International Traffic in Arms Regulations

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“ITAR” redirects here. For the Russian news agency, see ITAR-TASS.

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is a set of United States government regulations that control the export and import of defense-related articles and services on the United States Munitions List. These regulations implement the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, and are described in Title 22 (Foreign Relations), Chapter I (Department of State), Subchapter M of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Department of State interprets and enforces ITAR. Its goal is to advance national strategic objectives and U.S. foreign policy via the trade controls.

For practical purposes, ITAR regulations dictate that information and material pertaining to defense and military related technologies may only be shared with US Persons unless approval from the Department of State is received or a special exemption is used. United States companies can face heavy fines if the Department of State discovers they have, without approval or the use of an exemption, exposed non-US-Persons to ITAR-protected products or information such as designs, test data, processes, software code, etc.

A "US Person" can be

  • a US citizen;
  • a permanent resident who does not work for a foreign company, a foreign government, or a foreign governmental agency/organization;
  • a part of the US government, or
  • a corporation, business, organization, or group that is incorporated in the United States under US law.

The list of ITAR-controlled technologies often changes. Until 1996–1997, ITAR classified strong cryptography as arms and prohibited their export from the U.S. Another change occurred as a result of Space Systems/Loral's conduct after the February 1996 failed launch of the INTELSAT 708 satellite. The Department of State charged Space Systems/Loral with violating the Arms Export Control Act and the ITAR. [1] As a result, technology pertaining to satellites and launch vehicles became more carefully protected.

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[edit] Controversy

There is an open debate between the Department of State and the industries and academia regulated by ITAR concerning how harmful the regulatory restrictions are for U.S. businesses and higher education institutions. The Department of State insists that ITAR has limited effect and provides a security benefit to the nation that these sectors must bear. Every year the Department of State can cite multiple arrests of ITAR violators by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents. However, many companies and institutions within the affected areas argue that ITAR is stifling U.S. trade and science. Companies argue that ITAR is a significant trade barrier that acts as a substantial negative subsidy, weakening U.S. industries' ability to compete [1]. U.S. companies point to announcements in Europe by EADS and Alcatel promoting their "ITAR-free" satellites and defense items. [2] Higher education institutions argue that ITAR prevents the best international students from studying and contributing in the U.S. and prevents cooperation on international scientific projects.

Currently, officials at the Department of State dismiss the burden on industry and educational institutions as minor compared to the security provided by ITAR. They also view the announcements of "ITAR-free" items as anecdotal and not systemic.

ITAR's greatest irony is that by preventing US technologies from leaving the US, other countries are forced to develop those technologies themselves. While this may slow short-term acquisition of technology or even prevent it, it also decreases diffusion of US technology and long-term reliance on US suppliers.

[edit] ITAR Controls, Military Sales and Joint Programs

ITAR controls have interfered with military sales and cooperation with some of the United States' strongest allies. In April 2006, the Australian Government was reported to have chosen EADS MRH-90 troop-lift helicopters in preference to US Sikorsky models because “the European bid offered the ADF better access to crucial computer source codes than the Sikorsky bid” [2].

ITAR controls, as well as separate policy concerns, have hampered international cooperation in development of the F-35 Lightning II (JSF). The Clinton administration promised the UK that an ITAR waiver would be given, allowing greater technology transfer associated with the project. [3] Yet, despite the backing of the Bush administration, the waiver has been repeatedly blocked by U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde because of his security concerns about potential technology transfer to third countries. [4] These difficulties caused the UK to threaten that it would abandon the JSF project and consider alternative aircraft. [5] Both the UK and the Australian Governments demanded a guarantee that the US will fully disclose technology needed for the JSF project before they would commit to further involvement in the project [3]. [6] [7]

[edit] ITAR Controls and Commercial Programs

U.S. commercial firms expend significant resources to prove that their products should not be classified as ITAR controlled technology. ITAR controls dramatically increase the cost (time and money) of exporting data or hardware. Additionally, the regulations restrict access to specific markets and discourage potential customers from non-restricted nations. [8]

Concerns over connections between the Boeing 787 and the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber prompted Boeing to take elaborate steps cleansing the commercial jet of any military technology. The issue arose when Boeing engineers, fearing indictment and penalties, refused to sign forms declaring that the 787 was "ITAR-free." As a result Boeing conducted extensive research on the source of technology implemented on the 787. They removed all military technology and either found a commercial source for the same technology or replaced it with technology derived from a commercial source. [9]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Sharon Weinberger, “Here We Go Again: Industry and Government Revisit U.S. Export Controls”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 July 2006, page 82.
  2. ^ Geoffrey Barker, “Australian Aerospace wins $1.5bn bid”, Australian Financial Review, 27 April 2006, page 6.
  3. ^ Max Blenkin, “Fighter Deal Stalls on Secret Technology”, The Australian, 15 March 2006.

[edit] External links

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