King's Cross fire
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The King's Cross fire was a devastating underground fire in London which broke out at approximately 19:30 on November 18, 1987, and which killed 31 people. It burnt out the top level (entrances and ticket halls) of King's Cross St. Pancras London Underground station, a huge interchange station which has platforms on the Victoria, Piccadilly, Northern, Circle, Hammersmith & City and Metropolitan lines.
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[edit] Cause
The fire was most probably caused by a lighted match which was discarded on the escalator and fell down the side of the escalator onto the return track. The track had not been properly cleaned for some time and was heavily contaminated by rubbish and grease, which caught fire. Although smoking was banned on the subsurface sections of London Underground in February 1985 (a consequence of the Oxford Circus fire), smokers often lit up on their way out of the system.
Other possible causes such as arson and an IRA bomb were quickly rejected as possible causes of the fire, mainly because of the strong evidence pointing to discarded smokers' materials.
[edit] How the fire spread
The fire started beneath the escalator, spread above it, then flashed over and filled the ticket hall with flames and smoke. Afterwards, forensic investigation found charred wood in 18 places beneath the up escalator, which showed that fires had started before by the same cause but had run out of fuel without spreading. All these small fires were on the right hand (standing) side, which is where standing passengers are most likely to light a cigarette: passengers stand on the right to let walking passengers pass on the left.
The lack of visible flames and relatively clean woodsmoke produced lulled the emergency services into a false sense of security. Many people in the ticket hall believed that the fire was small and thus not an immediate hazard: indeed, an evacuation route from the tunnels below was arranged through a parallel escalator tunnel to the ticket hall above the burning escalator. Some argue that the evacuation of the station below the fire was unnecessary as "fires rarely burn downwards", citing that there was no fire damage below the starting point of the fire. Fires certainly can burn downwards; flame radiation can heat fuels in any direction including below the fire; falling embers and other combusting products and flammable liquids can spread fire downwards. Another consideration is ventilation; just because a fire is above does not mean that smoke and other products of incomplete combustion, including carbon monoxide, will not spread downwards. Alterations to normal ventilation flows are particularly common in underground environments, including subway systems.
The large number of casualties in the fire was an indirect consequence of a combustion phenomenon known as the trench effect, though this phenomenon was completely unknown prior to the fire. This effect meant that in the early stages of the fire the flames lay down in the escalator rather than burning vertically, so that they heated the steps higher up. In these early stages of the fire, the flames visible to anyone not standing on the burning escalator were a small part of the full story. The majority of the flames were lying down in the escalator trench; only a few flames protruded above the balustrade and were visible to observers.
However, once enough treads had been heated, a flashover happened on the escalator. When the treads of the escalator flashed over, the size of the fire increased exponentially and a sustained jet of flame was discharged from the escalator tunnel into the ticket hall, setting combustibles in the hall alight. The arrangement of underground hall and escalators functioned all too effectively as an incinerator due to heat driven convection added to the usual ventilation system, with temperatures reaching 600°C: a BBC television news report called Kings Cross underground station "an efficient furnace".
The fire was exacerbated by a solvent-based paint used on the ceiling above the escalator, which ignited during the flashover, causing the composition of the smoke to change from light and thin to black and oily.
[edit] Emergency response
The London Fire Brigade initially despatched four fire engines and a turntable ladder, with units from A24 Soho Fire Station being the first on the scene at 19:42, followed shortly by colleagues from C27 Clerkenwell, A22 Manchester Square and A23 Euston. More than 30 fire crews - over 150 firefighters - were eventually deployed to combat the incident.
A total of 14 ambulances from the London Ambulance Service fleet ferried the injured to local hospitals including University College Hospital.
The fire was officially declared extinguished at 01:46 the following day (19 November), although emergency crews remained at the scene until 18:20.
[edit] Casualties
In total, 31 people died and more than 60 received injuries ranging from severe burns to smoke inhalation. The fatalities were among those unable to escape from the ticket hall before succumbing to the effects of the latter stages of thick smoke and the intense heat. Their names are listed here:
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London Fire Brigade Station Officer Colin Townsley from A24 Soho was in charge of the first fire engine to arrive at the scene and was down in the station concourse at the time of the flashover. As he was making his exit, Townsley spotted a lady who was in trouble and stopped to help her. He was not wearing breathing apparatus and was overcome by the smoke. Although he was later found in the inferno by his colleagues, efforts to revive him had little effect, and he was rushed to hospital, where he later died due to smoke inhalation.
The case of the initially "unidentified man" was finally solved on 22 January 2004, when forensic evidence proved that he was 72-year-old Alexander Fallon of Falkirk, Scotland. The previously unidentified victim was immortalised in a 1990 Nick Lowe song, Who Was That Man?
[edit] Aftermath
A public inquiry into the incident was conducted by Mr. Desmond Fennell, QC, assisted by a panel of four expert advisers. The inquiry opened at Central Hall, Westminster on 1 February 1988 and closed on 24 June, after hearing 91 days of evidence.
The Fennell investigation's findings prompted the introduction of the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989 (usually referred to as the Section 12 Regulations because they were introduced under section 12 of the Fire Precautions Act 1971). These led to: the replacement of all wooden escalators on the Underground, of which only one (at Greenford station, above ground level) remains as of 2006; the mandatory installation of automatic sprinklers and heat detectors in escalators; mandatory fire safety training for all station staff twice a year; and improvements in emergency services liaison. It also led to stringent restrictions on the types of paint permitted for use on the Underground.
Six firemen received Certificates of Commendation for their actions at the fire, including Station Officer Townsley who was given the award posthumously.
A service of remembrance for the victims was held at St. Pancras Church and a memorial plaque was unveiled by HRH The Princess of Wales, with another erected at Kings Cross Station. A commemoration service was also held on 18 November 1997, the tenth anniversary of the blaze, in memory of those who died.
Due to the extensive damage caused by the fire, it took nearly eighteen months to repair and reopen the station; it remained closed until 5 March 1989.
[edit] See also
- King's Cross St. Pancras tube station
- King's Cross railway station
- London Fire Brigade
- Oxford Circus fire
- Trench effect
[edit] References
- D. Fennell, Investigation into the King's Cross Underground Fire. The Stationery Office Books; ISBN 0-10-104992-7 (6.8 MB pdf)
- K. Moodie, The King's Cross Fire: Damage Assessment and Overview of the Technical Investigation Fire Safety Journal, vol 18 (1992) 13-33
- S. Simcox, N.S. Wilkes & I.P. Jones, Computer Simulation of the Flows of Hot Gases from the Fire at King's Cross Underground Station Fire Safety Journal, vol 18 (1992) 49-73
- K. Moodie & S.F. Jagger, Results and analysis from the scale model tests Paper presented at IMechE seminar, The King's Cross Underground Fire: fire dynamics and the organisation of safety 1 June 1989; ISBN 0-85298-705-6
- A.F. Roberts, The King's Cross Fire: a correlation of the eyewitness accounts and results of the scientific investigation Paper presented at IMechE seminar,The King's Cross Underground Fire: fire dynamics and the organisation of safety 1 June 1989; ISBN 0-85298-705-6
- P. Chambers, Body 115: The Story of the Last Victim of the King's Cross Fire. John Wiley & Sons, 2006; ISBN 0-470-01808-9
- B. Appleton Report of an inquiry into health and safety aspects of stoppages caused by fire and bomb alerts on London Underground, British Rail and other mass transit systems. HSE Books 1992; ISBN 0-11-886394-0
- Vaughan, Adrian (2000). Tracks to Disaster. Ian Allan. ISBN 0-7110-2731-5.
- BBC News Online Solved after 16 years - the mystery of victim 115
