Involuntary servitude

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Involuntary servitude is a United States legal and constitutional term for a person laboring against that person's will to benefit another, under some form of coercion. While laboring to benefit another occurs in the condition of slavery, involuntary servitude does not connotate the complete lack of freedom experienced in chattel slavery; involuntary servitude may also refer to other forms of unfree labor. Involuntary servitude is not dependent upon compensation or its amount.

The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes involuntary servitude illegal under any US jurisdiction whether at the hands of the US government or in the private sphere, except as punishment for a crime: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

The Libertarian Party of the United States and other libertarians consider and military conscription to be involuntary servitude in the sense of the Thirteenth Amendment.[1] Some libertarians consider compulsory schooling a form of involuntary servitude.

Some have also argued that, should Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) be overturned by the United States Supreme Court, a constitutional right to abortion could still be sustained on the basis that denying it would subject women to involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment.[1] However, no U.S. court has yet accepted such an argument.[2] Differing views have been expressed as to whether the argument is so unpersuasive as to be "frivolous".[3] One major difficulty with the argument relates to the claim that pregnancy and child-bearing are within the scope of the term "servitude".[4]

[edit] References

  1. ^ Koppelman, Andrew, "Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion", 84 Northwestern University Law Review 480 (1990)
  2. ^ Roe v. Rampton, 394 F. Supp. 677 (D Utah 1975) (Ritter C.J. dissenting); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D Utah 1992).
  3. ^ Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1514-1515 (10th Cir. 1995).
  4. ^ Vieira, Norman, "Hardwick and the Right of Privacy" 55 University of Chicago Law Review 1181, 1189-1191 (1988).