Hossbach Memorandum
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The Hossbach Memorandum was the summary of a meeting on November 5, 1937 between Adolf Hitler and his military leadership, laying out his plans to precipitate an aggressive war that would eventually be known as World War II in Europe. The memorandum was named for the keeper of the minutes of the meeting, Hitler's military adjutant, Colonel Count Friedrich Hossbach. Besides Colonel Hossbach and Hitler, those attending the meeting were the Reich Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the Reich War Minister Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, the Wehrmacht Commander General Werner von Fritsch, the Kriegsmarine Commander Admiral Erich Raeder and the Luftwaffe Commander Hermann Göring.
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[edit] Intentionalist and Structuralist Arguments
The Memorandum is often used by intentionalist historians to prove that Hitler had planned the Second World War and some of the events which led to it. However structuralist historians would argue that the document shows no such plans. They would also contend that Britain and France's appeasement of Hitler (in his remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 and the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938) had given him the confidence to exploit the situations and to move on to Czechoslovakia and Poland. This appeasement only seemed to have ended when war was declared on Hitler by Britain and France on 3 September 1939.
The first part of the document minuted Hitler's wish that Germany become an autarkic, or self sufficient, state, reasoning that a reliance on others makes a state weak. This has been labelled by some historians as a way of preparing Germany for conflict, by ensuring that it is not economically reliant on states with which it could soon be at war. The second part of the document detailed three 'contingencies' that Hitler would take if certain situations prevailed in Europe, purportedly in order to ensure the security of the Reich. Beyond that, Hitler claimed that two “hate-inspired antagonists", namely Britain and France, were blocking German foreign policy goals at every turn, and sometime in the next five years or so, Germany would have to achieve autarky by seizing Eastern Europe to prepare for a possible war with the British and the French.
After the conference, three of the attendees, Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath, all argued that the foreign policy Hitler had outlined was too risky—Germany needed more time to rearm. Additionally, they stated that the 'contingencies' Hitler described as the prerequisite for war were too unlikely to occur, and that any German attack on the states of Eastern Europe, like Czechoslovakia, was likely to embroil Germany in war not only with the Czechoslovaks, but also with the British and the French before Germany was fully rearmed and ready for war with the other "Great Powers". By February 1938, Neurath, Fritsch and Blomberg had been removed from their positions. Some historians, such as Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and William L. Shirer, believed that Blomberg, Fritisch and Neurath were removed because of their opposition to the plans expressed in the Hossbach memorandum.
The accuracy of the Hossbach memorandum is in question, as the minutes were drawn up five days after the event by Hossbach, partially from notes he took at the meeting and partially from memory. Also, Hitler did not review the minutes of the meeting, instead insisting, as he commonly did, that he was too busy to bother with such small details. The British historian A.J.P. Taylor contended that the manuscript used by the prosecution in the Nuremberg Trials appeared to be a shortened version of the original, as it had passed through the US Army prior to arriving at the trial. Taylor drew attention to one thing that the memorandum can be used to prove; “Goering, Raeder and Neurath had sat by and approved of Hitler’s aggressive plans,” but this does not necessarily mean that Hitler laid down his plans for the domination of Europe. However, Hitler did make mention of the wish for increased armaments.
Taylor attempted to discredit the document by using the fact that the future annexations described in the 'contingencies' were unlike those which occurred in 1939, but opposing historians, such as Taylor's arch-rival, Hugh Trevor-Roper, have pointed out that the memorandum still demonstrated an intention for adding Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Poland to the Reich. Taylor also stipulated that the meeting was most likely a piece of internal politics, pointing out that Hitler could have been trying to encourage the gathering's members to put pressure on Reich Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, to release more funding for Germany's rearmament. Contending historians have also pointed out that rearmament is an integral part of preparation for conflict. In response, Taylor argued that Hitler's policy was one of bluff — he wished to re-arm Germany so as to frighten and intimidate other states to allow him to achieve his foreign policy goals without going to war.
In addition, Taylor argued that most of the 'contingencies' Hitler listed as the prerequisite for war, such as an outbreak of civil war in France or the Spanish Civil War leading to a war between Italy and France in the Mediterranean, did not occur. Trevor-Roper countered this criticism by arguing that Hitler expressed an intention to go to war sooner rather than later, and it was Hitler's intentions in foreign policy in late 1937 as opposed to his precise plans at this moment in history which really mattered.
[edit] References
- A. J. P. Taylor, 'The Origins of the Second World War', 2d ed. (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), pp. 266-68, 278-93
- H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the war' in Encounter, 17 (July 1961).
