Incorrigibility
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In philosophy, incorrigibility is a property of a philosophical proposition, which implies that it is necessarily true simply by virtue of being believed. A common example of such a proposition is René Descartes' "cogito ergo sum."
Johnathan Harrison has argued[1] that "incorrigible" may be the wrong term, since it seems to imply (by the dictionary definition)[1] a sense that the beliefs cannot be changed, which isn't actually true. In Harrison's view, the incorrigibility of a proposition actually implies something about the nature of believing---for example, that one must exist in order to believe---rather than the nature of the proposition itself.
For illustration, consider Descartes': I think, therefore I exist. Stated in incorrigible form, this could be: "That I believe that I exist implies that my belief is true." Harrison argues that a belief being true is really only incidental to the matter, that really what the cogito proves is that belief implies existence. One could equally well say, "That I believe God exists implies that I exist," or "That I believe I do not exist implies that my belief is false."---and these would have the same essential meaning as the cogito.
Charles Raff[2] draws a distinction between three types of incorrigibility:
- Type-1: It is logically necessary that, when the statement is sincerely made, it is true.
- Type-2: It is necessary that when the statement is believed to be true, it is true.
- Type-3: It is necessary that when the statement is true, it is believed to be true.
It should be noted that type-2 and type-3 incorrigibility are logical converses, and therefore logically independent. Charles Raff argues that introspection is not type-1 incorrigible, but is in fact type-2 and type-3 incorrigible.
