the Search gizmo for keywords. Hope it helps Luciuskwok. ericbritton 22:18, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

Here for you and friend Luciuskwok is the latest state of play in our greatly extended Land Cafe program. Your comments and participation are welcome. (Including if you will concerning the way in which we are trying to provide some creaitve synergistic interactions with Wikipedia.) ericbritton 14:49, 19 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Background

The sentence starting "An additional argument for LVT is that land values depend heavily on matters beyond the control of the land owner..." should be more direct and specific.

Suggested change (in italics) follows

An additional argument for LVT is that land values are created mainly by changes that are not the result of the landowner's own enterprise and effort; for example, the creation of new infrastructure, or a rezoning which can dramatically change the value of a piece of land. An LVT provides a way of recouping some of the windfall changes to land values that occur as a result of investment by government, placing less of the burden on taxpayers who don't benefit.

Janosabel 13:23, 19 January 2006 (UTC)

Looks good to me. Will you do this? ericbritton 14:50, 19 January 2006 (UTC)

Done. Janosabel 12:54, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Australian perspective

Let's not just delete this wholesale. It's not vandalism. The contributor made some good points, albeit without using an encyclopaedic style. I have moved the text here so that it isn't lost to view.

If I can give an Australian perspective. Land taxes are an important part of the Australian and New Zealand taxation system with most local and a substantial amount of state revenue being raised through land taxes. This followed the visit to Australia by Henry George at the end of the 19thC. Australia took up land taxation with zeal on the basis that it is "incentive taxation" (a term used in the US). From a taxation point of view land taxes have a number of advantages over other taxes. These include the fact that land cannot be destroyed, hidden, shipped overseas or lodged in a Swiss bank account. Further, the true taxpayer is always known being the registered proprietor at the Land Titles Office. Therefore, under the land tax system rich people will always have to pay their fair share of taxes. It is made progressive with an increasing rate of tax scale.

The advantage of land value taxation over improved value taxation is that the fiscal cadastre (the taxation records) are easily and cheaply updated because it is 2 dimensional rather than 3 dimensional. The urban areas in Australia are typically updated every 2 years whereas the cycle for improved values is much longer and therefore, out of date improved values causing distortions are more likely.

Another advantage is that high land taxes will discourage speculation and landbanking, forcing owners to develop land rather than keeping the land vacant. This helps to keep land prices down. If this is not happening then the land tax is too low.

States in Australia where land tax is the major system of local taxation are NSW, Queensland and Western Australia. Both South Australia and Victoria allow a composite (and therefore, less satisfactory) system of improved and land value systems).

Some years ago RICS in the UK in their submission to an inquiry on land taxation addressed the proposal to convert the UK system of rental values (ie an improved value) system to a land value system such as Australia's, by the rather pompous statement that the land value system "has not proved itself" - despite nearly 100 years of land taxation in Australia. I would reverse the argument and state that despite costing about 4-5 times more than a land value system, the improved value system has not proved itself as superior and certainly not to the extent to warrant it's high cost.

farang

I am sure that the information that it contains can be used to improve the article. -- Derek Ross | Talk 23:23, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Two rates

The article doesn't explain what a two-rate property tax is. Also, in some states, farm land and forest land is also taxed at a lower rate. This is not mentioned, is this an example of two-rate system? KAM 13:56, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Two-rate systems normally split property value into an unimproved land portion and a portion comprising the property's buildings and improvements. They then tax the value of the unimproved land at one rate and the the value of the buildings and improvements at another. Hence "two-rate" systems. As you can see this is rather different from the examples that you asked about (which are not examples of a two rate system). Your examples are examples of Land Area taxation which is inherently unfair to rural owners owing to the low rate of return on rural land compared to urban land (and unlike Land Value taxation which is fair to all landowners since value is directly related to Rate of Return). Hence the lower rates given to rural landowners in an attempt to even out the taxation burden. -- Derek Ross | Talk 19:45, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] 12/06 Cleanup

• Ok, I think I've made some good changes. It still needs a lot of work, particularly with NPOV. I emailed the webmaster of this site, asking for permission to quote their page in the "Claimed advantages" section. Even if we keep most if it, it too is in many places POV. For now, I'm sick of working on this page and will take a break. --Explodicle 19:02, 2 December 2006 (UTC)

• I've received permission to use their content, as follows (except for crossed out names):

Dear XXXXXX,

I am pleased to know that you are interested in the subject of Land
Value Taxation, for whatever reason, pro or con.

I and my colleagues have been aware of the possibility of
Wikipedia but have refrained from contributing simply because the
economics of Land are not well understood (even by academic
economists) and this leads to rants and opinions rather than
research, evidence and logical explanation. So we do not bother,
though scanning the Wiki article and the Talk pages I think we
must reconsider our position on this.

You are welcome to use any or all of our articles put up on the
websites. Our offerings have been used in many places, and not
always to our advantage. Many of the criticisms have been
spurious and misinformed. That is simply because our detractors
(and sometimes our supporters) have the tendency to view any
situation from the current/existing taxation regimes into the system
in which LVT operates - it just can't be done that way.

An example of this is when land holding by (tenant) farmers is
discussed. It is always assumed that LVT is a tax =added= to
existing levies which would bear heavily on the margins and
therefore on marginal farmers. But the application of LVT assumes
that for any LVT levied, there will be reductions in all other taxes -
ultimately collect LVT revenue only. We seem to forget that every
farm has to pay wages on which there is Income Tax, and every
farm pays profits or corporation tax, and many are caught with VAT
on machinery and other items. So the effect of LVT is to reduce
total taxes borne by lesser-valued sites and the margins - bearing
to the ultimate aim of NOT TAXING WAGES (all forms) OR
INVESTMENT. And not based on transactions but on evident
advantages.

I also consider the second para of the Wiki article to represent one
of the "parochial" views of LVT. that it discourages "speculative
bubbles" in land markets. Of course it does, but LVT should not be
thought of as an economic weapon in the chancellors's armoury. I
like to think of LVT as the just return to the community for the
monopoly right to exclusive use of the land (and thus keeping all
others from its use).

The land value arises from the nearness to resources and to the
efforts and presence of people both near and far (to create the
markets and infrastructure from which the site benefits). Thus, as
is said somewhere in the article "created by the community and
returned to it".

There are many "picky" points I could make all the way through the
article, but as I say above, that leads to endless arguments.

What I have been researching for the last eight years is the
locational advantages of countries, regions, sub-regions and cities
over the whole of Europe from Ireland to Turkey, from Finland to
Spain. The locational effect is evident over the whole area. It
explains why there are economic disparities. It illustrates that
harmonised taxes will lead to the instability and poor economic
performance across the continent. And even down the local High
Street and the urban/rural dichotomy. All are examples of the
locational (land value) effect taken with illogical taxation and high
rents.

The latest fashion is green taxes and carbon taxes. These will
discriminate against the remoter locations and poorer areas. The
NorthEast uses at least one month more heating fuel than the
Southeast, and the transport costs are proportional to the distance
to the market or centre of population (London and the SE, or even
Frankfurt in Germany, the centre of the EU market). So, the
Green/Carbon taxes will cane the NE, N-Ireland, Scotland and
Cornwall.

Perhaps you can see why I (we) don't enter the Wiki world.

Again, you are welcome to use any of the material on our website.
But I must deter you from using the /nopasson.htm page - it is
correct but needs a more precise explanation of the mechanism
that supports that view (when I have the time).

If I can help you in any way - eg examining your arguments or
suggesting additions - then let me know.

Regards,
XXXXXX,
Oxford.
Webmaster for LVT Campaign

--Explodicle 02:27, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

That's good news, Explodicle. I must admit that I thought our article was fairly sympathetic to the LVT concept already. And as a lifelong supporter of the idea I was quite happy about that. Most of the material has been added by proponents rather than detractors. I don't think that the LVT Campaign webmaster would have run into major problems refining what is already here (although he would have needed to use the Neutral Point Of View style which many Wikipedia neophytes find difficult) but I am fairly sure that most of us would welcome his input even if it needed to be reworded a little. -- Derek Ross | Talk 04:28, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Open Spaces

Just a quick note on the latest addition.

Another issue with LVT in large cities is that a pure LVT does not have a provision for open spaces in a densely populated city. Any parkland in a city would have an economic value higher than its usage as a park leading to parks being removed and the city losing out in the process, due to lack of open spaces. Thus, an LVT has to have important exceptions for open spaces to be preserved.

While this might seem reasonable in theory, it's not actually a problem in practice. The reason is that open space/parkland is almost invariably publically owned and thus the authority levying the tax is generally also the recipient of it. In that situation, the chances of the City council selling a park to avoid the Land Tax (which it would be paying to itself in any case) is probably less than the chance of the City council selling a park in order to reduce its longterm debt. After all even when no Land Tax is involved the city is missing out on the rent which it could raise by building tower blocks on all that lovely open space. Yet somehow it manages to resist the temptation to do so for rent, even for such an extremely rentable property as Central Park. I suspect that it would also resist the temptation to do so for Land Tax. Of course the paragraph is spot on as far as private parks are concerned. -- Derek Ross | Talk 06:04, 9 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] NPOV

The lack of NPOV in this article has a very simple explanation: the more one knows about taxation and LVT, the more difficult it becomes to remain neutral on the subject. To those who understand it fully, implementation of LVT is roughly equivalent to the emancipation of slaves. Does the Wikipedia article on slavery maintain NPOV? Or does it state the fact that slavery is an evil relic of barbarism intolerable to all civilized people? It may take a century or more, but there is little doubt that by comparison with LVT, the future will view our current atrocious taxation systems as effectively nothing but part-time slavery.

How much neutrality is possible to those who have apprehended the fact that private capture and retention of the publicly created economic rent of natural resources is the greatest evil in the history of the world, an evil that has directly or indirectly caused most of the other evils (especially poverty and war), an evil that has inflicted more harm, suffering and injustice on humanity than slavery, communism, fascism and religious intolerance COMBINED, and that continues to inflict a Holocaust worth of harm, suffering, injustice, oppression, torture, robbery, starvation and death on innocent people EVERY YEAR?

In point of fact, all objections to LVT have been comprehensively refuted, save one: that it does exactly what it says it will do, shift the burden of taxation off productive economic activity -- work and capital investment -- and place it squarely on the unjust privilege of charging others for access to what nature provided for free. The unrefuted "objection" to LVT is simply that we are accustomed to the injustice of private landowner privilege, and that many of us -- especially those in positions of wealth, power and privilege -- have come to count on (and yes, greatly to enjoy) being its beneficiaries. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Roy Langston (talk • contribs) 23:00, 9 January 2007 (UTC).

• The slavery article does maintain NPOV. For instance, one might say that "slavery is considered morally objectionable by many" is more NPOV than "slavery is the most evil thing there ever was". You have to keep in mind that there are many people who are just interested in a more efficient economy, and don't get quite so worked up about it. --Explodicle 15:50, 23 January 2007 (UTC)
• I've just read the Slavery and LVT articles in their entirety, and while the slavery article is much more detailed and comprehensive, there are a few passages where the evil of slavery is identified and decried. I do not see the slavery article as has having a perceptibly more NPOV than the LVT article.Roy Langston 07:02, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Loss of Asset Value

When slavery was abolished slaveowners suffered a 100% loss in asset value with regard to their human "assets". Thus they were understandably reluctant to agree to it (for that reason if no other). Yet abolition was unquestionably the right thing to do. Not only from the obvious moral point of view, but even from the less obvious economic point of view (Smith explains why slavery is economically a very bad thing in The Wealth of Nations for everyone other than the slaveowners at any rate). As the new section points out introduction of LVT would potentially cause the same type of economic dislocation and loss of asset value as the abolition of slavery (although the amount lost is dependent on how developed a piece of land is -- only vacant and completely undeveloped lots would suffer a total loss of value since LVT is not levied upon the improvements that a landowner may make to the land). Nevertheless, like the abolition of slavery, the introduction of LVT in place of other taxes is economically the right thing to do however carefully it may need to be done. -- Derek Ross | Talk 05:02, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Problem with "claimed disadvantages"

There is a problem with the things that come under "disadvantages". This is supposed to present the opinions of those who claim disadvantages. It is not supposed to be a place for discrediting those opinions. Imagine if following each of the claimed "advantages", an editor added "This is of course a naive misunderstanding and it wouldn't work in the real world.": this would be rightly recognised as editorial opinion and would be promptly removed. Similarly, "Bates (1973) discredits this argument" (imaginary scholarly argument, but just as bad).

I have removed the following from the section on Herbert J Davenport. I have added bold to show that the author has allowed their own opinions to dominate the discussion. Even where the language is neutral, all of the writing is devoted to showing that Davenport is mistaken.

However, these claims are highly dubious. Most land tax proponents do not consider fertilization (and other improvements) in the value of land but rather classify it as natural capital. It is also nonsensical to claim that a land value tax would be a tax on the production of farm goods, as the tax would be exactly the same whether any goods were produced on any particular farm or not. Moreover, as land rent is defined as the most users would willingly pay for the advantages of using a particular land site, it is impossible for a tax that only recovers land rent to push useful land out of use (though it may lead to the abandonment of inferior land currently in wasteful use, as more productive land is brought into use instead of being kept idle for speculative gain). Davenport may have been confused on this point by the rare historical examples (such as in the Late Roman Empire) of land taxes that were not based on land value or land rent, that exceeded the land rent, and that consequently reduced the land's value to a negative quantity and drove it out of production.

Urban land is somewhat different, since its owners collect rents on site value. Nevertheless, Davenport claimed that any effort to tax such rents would lead owners to economize on the land by building higher buildings and deeper basements than would be economically efficient. This argument contradicts standard economic analysis, by mistakenly conflating the roles of landlords and land users. Land users are willing to pay a premium in order to locate in economically beneficial areas. They pay for that benefit either directly to a private landlord, or by forgoing the income they would earn by selling or renting the parcel. LVT does not change these basic incentives; it improves economic efficiency by increasing market liquidity as well as avoiding the deadweight losses associated with property taxes and other taxes.

I am no expert on this subject, but I'd like to think I can spot an author's point of view. Please take this as a ground rule: if the author's opinion can be discovered or reasonably guessed by reading the article, then it cannot meet Wikipedia:Neutral point of view. Notinasnaid 12:55, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

That seems reasonable. -- Derek Ross | Talk 19:02, 6 February 2007 (UTC)