Talk:Isoroku Yamamoto

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Contents

[edit] New paragraph?

The article practically stops after Yamamoto's death. For such an important man, there should be a paragraph detailing any happenings concerning him after his death. His so called "legacy".

[edit] Oldest stuff

Incorrect use of the word deranged in this article, it should be derailed. Will the OP please correct it? Kalpak

It would be nice if someone knowledgable enough would change the image over to the method used in pages like Erwin Rommel instead of using all the ugly tables. --68.82.51.198 22:56, 19 May 2004 (UTC)

done. -- Finlay McWalter | Talk 23:20, 19 May 2004 (UTC)
Thanks. --68.82.51.198 04:17, 25 May 2004 (UTC)

From the article: (italics added)

"He also accurately envisaged the "island-hopping" and air dominance tactics such a war would have, although his vision failed him when it came to battleships, which he (in common with most officers in the American navy, it must be conceded) still believed to be the key component of naval force -a failing which would be a key component of the causes for the disaster which was to befall Japanese naval forces at Midway."

I don't see how this follows - what does a failed vision concerning belief in battleships have to do with the (Japanese) disaster at Midway? Whoever won the Battle of Midway it would have reenforced the viability of Naval Air Power, but have little bearing on a faith in battleships. The Battle of Lete Gulf could be cited as relevant, but not appropriately so in this article.

Leonard G. 03:50, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Agreed. If anything is the single most responsible reason for the Japanese failing at Midway, it's the lack of damage control measures in the Japanese navy. After sustaining the same type of attack which had sunk four Japanese carriers, the Yorktown still floated, crippled but serviceable. Doovinator 20:07, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)
Well, not just the damage control measures. They also had all sorts of ordnance lying around unstowed (in their rush to switch from land-attack to ship-attack weapons). I'm not sure we can really say for sure which was the biggest factor in the disaster (how exactly does one do the scientific experiment :-), and luck (exact location of hits, for instance) may have also played a role. However, certainly it didn't help that doctine called for carriers to be out front, to screen the "valuable" battleships. And it is true, I believe (without dragging down reference sources), that Yamamoto didn't forsee that the battleship's value had already declined as drastically as it (in actuality) had. Noel (talk) 21:22, 14 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I whittled this down and put in some text that I realized was covered in later paragraphs. Deleted the whole paragraph. Japanese battleship doctrine and its effect on the Midway battle is well covered appropriately in later paragraphs. Only "Island hopping" has been lost, someone may wish to re-insert at an appropriate location. "Island hopping" is usually used in the context of U.S. strategy of bypassing non critical islands, cutting them off from their logistics support and simply ignoring them. Leonard G. 03:10, 6 Aug 2004 (UTC)

There are several myths and misconceptions perpetuated in this article and this discussion:

First, Admiral Yamamoto did not suffer a failure of vision with respect to the role of battleships at Midway. He fully expected the Japanese carriers would bear the brunt of the fighting. The battleships of the Main Body were expected to clean up whatever the carriers left for them to catch. In this Yamamoto correctly perceived that the carriers of the time could deliver a tremendous pulse of firepower, but could not sustain intensive combat operations for long due to limits of ordnance, fuel and aircraft durability under combat conditions. Thus, the Japanese carriers would probably run out of firepower before polishing off the American Fleet, so the battleships of the Main Body would come up to finish the job. Yamamoto misappreciated nothing in bringing the battleships, he was simply using the assets he had available as he lacked adequate carriers to do everything required.

Second, the Japanese battleships were not held to the rear at Midway to allow the carriers to protect them. They were held to the rear to remain undetected and available to engage in the later stages of the operation as Yamamoto expected it to unfold. The carriers were out front because it was expected they would be needed to neutralize Midway and then neutralize the American carriers, before the battleships would be needed to finish off remaining American surface forces. When Yamamoto's plan fell apart due to the American intelligence coup, the Main Body wound up out of position and unable to intervene.

Third, no doctrine yet existed for battleships to screen carriers and to assume so at this early date is an artifact of hindsight that projects later World War Two practice on the part of the USN onto the IJN. In fact, at this date, Japanese battleship anti-aircraft batteries were quite weak, especially by later-war standards and would not have added much to the barrage thrown at attacking U.S. aircraft. Also, Japanese defensive maneuvering did not emphasize screening the carriers through massed fire. Photographs of Japanese evasive maneuvers show individual ships cutting circles in the water to evade attacking planes. Comparison between this practice and the synchronized movements of American ships in protective ring formations around carriers is instructive. S/Electric Joe

Good discussion of Midway. For more IJN details see Parshall's excellent "Shattered Sword".

I knew the three principals of the Yamamoto mission (excluding Y himself, of course!): Mitchell, Lanphier, and Barber. Mitchell always believed that Barber did the deed, citing the geometry of the intercept and Lanphier's contradictory accounts. There is no doubt that L intended to use the mission as a political springboard to the White House--he said as much at the time. OTOH, Rex Barber's ambition was to return to Oregon and resume farming.

One noteworthy item that emerged from discussion with other Guadalcanal fighter pilots is the fact that Lanphier wrote the mission report (conversation with retired Col. Paul Bechtel, 12th FS in 1943). It should also be noted that, whether Y's airplane lost its wing in flight or not, it was physically impossible for Lanphier (or anyone) to have shot off the wing from 90 degrees deflection, as he described. The only way to do so was to sever the spar, and that could not be done by shooting "end on" at the wingtip (envision shooting a pea into a soda straw at 300 mph from 300 yards away).

B Tillman April 2006

Wrong on doctrine. Yamamoto kept the heavies back & led with his carriers (scouts), per doctrine. (Nobody I've read suggests BBs screen CVs.) Had he put his battleships in front, he could have pounded Midway's installations with little risk from air attack, leaving Nagumo to rove & cover him. With all the cruisers' VSs (denied Nagumo in the event), he'd also have found Fletcher in time to strike before Fletcher's birds turned his carriers into funeral pyres. Trekphiler 22:10, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Operation Peacock

Someone added a reference to an "Operation Peacock", which I've never heard of. I'm too lazy to go get the ref books down at the moment - this ring a bell with anyone? Noel (talk) 21:22, 14 Dec 2004 (UTC)


There's a codeword dictionary I've seen that mentions it. Trekphiler 22:15, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Heading

Changed "most of WW2" to "first third". April 1943 was just the 17th month of a war that would last 45 months. The middle third of the war involved rolling back the outer defense perimeter, while the last third cracked the inner defense perimeter and brought the war to the Home Islands.

Yeah, "17th month" if you're counting from when the U.S. entered the war. If you weren't so blinkered, you'd know that World War II actually started in September 1939 (not December 1941!!!) and Japan was extremely active in the Pacific well before the sneak attack on Pearl Harbour. (In fact there is a good argument that the "Asian WW2" started in 1937.) -- 219.89.132.103 12:06, 23 July 2005 (UTC)


This is a semantic squabble of no real importance. Suffice it to say he was the CinC of the Combined Fleet for the first 17 months of war against the western Allies. S/ Electric Joe

[edit] Name

I'm been wondering for a decade now: Does his name mean "base of the mountain fifty-six"? -Hmib 10:03, 25 July 2005 (UTC)

Shouldn't his name 山本 五十六 link to the Japanese Wikipedia article on him? Uncle Ed 15:54, 5 December 2005 (UTC)
The link was already there, with all the other interwiki links:
 :
 [[nl:Isoroku Yamamoto]]
 [[ja:山本五十六]]
 [[pl:Isoroku Yamamoto]]
 :
If you want an interwiki link to show up within the page, you'd have to prefix a colon: [[:ja:山本五十六|山本五十六]]. Hmm, apparently on a Talk page you don't.
—wwoods 18:07, 5 December 2005 (UTC)
Thanks: [[:ja:山本五十六]] turns his kanji into a clickable interwiki link. Uncle Ed 17:50, 6 December 2005 (UTC)


THE BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA This entire section should be deleted. Yamamoto directed the Java Sea operations only in the most rarified and distant fashion. The actual operations were conducted by by the Japanese Second Fleet under Vice Admirals Takahashi, Kondo and Ozawa. Yamamoto "directed" these operations only in the sense that Second Fleet reported to Combined Fleet. The sense of this section is as if Yamamoto was flying his flag in the battle or directly ordering about the forces involved tactically. He did nothing of the sort. S/ElectricJoe

ADOPTION "In 1916, Isoroku changed his last name to Yamamoto, because the name Yamamoto was an honorable and ancient one in the history of Japan. One such figure was Tatewaki Yamamoto, who fought against the Emperor, and his forces at the Battle of Wakamatsu, during the Bosshin War (戊辰戦争). Since he was one of the leaders of the rebellion, when he was captured, he was beheaded at Wakamatsu. Since Tatewaki had no sons, Isoroku was also the future of the Yamamoto clan."

This is a terribly written paragraph. It would be more accurate to state that Takano Isoroku was adopted by the Yamamoto clan as Yamamoto Isoroku. All reference to Yamamoto Tatewaki should be stricken as a digression. S/Electric Joe

[edit] IMO This page needs...

There is a need write NPOV on this page. All familiar language shoud be avoided spur, whim... Big contributions done. Time for a break and a polish.  :-) Gtabary 02:07, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

What, pray tell, is NPOV about accounting for how Yamamoto's plan has been represented? It clearly states that it pertains to such misrepresentation and the new text is quite objective. I don't understand how this is at all either unfair to Yamamoto or to anyone else. S/ Electric Joe

Mrs Campbell suxxxx

support: Buckboard 09:09, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] OPERATION VENGEANCE

This entire section, while having a lot of valuable information, also has a lot of misinformation, particularly about the "controversy" but in other details as well. For instance, Lanphier died in 1987, not 1983. Lanphier's "account" was disputed from the moment the mission ended because he announced on the radio, in defiance of top secret security regarding the "Magic" Operation (not mention good sense), that "I got Yamamoto!" Moreover Lanphier, trained as a journalist, wrote out the citation awards for himself and the others involved and worked tirelessly to get HIS version into print without regard for the consequences to Magic. Rex Barber did not wait until 1983 to object, but made repeated attempts through channels to clear the record from 1943 on, as did Major Mitchell. Lanphier was a competent officer and a good pilot, but he was also a self-aggrandizing individual who gave varying versions of his story depending on time and audience, invented details when necessary, and left out Barber, Mitchell, and Holmes from his early statements to the press, the first of which app. was to the AP correspondent Norman Lodge, a gross breach of security for which Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, and King came down hard on Mitchell and Barber.

In the end Air Force historians rather wimpishly decided to give each a half credit for the shootdown of Yamamoto (they had earlier awarded Barber and Holmes half credit for shootdown of the staff bomber) despite physical evidence at the crash site supporting Barber's account (attacked from rear, plane crashed in level flight in jungle) and a lack of evidence supporting Lanphier (attack from right angle and right wing shot off before crash).

Also it's stated Yamamoto was "killed instantly" but then contradicts itself later, coming to a conclusion unsupported by facts. Two post-mortems reported that the admiral's body was not distended as were others at the crash site and lacked the maggots found on them, suggesting he was alive after the crash. If the search party finding the crash site "tidied it up" they not only did so out of respect but to spare themselves criticism (or worse) for not mounting a quicker search in time to save the admiral.

Much of the original information on this mission appears to come from early sources, including Sherrod's official history of Marine Corps aviation in WWII. I have used Glines (who uses primary sources for his material) and later updates.

Work on this section continues, bearing in mind a need for NPOV. Buckboard 09:09, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

I eliminated the term "Operation Vengeance" because the mission was definitely ad hoc and I cannot find the term in any sources. However I have no problem with it if a source can be shown. Buckboard 11:53, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Removed

Removed this as it's redundant & POV

"As a tactical raid, the attack was a smashing victory, handily achieving its limited objectives at an amazingly low price of 29 aircraft (and five miniature submarines that contributed nothing of value). Hindsight and wishful thinking on the part of the Japanese regarding the attack's flaws, and American unpreparedness should not detract from the appreciation that military forces seldom achieve such complete surprise and devastation in an operation. Credit for husbanding the ambitious brain-child of his talented air subordinates to fruition is Yamamoto's."

exolon 00:34, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

This was neither redundant, nor POV. It was a necessary summation to explain why Yamamoto is given credit for this operation. Otherwise we'll have people crawling all over this trying to say it was all really Genda's doing, or Onishi's. Genda's and Onishi's efforts would have gone nowhere except for being initiated by and nutured by Yamamoto.ElectricJoe 04:09, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Birth name

I believe this statement to be inaccurate:

"Yamamoto was born Isoroku Sadayoshi (高野 五十六 Sadayoshi Isoroku) in Nagaoka in Niigata. His father was Takano Sadayoshi (高野 貞吉 Takano Sadayoshi), a lower-ranking samurai of Nagaoka-han."

"Takano/高野" is a family name and "Sadayoshi/貞吉" appears to be a given name. Therefore, if his father's name was Takano Sadayoshi, Isoroku was probably born Takano Isoroku (高野 五十六).

I'm changing the article to read: "Yamamoto was born Isoroku Takano (高野 五十六 Takano Isoroku) in Nagaoka, Niigata. His father was Sadayoshi Takano (高野 貞吉 Takano Sadayoshi), a lower-ranking samurai of Nagaoka-han."

If anyone can confirm or refute this, please do.

[edit] Alternate history.

"Absent the American code break-through, the MI plan would appear neither particularly complex, diffuse, or dangerous. The Aleutians feint would have drawn American attention, Operation K would have ascertained the Pacific Fleet's whereabouts, the submarine cordon would have picked up the American carriers moving toward Midway, and the First Fleet, Second Fleet and First Mobile Force would have concentrated into a lethal whole."

Isn't this an awful lot of would-haves? How do we know that all these "would haves" would happen? No plan survives first contact with the enemy, and all that. Suppose Nimitz--no fool himself--recognized the feint? Suppose Operation K did not pick up the whereabouts of the pacific fleet?

I have to agree that this article is full of scenarios that "might" have been but were not. Let us focus on what did happen and ignore most of the would have, could have, should have scenarios. Same goes for the mischaracterizations of other historians. Just stick to our best understandings of the facts. You may point out risks that effected decision making, or documented "close calls", but please keep them to a minimum: they are distracting. -- 67.119.193.90 12:04, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
This particular alternate history is based on a good bit of incorrect information in any case. Recommended reading: "Shattered Sword" by Parshall & Tully, 2005. It is very well researched, particularly in the authors' access to Japanese materials, some of which were not translated until recently. I base all the following statements on that book.
Firstly, the Aleutian Islands attack (Operation AL) was not an attempt to lure the Americans out but a simultaneous operation, however ill-conceived it may seem to split one's forces and attack two objectives on the same day. The only reason the Aleutians were attacked the day before Midway was that Nagumo's Midway-bound carrier strike force was a day late leaving port. Incredibly, NO schedule adjustments were made: no delay for the Aleutians attack, and no delay for the Midway invasion force, which consequently risked premature detection by Midway-based search planes. The reasons behind splitting forces were largely political, stemming in part from the Doolittle raid on Tokyo at a propitious (for America) time in the planning. If it was a feint, the Japanese would have attacked the Aleutians at a few days earlier. Carrier fleets need reaction time; they can't leave port on a moment's notice. The exact reasoning remains hard to divine, but it seems the Aleutians op was viewed as a "land grab" while the Americans were busy getting the stuffing beaten out of them 1500 miles to the south. At this juncture the Imperial Navy was rather contemptuous of the US Navy, and Yamamoto evidently felt that four of his carriers were more than a match for anything Nimitz could produce. So he offered no objections.
Secondly, the American carriers weren't that early, arriving a couple of days before the battle. Rather, the Japanese submarines were horrendously late arriving on station, and worse, Yamamomoto was not apprised of that fact. The reason is "rather scandalous" as worded by Parshall & Tully; the sub ops were the domain of one of the Emperor's relatives, who neglected to mention this failure.
Thirdly, it's not certain that Operation K failed due to the code-breaking. The Japanese flying boats were intended to be refueled by submarine at French Frigate Shoals (600 miles from Hawaii), but when the sub arrived it was discovered that the Americans were using it themselves for similar purposes (a base for seaplane operations). Nimitz had no such level of detail in his intelligence information; even the target of the operation (Midway) was only confirmed through some clever work. They were intercepting about 60% of the message traffic, processing 40% of that due to time constraints, and could only decipher about 10% of the code groups in a given message.
It didn't. It failed because of a previous, identical (stupid) mission that dropped a handful of bombs (on Niihau?) in May. As for "the Americans using it themselves", that's a mistake (or misunderstanding); the tenders were to prevent the Japanese from using them again. Trekphiler 22:28, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
Yamamoto had plenty of clues that the Americans were onto him. He knew: a)Operation K was scrubbed. b)Message traffic was very heavy indicating that the carrier fleet wasn't sitting at home in Pearl. c)Midway itself, when scouted by submarine, was bustling with activity. Midway's aircraft complement had doubled or tripled, and bright worklights revealed round-the-clock construction. d)The number, and timing, of Midway's scout plane takeoffs & landings indicated heavy search activity out to the limit of their range. All of this information was in Yamamoto's hands, and Nagumo's (the Midway carrier strike force commander.)
Midway was clearly expecting visitors, digging in and maintaining a constant vigil. Yamamoto's entire convoluted scheme depended on the Americans following his script. The first act of that play, for the Americans, was being home at Pearl and needing days to arrive at Midway. It was quite evident that Midway was alerted, plus there were signs (radio traffic) that the carriers were at sea. Yet the intricate invasion plan continued, unaltered in any detail. --Shyland 01:05, 19 October 2006 (UTC) (edited after re-consulting Shattered Sword --Shyland 19:38, 24 October 2006 (UTC))

[edit] Intro rewording

I reworded the intro, due to the "stellar tactics" which I felt was POV--one could spend hours punching holes in Yamamoto's tactics--and for the "highly respected in the US" line. Most modern US historians--note I am not casting judgement as to whether they're right or not--tend to denigrate his strategic vision and tactics; see the quoted "Shattered Sword".--Steve Dallas 01:23, 30 June 2006 (UTC)Steve Dallas

[edit] War crimes reference

In "Revision as of 11:49, 22 July 2006", the wording of the second paragraph was changed from

"He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the US for both tactical prowess and for running a "clean" war (in other words, he usually steered clear of committing war crimes)."

to

"He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the US for both tactical prowess and for preventeing his men from committing war crimes."

Is there a reference on which this change was based, i.e. a citation about Adm. Yamamoto ordering his men not to commit war crimes, as opposed to him not issuing orders to commit them? After doing a little bit of searching, the only references I can find regarding war crimes committed during operations planned or commanded by him pertain to the murder of captured US Navy pilots during the Battle of Midway.

--Emamid 11:24, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Yamato was hundreds of miles away aboard Yamato. His plan was to lurk out of detection range with most of his battleships and heavy cruisers. (I'm still at a loss as to what exactly he intended to do with said battleships eventually...chase carriers on the open ocean in spite of a speed disadvantage?) If the fleet had broken radio silence by that time they must have been keeping communications to a minimum. It seems doubtful that if he even knew of the prisoners, he issued any order one way or the other, to execute them or keep them alive. Naval warfare typically results in few prisoners, but I haven't read anything that indicated he took measures to prevent war crimes. Can anyone cite a source to that effect? --Shyland 23:01, 24 October 2006 (UTC)
As I recall, there was some mention in Shattered Sword of Japanese naval aviators having shown they were "no less willing than their American counterparts" to strafe people in parachutes or around sinking ships. I can't find it now. --Shyland 00:51, 25 October 2006 (UTC)
...And, I've got issues with the "highly respected in the US for tactical prowess" part. The attack on Pearl Harbor, while well-planned and well-executed, seems unlikely to have engendered respect in the U.S. And while code-breaking was a very important part of his disastrous loss at Midway, one could argue that Yamamoto's battle plan was also a huge factor. Even if the enemy knows you're coming, he's not guaranteed to win. The IJN had clear superiority in many respects, until it was irretrievably lost forever at Midway. The reasons for that loss are numerous and complex, but among them Yamamoto's plan, and total inflexibility in not deviating from it when circumstances changed, must rank high. The plan involved multiple groups operating in tightly-synchronized fashion, across 1500 miles of ocean, in strict radio silence, and furthermore expecting the enemy to behave exactly as Yamamoto predicted. The Japanese didn't even get out of port on schedule (Nagumo's carrier force was a day late), and no adjustments were made. When it started looking like the Americans weren't following the script, no adjustments were made. --Shyland 00:51, 25 October 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Midway: good plan? That's POV

"The plan was well thought out, well organized and finely timed." Totally POV. My POV is completely opposite. There are lots of sources ( Parshall & Tully, Lord, Fuchida, etc.) claiming Yamamoto's plan was a big factor in the devastating defeat at Midway. I find it hard to believe Midway was planned & executed by the same people who were behind the overwheming success at Pearl Harbor. I don't think I'm a good candidate to do the rewriting; I'm sure my own POV would creep in.

Yamamoto split his forces THREE ways, nullifying the massive numerical superiority claimed in the article (as of 17Nov2006): two concurrent attacks extremely far apart (Midway and the Aleutians), and a third group originally slated to be roughly two days' sailing(!!??) away from either. As to "finely timed", this phrase hardly fits when your carrier group is a day late leaving port for Midway, and all the other groups proceed according to plan! I could go on and on...see comments above in "War Crimes" section for starters. The whole Midway section needs rewrite. --Shyland 23:24, 17 November 2006 (UTC)

So your POV is right and anyone else's is wrong? Just because a battle is unsuccessful, does not mean it wasn't well planned or well thought out. Remove the circumstance of the American cryptological break and the operation would have gone off quite well. A cryptological break such as that at Midway is the sort of event it is almost impossible to plan against. However, Yamamoto tried to cover himself with Operation K and the submarine picket lines. Unfortunately, the American cryptological break permitted them to circumvent those measures as well. Lord's access to classified information and Japanese material was extremely limited. Fuchida has been proven to have lied by none other than Parshall & Tully. Parshall & Tully did tremendous work in Shattered Sword, but that does not make them gods nor universally correct when they express their opinions. There is plenty of room for debate about the quality of the Midway plan, and as currently written the basis for debate is highlighted. Thus Yamamoto is treated fairly and not arbitrarily condemned as an idiot, and the controversy is treated fairly by being revealed with both points of view mentioned.ElectricJoe 03:53, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Wrong. Removing the crypto break is effectively rewriting history. If "Yamamoto tried to cover himself with Operation K and the submarine picket lines", why did he sail his task force before the pickets arrived, & after the flying boats had failed in recon? (And, 1 may ask, why did he allow that stupid stunt in May?) A smart commander plans for the undexpected (like U.S. carriers being closeby...); he didn't need to know his codes were compromised to do that. Are Parshall & Tully "universally correct"? No, but I've seen much the same argument in Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin; don't try & tell me he had no access to decrypts. Yamamoto isn't being "arbitrarily condemned as an idiot", he's being fairly condemned for bad command decisions. Trekphiler 22:54, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Changes

Okay, the fight over exactly when WWII started is just senseless. Yamamoto was "a" CINC of the IJN during WWII, so I got rid of any reference to the exact duration of his command. Thus the people that want to date the war from 1937, 1939 or 1941 can make their own calculations.

The references to a "clean" fight and/or preventing war crimes have also become horridly cumbersome and wildly inaccurate. I've changed the wording to more accurately account for how Yamamoto is viewed in the United States.

The number of aircraft dispatched against Pearl Harbor has been corrected from 250 to 350.

I reinserted a paragraph summarizing the tactical evaluation of the Pearl Harbor raid for parallelism with the political and strategic ramifications, and to make clear that the raid would not have been successfully brought to fruition without Yamamoto's contribution.

When I originally editted this article I had not had the pleasure of reading Parshall & Tully's excellent work. I've made several changes based on that information.

Regarding the positioning of US forces at French Frigate Shoals to disrupt Operation K, this is found in Prados, page 316. Regarding the timing of the Japanese submarine cordon's arrival, even late the submarines arrived before the earliest time the Japanese calculated the carriers would be headed their direction. Ergo, since the carriers left Pearl Harbor on the basis of cryptological information in time to benefit from the late arrival of the Japanese submarines on station, this can be accounted a benefit of the cryptological break. Thus, all three factors contributing to the American surprise derived directly from the cryptological break.ElectricJoe 04:53, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Fletcher & Spruance were hurried due to crypto, & beat the pickets as a result? I've never heard that before. My understanding was, the subs sailed a day late, giving Nimitz the time he needed. Was this compounded by a hurry-up due to crypto? AFAIK, the actual date of Yamamoto's (or Nagumo's) scheduled arrival wasn't known... Trekphiler 23:00, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Low Bywater mark

I deleted "Sixteen years before Pearl Harbor attack, an English naval expert Hector Bywater uncannily prophesied in detail the war in the Pacific. Could Yamamoto have been influenced by Bywater's remarkable plan too?" Yamamoto wasn't an idiot. He was a professional navy officer. This is on par with the conspiracy theorists' implication, being Japanese, they were incapable of originality or achieving surprise without help. Trekphiler 23:08, 16 February 2007 (UTC)


[edit] Decisive Battle

I rewrote this:

"advanced across the Pacific until engaging in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea between the Ryukyu Islands on the west and the Marianas Islands on the east. This battle was intended to take place when the American forces had finally been worn down to parity with the Japanese Navy."

to this:

"whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas Islands), with battleships meeting in the traditional exchange between battle lines."

This was in line with Mahanian doctrine. Trekphiler 01:10, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] On the attack

I rewrote this:

"Surprise attacks were a Japanese military tradition when starting a war"

to this:

"Surprise attacks have a long military tradition when starting a war, and Japan could see clear to supporting"

I think Peattie & Evans point out most wars had been started without declarations of war.

On the greater issue, I must question the presumption Nagumo needed to use his aircraft to attack Hawaii. Also, the threat from U.S. aircraft was overblown; his fighters were more than capable of defending him, especially since his aviators had vastly more experience, as well as combat experience, & surprise on their side. Lack of VB or VT strength was not an issue; if he could find Halsey & Brown at night, his cruisers were more than enough to destroy them (as Spruance almost learned, to his detriment, at Midway). Neither does the article say one word to the fact Nagumo had orders to find & sink the carriers, even if it meant loss of half his carriers. Neither would I read too much into Yamamoto's not punishing Nagumo; it was Japanese practise not to criticize senior commanders, regardless their decisions. It seems to me this needs rewriting. Trekphiler 01:22, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Special K

I rewrote this:

"Nimitz dispatched a destroyer to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K's flying boats,"

to this:

"Following a foolish nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May, Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K"

based on Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets & Undersea Victory. (He mentions the officer who planned in in UV; anybody know who it was?) Trekphiler 02:46, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Meet you midway

I rewrote this:

"With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east rather than risk a night surface encounter in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage. Correctly perceiving that he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew his forces from the field, having no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
"Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began."

to this:

"With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east, in a position to further defend Midway, believing (based on a mistaken submarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade.[1] (He did not apprehend the severe risk of night surface battle, in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage, not knowing Yamato was on the Japanese order of battle.[2]) Correctly perceiving he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
"Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began. Had Yamamoto's dispositions not denied Nagumo pre-attack reconaissance assets, the cryptanalytic success, and the unexpected appearance of Fletcher's carriers, would have been irrelevant.[3]"

I'm far from convinced Yamamoto had "no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend." He couldn't have supported or defended it successfully had it been taken. Rather, he knew he no longer could take it. As for Spruance, he didn't forsee night battle as much as take a blocking position; I can't recall the name of the sub skipper who got it wrong offhand. The importance of codebreaking in the immediate U.S. success is overblown, as Willmott points out; Yamamoto had sufficient strength to overcome the surprise of Fletcher's unexpected appearance, had his initial dispositions not been ludicrous (quite aside the redeployment of Shinyo or Ryujo, sometimes mentioned). Trekphiler 03:37, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] For the defense

I rewrote this:

"Particularly harmful were the severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles that emasculated the carrier air groups."

to this:

"There were severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles, emasculating the already depleted carrier air groups. Particularly harmful, however, were losses of destroyers in the foolish Tokyo Express supply runs. IJN already faced a shortage, and commerce defense was laughably bad with the existing numbers as it was, thanks to poor doctrine and low priority to the task.[4]"

While the aviators & fleet battles get all the attention, in the long run, the commerce war meant more to Japan's ability to continue fighting. Trekphiler 03:53, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Personal Life

The whole section about his personal life is painfully POV. I've improved the wording of the chatter about geisha, but I really think the entire section should be jettisoned or, at least, completely rewritten. If there's important about his being a teetotaler, it is wholly unrelated to his gambling which also seems -- from the piece, I have no other knowledge -- to have referred more to enjoyment of games of skill than to any focus on betting per se. Czrisher 18:04, 14 March 2007 (UTC)

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