Isandlwana

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Isandlwana (also sometimes seen as Isandhlwana or Isandula) is an isolated hill in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa.

On January 22, 1879, Isandlwana was the site of the Battle of Isandlwana, where approximately 25,000 Zulu warriors defeated a contingent of British and Native troops in the first engagement of the Anglo-Zulu War. The battle remains the single greatest defeat for the British Army at the hands of a native foe.

Rest of this page is a content fork with Battle of Isandlwana, q.v.

After having crossed into Zululand at the head of No.3 column made up of approximately 4,000 men - of whom about 1,500 were British and European - Lord Chelmsford ordered camp to be made underneath the rocky slopes of Isandlwana on January 21st. Scout reports led Chelmsford to believe that the main Zulu impi lay to the south west and, eager to find and engage this force, he split his forces. In fact, he had been outmanouvered by the Zulus, whose main intention had been to lure the British forces from the camp and then strike a decisive blow against it.

Under Colonel Pulleine, Chelmsford left behind six companies (between 60-100 each) taken from both battalions of the 24th Foot, made up of experienced and steady troops, many of whom had seen active colonial service previously. In addition, Pulleine had further British forces in the shape of two guns from the Royal Artillery with about seventy gunners. Colonial forces added a further 500 troops to the defence of the camp, although of these the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) were not intended to be used in frontline defence but rather as a reserve - they consisted of tribal conscripts armed mainly with spears (only one in ten had firearms, many of these outdated) and led by White officers. On the morning of the 22nd January, Colonel Durnford was ordered to march up from Rorke's Drift (a with his contingent of about 400 natives (both foot and mounted) and a rocket battery. He arrived at the camp early morning. There has been much debate over whether Durnford - as senior - was supposed to take over command of the camp or whether he believed his orders were to support Chelmsford's advance. The orders were vague and the debate persists.

In any case, during the early morning of 22nd January, groups of Zulus could be seen in the distance away from the camp. Durnford believed that these forces were possibly attempting to attack Chelmsford's rear and he took out his mounted infantry as well as the rocket troop to push the Zulus back, not appreciating the odds he was facing. The camp was ordered to stand-to. At this stage, there was no realisation that the camp was incredible danger from vastly superior forces and a calm mood prevailed. Pulleine sent a message to Chelmsford informing him that a Zulu force was moving on the camp - though at this stage there was no request for reinforcements. It was expected that even fairly small British forces could deal with a native force several times their number due to the firepower and discipline they enjoyed.

Mid-morning, as they were several miles from camp, scouts from Raw's Troop (under Durnford) stumbled upon a large Zulu impi (army), which had possibly been intending to wait another day before attacking (the 22nd January saw an eclipse, which was not a suitable day to be fighting for the Zulus). The force was sitting down in a large gulley and numbered some 25,000 men. Durnford and his mounted troops began a fighting retreat towards the encampment but Major Russell and the rocket troops was overrun and the crew killed after having only managed to fire one, ineffectual rocket.

With reports of the Zulu advance reaching the camp, Pulleine deployed his infantry in an extended firing line over a mile in length and some considerable distance from the camp in an effort to meet the attack - which seemed to be developing from a specific area - head on. He had not fully grasped the Zulus' use of "the horns" of the buffalo, which were intended to move behind the British force and envelop it. The redcoats were in two ranks, standing some five yards apart in extended order. They carried about 70 rounds of ammunition for their Martini-Henri rifles. Pulleine has been criticised for using a firing line as opposed to a square, as it spread the men too thinly and left the flanks wide open to attack. However, it probably wasn't at first clear, given the topography of the terrain and the gunsmoke, that either the Zulus were attacking in such overwhelming force or that they intended to outflank the British position.

For roughly an hour, the firing line held back the Zulu attack and most of the estimated 3,000 Zulu casualties were inflicted in this period. The Martin-Henri was a formidable weapon and could stop a man dead in his tracks, shattering bone and leaving an exit wound the size of a large plate. The Zulus were forced to lie down in the long grass to seek protection and for a time their attack in the centre stalled.

At this stage, then, morale was strong in the British lines and it appeared that all was going well. However, it soon became apparent that the men were both running low on ammunition and seriously exposed. Durnford's troops, which had been defending a donga (dried stream) on the right of the British line after their fighting retreat, and who had therefore been in action for longer than the rest of the force, were the first to pull back in an attempt to re-form in the camp. This left the right flank of the firing line - Charlie Pope's "G" Company - totally exposed and they were slaughtered to a man, unable to form in rallying groups larger than three of four men at a time due to their extended formation.

Pulleine may have seen this and this led to his command for the rest of the British line, whose right flank and rear was now exposed, to also fall back on the camp and take up a more secure, tigther defensive formation. The gravity of the situation was only now becoming clear. It was too late. As the British line pulled back, the Zulu force in the centre which had hitherto been pinned down, rose and charged forward. Although reports vary, it is generally accepted that centrally-organsied British defence fell apart at this moment and the retreat became confused with no central rallying point and with Zulus and British mixed together as they ran into the camp. The Zulus were able to outrun many of the redcoats who were weighed down with heavy boots and kit.

Once the line had broken, all hope of maintaining a concerted defence was lost, although there was still much killing to be done. Individual groups, large and small, rallied together but were overwhelmed amongst the debris of the camp. Unarmed cooks, servants and European "casuals" who had accompanied the column were speared as they tried to flee. The Zulus attacked in the shape of a horn to envelop the whole British position and cut off the retreat. As the camp was overrun, the British defenders fought to the last man in bitter hand to hand fighting, back to back and using rifle butts, fists and even pocket knives, once their ammunition had been expended. Zulu accounts testify to the bravery of the defenders and the tenacity of their resistance.

The position of the bodies indicated a number of determined stands of several large groups (40-100 men) mainly from the 24th Foot but also including other defenders who found themselves left in camp with no escape. These stands took some time to break down, but with ammunition running out and facing overwhelming odds, they were wiped out by a foe who asked and gave no quarter - an example the British in the rest of the war would follow. The bravery shown by the redcoats - and their use of the bayonet to spear the Zulus through the throat, face and belly - earned them the Zulus' respect - one legend is that the Zulus allowed the remnants of one group under Capt. Younghusband to shake each others' hands before they were finally killed. No prisoners were taken and even animals were slaughtered. Once the Zulus had taken the camp, they set about mutilating the bodies of the dead in a ritual that was brutal but actually a spiritual act to free the soul of the dead and stop the killer's body from swelling.

Stragglers who had left the battle before the British line collapsed completely were hunted down in what is now called Fugitives' Drift, and only thirty Europeans, all mounted, survived. The colours of the 24th Foot were lost, despite heroic efforts by Lt Melville and Coghill to save them. In total some 1,200 men were killed in and around the camp. Not one man of the 24th Foot lived and only five imperial officers survived, along with about 300 natives who fled very early in the engagment. The battlefield today is marked with many whitewashed stone cairns, covering the remains of the dead - mainly British as they were left on the battlefield for several months after the defeat. In a bitter irony, Isandlwana Mountain is shaped like the very Sphinx on the 24th Foot's regimental crest that had been awarded for its service in Egypt some fifty years before the regiment suffered its most infamous reverse.

Various reasons have been given for this defeat including difficulty in supplying ammunition and attempting to defend too great a frontline with too few men. Once the Zulus were able to penetrate and outflank the British line their strength in hand to hand combat and sheer weight of numbers proved critical. However, the key factor in the defeat was the total failure to secure the camp by forming a laager - the traditonal Boer method of defence against an attacking Zulu force, whereby the camp would be enclosed and barricades errected, where possible. This would have kept the British forces supplied with ammunition and protected their flanks - and possibly changed the course of the battle. Indeed, this was to be the case at Rorke's Drift where 100 British held off 4,000 Zulus. However, the bravery of those troops left and who fought to the last man has long held fascination for historians and laymen alike - C.E. Fripps' famous painting, on show at the National Army Museum, of the last stand of the 24th Foot, is extremely evocative.

Lord Chelmsford returned that night of 22 January 1879 to a scene of utter devastation and his men spent the night amidst the carnage in what must have been an extraordinarily unpleasant experience, given that these men had lost comrades and friends they had only left a few hours before oblivious to their fate. They were deliberately woken before dawn to escape the full horror of the camp, but many of them slept in the blood and entrails of the dead and the next morning gave the impression of badly wounded men, such was the condition of the blood-soaked ground. The sight of smoke rising over Rorke's Drift in the distance - where one company of the 24th Foot was left to guard - would not have helped the morale of the men, either. However, as Chelmsford and his column would soon discover, the position had been held and Britain had one piece of news to celebrate on an otherwise terrible day.