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United States v. Morrison

Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 11, 2000
Decided May 15, 2000
Full case name: United States v. Antonio J. Morrison et al. and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison et al.
Docket #: 99-5; 99-29
Citations: 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d. 658, 2000 US LEXIS 3422
Prior history: Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
Holding
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, is unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Court membership
Chief Justice: William Rehnquist
Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
Majority by: Rehnquist
Joined by: O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Concurrence by: Thomas
Dissent by: Souter
Joined by: Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer
Dissent by: Breyer
Joined by: Stevens, Souter (Points 1 and 2 only), Ginsburg (Points 1 and 2 only)
Laws applied
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 13981.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) is a United States Supreme Court decision that examined the limits of Congress's power to make laws under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Contents

[edit] History

In 1994, the United States Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which contained a provision at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 for a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence, even when no criminal charges were filed.

That fall, at Virginia Tech, freshman student Christy Brzonkala was allegedly assaulted and repeatedly raped by Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, members of the school's football team. During the school-conducted hearing on her complaint, Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her despite the fact that she had twice told him "no."[1] College proceedings failed to punish Crawford, but initially punished Morrison with a suspension (punishment later struck down by the administration). A state grand jury did not find sufficient evidence, in its opinion, to charge either man with a crime.[2] Brzonkala then filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia held Congress lacked authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981. A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 2-1. The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the panel, upholding the district court.

The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that Congress lacked authority, under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact the law.

[edit] Overview

With regard to the Commerce Clause, Rehnquist said that United States v. Lopez (1995) was the controlling precedent. Lopez held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional because the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn (1942) was limited to only direct economic acts that, when added up, substantially impact commerce. According to the Morrison Court, economic effects of crimes against women were indirect, and therefore could not be addressed through the Commerce Clause. Rehnquist expressed a need to limit Wickard to activity that is directly economic in nature in order to maintain "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Lopez therefore limited the scope of Wickard for the first time in 53 years.

With regard to the Equal Protection Clause, Rehnquist said that United States v. Harris (1883) and Civil Rights Cases (1883) were the controlling precedents. Harris held that a prison lynching did not involve state action, and that the Equal Protection Clause therefore did not apply.

Rehnquist mentioned the government's argument that VAWA was in response to "gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities," whereas with the Civil Rights Cases there was "no indication of such state action." Rehnquist countered that "There were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves."[3] Rehnquist was referring to disparate enforcement of state laws that were among the issues before the Civil Rights Cases Court. Civil Rights Cases held that civil rights laws were unconstitutional because racial discrimination in private business establishments did not involve state action.

Rehnquist continued that even if the government's argument was valid, VAWA laws were unconstitutional because they were aimed not at state actors but at private criminal conduct. Although the "one way ratchet" interpretation of Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) would allow Congress to go beyond, but not fall short of, the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, Rehnquist said the Court's City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) interpretation of Morgan required that Congress adhere to the Court's state action interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's Boerne decision mentioned a need to prevent "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority."[4]

[edit] Rationale

United States v. Morrison invalidated a section of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 which gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court, although program funding remains unaffected. Congress enacted this private civil remedy because of statistical evidence that states did not prosecute crimes against women as often as crimes against men. The Court majority ruled that VAWA exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

[edit] Commerce Clause

In striking down VAWA as exceeding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the majority applied United States v. Lopez (1995), a case that invalidated a federal criminal statute enacted using the Commerce Clause power. There as in Morrison, the court stressed the "enumerated powers" that limit federal power. The Lopez court stated that Congress may regulate (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the "instrumentalities" (for example, vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the Morrison court analyzed its validity under the third. The majority concluded that an act of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce. The government, however, argued that in the aggregate, these acts did have a substantial effect; for this proposition it relied on Wickard v. Filburn, which held that Congress could regulate an individual act that lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce if, when aggregated, acts of that sort had the required relation to interstate commerce. The majority, once again relying on Lopez, replied that the aggregation principle of Wickard applied only to "economic" activity. Because, the court claimed, the violence VAWA was meant to prevent was "noneconomic" activity in that the economic effect was indirect, rather than direct, it could not properly be federally regulated in the aggregate.

The Court explained that the need to distinguish between economic activities that directly and those that indirectly affect interstate commerce was due to "the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority." Referring to Lopez, the Court said: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur." The majority further stated, "[I]t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also expressed the concern that "Congress [was] appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce."

The majority, quoting from Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937), said that the scope of the interstate commerce power

“ must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government. ”

[edit] Equal Protection Clause

The United States argued that pervasive gender stereotypes and assumptions permeated state justice systems. The Government argued these forms of state bias led to "insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence." This bias, the government argued, deprived women of the equal protection of the laws, and the private civil remedy of VAWA was meant to redress "both the States' bias and deter future instances of gender discrimination in the state courts."

The Court responded that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the manner in which Congress may remedy discrimination, and requires that a civil remedy be directed at a State or state actor instead of a private party. The Fourteenth Amendment, said the Court, prohibits only state action – i.e., action by state governments – and not private conduct.

The majority reaffirmed the state action doctrine, and specifically reaffirmed the results reached in United States v. Harris (1883) and the Civil Rights Cases (1883), both decided fifteen years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause applied only to acts done by states, not to those done by private individuals; because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to racial discrimination in private establishments, the Court said, it exceeded congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Harris, the Court had ruled that the Clause did not apply to a prison lynching, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit private criminal acts.

According to Morrison, "assuming that there has been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities in this case, it would not be enough to save § 13981's civil remedy, which is directed not at a State or state actor but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias." The Court agreed with the government that there was a "voluminous congressional record" supporting the "assertion that there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence," and the Court also agreed with the government that "state-sponsored gender discrimination violates equal protection unless it serves important governmental objectives...." However, according to the majority:

“ the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. These limitations are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government. ”

Rehnquist mentioned the government's argument that with VAWA there was "disparate treatment," whereas with Civil Rights Cases there was "no indication of such state action." Referring to this argument of the petitioners, the Court said:

“ But even if that distinction were valid, we do not believe it would save §13981’s civil remedy. For the remedy is simply not "corrective in its character, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited [s]tate laws or proceedings of [s]tate officers." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., at 18. ”

The Court distinguished VAWA from prior laws upheld as a valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment powers in that the prior legislation was designed to motivate state actors. The Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), and Ex parte Virginia (1880) upheld legislation designed to indirectly influence state actors to remove unrelated state discriminatory action. For example, Katzenbach v. Morgan upheld a law preventing the imposition of literacy tests in New York despite a judicial ruling that the tests were not discriminatory. Morgan upheld the legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that it would give Puerto Ricans increased political power, which they could use to remedy discrimination in the local garbage collection industry. VAWA had no such effect. The legislation established a cause of action against private individuals acting in their private capacity. The Court could not find a way that these private fines would influence state actors to change their behavior.

For this proposition, the Court also relied upon City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), which held that only congressional remedies which showed "congruence and proportionality" to the wrongs they sought to redress or deter were constitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. VAWA's civil remedy, the Morrison Court said, was aimed at private actors who broke state laws, instead of at state actors who failed to enforce those laws. According to the majority, this fact made VAWA's civil remedy lacking in "congruence and proportionality" to the wrong it sought to correct.

Boerne was a precedent of major importance to the outcome of Morrison with regard to interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Boerne Court had sought to "limit congressional power" to make a "substantive change" to the Court's interpretation of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, on the theory that Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Because of the Boerne "congruence and proportionality" requirement, Congress, in authorizing individuals to sue the states for money damages, could not provide substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment which the Court had refused to recognize.

In the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the Court had said that the Equal Protection Clause is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Before the 1997 Boerne decision, Morgan was widely interpreted as allowing Congress to go beyond, but not fall short of, the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.[5] However, the Boerne Court said, "This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one." The Court in Boerne said that only the Court could interpret the Constitution, in order to maintain the "traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary." Professor Jim Chen of the University of Minnesota has said that while Boerne did not formally overrule Morgan, "after Boerne, Morgan will never again enjoy iconic status."[6]

[edit] Critiques of Morrison

The United States v. Morrison decision was seen by the press as part of the Rehnquist Court's series of federalism or states' rights decisions.[7] Feminist Wendy Kaminer agreed with the courts that Congress had overstepped its bounds by invoking the Commerce Clause: "The price of upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy is an unconstitutional grant of unlimited power to Congress, power that will not always be used wisely or with regard to individual rights. We need to combat sexual violence without making a federal case of it."[8]

Law Professor Peter Shane said that the attorneys general of 36 states had endorsed the VAWA, and Shane argued that the endorsement "exposes one of the more bizarre aspects of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf of state sovereignty: From the states' point of view, this campaign is often pointless and sometimes counterproductive."[9] According to Shane, the 36 attorneys general called the Violence Against Women Act "a particularly appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated violence."

The Washington Post came out in favor of the Morrison decision: "The court got it right. If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it's hard to think of anything it couldn't."[10] An editorial by columnist Ann Coulter agreed with the Court's arguments, and said of Congress: "their theory was that they could usurp the traditional police powers of the states."[11]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
  2. ^ Taylor, Stuart. "Court to Congress: You can't regulate everything by Stuart Taylor Jr.," National Journal (1999-03-13). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
  3. ^ The Court quoted the following statements made by nineteenth-century Republicans who supported the civil rights bills in question to support its argument:
    "The statement of Representative Garfield in the House and that of Senator Sumner in the Senate are representative:
    "'[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them.' Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (1871) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
    "'The Legislature of South Carolina has passed a law giving precisely the rights contained in your "supplementary civil rights bill." But such a law remains a dead letter on her statute-books, because the State courts, comprised largely of those whom the Senator wishes to obtain amnesty for, refuse to enforce it.' Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 430 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner)."
  4. ^ To support its argument that Congress had limited power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against state governments, the Court pointed to a proposed enforcement provision which was rejected by the Congress that eventually approved the Fourteenth Amendment:
    "Democrats and conservative Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment [i.e., the proposed enforcement provision] would give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York labeled the Amendment 'an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our Constitution,' and warned that under it 'all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedures … may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead.' Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the Amendment would permit 'Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,' such that 'there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,' and would thereby 'work an entire change in our form of government.'"
    521 U.S. at 521 (citations omitted).
  5. ^ See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, "The Morgan 'Power' and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions," 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 819 (1986); William Cohen, "Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection," 27 Stan L. Rev. 603 (1975).
  6. ^ Jim Chen, "Come Back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law", 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1203, 1287 (2002).
  7. ^ Rehnquist's opinion, United States v. Morrison; No Winners in Rape Lawsuit, Brooke A. Masters, The Washington Post, May 19, 2000; Violence Against Coherence, Ann Coulter, Townhall.com, May 19, 2000; In Who's Best Interests? Not the States, Peter M. Shane, The Washington Post, May 21, 2000
  8. ^ Kaminer, Wendy. "Sexual Congress," American Prospect (2000-02-14). Retrieved 2007-02-13. Kaminer's article also stated:
    "Try the common sense test: When you think of a rape in a college dormitory, do you think about interstate commerce? As the Fourth Circuit noted in Brzonkala, the relationship between sexual violence and interstate commerce is rather attenuated....Do you want Congress to enjoy unrestricted regulatory power over you? (Do you want your divorce in federal court? Do you want Congress making local zoning decisions for your town?) The Supreme Court in Lopez rightly held that the Commerce Clause is not a grant of general police power....This standard does not unduly limit congressional power, including the power to prohibit discrimination. It does not invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Segregation in hotels and restaurants, on transportation systems, and in the workplace involved commercial activities with clear and substantial effects upon interstate commerce."
  9. ^ Shane, Peter. "In Whose Best Interests? Not the States," Washington Post (2000-05-21). Also see Mauro, Tony. "States' Rights Triumph in Supreme Court Kimel Decision, Oral VAWA Argument," Legal Intelligencer (2000-01-12); Greenhouse, Linda. "Justices Cool to Law Protecting Women," New York Times, (2000-01-12)
  10. ^ Washington Post, Editorial: States’ Business, (2000-05-16). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
  11. ^ Coulter, Ann. "Violence against coherence," Townhall.com (2000-05-19). Retrieved 2007-02-13.

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

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