HMS Victoria (1887)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Career Royal Navy Ensign
Laid down: 23 April 1885
Launched: 9 April 1887 at Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd., shipyard at Newcastle-on-Tyne, England
Completed: March 1890
Fate: Accidentally rammed and sunk on 22 June 1893
Specification
Displacement: 11,020 tons (11,200 t)
Length: 340 ft (104 m)
Beam: 70 ft (21.3 m)
Draught: 26 ft 9 inches
Engine: Two-shaft Humphreys triple expansion

I.H.P.= 8,000 normal draught, 14,244 forced draught

Speed: 16 knots normal draught, 17.3 knots forced draught
Complement: 430; as flagship 583
Armament: Two 16.25 inch breech loaders

One 10 inch breech loader

Twelve 6 inch breech loaders

Twelve 6 pounders

Six 14 inch torpedo tubes

Armour: Belt 18 inches

Bulkheads 16 inches

Turret 17 inches

Redoubt 18 inches

Battery side 3 inches

Battery bulkhead 6 inches

Conning tower 14 inches sides, 2 inches top

Deck 3 inches

HMS Victoria was one of two Victoria class battleships of the Royal Navy. On 22 June 1893 she collided with HMS Camperdown near Tripoli, Lebanon during manoeuvres and quickly sank taking 358 crew with her, including the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon. One of the survivors was her second-in-command, John Jellicoe, later commander-in chief of the British Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland.

She was originally to have been named Renown, but the name was changed before launching to celebrate Queen Victoria's Jubilee (i.e. 50 years since becoming monarch) which occurred the year that the ship was launched.

She was the first battleship to be propelled by triple expansion steam engines and also the first Royal Navy ship to be equipped with a steam turbine, which was used to power a dynamo.

Contents

[edit] The collision

The British Mediterranean Fleet was one of the most powerful in the world at the time. The Royal Navy saw the Mediterranean as a vital sea route between the United Kingdom and India, and under constant threat from the navies of France and Italy, and concentrated an impressive force in it. The bulk of the fleet, eleven ironclads (eight battleships and three large cruisers), were on their annual summer exercises off Tripoli in Syria (now part of Lebanon) on 22 June 1893.

Tryon was a strict disciplinarian who believed that the best way of keeping his crews taut and efficient was by continuous fleet evolutions, which before the invention of wireless were signalled by flags, and he had gained a fine reputation as a daring and highly proficient handler of his ships. A taciturn and difficult man for his subordinate officers to deal with, he deliberately avoided making his intentions known to them to train them to be adept in handling unpredictable situations.

Tryon led one column of six ships, which formed the first division of his fleet, in his flagship Victoria travelling at 8 knots (15 km/h). His deputy, Rear-Admiral Hastings Markham was in the lead ship of the second division of five ships, the 10,600 ton Camperdown. Markham's normal divisional flagship, Trafalgar was being refitted. Unusually for Tryon, he had discussed his plans for anchoring the fleet with some of his officers. The fleet were to turn inwards in succession by 180 degrees, thus closing to 400 yards (370 m) and reversing their direction of travel. After travelling a few miles in this formation the whole fleet would slow and simultaneously turn 90 degrees to port and drop their anchors for the night. The officers had observed that 1,200 yards (1100 m) was much too close and suggested that the columns should start at least 1,600 yards (1500 m) apart. Even this would leave insufficient margin for safety. the normal turning circles of the ships involved would have meant that a gap between the two columns of 2,000 yards would be needed to leave a space between the columns of 400 yards on completion of the manoevre. Tryon had agreed to 1,600 yards (1500 m) but had later signalled for the columns to close to 1,200 yards (1100 m). Two of his officers gingerly queried whether the order was correct, and he brusquely confirmed that it was.

He ordered speed to be increased to 8.8 knots (16 km/h) and at about 15:00 ordered a signal to be flown from Victoria to have the ships in each column turn in succession by 180 degrees inwards towards the other column so that the fleet would reverse its course. However the normal "tactical" turning circle of the ships had a radius of around 800 yards (730 m) each (and a minimum of 600 yards (550 m), although standing orders required "tactical rudder" to be used in fleet manoeuvres), so if they were less than 1,600 yards (1500 m) apart then a collision was likely.

As there was no pre-determined code in the signal book for the manoevre he wished to order, Tryon sent separate orders to the two divisions. They were:

"Second division alter course in succession 16 points to starboard preserving the order of the fleet." "First division alter course in succession 16 points to port preserving the order of the fleet."

The phrase "preserving the order of the fleet" would imply that on conclusion of the manoevre the starboard column at the start would still be the starboard at the finish. This theory was propounded in 'The Royal Navy' Vol VII pages 415-426. It is suggested here that Tryon intended that one division should turn outside the other.

Although some of his officers knew what Tryon was planning they did not raise an objection. Markham, at the head of the other column, was confused by the dangerous order and delayed raising the flag signal indicating that he had understood it. This precipitated another flag signal from Tryon which translated as "What are you waiting for?" Stung by this public rebuke from his commander, Markham immediately ordered his column to start turning. Various officers on the two flagships confirmed later that they had either assumed or hoped that Tryon would order some new manoeuvre at the last minute.

However the columns continued to turn towards each other and only moments before the collision did the captains of the two ships appreciate that this was not going to happen and even then waited for permission to take the action which might have prevented the collision. Captain Maurice Bourke of the Victoria asked Tryon three times for permission to order the engines astern and only acted once he had received that permission. At the last moment Tryon shouted across to Markham "Go astern, go astern".

By the time that both captains had ordered the engines on their respective ships reversed, it was too late, and Camperdown's ram struck the starboard side of Victoria about 12 feet (4 m) below the waterline and penetrated nine feet (3 m) into it. Reversing the engines only had the effect of causing the ram to be withdrawn to let in more seawater before all of the watertight doors on Victoria had been closed.

With 100 square feet (9 m²) open to the sea, the forecastle deck was underwater in four minutes, and five minutes later the gun ports in the large forward turret reached sea level and water started to pour through them. Victoria capsized just thirteen minutes after the collision, and sank a few minutes later.

Camperdown herself was in serious condition with her ram nearly wrenched off. Hundreds of tons of water flooded into her bows, but she survived. Her crew had to construct a coffer dam across the main deck to stop the flooding. The following ships had more time to take evasive action, and avoided colliding with each other in turn.

357 crew were rescued and 358 died. Tryon himself stayed on the bridge as the ship sank, and was heard to murmur, "It's all my fault". It has been hypothesised that he had confused turning his ships through 90 degrees with turning them through 180 degrees when he considered how much sea room was needed. The former manoeuvre was much more common and required considerably less room.

[edit] The aftermath

The news of the accident caused a sensation and appalled the British public at a time when the Royal Navy occupied a prime position in the national consciousness.

A court-martial of the captain of Victoria, Maurice Bourke, was held on HMS Hibernia at Malta. It was established that the ship would have been in no danger had her watertight doors been closed in time. Bourke was found blameless since the collision was due to Admiral Tryon's explicit order but carried an implied criticism of Vice-Admiral Markham by saying that "it would be fatal to the best interests of the Service to say that he was to blame for carrying out the directions of the Commander-in-Chief present in person".

There is a legend in which Tryon's wife had given a large social party in their London home, and Admiral Tryon was seen descending the staircase by a number of people the moment his ship collided with the Camperdown.

There is a memorial to the crew killed in the disaster in Victoria Park, Portsmouth. It was originally erected in the town's main square, but at the request of survivors was moved to the park in 1903 where it would be better protected.

A scale section of the Victoria, a popular exhibit on display at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago at the time of the accident, was subsequently draped in black cloth as a tribute to the loss.

The wreck was discovered in September 2004 in 140 metres of water. Probably uniquely for a shipwreck, she stands vertically with her bow and three quarters of her length buried in the mud and her stern pointing directly upwards towards the surface. The unusual attitude of this wreck is thought to have been due to the heavy single turret forward containing the main armament coupled with the still-turning propellers driving the wreck downwards.

The 1949 comedy movie Kind Hearts and Coronets featured a satire of the accident, in which Alec Guinness plays a pompous and stupid Admiral D'Ascoyne who stands saluting on the bridge whilst his ship sinks beneath his feet. [1]

See HMS Victoria for other ships of this name.

[edit] External links

[edit] References

  • Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, John Murray.
  • David Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship development 1860-1905, Chatham Publishing.
  • Richard Hough, Admirals in Collision, Viking Press
  • Oscar Parkes British Battleships, ISBN 0-85052-604-3


Victoria-class battleship
Victoria | Sans Pareil

List of battleships of the Royal Navy