Jakob Meckel

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Klemens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel; (28 March 1842 - 5 July 1905) was a general in the Prussian army and foreign advisor to the government of Meiji period Japan.

Meckel was born in Koln, Germany. He graduated from the Prussian Army Staff College in 1867. After the government of Meiji period Japan decided to model the Imperial Japanese Army after the Prussian army, following the German victory over the French in the Franco-Prussian War, Meckel (with the rank of major at the time) was invited to Japan as a professor at the Army Staff College and as an advisor to the Japanese General Staff. He worked closely with future Prime Ministers General Katsura Taro and General Yamagata Aritomo, and with army strategist General Kawakami Soroku. Meckel made numerous recommendations which were implemented, including reorganization of the command structure of the army into divisions and regiments, thus increasing mobility, strengthening the army logistics and transportation structure, with the major army bases connected by railways, establishing artillery and engineering regiments as independent commands, and revising the universal conscription system to abolished virtually all exceptions.

Although his period in Japan (1885-1888) was relatively short, Meckel had a tremendous impact on the development of the Japanese military. By training some sixty of the highest-ranking Japanese officers of the time in tactics, strategy and organization, he was able to replace the previous influences of the French advisors with his own philosophies. Meckel especially reinforced the idea of subservience to the Emperor by teaching his pupils that Prussian military success was a consequence of the officer class's unswerving loyalty to their king.

On his return to Germany, Meckel was promoted to major general, and placed in command of German forces in the Rhine area.

Meckel's reforms are credited with Japan's overwhelming victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. However, his over-reliance on the use of infantry in offensive campaigns also led to the large number of Japanese casualties in the subsequent Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.