Internalism and externalism

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Recently internalism and externalism have become part of the standard jargon of philosophical discourse, and have become central to certain important debates.

Contents 1 Moral philosophy 2 Epistemology 2.1 As a response to skepticism 3 Semantics 4 Philosophy of mind 5 References 6 Bibliography 7 External links

[edit] Moral philosophy

In contemporary moral philosophy, internalism is the view that moral beliefs function as a motivating factor. That is, the internalist believes that there is an internal connection between her belief that "X ought to be done" and her motivation to do X. In the same way, an externalist would argue that there is no essential internal connection between moral beliefs and motives, i.e. there's no essential reason that the belief "X is wrong" leads to a desire not to do X. It is likely that this use of these terms comes from W.D. Falk's paper Ought and motivation (1948).

[edit] Epistemology

In contemporary epistemology internalism about justification is the idea that everything necessary to provide justification for a belief is immediately available in consciousness. Externalism in this context is the view that there are factors other than those which are internal to the believer which can affect the justificatory status of a belief. One strand of externalism is loosely called the causal theory of knowledge, and reliabilism is sometimes considered to be another strand. It is important to distinguish internalism about justification from internalism about knowledge. An internalist about knowledge will likely hold that the conditions that distinguish mere true belief from knowledge are similarly internal to the individual's perspective or grounded in the subject's mental states. Whereas internalism about justification is a widely endorsed view, there are few defenders of internalism about knowledge thanks in no small part to Edmund Gettier and Gettier-examples that suggest that there is more to knowledge than just justified true belief. In a short but widely discussed paper published in 1963, Gettier produced examples that seemed to show that owing to an accidental connection between an individual's evidence or reasons and the truth of her belief, someone could be justified in believing something true but nevertheless be ignorant.

One line of argument in favor of externalism begins with the observation that if what justified our beliefs failed to significantly eliminate the risk of error, then it does not seem that knowledge would be attainable as it would appear that when our beliefs did happen to be correct, this would really be a matter of good fortune. While many will agree with this last claim, the argument seems inconclusive. Setting aside sceptical concerns about the possession of knowledge, Gettier cases have suggested the need to distinguish justification from warrant where warrant is understood as that which distinguishes justified true belief from knowledge by eliminating the kind of accidentality often present in Gettier-type cases. Even if something must significantly reduce the risk of error, it is not clear why justification is what must fill the bill.

One of the more popular arguments for internalism begins with the observation, perhaps first due to Stewart Cohen, that when we imagine subjects completely cut off from their surroundings (thanks to a malicious Cartesian demon, perhaps) we do not think that in cutting these individuals off from their surroundings, these subjects cease to be rational in taking things to be as they appear. The 'new evil demon' argument for internalism (and against externalism) begins with the observation that individuals like us on the inside will be as justified as we are in believing what we believe. As it is part of the story that these individuals' beliefs are not produced by reliable mechanisms or backed by veridical perceptual experiences, the claim that the justification of our beliefs depends upon such things appears to be seriously challenged. Externalists have offered a variety of responses but there is no consensus among epistemologists as to whether these replies are successful.^[1]

[edit] As a response to skepticism

In responding to skepticism, Hilary Putnam claims that semantic externalism yields "an argument we can give that shows we are not brains in a vat (BIV).^[2][3] If semantic externalism is true, then the meaning of a word or sentence is not wholly determined by what individuals think those words mean. For example, semantic externalists maintain that the word "water" referred to the substance whose chemical composition is H20 even before scientists had discovered that chemical composition. The fact that the substance out in the world we were calling "water" actually had that composition at least partially determined the meaning of the word. One way to use this in a response to skepticism is to apply the same strategy to the terms used in a skeptical argument.

• Either I am a BIV, or I am not a BIV.
• If I am not a BIV, then when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true.
• If I am a BIV, then, when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true (because "brain" and "vat" would only pick out the brains and vats being simulated).

---

• My utterance of "I am not a BIV" is true.^[3]

To clarify how this argument is supposed to work: Imagine that there is brain in a vat, and a whole world is being simulated for it. Call the individual who is being deceived "Steve." When Steve is given an experience of walking through a park, semantic externalism allows for his thought, "I am walking through a park" to be true so long as the simulated reality is one in which he is walking through a park. Similarly, what it takes for his thought "I am a brain in a vat" to be true is for the simulated reality to be one in which he is a brain in a vat. But in the simulated reality, he is not a brain in a vat. Apart from disputes over the success of the argument or the plausibility of the specific type of semantic externalism required for it to work, there is question as to what is gained by defeating the skeptical worry with this strategy. Skeptics can give new skeptical cases that wouldn't be subject to the same response (e.g. one in which the person was very recently turned into a brain in a vat, so that their words "brain" and "vat" still pick out real brains and vats, rather than simulated ones). Further, if even brains in vats can correctly believe "I am not a brain in a vat," then the skeptic can still press us on how we know we are not in that situation (though the externalist will point out that it may be difficult for the skeptic to describe that situation). Another attempt to use externalism to refute skepticism is done by Brueckner and Warfield. It involves the claim that our thoughts are about things, unlike a BIV's thoughts which cannot be about things.^[3]

[edit] Semantics

Semantic externalism comes in two flavours, depending on whether meaning is construed cognitively or linguistically. On a cognitive construal, externalism is the thesis that what concepts (or contents) are available to a thinker is determined by her environment, or her relation to her environment. On a linguistic construal, externalism is the thesis that the meaning of a word is environmentally determined. Likewise, one can construe semantic internalism in two ways, as a denial of either of these two theses.

See also:

• Linguistic turn and cognitive turn for more about the two construals of meaning.
• Twin Earth thought experiment
• Swamp man thought experiment

[edit] Philosophy of mind

Within the context of the philosophy of mind, externalism is the theory that the contents of mental states are dependent on their relationship to the external world. Some mental states, such as believing that water is wet, and fearing that the Queen has been insulted, have contents which we can capture using 'that' clauses. The content externalist often appeals to observations which are found as early as Hilary Putnam's seminal "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" that we can easily imagine pairs of individuals that are microphysical duplicates embedded in different surroundings who use the same words but mean different things when using them. For example, suppose that Ike and Tina's mothers are identical twins and that Ike and Tina are raised in isolation from one another in indistinguishable environments. When Ike says 'I want my mommy', he expresses a want that is satisfied only if he is brought to his mommy. If we brought Tina's mommy, Ike might not notice the difference, but he doesn't get what he wants. It seems that what he wants and what he says when he says 'I want my mommy' will be different from what Tina wants and what she says she wants when she says 'I want my mommy'. Externalists say that if we assume that competent speakers know what they think and say what they think, the difference in what these two speakers mean will correspond to a difference in the minds of the two speakers that is not (necessarily) reflected by an internal difference in the internal make up of the speakers or thinkers. They urge us to move from externalism about meaning of the sort Putnam defended to externalism about contentful states of mind. The example offered pertains to singular terms but it has been extended to cover kind terms as well such as terms for kinds of substances (e.g., 'water') and for kinds of artifacts (e.g., 'espresso maker'). There is no general agreement amongst content externalists as to the scope of the thesis.

Critics of the view have questioned the original thought experiments saying that the lessons that Putnam and later writers such as Tyler Burge have urged us to draw can be resisted. Frank Jackson and John Searle, for example, have defended internalist accounts of thought content according to which the contents of our thoughts are fixed by descriptions that pick out the individuals and kinds that our thoughts intuitively pertain to the sorts of things that we take them to. In the Ike/Tina example, one might agree that Ike's thoughts pertain to Ike's mother and that Tina's thoughts pertain to Tina's but insist that this is because Ike thinks of that woman as his mother and we can capture this by saying that he thinks of her as 'the mother of the speaker'. This descriptive phrase will pick out one unique woman. Externalists have claimed that this is implausible as we would have to ascribe Ike knowledge he wouldn't seem to need in order to successfully refer to his mother or think about his mother.

Critics have also claimed that content externalists are committed to epistemological absurdities. Suppose that a speaker can have the concept of water we do only if the speaker lives in a world that contains H2O. It seems this speaker could know apriori that she thinks that water is wet. This is the thesis of privileged access. It also seems that she could know on the basis of simple thought experiments that she can only think that water is wet if she lives in a world that contains water. What would prevent her from putting these together and coming to know apriori that the world contains water? If we should say that no one could possibly know whether water exists apriori, it seems either we cannot know content externalism to be true on the basis of thought experiments or we cannot know what we are thinking without first looking into the world to see what it is like.

[edit] References

1. ^ Cohen, Stewart. (1984): “Justification and Truth” Philosophical Studies 46, pp. 279-296. See also, Sosa, Ernest, (1991): “Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue,” in E. Sosa, Knowledge In Perspective, Cambridge Press, pp. 131-145.
2. ^ Putnam, Hilary (1982): "Brains in a vat" in Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press; reprinted in DeRose and Warfield, editors (1999): Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford University Press. Retrived on 2007-01-31
3. ^ ^{a b c} DeRose, Keith (1999-02-06). "Responding to Skepticism". Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Retrieved on 2006-07-21.

[edit] Bibliography

• Kornblith, Hilary (editor) (2001): Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell Press.

[edit] External links

• Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Internalist and Externalism by Alberto Voltolini

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