Kiev Offensive (1920)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Kiev Offensive (1920) | |||||||
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Part of Polish-Soviet War | |||||||
Polish Breguet 14 operating from Kiev airfield |
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Combatants | |||||||
Poland, Ukrainian People's Republic |
Bolshevist Russia | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Józef Piłsudski, Edward Rydz-Śmigły |
Aleksandr Yegorov, Semyon Budyonny | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
8 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 understrength Ukrainian divisions | 8 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, later also 1st Cavalry Army |
Polish-Soviet War |
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1919 Target Vistula – Bereza Kartuska – Pińsk – Lida – Wilno – Minsk – 1st Berezina – Daugavpils 1920 |
The 1920 Kiev Offensive (or Kiev Operation) that is sometimes considered to have started the Soviet-Polish War[1] was an attempt by the newly re-emerged Poland, led by Józef Piłsudski, to seize central and eastern Ukraine,[1] torn in the warring among various factions, both domestic and foreign, from Bolshevist Russia.
The stated goal of the operation was to create a formally independent Ukraine dominated by Poland,[2] although much of Ukrainian population were ambivalent as many viewed the Polish advance as a new occupation[3] aimed at subbordinating Ukraine to under the Polish rule[4] while others greeted the Polish and allied Ukrainian forces as liberators.[5] With their loyalties divided, Ukrainian fought for both sides of the conflict.[6]
A major military operation, this campaign was conducted from April to June 1920 by the Polish Army in alliance with Ukrainian People's Republic forces under the exiled nationalist leader Symon Petliura, opposed by the Bolsheviks who claimed those territories for the Ukrainian SSR and whose Red Army also included numerous Ukrainians in its ranks. Initially successful for the Polish army, which captured Kiev on May 7, 1920, the campaign was dramatically reversed. The ambivalence of the Ukrainian population[7][8] prevented Piłsudski and Petliura from gaining the support they expected, and the allied Polish forces and Petlura's Ukrainians were forced to retreat under mounting pressure from a Red Army counteroffensive.
Contents |
[edit] Before the Battle
The Ukrainian People's Republic, with mounting attacks on its territory since early 1919, had the entire Ukrainian territory outside of its control as the latter was divided between a large group of disparate powers: the Denikin's Whites, Bolshevik forces, the Makhnovist Partisan Army claiming a significant territory along with various bands lacking any political ideology, as well as Romania in the south-west and Poland itself. The forces of the exiled Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petlura who formally represented the Ukrainian People's Republic only contolled a small sliver of land near the Polish border.[9] In such conditions, Piłsudski could not have any difficulty to convince Petlura to join the alliance with Poland despite many unresolved territorial conflicts between these two nations[2] and on April 21 they signed a Treaty of Warsaw. In exchange for agreeing to a border along the Zbruch River, recognizing the recent Polish territorial gains in western Ukraine obtained by the Poland's defeating the Ukrainian attempt to create another Ukrainian state in Volhynia and Galicia, largely Ukrainian populated but with significant Polish minority, Petlura was promised military help in regaining the control of Bolshevik-occupied territories with Kiev, where he would again assume the authority of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Following the formal restoration of Ukrainian independence, the Ukrainian republic was then supposed to subbordinate its military and economy to Warsaw[2] through joining the Polish-led "Międzymorze" federation of East-Central European states, as Piłsudski wanted Ukraine to be a buffer between Poland and Russia rather than seeing Ukraine again dominated by Russia right at the Polish border.[10][11] Separate provisions in the treaty guaranteed the rights of the Polish and Ukrainian minorities within both states and obliged each side not to conclude any international agreements against each other.[2][12][9]
The treaty was followed by a formal alliance signed by Petlura and Piłsudski on April 24. On the same day, Poland and UPR forces began the Kiev Operation, aimed at securing the Ukrainian territory for the Petlura's government thus creating a buffer for Poland that would separate it from Russia. Sixty-five thousand Polish and fifteen thousand Ukrainian soldiers[13] took part in the initial expedition whose main military goal was to outflank the Bolsheviks and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. The Polish southern flank was to be held by Polish-allied Ukrainian forces under a friendly government in Ukraine. On May 7, Polish and Ukrainians soldiers entered Kiev.
[edit] The campaign
[edit] Polish-Ukrainian advance
Pilsudski's forces were divided into three armies. Arranged from north to south, they were the 3rd, 2nd and 6th, with Petliura's forces attached to the 6th army. Facing them were the Soviet 12th and 14th armies led by Alexander Yegorov. Pilsudski struck on April 25, and captured Zhytomyr the following day. Within a week, the Soviet 12th army was largely destroyed. In the south, the Polish 6th Army and Petliura's forces pushed the Soviet 14th army out of central Ukraine as they quickly marched eastward through Vinnytsia .[9] The combined Polish-Ukrainian forces entered Kiev on May 7, encountering only token resistance. On May 9 the Polish troops celebrated the capture of Kiev with the victory parade on Kreschatyk, the city's main street. However as the parading troops were Piłsudski's Poles instead of Petlura's Ukrainians, the Kievans watched this demonstration of force with great ambivalence, which looked to them just like another occupation army.[3] Following this parade, however, all Polish forces were withdrawn from the city and control was given to the Ukrainian 6th division under the control of Petlura's Ukrainian government.[14].
The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the Soviets in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign ultimately failed. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions largely due to the ambivalent attitude of Ukrainians towards the alliance. Petliura was only able to recruit 20,000 soldiers into his army, a number insufficient to hold back the Soviet forces.
However the Bolshevik army, although having suffered some defeats, avoided total destruction. The Polish offensive stopped at Kiev and only a small bridgehead was established on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.
[edit] Soviet counterattack
The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met the Red Army counterattack. On May 24, 1920 the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budionny and his famous First Cavalry Army. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On June 3, 1920 another Russian assault began north of the city.
Meanwhile, Polish military intelligence was aware of Russian preparations for a counteroffensive, and Polish commander-in-chief Józef Piłsudski ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General Antoni Listowski, to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in Warsaw, it was clear that the recently-created Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in Belarus and north of the Pripyat Marshes. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the General Staff regrouping all his forces at Kiev and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.
General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories[citation needed] in the areas of Bila Tserkva, where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the Battle of Wołodarka, which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its cossack regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's cossack cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on June 5 and on June 10 Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale,[citation needed] the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On June 13 Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets.
Before their withdrawal the Polish army destroyed both Kiev bridges across the Dnieper River.[15] Soviet propaganda claimed that Poles also destroyed much of Kiev's infrastructure, including the passenger and cargo railway stations, and other purely civilian objects crucial for the city functioning, such as the electric power station, the city sewerage and water supply systems.[16] The Poles denied that they committed any such acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up the bridges over the Dnieper, for strictly military reasons.[1] Recently one book, published by a Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, made a charge that Poles committed the acts of vandalism in the city.[17] No confirmation of this can be found in modern sources devoted to the history of Kiev.[18][19][20]
The Soviet advance into Ukraine was characterized by mass killing of civilians and the burning of entire villages, especially by Budyonny's cossacks, designed to instill a sense of fear in the Ukrainian population. Behind Polish lines, the Soviet forces destroyed railroads, hung suspected enemies on the spot,and cut telegraph wires.[21] Ultimately, in the pacification of Ukraine that began during the Soviet counteroffensive in 1920 and which would not end until 1922 the Soviets would take 10,000s of Ukrainian lives.[22] At the same time Isaac Babel, a war correspondent embedded with the Red Army, in his diary wrote down first-hand accounts of atrocities committed during their retreat by Polish troops and their allies (particularly notorious were the regiment of the Cossack defector Vadim Yakovlev who switched sides and became a Polish ally) instilled fear among the civilian population, especially the Jews who suffered from multiple pogroms committed by the Polish troops.[23]
As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the Auta River during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand, the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of Lwów.
In the aftermath of the defeat in Ukraine, Polish government of Leopold Skulski resigned on the June 9, and a political crisis gripped Polish government for most of June. Bolshevik and later Soviet propaganda has used Kiev Operation to portray the Poles as an 'imperialist aggressors'.[24]
[edit] Opposing forces
The following is the Order of Battle of Polish and Bolshevik forces taking part in the struggles in Ukraine, as of April 25, 1920. It should be noted that the command structure of both sides changed during the operation. Also, the Russian forces were joined by Budennyi's 1st Cavalry Army in the latter part of the operation, while a large part of the Polish forces was withdrawn by then to Belarus.
Among Polish Airforce was the 7th Kościuszko Squadron.
[edit] Poland/Ukrainian People's Republic
Polish Army | Unit | Polish name | Commander | Remarks | |||||||||
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General Command of the Polish Army - Gen. Józef Piłsudski | |||||||||||||
supporting armies | |||||||||||||
6th Army Wacław Iwaszkiewicz |
5th Infantry | 5. Dywizja Piechoty | Waclaw Jędrzejewski | ||||||||||
12th Infantry | 12. Dywizja Piechoty | Marian Żegota-Januszajtis | |||||||||||
18th Infantry | 18. Dywizja Piechoty | Franciszek Krajowski | |||||||||||
2nd Army Antoni Listowski |
13th Infantry | 13. Dywizja Piechoty | Franciszek Paulik | ||||||||||
15th Infantry | 15. Pomorska Dywizja Piechoty | Antoni Jasieński | |||||||||||
6th Ukrainian | 6. Dywizja Piechoty | Marko Bezruchko | |||||||||||
Assault Group - Józef Piłsudski | |||||||||||||
Assault Group Józef Piłsudski |
4th Infantry | 4. Dywizja Piechoty | Leonard Skierski | ||||||||||
Cavalry Division | Dywizja Jazdy | Jan Romer | |||||||||||
Rybak Operational Group Józef Rybak |
1st Mountain Bde | 1. Brygada Górska | Stanisław Wróblewski | ||||||||||
7th Cavalry Bde | 7. Brygada Kawalerii | Aleksander Romanowicz | |||||||||||
Rydz-Śmigły Operational Group Edward Rydz-Śmigły |
1st Legions | 1. Dywizja Piechoty Legionów | Edward Rydz-Śmigły | ||||||||||
7th Infantry | 7. Dywizja Piechoty | Eugeniusz Pogorzelski | |||||||||||
3rd Cavalry Bde | 3. Brygada Kawalerii | Jerzy Sawicki |
[edit] Soviet Russia/Soviet Ukraine
Red Army | Unit | Russian name | Commander | Remarks | |||||||||
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South-Western Front - Gen. Aleksandr Yegorov | |||||||||||||
12th Army Miezheninov |
7th Rifle | 7. стрелковая дивизия | |||||||||||
44th Rifle | 44. стрелковая дивизия | ||||||||||||
47th Rifle | 47. стрелковая дивизия | ||||||||||||
58th Rifle | 58. стрелковая дивизия | ||||||||||||
17th Cavalry Division | 17. кавдивизия | ||||||||||||
14th Army Ieronim Uborevich |
21st Rifle | 21. стрелковая дивизия | |||||||||||
41st Rifle | 41. стрелковая дивизия | ||||||||||||
45th Rifle | 45. стрелковая дивизия | ||||||||||||
60th Rifle | 60. стрелковая дивизия | ||||||||||||
8th Cavalry Division | 8. кавдивизия | ||||||||||||
13th Army |
unknown composition |
[edit] Notes
- ^ The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from Kiev and Russian advance was a severe blow to Józef Piłsudski's political plans to uphold the UPR's independence, as part of the "Międzymorze federation.". As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski, as well as to Petliura.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Inline
- ^ a b See, e.g. Russo-Polish War in Encyclopædia Britannica
[This war was a] military conflict between Soviet Russia and Poland, which sought to seize Ukraine […]Although there had been hostilities between the two countries during 1919, the conflict began when the Polish head of state Józef Pilsudski formed an alliance with the Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petlura (April 21, 1920) and their combined forces began to overrun Ukraine, occupying Kiev on May 7. - ^ a b c d "Although the [UNR] was unable to contribute real strength to the Polish offensive, it could offer a certain camouflage for the naked aggression involved. Warsaw had no difficulty in convincing the powerless Petliura to sign a treaty of alliance. In it he abandoned his claim of all territories [...] demanded by Pilsudki. In exchange the Poles recognized the souvereignty of the UNR on all territories which it claimed, including those within the Polish frontiers of 1772 - in other words, much of the area Poland demanded from Soviet Russia. Petlura also pledged not to conclude any international agreements against Poland and guaranteed full cultural rights to the Polish residents in Ukraine. Supplementary military and economic agreements subbordinate the Ukrainian army and economy to the control of Warsaw."
Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-1921, pp. 210-211, McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7. - ^ a b Tadeusz Machalski, then a captain, (the future Polish attache in Ankara) wrote in his diary: "Ukrainian people, who saw in their capital an alien general with the Polish army, instead of Petliura leading his own army, didn't view it as the act of liberation but as a variety of a new occupation. Therefore, the Ukrainians, instead of enthusiasm and joy, watched in gloomy silence and instead of rallying to arms to defend the freedom remained the passive speactators". Quoted from: "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- ^ "No less influential and popular than the concept of [national democrats] was the "federalist" program of Josef Pilsudski, a socialist and the most authoritative Polish politicial of the 20th century. The essence of that program was that after the ovethrowal of tsardom and the disintegration of the Russian empire, the large, strong and mighty Poland was to be created in Eastern Europe. It was the reincarnation of the Rzeczpospolita on "federative" principles. It was to include the Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. The leading role, of course, was to be given to the Polish ethnic, political, economic and cultural element. Despite the program failed to address the question on what to do if the people would not want to join into the Rzeczpospolita, the socialists declared the voluntaraly entry into the future state. "
Oleksandr Derhachov (editor), "Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis", Chapter: "Ukraine in Polish concepts of the foreign policy", 1996, Kiev ISBN 966-543-040-8 - ^ Davies, Norman (1996). Europe: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 935. ISBN 0-19-820171-0.
- ^ Peter Abbot. "Ukrainian Armies 1914-55", Chapter "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1917-21", Osprey, 2004, ISBN 1-84176-668-2
- ^ "[I]n practice, [Pilsudski] was engaged in a process of conquest that was bitterly resisted by Lithuanians and Ukrainians (except the latter's defeat by the Bolsheviks left them with no one else to turn but Pilsudski)."
Roshwald, Aviel (2001). Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 1914-1923. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-24229-0. - ^ "The Bolsheviks had flooded the Ukraine, forcing Ataman Semyon Petlura(a Ukrainian bookkeeper turned national hero) to sign an alliance with Pilsudski, securing Lwow for Poland and possibly Pilsudski's federation. On 7 May the Polish army liberated Kiev in the intention of giving it to Petlura in a Polish-Ukrainian-Federation. On 5 June the Bolsheviks were back in Kiev. The major problem which prevented Pilsudski from securing Kiev and creating his federation was the unwillingness of the inhabitants of Ukraine, to rush to the aid of Petlura and his Ukrainian nationalist forces. Most Ukrainians had no idea what Bolshevism was and were easily manipulated by the Russians. Besides, many of the Ukrainian peasants were very simple people who still had memories of serfdom, which was imposed on them by the Polish Szlachta (Nobility). They believed Pilsudski to be another Polish Magnate, as from the 18th century. Thus, Petlura could not foster more than 30,000 troops.". Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. Messiah and Central European Federalist. Polonica.net article by Patryk Dole
- ^ a b c Watt, Richard (1979). Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918-1939. New York: Simon and Schuster, 119. ISBN 0-671-22625-8.
- ^ "The newly found Polish state cared much more about the expansion of its borders to the east and south-east ("between the seas") that about helping the agonizing state of which Petlura was a de-facto dictator. ("A Belated Idealist." Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), May 22-28, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.)
Piłsudski is quoted to have said: "After the Polish independence we will see about Poland's size". (ibid) - ^ One moth before his death Pilsudski told his aide: "My life is lost. I failed to create the free from the Russians Ukraine"
<(Russian)(Ukrainian) Oleksa Pidlutskyi, Postati XX stolittia, (Figures of the 20th century), Kiev, 2004, ISBN 966-8290-01-1, LCCN 20-04440333. Chapter "Józef Piłsudski: The Chief who Created Himself a State" reprinted in Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Kiev, February 3 - 9, 2001, in Russian and in Ukrainian. - ^ Kubijovic, V. (1963). Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- ^ Subtelny, Orest (2000). "Twentieth Century Ukraine: The Ukrainian Revolution: Petlura's alliance with Poland", Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 375. ISBN 0-8020-8390-0.
- ^ Kutrzeba, T. (1937). Wyprawa kijowska 1920 roku. Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff.
- ^ "Fording the Dnipro. The past, present and future of Kyiv's bridges", The Ukrainian observer, issue 193.
- ^ Кузьмин Н.Ф. (1958). Крушение последнего похода Антанты, 64-65.
(1961) Из истории гражданской войны. Т. 3., 266-269.
Пшибыльский А. (1931). Войны польского империализма 1918—1921. Russian translation from Polish, 152-153.
Likely original: Przybylski, Adam (1930). Wojna polska, 1918-1921. (in Polish). Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy. LCCN 55053688.
above sources cited by Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Meltyukhov) (2001). Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939). Moscow: Вече (Veche). ISBN 5-699-07637-9. - ^ ‘The failures of the Polish army only whipped up its vengeful vandalism. [...] The Polish troops leaving Kiev acted no less savagely. In the city, they damaged the electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations. The governments of Soviet Russia and Ukraine, pointed out in the note of June 11 addressed to the Antanta countries that "the magnificent cathedral of St. Vladimir, this unique pearle of Russian religious architecture and the unique monument with the priceless frescoes by Vasnetsov, was destroyed by the Poles in their retreat only because they to avenge their rage on inanimate objects..."’
from Meltyukhov, cited above - ^ "Kievenergo".
- ^ "oldkyiv.org.ua".
- ^ "swrailway.gov.ua".
- ^ ‘Having burst through the front, Budyonny's cavalry would devesate the enemies rear - burning, killing and looting as they went. These Red cavalrymen inspired an almost numbing sense of fear in their opponents [...] the very names Budyonny and Cossack terrified the Ukrainian population, and they moved into a state of nuetrality or even hostility toward Petliura and the Poles..."’
from Richard Watt, 1979. Bitter Glory: Poland and its fate 1918-1939. New York: Simon & Shuster. ISBN 0-671-22625-8 - ^ Courtois, Stephane; Werth, Nicolas; Panne, Jean-Louis; Paczkowki, Andrzej; Bartosek, Karel; Margolin, Jean-Louis (1999). The Black Book of Communism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-07608-7
- ^ The war diary of Isaac Babel recently translated and published in English (1920 Diary, Yale, 2002, ISBN 0-300-09313-6) gives the first-hand witness account of those events
"Zhitomir pogrom, organized by the Poles, continued, of course, by the Cossacks. When our advance troops appeared the Poles entered the town, stayed 3 days, there was a pogrom, they cut off beards, that's usual, assembled 45 Jews in the marketplace, led them to the slaughteryard, tortures, cut out tongues, wails heard all over the square. They set fire to 6 houses,[...] they machine-gunned those who tried to rescue people. The yardman, into whose arms a mother dropped a child from a burning window, was bayoneted, the priest put a ladder up against the back wall, they escaped that way." (p. 4)
" [T]he Poles pillaged, then the others descended, whooping and yelling, carried off everything, all his wife's things." p. 7, p. 10
"[A] pathetic, good-looking Jew [...] gray in the face with worry [...]. The Poles mocked and tormented him, he thiks that life will begin now, Cossacks, however, don't always behave well. p. 26
"Dubno has changed hands several times... Now everybody's trembling again, and hatred of the Poles, who pluck their beards" p. 33
"Berestechko... the town is steeped in the bloody history of the Polish-Jewish ghetto. hatred for the Poles is unanimous. They have looted, tortured, branded the pharmacist with a red-hot iron, put needles under his nails, pulled out his hair, all because somebody shot at a Polish officer. What idiocy. The Poles have gone mad, they are destroying themselves." p. 57
"Rumor of atrocities. I walk into town. Indescribable terror and despair. They tell me all about it. Privately, indoors, they’re afraid the Poles may come back. Captain Yakovlev’s Cossacks were here yesterday. A pogrom. The family of David Zyz, in people’s homes, a naked, barely breathing prophet of an old man, and old woman butchered, a child with fingers chopped off, many people still breathing, stench of blood, everything turned upside down, chaos, a mother sitting over her sobered son, an old woman lying twisted up like a pretzel, four people in one hovel, filth, blood under a black beard, just lying there in their blood." (p. 84) - ^ (Polish)Janusz Szczepański, KONTROWERSJE WOKÓŁ BITWY WARSZAWSKIEJ 1920 ROKU (Controversies surrounding the Battle of Warsaw in 1920). Mówią Wieki, online version.
- General
- Lech Wyszczelski (1999). Kijów 1920. Warsaw: Bellona. ISBN 83-11-08963-9.
- Norman Davies (2003). White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0-7126-0694-7.
- Józef Piłsudski (1937–1991). Pisma zbiorowe (Collected Works). Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza (reprint). ISBN 83-03-03059-0.
- Mikhail Tukhachevski (1989). Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7–10, 1923 in: Pochód za Wisłę. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie. ISBN 83-218-0777-1.
- Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-8390-0.
- Janusz Cisek (1990). Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku. Wybór dokumentów. (Neighbours Attitude Towards the War of 1920. A collection of documents, English summary). London: Polish Cultural Foundation Ltd. ISBN 0-85065-212-X.
- Isaac Babel (2002). Red Cavalry.. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-32423-0.
[edit] Online references
- (Russian)/(Ukrainian) "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- (Russian) "Dramas of Ukrainian-Polish Brotherhood" (documentary film), a review in Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), March 13-19, 1999, available online (in Russian).
- (Russian) Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Meltyukhov) (2001). Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939). Moscow: Вече (Veche). ISBN 5-699-07637-9. .
- Kiev is in the Hands of the Polish Gentry! The Military writing of Leon Trotsky Volume 3: 1920 — The War with Poland
- Postal Telegram No. 2886-a The Military writing of Leon Trotsky Volume 3: 1920 — The War with Poland