History of fundamentalist Islam in Iran

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This article addresses the roots and the developmental history of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. For Iranian politics and human right issues in Iran, see: Politics of Iran and Human rights in Iran.

Today there are basically three types of Islam in Iran: traditionalism, modernism, and a variety of forms of revivalism usually brought together as fundamentalism.[1] Neo-fundamentalists (also called neo-conservatives) in Iran are a subgroup of fundamentalists who have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism.[2]

Navvab Safavi escourted by Iranian police to the court
Navvab Safavi escourted by Iranian police to the court

Contents

[edit] Definition

"Fundamentalism is the belief in absolute religious authority and the demand that this religious authority be legally enforced. Often, fundamentalism involves the willingness to do battle for one's faith. Fundamentalists make up only one part of any religion's followers, who usually fall along a wide spectrum of different interpretations, values and beliefs."[3]

There are some major deferences between Christian fundamentalism and what is called Islamic fundamentalism. According to Bernard Lewis:[4]

"In western usage these words[Revivalism and Fundamentalism] have a rather specific connotation; they suggest a certain type of religiosity- emotional indeed sentimental; not intellectual, perhaps even anti intellectual; and in general apolitical and even anti-political. Fundamentalists are against liberal theology and biblical criticism and in favor of a return to fundamentals-i.e. to the divine inerrant text of the scriptures. For the so call fundamentalists of Islam these are not and never have been the issues. Liberal theology have not hitherto made much headway in Islam, and the divinity and inerrancy of the Quran are still central dogmas of the faith ... Unlike their Christian namesakes, the Islamic fundamentalists do not set aside but on the contrary embrace much of the post-scriptural scholastic tradition of their faith, in both its theological and its legal aspects ."

[edit] Background

Until two hundred years ago, in spite of the many schools of thought and interpretations, many Muslims in Iran lived within the tradition. It was a living tradition, emphasizing the harmony of law, art, and all forms of knowledge. Also, a significant Iranian scholar followed the tradition of Persian sufism and pluralism. Currently in Iran, there exists three main types of Islam: traditionalists (represented by Hossein Nasr, Yousef Sanei), modernists (represented by Abdolkarim Soroush), fundamentalists (represented by Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi (neo-cons), Ali Khamenei and several Grand Ayatollahs). It must be noted that Iranian Islam differs significantly from mainstream Islam and can not be understood perfectly outside the context of Iranian history. Subsequently, religious fundamentalism in Iran has several aspects that make it different from Islamic fundamentalism in other parts of the world. Finally, fundamentalism in Iran is not limited to religious fundamentalism. In fact, Iranian secular fundamentalists can be just as dogmatic and ideological as religious fundamentalists—-deny that any religious law or social practice can be just or equal.[5] Also, it is worth noting that there exists a huge controversy over the terminology used to describe Iranian contemporary political philosophy. The terms Iranian "conservatism", "neoconservatism", "fundamentalism" and "neo-fundamentalism" are all subject to numerous philosophical debates. Javad Tabatabaei and Ronald Dworkin and a few other philosophers of law and politics have criticized the terminology and suggested various other classifications in the context of Iranian political philosophy.[6][7][8][9] According to Bernard Lewis:[10]

"Even an appropriate vocabulary seemed to be lacking in western languages and writers on the subjects had recourse to such words as "revivalism", "fundamentalism" and "integrism". But most of these words have specifically Christian connotations, and their use to denote Islamic religious phenomena depends at best on a very loose analogy."

[edit] Emergence

The birth date of fundamentalist Islam in Iran is believed to be in 18th century, when secular humanism and its associated art and science entered Iran.[11] Neo-fundamentalist Islam in Iran mainly speaks of reviving Islam in opposition to modernism. But most so-called fundamentalists are pseudo-traditional, as can be seen in their attitude toward modern technologies and the destruction of the environment.[12]

Iranian fundamentalists have synthesized a variety of Western and non-Western ideas in their attempts to adumbrate and defend the revival of a political ummah. They have expropriated aspects of such Western and yet anti-liberal ideas as Marxism, fascism, syndicalism, national-socialism (and more recently, post-modernism) for concocting their own nativist syntheses.[13]

When Marxism was hot, the forerunners of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran did not hesitate to ransack its Culture of Critical Discourse. They even attempted to beat the Marxists at their own game. In a treatise entitled "The Allure of Materialism" (Elal-e Gerayesh be Maddigari) the late Ayatollah Morteza Motahari identified the revolutionary rage as part of the attraction of Materialism and charged Muslim activists with the task of recapturing "the bunkers of aggressiveness" (Sangar-haye Parkhash-gari). Subsequently, the People's Mujahedeen Organization proposed to wage a designer Jihad against the Shah, cloning the Marxist Fedaeen's vanguard "Guevarist" ideology.[14]

"Beatle-ism" have ravaged Western youth, according to Ali Khamenei.
"Beatle-ism" have ravaged Western youth, according to Ali Khamenei.

After the Iranian revolution, the Iranian fundamentalism has been innovative and wildly eclectic. Since it has succeeded in establishing a state, Iran's Islamic fundamentalism has generated its own opposite (the reform movement) in proper Hegelian fashion.[15] The critical appraisal of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran was effective because it was a self-critique by ex-members, rather than an attack by non-members.[16]

Hassan Rahimpour Azghandi, a well known Iranian neo-fundamentalist, explains the emergence of the fundamentalism as follows: "It should be made clear that if fundamentalism or terrorism exist, they are a reaction to the colonialistic militarism of the West in the Islamic world, from the 18th century until today. European armies occupied all of North and South America and Africa, in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and divided them among themselves. Then they came to the Islamic world in North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It is only natural that the Muslims act in accordance with their religious duty, just as you would defend your homes if they were occupied. Why do we call resistance "terrorism"? When Hitler and the Fascists rolled Europe in blood and dust - would your forefathers be called terrorists if they conducted resistance?"[17]

In May 2005, Ali Khamenei expound the concept of reformist fundamentalism. He defined the term as the following: "While adhering to and preserving our basic principles, we should try to constantly rectify and improve our methods. This is the meaning of real reformism. But U.S. officials define reformism as opposition to Islam and the Islamic system."[18]

In January 2007, a new parliamentary fraction announced its formation. The former Osoulgaraian ("fundamentalist") fraction divided into two fractions due to "lack of consensus" on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's policies. The new fraction was named "Fraction of creative fundamentalists" which is said to be critical of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's neo-fundamentalist policies and to reject conservatism on such matters related to the government. The main leaders of the fraction are Emad Afroogh, Mohammad Khoshchehreh, Saeed Aboutaleb and MP Sobhani.[19]

[edit] Viewpoints

Saeed Hajjarian and Dariush Forouhar were among numerous victims of fundamentalism
Saeed Hajjarian and Dariush Forouhar were among numerous victims of fundamentalism

There is a lot that is unique about Iranian fundamentalism but it nonetheless must be seen as one of the Abrahamic revivalisms of the twentieth century.[20] As in the course of the Persian Constitutional Revolution nearly a century earlier, the concept of justice was at the center of the ideological debates among the followers of the three Islamic orientations during and after the revolution. The conservatives (fundamentalists) adhered to the traditional notion of Islamic justice, one which, much like the Aristotelian idea of justice, states that "equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportionately to their relevant differences, and all with impartiality." The radicals (neo-fundamentalists), on the other hand, gave a messianic interpretation to the concept, one that promised equal distribution of societal resources to all—including the "unequals." And finally, those with a liberal orientation to Islam understood the notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary slogan of egalit`e, i.e., the equality of all before law.[21]

While the fundamentalists (conservatives) were generally suspicious of modern ideas and resistant to modern lifestyles at the time of Iranian revolution, the Islamic radicals (neo-fundamentalists) were receptive to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular intellectuals and political activists.[22]

Many of the so-called neo-fundamentalists, like Christian fundamentalists, pull out a verse from the scriptures and give it a meaning quite contrary to its traditional commentary. Also, even while denouncing modernism as the "Great Satan", many fundamentalists accept its foundations, especially science and technology. For traditionalists, there is beauty in nature which must be preserved and beauty in every aspect of traditional life, from chanting the Qur'an to the artisan's fashioning a bowl or everyday pot. Many fundamentalists even seek a Qur'anic basis for modern man's domination and destruction of nature by referring to the injunction to 'dominate the earth' -- misconstruing entirely the basic idea of vicegerency: that man is expected to be the perfect servant of God.[23]

Naser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Noori Hamedani are among the main advocates of fundamentalism in Iran
Naser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Noori Hamedani are among the main advocates of fundamentalism in Iran[24]

An example of environmental problem is overpopulation of earth. Neo-fundamentalists's family policy is to increase the population dramatically. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call for increasing Iran's population from 70 to 120 milions can be understood in the same line.

In Mehdi Mozaffan's chapter on a comparative study of Islamism in Algeria and Iran, he says, "I define Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism as a militant and anti-modernist movement ... not every militant Muslim is a fundamentalist. but an Islamic fundamentalist is necessarily a militant".[25]

A major difference between fundamentalism in Iran and main stream Islamic fundamentalism is that the former has nothing to do with Salafism. According to Gary Legenhausen from Haghani school: "The term Islamic Fundamentalism is one that has been invented by Western journalists by analogy with Christian Fundamentalism. It is not a very apt term, but it has gained currency. In the Sunni world it is used for groups descended from the Salafiyyah movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood." It is worth noting that the concept of "Salaf" (السلف) does not exist in Shia theology in contrast to Sunni Islam as well as Christianity (a similar concept refered to as "original christianity").[26]

A look through several generations of clerics in seminaries shows significant differences in viewpoints and practical approaches. When young Ruhollah Khomeini urged his mentor Ayatullah Husain Borujerdi, to oppose the Shah more openly. Broujerdi rejected his idea. He believed in the "separation" of religion from politics, even though he was Khomeini's senior in rank.[27] However just before his death Hossein Boroujerdi (d. 1961), expressed his opposition to the Shah’s plans for land reform and women’s enfranchisement.[28] He also issued a fatwa for killing Ahmad Kasravi.[29] Khomeini remained silent till his seniors Ayatollah Haeri or Ayatolla Boroujerdi's, were alive. Then he was promoted to the status of a Grand marja and started his activism and established his Islamic Republic eventually. Among Khomeini's students, there were notable clerics whose ideas were not compatible with their mentor. As examples of the prototypes of his students one can mention Morteza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti and Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi. Criticizing Mesbah Yazdi and Haghani school Beheshti said: "Controversial and provocative positions that are coupled with violence, in my opinion...will have the reverse effect. Such positions remind many individuals of the wielding of threats of excommunication that you have read about in history concerning the age of the Inquisition, the ideas of the Church, and the Middle Ages".[30] Morteza Motahhari, the most notable student of Khomeini, was widely known as the main theoretician of Iranian revolution (next to Ali Shariati). While Mesbah Yazdi was an advocate of expelling secular University lecturers, Motahhari insisted that the philosophy of marxism or liberalism must be taught by a marxist and liberal respectively. Both Motahhari and Beheshti were assassinated by terrorist groups early after the revolution. Motahhari also introduced the concept of "dynamism of Islam".[31]

After the triumph of the revolution in February 1979, and the subsequent liquidation of the liberal and secular-leftist groups, two principal ideological camps became dominant in Iranian politics, the "conservatives" (fundamentalists) and the "radicals" (neo-fundamentalists). The radicals' following of Khomeini of the revolution rather than his incumbency of the office of the Supreme Jurist (Vali-eFaqih) or his theocratic vision of the "Islamic Government." Today, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi clearly rejects Khomeini's "Islamic Republic" and supports the idea of "Islamic government" where the votes of people has no value.[32]

Neo-fundamentalists believe that supreme leader is holy and infallible and the role of people and elections are merely to discover the leader. However the legitimacy of the leader comes from God and not the people.[33] Contrary to Iranian traditionalists, neo-fundamentalists as well as Iranian liberals have been under the influence of western thinkers. The Islamic neo-fundamentalists have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism[34] without the welfare state. Among influential figures in Iran's neo-fundamentalist schools is Gary Legenhausen, a Christian born American philosopher and associate of Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi.

Gary Legenhausen teaches western philosophy in the institute founded by Mesbah Yazdi.[citation needed]
Gary Legenhausen teaches western philosophy in the institute founded by Mesbah Yazdi.[citation needed]
Conservatives wrote numerous books to spread their ideas. (Books by Mesbah Yazdi)
Conservatives wrote numerous books to spread their ideas. (Books by Mesbah Yazdi)

During 1990s, Akbar Ganji had discovered crucial links that connected the chain murders of Iran to the reigning neoconservative clergymen (Ali Fallahian, Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi) who had issued the fatwas legitimizing assassinations of secular humanists and religious modernists. In May 1996, Akbar Ganji presented a lecture at Shiraz University entitled "Satan Was the First Fascist". He was charged with defaming the Islamic Republic and tried in a closed court. His defense was later published under the title of "Fascism is one of the Mortal Sins." (Kian, Number 40, February 1997.)[35]

Another important issue is the concept of "insider-outsider" introduced by Ali Khamenei. Accordingly, in his administration outsiders have less rights compared to insiders and cannot have any administrative posts. He stated that "I mean, you [to his followers] must trust an insider as a member of your clique. We must consider as insiders those persons who are sympathetic towards our revolution, our state and Islam. The outsiders are the ones who are opposed to the principle of our state."[36]

In another speech Ali Khamenei compared what he called "American fundamentalism" and "Islamic fundamentalism": "We can see that in the world today there are nations with constitutions going back 200 to 300 years. The governments of these nations, which occasionally protest against the Islamic Republic, firmly safeguard their own constitutions. They clutch firmly to safeguard centuries old constitutions to protect them from harm. [...] However, when it comes to us and as we show commitment to our constitution and values, they accuse us of fundamentalism or describe us as reactionaries. In other words, the American fundamentalism is viewed as a positive virtue, whereas Islamic fundamentalism - based on logic, wisdom, experience and desire for independence - is condemned as some sort of debasement. Of course, they no longer use that term fundamentalism to describe us, instead they refer to us as conservatives."[37] He also made a clear distinction between what he called "extremism" and "fundamentalism": " There may be a handful of extremists here and there, but all the elements serving in various departments of our country are fundamentalists in essence."[38]

Iranian neoconservatives are against democracy, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and disparage the people and their views.[39] In particular Mesbah Yazdi is an aggressive defender of the supreme leader's absolute power, and he has long held that democracy and elections are not compatible with Islam. He once stated that: "Democracy means if the people want something that is against God's will, then they should forget about God and religion ... Be careful not to be deceived. Accepting Islam is not compatible with democracy."[40] In contrast to neo-fundamentalists, fundamentalists accepts the ideas of democracy and UDHR. During his life time, Ayatollah Khomeini expressed support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; in Sahifeh Nour (Vol.2 Page 242), he states: "We would like to act according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We would like to be free. We would like independence." However, Iran adopted an alternative human rights declaration, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in 1990 (one year after Khomeini's death), which diverges in key respects from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[citation needed]

There exists various viewpoints on practice of controversial Islamic criminal codes like stoning. Ayatollah Gholamreza Rezvani states that the Quran sanctions stoning unequivocally and since it is the word of God, it must be carried out in real life. This is in contrast to fundamentalist point of view. In December 2002, Hashemi Shahroudi, the fundamentalist Head of Judiciary ordered a ban on the practice of stoning.

Fabrication of fake history and use of propaganda is common among neo-fundamentalist circles. A good example is spread of superstitions over and fabricating a fake history for Jamkaran mosque, a small ordinary mosque suddenly turned out to be the holiest place in Shia Islam.[opinion needs balancing] The issue has been harshly criticized even by conservative circles.[41][42] Some of Iran's ayatollahs say the legend of Jamkaran is superstition.[43] During Khatami's presidency, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi claimed that an unnamed former CIA chief had visited Iran with a suitcase stuffed with dollars to pay opinion-formers. "What is dangerous is that agents of the enemy, the CIA, have infiltrated the government and the cultural services," he was quoted as saying. On top of its official budget for Iran, the CIA had given "hundreds of millions de dollars to our cultural officials and journalists," he added. "The former head of the CIA recently came here as a tourist with a suitcase full of dollars for our cultural centres and certain newspapers. He made contact with various newspaper chiefs and gave them dollars."[44][45] Nasser Pourpirar for instance believes that a significant portion of Iranian history are baseless fabrications by Jewish orientalists and Zionists. The whole existence of Pre-Islamic Iran is no more than a Jewish conspiracy and the most important key for analyzing today’s world events is the analysis of ancient "Jewish genocide of Purim".[46][47][48] Another neoconservative theorist, Mohammad Ali Ramin believes that contemporary western history (e.g. Holocaust) are all fabrications by Jews. He also claimed that Adolf Hitler was a Jew himself.[49] M.A. Ramin, Hassan Abbasi, Abbas Salimi Namin, Hasan Bolkhari and others have been giving speeches about Jewish conspiracy theory, Iranian and western history intensively all over the country since the establishment of Ahmadinejad government in 2005.[50] Currently, Abadgaran described itself as a group of Islamic neo-fundamentalist,[51] have the control over current Iranian government. However it lost the 2006 city council election.

The problem with identity is at the heart of fundamentalism, no matter it is Islamic, Jewish or Christian. If people's religious identity becomes more prominent than the national identity, fundamentalism will rise. In other words fundamentalism can be seen as "identity-ism". Many of the religious remarks that are made in Iran, especially from official platforms, basically rest on identity-oriented thinking and the inculcation of an identity known as a religious identity.[52]

[edit] Circles, schools and organizations

[edit] Fadayan-e Islam

Ahmad Kasravi one of the early victims of Fadayan-e Islam and the Islamic Fundamentalism in modern Iran -(Oil Painting on Canvas by Shapour Suren-Pahlav)
Ahmad Kasravi one of the early victims of Fadayan-e Islam and the Islamic Fundamentalism in modern Iran -(Oil Painting on Canvas by Shapour Suren-Pahlav)

Fadayan-e Islam was founded in 1946 as an Islamic fundamentalist organization. The founder of the group was Navab Safavi, a neo-fundamentalist cleric.[53] The group's aim was to transform Iran into an "Islamic state". To achieve their objective, the group committed numerous terrorist acts. Notable among these was the 1946 assassination of Ahmad Kasravi, an intellectual who had criticized the mullahs (Shia Islamic clergy). The group also assassinated two prime ministers (Ali Razmara and Hassan Ali Mansour, 1951 and 1965) and an ex-prime minister (Hazhir, 1949).[citation needed]

[edit] Haghani school

Haghani Circle is a neo-fundamentalist school of thought in Iran founded by a group of clerics based in the holy city of Qom and headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, an influential cleric and theologian.[citation needed]

The school trains clerics with both a traditional and modern curriculum, including a secular education in science, medicine, politics, and Western/non-Islamic philosophy (the topics that are not taught in traditional schools). It was founded by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Ayatollah Dr. Beheshti and Ayatollah Sadoughi.[citation needed]

Many famous theologians and influential figures in Iran's politics after the revolution were associated (as teacher or student) with the Haghani Circle or follows its ideology.[citation needed]

[edit] Ansar e Hezbollah

Ansar-e-Hezbollah is a militant neo-fundamentalist group in Iran. Mojtaba Bigdeli is a spokesman for the Iranian Hezbollah. Human Rights Watch strongly condemned the brutal assault on students at Tehran University halls of residence in the early hours of Friday July 9, 1999 by members of the Ansar-e Hezbollah.[54][citation needed]

[edit] Basij

Basij is a military fundamentalist network established after the Iranian revolution. In July 1999, Ezzat Ebrahim-Nejad was shot dead in Tehran University dormitory by a member of Basij military force. The event initiated a huge demonstration. In 2001, a member of the Basij, Saeed Asgar attempted to assassinate Saeed Hajjarian a leading reformist and political advisor to reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Asagar was arrested and sentenced to spend 15 years in jail, but was released after spending only a short term in prison. Human Rights Watch informs that the Basij belong to the "Parallel institutions" (nahad-e movazi), "the quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open in crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at public events." Under the control of the Office of the Supreme Leader these groups set up arbitrary checkpoints around Tehran, uniformed police often refraining from directly confronting these plainclothes agents. "Illegal prisons, which are outside of the oversight of the National Prisons Office, are sites where political prisoners are abused, intimidated, and tortured with impunity."[55] On March 8 2004 the Basij issued a violent crackdown on the activists celebrating the International Women's Day in Tehran.[56] On 13 November 2006, Tohid Ghaffarzadeh, a student at Sabzevar University was murdered by a Basij member at the University. The murderer reportedly said that what he did was according to his religious beliefs. Tohid Ghaffarzadeh was talking to his girl friend when he was approached and stabbed with a knife by the Basij member.[57]

Basij has also become active in such nonmilitary projects as nationwide polio vaccination of children and the distribution of millions of oral polio vaccine drops throuput the country.[58] Basij contributed a great deal to the success of two health programs implemented in Iran, particularly the nationwide polio and measles vaccination schemes.[59]

[edit] Seminary-University conflicts

One of the main clarion calls raised within the geography of events known as the Cultural Revolution was the call for seminary-university unity. The original idea was a reconciliation between science and religion. In other words the meaning of seminary-university unity was a resolution of the historical battle between science and religion. Resolving this battle is a scholarly endeavour, not a political and practical one. However after the revolution, since clerics came to rule over the country, the idea of seminary-university unity, which meant understanding between seminary teachers and academics, gradually turned into submission by academics to clerics and seminary teachers, and it lost its logical and scholarly meaning and took on a political and practical sense.[60] Apponitment of Abbasali Amid Zanjani as the first and only cleric president of University of Tehran in 27 December 2005 can be understood in the same line. Tehran University is the symbol of higher education in Iran. Abbasali Amid Zanjani hold no academic degree[61] and was appointed by Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, the minister of Science, Research, and Technology in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cabinet.

There was a journal in 1980s, by the name of "University of Revolution" which used to include some material written by neofundamentalists. They wrote many articles to prove that science is not wild and without a homeland, that it is not the case that it recognises no geography, and that it is therefore possible for us to create "Islamic sciences".[62]

[edit] Theories of State Based on Divine Legitimacy

Various Theories of State Based on Immediate Divine Legitimacy have been proposed over the years by Iranian clerics. One can distinguish four types of theocracies. Typology of the types of government adumbrated in Shiite jurisprudential sources can be summarized as follows (in chronological order):[63]

  • "Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" in Religious Matters (Shar’iat) Along with the Monarchic Mandate of Muslim Potentates in Secular Matters (Saltanat E Mashrou’eh )
    • Proponents: Mohammad Bagher Majlesi, Mirza ye Ghomi, Seyed e Kashfi, Sheikh Fadl ollah Nouri, Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri Yazdi.
  • "General Appointed Mandate of Jurissonsults" (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh)
    • Proponents: Molla Ahmad Naraghi, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (Saheb Javaher) Ayatollahs Husain Borujerdi, Golpayegani, Khomeini, (before the revolution)
  • "General Appointed Mandate of the Council of the Sources of Immitation" (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh Ye Shora Ye Marje’eh Taghlid)
  • "Absolute Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" (Velayat e Entesabi ye Motlaghe ye Faghihan)
    • Proponent: Ayatollah Khomeini (after revolution)

[edit] Islamic Republic versus Islamic Administration

Since the election of pro-reform president Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there have been two basic approaches, two outlooks, toward the achievement of reform in Iran: "Reformists" within the regime (In-system reformers) essentially believe that the Constitution has the capacity—indeed, the positive potential—to lead the "Revolutionary" government of Iran toward "democracy". By contrast, secularists, who remain outside the regime, basically think that the Constitution contains impediments profound enough to block meaningful reform.[64][65]

On the other hand, fundamentalists and in-system reformers on one side and neo-fundamentalists on the other side are struggling over "Khomeini’s Islamic Republic" versus "Mesbah’s Islamic administration". Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and Ansar-e-Hezbollah call for a change in the Iranian constitution from a republic to an Islamic administration.[66][67] They believe the institutions of the Islamic Republic such as the Majlis (Iran's Parliament) are contradictory to Islamic government which is completely centered around Velayat-e Faqih and total obedience to him.[68]

The Iranian parliament building as it appeared in the winter of 1956.
The Iranian parliament building as it appeared in the winter of 1956.

Ali Khamenei, himself, has remained silent on the issue of whether Iran should have an Islamic Republic or an Islamic Administration.[69] However he clearly rejected the supervision of Assembly of Experts on the institutions that are governed directly under his responsibility (e.g. Military forces, Judiciary system and IRIB).[70]

Neo-fundamentalists believe that supreme leader is holy and infallible and the role of people and elections are merely to discover the leader. However the legitimacy of the leader comes from God and not the people.[71] In January 2007, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who won the 2006 election for Assembly of Experts, clearly rejected this idea and emphasized on the fact that the leader and the cleric members of the Assembly of Experts may make wrong decisions and the legitimacy of the leader comes from the people not the God.[72]

Beyond these theoretical debates, elements of the "Islamic Administration" are (in practice) slowly replacing those of the "Islamic Republic".[73]

[edit] Exporting Islamic Revolution and fundamentalist diplomacy

"The Lizard" directed by Kamal Tabrizi: A thief poses as a mullah to avoid jail and accidentally becomes the leader of a mosque. Described by the Ahmad Jannati as "a hideous film" and a "bad influence", The Lizard was withdrawn from distribution after three weeks of playing in Iranian cinemas, where it had enjoyed enormous box-office success.
"The Lizard" directed by Kamal Tabrizi: A thief poses as a mullah to avoid jail and accidentally becomes the leader of a mosque. Described by the Ahmad Jannati as "a hideous film" and a "bad influence", The Lizard was withdrawn from distribution after three weeks of playing in Iranian cinemas, where it had enjoyed enormous box-office success.[74]

Upon establishment of Islamic Republic, the two factions (conservatives and radicals) differed on foreign policy and cultural issues. The radicals (neo-cons) adamantly opposed any rapprochement with the United States and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries, while seeking to expand Iran’s relations with the socialist bloc countries. They advocated active support for Islamic and liberation movements , so called "export of the revolution", throughout the world. The conservatives favored a more cautious approach to foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of normalizing Iran’s economic relations with the rest of the world, so long as the West’s political and cultural influence on the country could be curbed.[75]

The end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, pragmatists (under the leadereship of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) normalization of Iran’s relations with other countries, particularly those in the region, by playing down the once-popular adventurist fantasy of "exporting the Islamic revolution" to other Muslim lands.[76] After the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 elections and defeat of pragmatists and reformists (under the leadership of Mohammad Khatami), neoconservative who gained full control of both parliament and government for the first time after Iranian revolution, again recalled the idea of exporting the revolution after years of silence.[citation needed]

After the Iranian Revolution, the new Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued an Islamic ideologic foreign policy that had included creation of Hezbollah, subsidies to Hamas,[77] opposition to Israel and Zionist leaders, and aid to Iraq's Shiite political parties.[78][79]

Fundamentalism and political realism are diplomatically incompatible. It is believed that the most evident characteristic of diplomacy is flexibility. The reason Iran’s diplomacy has encountered many shortcomings and lost numerous opportunities provided by international or regional political developments is the country’s focus on fundamental values and neglect of national interests. Fundamentalism is always accompanied with idealism while diplomacy always emphasizes realities. Therefore, the model of realistic fundamentalism will not work in the diplomatic arena.[80]

Muslim thinkers in the world generally believe in a sort of "religious internationalism". Even religious modernists in Iran have still some inclinations towards religious internationalism and the concept of nation-state is not firmly established in their mind. These kinds of beliefs mainly rooted in traditional thinking rather that postmodernism. There are however, some religious intellectuals like Ahmad Zeidabadi who are against religious internationalism.[81][82]

[edit] Fundamentalist art and literature

Navvab Safavi metro station in Tehran
Navvab Safavi metro station in Tehran

Both Iranian fundamentalism and neo fundamentaslism are associated with their own art, cinema and literature. In cinema, the first attempts were perhaps made by Masoud Dehnamaki. Dehnamaki, a famous neo-fundamentalist, made his first documentary film "Poverty and Prostitution" in 2002. His next documentary was "Which Blue, Which Red", which is about the rivalry between the Iranian capital’s two football teams, Esteqlal and Persepolis, and their fans. He is now making his debut feature-length film "The Outcasts".[83]

Iranian journalist turned documentary filmmaker Masud Dehnamaki, was formerly the managing director and chief editor of the weeklies "Shalamcheh" and "Jebheh", which were closed by Tehran’s conservative Press Court. These journals were among main neo-fundamentalist publications.[84] The rightist newsweekly "Shalamcheh" under the editorship of Masoud Dehnamaki, one of the strongest opponents of President Khatami and his policies, has been closed down by the press supervisory board of the Ministry of culture and Islamic guidance, presumably for insulting or criticizing the late Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, who had called the "velayat-e faqih" position unislamic, prior to his passing away.[85]

Perhaps the most influential neo-conservative newspaper during 1990s and 2000s was Kayhan daily. Hossein Shariatmadari and Hossein Saffar Harandi (later become a minister of culture) were main editor and responsible chief of the newspaper. In 2006, British ambassador to Tehran, met Hossein Shariatmadari and acknowledged the role of Kayhan in Iran and the region.[86]

To promote art and literature, Islamic Development Organization was founded by Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1991, Ali Khamenei revised the organization's structure and plans. The plan is to promote religious and moral ideas through art and literature.[87] According Minister of Culture, Hossein Saffar Harandi, the funds for Qur'anic activities will increase by four-fold in the year 2007. "All of the ninth governments' cultural and artistic activities should conform to the holy book," he declared.[88]

While promoting their own art and literature, fundamentalists are against the development of art and literature that has no "valuable content". In late 1996, following a fatwa by Ali Khamenei stating that music education corrupts the minds of young children, many music schools were closed and music instruction to children under the age of 16 was banned by public establishments (although private instruction continued).[89][90] Khamenei and his followers believe that "Nihilism and Beatle-ism" have ravaged Western youth.[91]

[edit] Islamic-neoclassical economy

D. Ashuri and A. Soroush believe that Ahmad Fardid originally theorized neo- fundamentalism in Iran. Mesbah Yazdi rejects the claim.
D. Ashuri and A. Soroush believe that Ahmad Fardid originally theorized neo- fundamentalism in Iran. Mesbah Yazdi rejects the claim.[92][93]

"Association of the Lecturers of Qom's Seminaries", or ALQRS (Jame'eh-ye Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyeh-ye Qom), published their authenticated version of Islamic economy in 1984. It was based on traditional interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, which the ALQRS find compatible with the market system and neoclassical economics. They emphasize economic growth against social equity and declare the quest for profit as a legitimate Islamic motive. According to ALQRS, attaining "maximum welfare" in a neoclassical sense is the aim of an Islamic economic system. However the system must establish the limits of individual rights. In accordance with this ideological-methodological manifesto of the ALQRS, in February 1984, the council for cultural revolution proposed a national curriculum for economics for all Iranian Universities.[94]

The concept of "Islamic economics" appeared as a rainbow on the revolutionary horizon and disappeared soon after the revolutionary heat dissipated (the end of 1980s and after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini). It disappeared from Iranian political discourse for fifteen years. In the June 2005 presidential elections neither the populist-fundamentalist winning candidate, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, nor any of his reformist or conservative opponents said a word about Islamic economy.[95] However after the establishment of Ahmadinejad's government, his neoconservative team opened the closed file of Islamic economy. For instance, Vice-President Parviz Davoudi said in 2006: "On the economic field, we are dutybound to implement an Islamic economy and not a capitalistic economy. [...] It is a false image to think that we will make equations and attitudes based on those in a capitalistic system".[96]

[edit] Islamic Republic & De-Iranianisation Policy

[edit] Iranian identity versus Religious identity

Since the establishment of Islamic Republic, fundamentalists have initiated the policy of de-Iranianization of the Iran, by replacing the notion of Iranian Identity and Nationality with Moslem Identity, both inside and outside Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini has emphasized this goal in several of his speeches, for example, on Dec 1980 (as published in Kayhan):

"Those who say that we want nationality, they are standing against Islam....We have no use for the nationalists. Moslems are useful for us. Islam is against nationality...."[97]
"These issues that exist among people that we are Iranian and what we need to do for Iran are not correct; these issues are not correct. This issue, which is perhaps being discussed everywhere, regarding paying attention to nation and nationality is nonsense in Islam and is against Islam. One of the things that the designers of Imperialism and their agents have promoted is the idea of nation and nationality."[98]

Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime minister of Islamic Republic, once said: "Imam [Khomeini] wants Iran for Islam and we want Islam for Iran." Due to the commitment to Pan-Islamism inherent in Iranian Islamic revolutionary ideology, the Islamic Republic's attitude toward Sunni Islam is positive.[99]

Also in the theory of "Islamic administration" by Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, there is no mention of nationality for Vali-e Faqih. However, in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Leader needs to be Iranian[citation needed].

The hanging judge and Islamist negationist Sadeq Khalkhali
The hanging judge and Islamist negationist Sadeq Khalkhali

At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, one of the most-notorious clerics in Iran, Sadeq Khalkhali known as the hanging judge,[100] who was renowned for his brutality and mass executions in post-revolutionary Iran, hopelessly tried to bulldoze and level-down 2500-year-old Persepolis, and after that the mausoleum of Ferdowsi.[101] He was stopped by the local people who risked their lives and laid down in front of bulldozers.[102][103]

The Islamic Republic has been building Sivand Dam near the Persian antiquities in Pasargad.[104] The construction of the Sivand Dam on the Polvar River began in 1992 without consultation with or the knowledge of the World Cultural Heritage Organization officials. This dam will flood the entire Tang—e Bolaghi (Bolaghi Gorge) mountain pass and the surrounding region. That would lead to some 8 kilometers of the Bolaghi Gorge being submerged.[105][106]

Since 2005, the International Committee to Save Pasargad documented more than 600 official reports of destruction of historical entities by the Islamic Republic of Iran.[107]

In January 2007, the Minister of Energy, Parviz Fattah directly ordered the opening of the Sivand Dam. Making fun of opposition to the opening, he said: "I will make a museum next to the dam with my own money!".[108] In a visit to the area, deputy director general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for cultural affairs warned about the possible destruction but the only answer he received from the Cultural Heritage and Tourism Department's officials was that they wanted to establish an underwater museum in this area. Why the world's first underwater museum is due to be constructed in Iran on the route to Bolaghi Pass, which may destroy dozens of historical monuments, was a question about which even the UNESCO official could not conceal his astonishment. He said, "The only thing I can do is to inform UNESCO officials about the problem."[109][110]

On January 22, 2007, Islamic’s Republic of Iran’s (IRI) Minister of Energy announced his intention to begin flooding the Sivand Dam within a week. This Dam will flood the ancient archeological sites of Bolaghi Gorge and Pasargad Plains where the mausoleum of Cyrus the Great is situated. The date chosen for this act coincides with the 28th anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran and rise to power.[111]

Apart from neoconservatives, pragmatists like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his allies supported the construction of Sivand dam. Hossein Marashi, the Iranian Vice President for Cultural Heritage and Tourism said: "We can not sacrifice the dam for cultural and historical sites."[112] Hossein Marashi is a relative of Rafsanjani and the spokesman for the pro-Rafsanjani Executives of Construction Party.[113] Also "Karun 3 dam" was constructed during Rafsanjani's presidency which led to destruction of ancient archeological site in Izeh.[114][115]

Sivand dam project has been one of the most condemned projects in post-revolution Iran due to its potential to destroy Iranian archaeological sites. Some Iranians are furious about the construction of the dam and argue that there is no objective in the world worthy to justify the construction of a dam, so close to Pasargadae.[116][117]

Kaba of Zoroastar, Naghsh-e Rostam
Kaba of Zoroastar, Naghsh-e Rostam

A railroad is under construction which could destroy the Achaemenid Kaaba of Zoraster and other monuments in Naqsh-e Rostam. Experts have said that the rumbling of the trains will damage the monuments at Naqsh-e Rostam in the future and will cause Kaaba of Zoroaster to collapse in less than ten years if the railroad becomes operational. Naqsh-e Rostami is the site of the tombs of Achaemenid Emperors such as Darius the Great and Xerxes. The site also contains remnants of the Elamite, Parthian and Sassanid dynastic eras.[118]

Defaming Cyrus the Great, Islamist negationist Sadeq Khalkhali wrote an article entitled "Kourosh-e Doroughin" (Impostor Cyrus) shortly after the revolution. In 2001, Nasser Pourpirar wrote two books entitled "Twelve centuries of silence" and "A bridge to past", claiming that the Sassanid empire and Parthian Empires never existed, and are the fabrications of Jewish and American orientalists.[119] Such claims originally belonged to Abdollah Shahbazi who had close ties with the intelligence ministry, Hossein Shariatmadari and Ruhollah Hosseinian.[120] Pourpirar was one of the organizers of Hovyiat TV series and acted as an interrogator for the Judiciary.[121] According to Economics, Ali Larijani lauded a book which claims that Achaemenid civilization did not exist.[122] Similarly, Abbas Salimi Namin attributed Persepolis to Russian civilization.[123] Islamist negationists Abbas Salimi Namin and Purpirar were coworkers for the hardline "Kayhan Havaei" (a weekly review of the daily Keyhan in English) after the revolution. Namin, a computer engineer and former member of Haghani circle is a close ally of Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic.[124] Ignored by Iranian scholars, such figures managed to enter and influence traditional clerical circles and the policy makers of the Islamic Republic.[125] Interestingly several of these Islamist negationists were formerly associated with Marxist groups before acting as agents of Islamic Republic.[126]

Ruling clerics sought to stamp out many traditions, like Nowruz, a celebration with some Zoroastrian links that stretches back thousands of years to the pre-Islamic era, to mark the arrival of spring. The celebration is considered by many here the most Iranian of holidays.[127][128]

Ali Khamenei in many occasions attacked the Iranian fire festival Chahar Shanbeh Suri and also called for shortening Norouz, claiming that the holidays are seriously damaging Iranian economy. Following an order by Ali Khamenei the fire festival has been banned by the regime since it is of Zoroastrian origins and is not Islamic. However, due to internal opposition, the government had to step back.[129]

[edit] Arabic vs Persian

Arabic language has been held in high esteem by the Islamic Republic from the beginning. Since early days of revolution, there has been an Arabic resurgence by the Islamic Regime in Iran. Most of the prominent members of the Islamic regime and clerics have caused a considerable number of new Arabic entering Persian.[130] Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the regime, made no secret of his contempt for Iranian culture and values, including the Persian language. From the early days of the revolution, he injected Persian with so many Arabic words that it confounded the ordinary listener, something for which he compensated by repetitiveness. But as popular as he was in those early days of the revolution, the public's backlash against his stance on pre-Islamic Iranian heritage.[131] Since then, the most detailed and explicit statement about Arabic was made by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1981 in an important Sermon linking the fate of Persian language directly to that of Persian nationality: "both shall vanish as soon as Islamic unity is attained".[132]

Apart from high-ranking authorities of the regime, many minor agents of the Islamic Republic used any opportunities to attack Persian language and replace it with Arabic. According to one of these muslim extremists, Nasser Pourpirar: "It is very unfortunate that we can not put the Persian language aside and replace it with the language of Koran. However the future of Iran is at the hand of Islamic Unity. Spreading Arabic language among Iranian youths and incorporating it more seriously into the education system [...] can make a foundation for such Islamic Unity."[133] As an Islamic fundamentalist and a neoconservative political analyst who is infamous for his anti-Semitic, anti-Iranian and anti-Western rhetorical slogans, Pourpirar has praised Saddam Hussein and refered to him as the "Great Arab hero" and the "symbol of resistance."[134][135]According to some sources, Pourpirar is of Arab origin, whose parents were Iraqi-Libiyan refugees who migrated to Iran.[136] In his earlier life, Pourpirar was closely involved with the Tudeh Party of Iran (Iranian Communist Party), which had close relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After the 1979 Revolution, he joined with the revolutionaries. According to Alireza Nurizadeh, a renowned Iranian journalist based in the UK, Naser Pourpirar was an interrogator with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts before proclaiming himself as a scholar and historian.[137]

"Two centuries of silence" by legendary historian Abdolhosein Zarrinkoub angered the conservatives.
"Two centuries of silence" by legendary historian Abdolhosein Zarrinkoub angered the conservatives.

The tradition of banning names dates to the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in the early 1980s, when Iran's conservative leaders sought to purge the country of both Western culture and its own Persian, pre-Islamic past. Fundamentalists consider it unfortunate that Iranians used to be Zoroastrians, or that the ancient Persian empire achieved its greatest triumphs before Islam's arrival. To that end, they compiled a long list of forbidden names that included Zoroastrians gods and goddesses, commanders of ancient Persian armies, and other such tainted, best-forgotten figures. Indeed, Arabic names, except for a handful of Sunni villains, were fine. Persian ones, despite originating from the language actually spoken in Iran, had to be checked against the official list. Along the way, other politically inconvenient realities were fought on the baby name terrain. Wishing to quell an uprising by ethnically Kurdish Iranians in the north, the government banned Kurdish names.[138] Street names had changed from old Persian names to Arabic and Muslim names .This whole shift of the Iranian identity toward a more Islamic one created a kind of crisis.[139]

Iranian society on the other hand, identify itself as Iranian. In Iran-Iraq war for example, all Iranians irrespective of their religions and ethnic groups defended the country. Also in occasions where a conflict between nationality and religion occurs, Iranian will not put their nationality aside. For instance when Norouz and Ashura conincide, Shia Iranians celebrate the ancient Iranian celebration with other Iranians. Abdolkarim Soroush, foremost Iranian religious intellectual, once suggested to adapt the religion to Iranian culture by organizing Ashura and other Islamic festivals according to Iranian calendar instead of Islamic calendar to avoid conflicts between Iranian identity and religion.[140][141]

As the result of Islamic Regime's "de-Iranianization policy", the Iranian patriotism to the point of chauvinism has been on the rise. Pre-Islamic holidays are being celebrated with unprecedented fanfare. The Persian lexicon has turned into a bastion of nationalism. Numerous Persian synonyms have been invented (originated from the Old and the middle-Persian Pahlavi) to replace the most commonly used foreign words, primarily Arabic/Islamic ones; -To everyone's wonder, the new words have caught on.[142]

[edit] Future of fundamentalism in Iran

Abdolkarim Soroush, advocate of Islamic pluralism,[143] believes that fundamentalism in Iran will self-destruct as it is afflicted with an internal contradiction, which will shatter it from within.[144] Similar ideas have been put forward by Iranian scholar Saeed Hajjarian.[145] Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saeed Hajjarian and Seyyed Hossein Nasr are among most notable critics of fundamentalism in Iran. Today Iranian neofundamentalists are a very strong minority in Qom seminaries. However they enjoy supports from two Grand Marjas namely, Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Noori Hamedani as well as direct support from supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.[146]

[edit] Iran as a victim of Islamic fundamentalism

Clash or dialogue? who is the winner, Khatami or Huntington?
Clash or dialogue? who is the winner, Khatami or Huntington?

There was a handful of Iranian victims among the thousands of innocent dead of September 11, 2001 attacks.[147] Behnaz Mozakka was among the victims of 7 July 2005 London bombings.

In 1943, a Saudi religious judge ordered an Iranian pilgrim beheaded for allegedly defiling the Great Mosque with excrement supposedly carried into the mosque in his pilgrim's garment.[148]

In 1987, Saudi Arabia's fundamentalist regime attacked Iranian pilgrims who were doing a peaceful annual demonstration of Haj and killed some 275 people. 303 people were seriously injured. For years, Iranian pilgrims had tried to stage peaceful political demonstrations in the Muslim holy city of Mecca during the hajj. Iran sees 1987 massacre of Iranian pilgrims as the first major attack by Sunni extrimists like Osama bin Laden and the emerging Al-Qaeda on Shia Iranians. A few days before the massacre of Iranian pilgrims by Saudi police, USS Vincennes shots down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians.

In March 2004 (Ashura), Al-Qaeda killed 40 Iranian pilgrims at the Shia holy places in Iraq. Many others were injured in the blasts. Ashura commemorates the killing of the revered Imam Hussein at the battle of Karbala in the seventh century AD. It is the event that gave birth to the Shia branch of Islam which predominates in Iran. Ashura is by far the most significant day in the Iranian religious calendar, and it is commemorated as a slaughter of innocents by traitors and tyrants.[149]

Justifying the attack on Iran, Saddam Hussein accused Iranians of "murdering the second (Umar), third (Uthman), and fourth (Ali) Caliphs of Islam".[150] In March 1988, Saddam Hussein killed about 20000 Iranian soldiers immediately using nerve-gas agents. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and China.[151][152][153][154] Iraq also targeted Iranian civilians with chemical weapons. Many thousands were killed in attacks on populations in villages and towns, as well as front-line hospitals. Many still suffer from the severe effects.[155] Iran therefore is a victim, at least of one type of weapons of mass destruction. In December 2006, Sadam Hussein said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the 1980-1988 war but he took issue with charges he ordered attacks on Iraqis.[156][157]

[edit] Leaders

[edit] Theorists (Think tank)

German-Iranian Mohammad Ali Ramin and Iranian born American Hamid Mowlana were among theorists of neoconservative circles in Iran (1990s and 2000s)
German-Iranian Mohammad Ali Ramin and Iranian born American Hamid Mowlana were among theorists of neoconservative circles in Iran (1990s and 2000s)

[edit] Notable victims

[edit] Notable figures

Nikahang Kowsar was arrested for his depiction of "Professor Crocodile", a reptilian academic who was shown strangling a journalist with his tail. The cartoon has been interpreted as a reference to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, leader of fundamentalism in Iran
Nikahang Kowsar was arrested for his depiction of "Professor Crocodile", a reptilian academic who was shown strangling a journalist with his tail. The cartoon has been interpreted as a reference to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, leader of fundamentalism in Iran

[edit] References and further readings

Written by fundamentalists:

Written by others:

  • Iran’s Tortuous Path Toward Islamic Liberalism, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, Winter 2001
  • Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars (Perennial Philosophy Series) by Joseph Lumbard and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, World Wisdom (October 23, 2003) ISBN 978-0941532600.
  • Traditional Islam in the Modern World by Seyyed Hossein, Nasr Kegan Paul International(1995) ISBN 978-0710303325.
  • Democracy, Justice, Fundamentalism and Religious Intellectualism, by Abdolkarim Soroush (2005)
  • R. Scott Appleby, eds., Accounting for Fundamentalisms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 403–424.
  • Islamic Fundamentalism, Edited by Abdel salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. Boulder, CO.
  • Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity, By ROBERT D. LEE. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. ISBN 0-8133-2798-9.
  • The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, by Vali R. Nasr, W. W. Norton (August 5, 2006) ISBN 0393062112
  • Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty, by Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Oxford University Press, USA (June 15, 2006) ISBN 0195189671

[edit] Notes

Hundreds of Iranian newspapers (secular and modernist) were shut down since the rise of neo-fundamentalism in post revolution Iran.
Hundreds of Iranian newspapers (secular and modernist) were shut down since the rise of neo-fundamentalism in post revolution Iran.
  1. ^ M. Hope and J. Young, CrossCurrents:ISLAM AND ECOLOGY. Retrieved 28-01-2007.
  2. ^ Ali Asghar Seyyedabadi (2005) An interview with Abdulkarim Soroush: Democracy, Justice, Fundamentalism and Religious Intellectualism
  3. ^ [www.gsanetwork.org/justiceforall/definitions.htm]
  4. ^ Lewis, Bernard(1993)Islam in history:ideas, people and events in the middle east:398
  5. ^ University of Chicago Journal: [1]. Retrieved 28-01-2007.
  6. ^ Hamshahri online, Discussing reformism: an interview with Dr. Seyyed Javad Tabatabayi [2]. Retrieved 28-01-2007.
  7. ^ Hamshahri online, Do we have Iranian reformism? [3]. Retrieved 28-01-2007.
  8. ^ Hamshahri online, Iranian reformism a term without a definition [4]. Retrieved 28-01-2007.
  9. ^ Hamshahri online, Fundamental liberalism and conservatism in Iran and the West. [5]. Retrieved 28-01-2007.
  10. ^ Lewis, Bernard(1993)Islam in history:ideas, people and events in the middle east:402
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  77. ^ Military destiny and madness in Iran Arab Times 6 June 2006
  78. ^ Iran’s Influence in Iraq
  79. ^ Plan Floated to Divide Iraq Along Ethnic Lines See the talks about "The Shiite south is governed by the Shiite religious parties who enforce an Iranian-style Islamic law with militias." The Online Newshour with Jim Lehrer 24 October 2006
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  97. ^ [Mehregan Magazine, Volume 12, Numbers 1 & 2, Spring & Summer 2003, p 16.]
  98. ^ [Mehregan Magazine, Volume 12, Numbers 1 & 2, Spring & Summer 2003, p 16.]
  99. ^ [88]
  100. ^ [89] Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, The Guardian Unlimited, dated December 01, 2003; accessed January 11, 2007
  101. ^ [90] Power Grids Threaten World Registration of Ferdowsi Mausoleum CAIS Archaeologicla and Cultural News; CAIS Online, accessed January 11, 2007
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  103. ^ [92] Date of Inundation of Islamic Regime' Sivand Dam, the Plague of Iranian Heritage Not Yet Agreed Upon, CAIS Archaeologicla and Cultural News, 30 May 2006; accessed January 11, 2007
  104. ^ [93], Sivand Dam Threatens Pasargadae CAIS Archaeological and Cultural News, July 25, 2004; accessed January 11, 2007
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  143. ^ Extract from TIME magazine. Mentions him as helping found "Islamic pluralism".
  144. ^ [132]
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  150. ^ Tallal Etrisi طلال عتریسی in: Arab-iranian Relations, edited by: Khair El-Din Haseeb. 1998. ISBN 1-86064-156-3
  151. ^ Link: The Independent, Wednesday, 18 December, 2002: http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorbkgd/uscorpsiniraq.html
  152. ^ [138]
  153. ^ [http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=39470
  154. ^ http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0213-05.htm]
  155. ^ [139]
  156. ^ Saddam admits Iran gas attacks
  157. ^ Saddam says responsible for any Iran gas attacks
  158. ^ [140]

[edit] See also

Iran:

Islam:

Fundamentalism in other religions & countries:

[edit] External links