User:John Z/drafts/Cairo Conference (1921)
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The 1921 Cairo Conference of British Middle East experts was called by then Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill primarily to settle the terms of the Mesopotamia British Mandate of Iraq, but also made major decisions concerning the British Mandate of Palestine
At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution; they chose a Hashemite, Faisal ibn Husayn, son of Sherif Hussein ibn Ali former Sharif of Mecca as Iraq's first King; they established an indigenous Iraqi army; and they proposed a new treaty. To confirm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was carefully arranged that had a return of 96 percent in his favor. The British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist and Islamic credentials to have broad appeal, but who also was vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. His ancestors held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century. The British believed these credentials would satisfy traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy; moreover, the British thought Faisal would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his role in the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities.
The final major decision taken at the Cairo Conference related to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Faisal was under pressure from the nationalists and the anti-British mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala to limit both British influence in Iraq and the duration of the treaty. Recognizing that the monarchy depended on British support—and wishing to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria—Faisal maintained a moderate approach in dealing with Britain. The twenty-year Anglo-Iraqi Treaty treaty, which was ratified in October 1922, stated that the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq had a balance of payments deficit with Britain, and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent financial agreement, which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically dependent on Britain. While unable to prevent the treaty, Faisal clearly felt that the British had gone back on their promises to him.
The British decision at the Cairo Conference to establish an indigenous Iraqi army was significant. In Iraq, as in most of the developing world, the military establishment has been the best organized institution in an otherwise weak political system. Thus, while Iraq's body politic crumbled under immense political and economic pressure throughout the monarchic period, the military gained increasing power and influence; moreover, because the officers in the new army were by necessity Sunnis who had served under the Ottomans, while the lower ranks were predominantly filled by Shia tribal elements, Sunni dominance in the military was preserved.
[edit] Source
- Catherwood, Christopher (2004). Churchill's Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq. Carroll & Graf. ISBN 0786713518.
- Fromkin, David (1989). A Peace to End All Peace. Henry Holt. ISBN 0805068848.
- Klieman, Aaron S. (1970). Foundations of British policy in the Arab world: The Cairo Conference of 1921. Johns Hopkins Press. ISBN 0801811252.
- Sachar, Howard M. (1969). The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924. Knopf. ASIN B0006CPB1A.
- Sykes, Christopher (1965). Crossroads to Israel. World Publishing Company. ISBN. [out of print]
- Wasserstein, Bernard (2004). Israelis and Palestinians : Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop?, 2nd ed.. Yale University Press. ISBN 0300105975.
- Should be in category post ww1 conferences
- remember disambiguation page
