Talk:Holdout problem

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This creates a different, sometimes unfair, situation between holders of new bonds and those of existing bonds. In addition it may delay the restructuring process and ultimately reduce the resource and capacity of the country to repay its debt.

Phewee! "Unfair"? The country has defaulted! Which is the polite word for theft in this context. And the country has already demonstrated its inability to "repay its debt". A slightly more NPOV account of this must be possible. Paul Beardsell 03:20, 17 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Good point. I have changed this to "unequal" which I consider more of a NPOV. --Vikingstad 09:01, 17 Feb 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Not only government bonds

Exactly this same problem occurs with commercial bonds. Indeed the terminology is borrowed from ordinary commercial bonds. Defaults on sovereign debt being almost unheard of until Peru, Argentina and Russia. So the entire focus of the article is too narrow. When I get time I will have a go editing. Paul Beardsell 00:49, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

This bond situation is merely one example of a much larger class of collective-action problems in which a few people try to extract above-average utility at the expense of the collective. Eminent Domain is a solution to another example, public development, recently in the news thanks to the controversial Kelo vs. New London decision. Refer to "The Calculus of Consent" by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock for a wider discussion of the holdout problem. --Stephen Cobb <scobb_at_FreeStateProject.org> Also: http://www.freeliberal.com/archives/001168.html