History of Balochistan

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This article is about the history of the Balochistan province of Pakistan. For other uses of the name, see Balochistan.

Pakistani Balochistan was conquered by the British Empire on October 1, 1887. In 1948, it forcely became part of Pakistan. Since then, a number of separatist groups in the province have engaged in armed violence against the Pakistani government—first led by Prince Karim Khan in 1948, and later by Nawab Nowroz Khan in 1968. These tribal uprisings were limited in scope. A more serious insurgency was led by the Marri and Mengal tribes in 1973-1977. All these groups fought for the existence of a "Greater Balochistan"—a single independent state ruled under tribal jirgas (a tribal system of government) and comprising the historical Balochistan region, presently split between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2005 there was another violent struggle to achieve these aims. In 2006, the Pakistan army killed Nawab Akber Bugti.

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[edit] Accession issues of 1948

Balochi nationals support the claim that the ruler of the Khanate of Balochistan, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, might have been coerced by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first governor-general of Pakistan, to sign the document of accession. Critics dispute such claims as unrealistic and contrary to popular support for Jinnah, as the Khan of Kalat ruled even after Jinnah's death with the support of the government. However, the Khan was not an absolute monarch; he was required to act under the provisions of the Rawaj (the Baloch constitution).

The incorporation of the Khanate resulted in a few anti-Pakistani rallies and meetings in certain areas of the Khanate. To subdue anti-Pakistani sentiment, the Army of Pakistan was placed on alert. The Government of Pakistan decided to take complete control of the administration of the Khanate of Balochistan on April 15, 1948. The A.G.G. in Balochistan conveyed Jinnah's orders that the Khanate would revert to its previous status as it had existed under British rule. Jinnah also refused to give autonomy to Balochistan.

In April 1948, several political leaders from Balochistan, including Mohammad Amin Khosa and Abdul Samad Achakzai, were arrested. The pro-Congress Anjuman-i-Watan Party, headed by Samad Achakzai, was declared unlawful.

[edit] Prince Abdul Karim Khan

The refusal to grant autonomy to Balochistan and the continued existence of the Sandeman system re­sulted in civil unrest. On the night of May 16, 1948, Prince Abdul Karim Khan, the younger brother of the Khan, decided to lead a national liberation movement.

The Prince invited the leading members of nationalist political parties—the Kalat State National Party, the Baloch League, and the Baloch National Workers Party—to join him in the struggle for the creation of an independent "Greater Balochistan." Apart from his political motives, the Prince was a member of the royal family and the former governor of the Makran province; he was upset by Pakistan's recognition of Sardar Bay Khan Gichki as Makran's ruler.

[edit] Origins and allies of the movement

Prince Karim decided to migrate to Afghanistan in order to get help and to organ­ize the liberation movement. He wrote to the Khan on June 28, 1948 ex­plaining the causes of his migration.

Some of the prominent political leaders who joined him were Mohammed Hussein Anka (the secretary of the Baloch League and the editor of Weekly Bolan Mastung), Malik Saeed Dehwar (the secretary of the Kalat State National Party), Qadir Bakhsh Nizamami (a member of the Baloch League), Maulwi Mohd Afzal (a member of Jamiat-Ulm-e-Balochistan), and prominent members of the Sind-Balochistan branch of the Communist Party.

[edit] Plan of action

The Baloch Warriors , entered Afghanistan and encamped at Sarlath in the province of Kandahar. During their stay, the Baloch freedom fighters adopted the following measures to achieve their goal:

  • Sending messages to the Baloch chiefs of Eastern and Western Balochistan, asking them to join in the armed struggle;
  • Running a truth-revealing campaign in Balochistan, aimed at the educating the locals, teaching them to fight for their rights and enlist in a national liberation force;
  • Searching for international support, particularly from countries who were supportive of democratic process and did not support the rule of military juntas.

Messages were sent to Mir Ghulam Faruq of the Rudini tribe, Sardar Mehrab Khan, Sardar Mir Jumma and Mir Wazir Khan Sanjrani of Chagai, and several other chiefs. The propaganda campaign was to be carried out on two fronts:

  • (A) The national cultural front
  • (B) The religious front

[edit] Armed struggle

In addition to the cultural and religious campaigns, the Prince also organized the Baloch Warriors, a liberation force consisting of former soldiers and officers of the Khanate's army. Prince Karim was chosen as the supreme commander.

The Prince issued an appeal to individuals to help with the recruitment. A person re­cruiting 100 men was offered the rank of major, and a person recruiting 50 men was entitled to the rank of captain. The Baloch liberation army had a secret agency called Jannisar (devotee), whose duty was to provide information, destroy the communication system,watch the activities of Pakistan Army. There was also a secret unit called Janbaz (darer), whose job was to kill all traitors. The Janbaz were subordinate to the Jannisar. The headquarters of the agency was known as Bab-i-Aali (war office) and was headed by Prince Karim. The total strength of the Jannisar was recorded as 30; nothing is known about the strength of the Janbaz.

[edit] Soviets and Afghans

The Prince did not start a war of liberation because of Afghanistan's re­fusal and the Soviet Union's unwillingness to offer assistance. During his stay in Sarlath, Prince Karim appointed Malik Saeed and Qadir Bakhsh Nizamani as his emis­saries to contact the Afghan government and approach other embassies in order to get moral and material support. According to Nizamani, the Afghan authorities refused to provide any sort of help and told them either to remain in Kandahar as political refugees or to return to Balochistan. The Afghan authorities also re­fused to permit the rebel group to operate on Afghan soil. Nizamami informed the Iranian Embassy of the Baloch demands as well. Iranian diplomats showed their concern but did not offer any assistance, though they were willing to provide asylum to the rebel group in Iran. The last hope of the Prince's re­presentative was the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet diplomats listened to Nizamami carefully. Though they did not give any assurances, they did promise to inform Moscow.

Since the rise of Ahmed Shah Abdali, the Afghans had treated Balochistan as a vassal state until the Baloch-Afghan war of 1758, when both parties signed an agreement of "non-interference." In the 19th century, Afghan rulers like Shuja Shah and Abdur Rahman Khan wanted to occupy Balochistan. In 1947, the Afghan government demanded the creation of Pashtunistan, a region stretching from Chitral and Gilgit to the Baloch coast in the Arabian Sea. The Afghan go­vernment called Balochistan "South Pashtunistan" in statements and in its publications. The Afghan expansionist policy reflected the economic considerations of a landlocked state. At the same time, it was impossible for the Afghan government to neglect its own national interests and to support the movement of an indepen­dent Greater Balochistan, which claimed the Baloch region in Afghanistan.

Stalin did not pursue Lenin's policy in the East. Moreover, the Soviet government was unwilling to annoy the Afghans or the British, both of whom opposed the creation of an independent Balochistan.

[edit] Prince Karim's legitimacy outlawed

Meanwhile, a Farman royal order issued by the Khan on May 24, 1948 stated that the Prince and his party were to be regarded as a rebel group; no connection of any sort with the Prince and his party should be maintained, nor should they be given rations; further, if any member of the rebel group committed an offence, he would be punished. The Government of Pakistan moved the army to the military posts of Punjab, Chaman Chashme, and Rastri near the Afghan border, attempting to control the rebels' rations which were being sent by pro-liberation elements, and to control their activities or stop any attempt at invasion. The Pakistani au­thorities confirmed two clashes between the army and the liberation forces.

To avoid popular unrest in Balochistan, the Khan sent his maternal uncles Hajji Ibrahim Khan and Hajji Taj Mohammed from Sarlath to bring Prince Karim back to Kalat. Khan made his return conditional.

The Prince and the liberation movement failed to achieve internal and external sup­port. Moreover, the Baloch nationalists were divided into two groups. Anqa and Malik Saeed favored armed struggle in the form of guerilla war, while Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo and other prominent leaders wished to resolve all issues by negotiation.

[edit] The return of Prince Karim

The Prince was forced to return to the Khanate and negotiate for his demands peacefully. On July 8, 1948, when the news of the Prince's arrival reached Kalat, the Prime Minister and a Kalat State Force went to meet the Prince at Earboi to deliver the Khan's message.

[edit] Prince Karim's capture

With Afghan aid, Abdul Karim entered Balochistan and organized a rebellion against Pakistan in the Jalawan area. He received assistance from Mir Gohar Khan Zahrri, an influential tribal leader of the Zarkzai clan. Major General Akbar Khan, who was in charge of the Pakistani army's Seventh Regiment, was ordered to attack the insurgents and force them to surrender. Prince Karim and his 142 followers were arrested and imprisoned in the Mach and Quetta jails.

A detailed and interesting statement comes from General Akbar Khan, in his article published in the daily Dawn, dated August 14, 1960, under the title "Early reminiscences of a soldier." In this article, General Akbar confirms that there was a plan to invade the Khanate and describes the clash between the Pakistani army and the liberation force headed by Prince Karim. Akbar claims that Jinnah had issued instructions that this news should not be published in the Pakistani press.

[edit] Trial and sentencing

After the arrest of the Prince and his party, the A.G.G. gave an order for an inquiry, to be conducted by Khan Sahib Abdullah Khan, the Additional District Ma­gistrate of Quetta. He submitted his report on September 12, 1948. His report was based on the Prince's activities and upon the letters and documents published by the liberation force. After the inquiry, R. K. Saker, the District Magistrate of Quetta, appointed a special Jirga (official council of elders) consisting of the following persons:

  1. Khan Bahador Sahibzada, M.Ayub Khan Isakhel, Pakhtoon from Pishin;
  2. K.B. Baz Mohd Khan. Jogezai, Pakhtoon from Loralai;
  3. Abdul Ghaffar Khan Achakzai, Pakhtoon from Pishin;
  4. S.B. Wadera Noor Muhammad Khan, a Baloch Chief from Kalat;
  5. Syed Aurang Shah from Kalat;
  6. Sheikh Baz Gul Khan. Pakhtoon from Zhob;
  7. Wahab Khan Panezai, Pakhtoon from Sibi;
  8. Sardar Doda Khan Marri, Baloch from Sibi.

This Jirga was instructed to study the circumstances and events which led to the revolt and was asked to give its recommendations to the District Magistrate. On November 10, 1948, the Jirga heard the testimony of the accused and gave its recommendations to the D.M. on November 17, 1948, suggesting the delivery of the Prince to Loralai at the pleasure of the Government of Pakistan and various other penalties. The D.M., in his order dated November 27, 1948, differed with the opinion of the Jirga and sentenced the Prince to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 5000 rupees. Other members of his party were given various sentences and fines.

[edit] Second Baloch National Resistance of 1958

Nawab Nowroz or Nowroz Khan, commonly known by Balochs as Babu Nowroz, was the head of the Zarakzai tribes of Balochistan. Nowroz started an armed struggle against Pakistan, but later surrendered to Lt. Col. Tikka Khan (later General of the Pakistani army) when Nowroz came to the army for negotiations. He and his followers, including his sons and nephews, were taken to Hyderabad Jail, where they were all executed without a trial. Nawab Nowroz Khan was 84 at the time of his execution.

[edit] Balochistan Rebellion of the 1970s

Main article: Baloch Insurgency and Rahimuddin's Stabilization

This rebellion constitutes an infamous period in Pakistani history, second only to the Civil War of 1971 and subsequent loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

The National Awami Party, led by nationalists Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Khair Bux Marri, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and Khan Wali Khan, dominated Balochistan and the NWFP. At the time, even the Jamiat i Ulema i Islam of Maulana Mufti Mahmud (father of Maulana Fazlur Rehman) thought it fit to join hands with the nationalists to espouse the provincial cause.

Emboldened by the stand taken by Sheikh Mujib, the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists demanded their "provincial rights" from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in exchange for a consentual approval of the 1973 constitution. But while Mr. Bhutto admitted the NWFP and Balochistan to a NAP-JUI coalition, he refused to negotiate with the provincial governments led by chief minister Ataullah Mengal in Quetta and Mufti Mahmud in Peshawar. Tensions erupted.

Within six months, the federal government had sacked the two provincial governments, arrested the two chief ministers, two governors and forty-four MNAs and MPAs, obtained an order from the Supreme Court banning the NAP and charged everyone with high treason to be tried by a specially constituted Hyderabad Tribunal of handpicked judges. In time, a nationalist insurgency erupted and sucked the army into the province, pitting the Baloch tribal middle classes against Islamabad.

The 1970s revolt of the Baloch, which manifested itself in the form of an armed struggle against the Pakistani army in Balochistan, was provoked by federal impatience, high-handedness and undemocratic constitutional deviation. Mir Hazar Khan Marri led the Baluch liberation movement under an organization nicknamed BPLF, the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front. Marri and the BPLF were forced to move to Afghanistan, along with thousands of his supporters. Baluch fighters often fight today under related nicknames such as BLA, BLM, BLO, etc.

The modern Pakistani province of Baluchistan comprises a part of historical Balochistan. Another part is incorporated in the Sistan and Baluchistan province of Iran. The irony was that Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti served the federal government when Bhutto appointed him Governor of Balochistan throughout the time of the insurgency; during this time, Bugti spoke not a word in favor of Baloch rights or provincial autonomy. The greater irony was that the insurgency came to an end following the army coup of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq against Mr. Bhutto's civilian government.

Soon thereafter, Gen. Zia unfolded plans to desensitize the alienated Baloch and Pashtun leadership by a multi-faceted strategy aimed at co-opting the leaders into office while providing jobs and funds from the federal government to the alienated, insecure tribal middle classes. More significantly, Zia created maximum political space for the mullah parties in the NWFP and Balochistan so that they could be galvanized in the jihad against the USSR in neighboring Afghanistan.

Divided, fatigued and shorn of its ideological moorings or avowed enemies such as Bhutto, the Greater Balochistan movement melted into memory over the next two decades.

[edit] Rahimuddin Khan's Reign

The uprising itself had suffered from a lack of direction. Some Baloch wanted independence, others only greater autonomy within Pakistan. Attacks were organised by individual Baloch chiefs, rather than an organised Baloch-wide attack. Also, the Baloch hoped to get the support of the USSR, which never happened. Also, the large Pashtun minority in Balochistan did not take part and were hostile to the idea of an independent Balochistan.

Another Pathan who was hostile to the idea of an independent Balochistan was Rahimuddin Khan, a distinguished Lieutenant General at the time (later General). Soon after Zia's assuming power, Rahimuddin was appointed Martial Law Governor of Balochistan, a position that headed all affairs to do with the province, and thus was, for the Pakistani government, a phenomenally powerful post.

Rahimuddin's unprecedentedly long rule (1978-1984) crushed any armed uprisings within the province with an iron fist. His completely isolating Baloch Sardars from provincial policy was a move that, over time, gained increasing controversy, due to the unheard of nature of Rahimuddin's style of government. Past rulers had tried to appease the feudal lords; Rahimuddin went out of his way to isolate them from any position of provincial power.

This, in retrospect, ultimately led to the most stable period Balochistan has ever witnessed in its short history as a Pakistani province. Economic expansion was also impressive during Rahimuddin's reign.

[edit] Revival of the provincial rights struggle

Today, the single most critical macro factor is the social and electoral engineering initiated by the military regime of President Pervez Musharaf. By sidelining the mainstream PPP and PMLN parties and their natural progressive allies such as the ANP, BNP and others in favor of the mullahs of the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat i Ulema i Islam, General Musharraf has alienated the old non-religious tribal leadership as well as the new secular urban middle classes of Balochistan, who see no economic or political space for themselves in the new military-mullah dispensation.

Similarly, by sacrificing the cause of provincial autonomy at the altar of local and federal government, the military regime has threatened the very roots of constitutional consensus enshrined in the Baloch consciousness.

Balochistan remains a backwater province, infested by Taliban-type mullahs, corrupt and opportunist politicians and tribal chiefs, all beholden to the military regime in Islamabad.

The Baloch Liberation Army, composed of a few bandits under tribal and middle-class command, is conducting terrorist operations. Gwadar is an obvious target.

[edit] Military cantonments

The military cantonments planned for Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu (the capital of the Marri tribal lands) are viewed as outposts of repression and control, not development. In Balochistan, the corrupt Frontier Corps (which is almost exclusively made of Pashtuns) is thoroughly hated and despised as a federal instrument of oppression. With the mad mullahs rampaging in much of Balochistan and defying the writ of the government, the rise of incipient armed nationalism poses a grave challenge to the stability and security of Pakistan.

Army helicopters strafed and bombed a strip of land between Turbat and Gwadar in the Makran district, where Baloch insurgents who had earlier rocketed Gwadar were thought to be hiding. In retaliation, an army truck was ambushed in Khuzdar, leaving five soldiers dead. Later the puppet chief minister of the province, Jam Yusuf, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt.

The government retaliated by registering cases of murder against 12 people, including a former chief minister of the province, Sardar Akhtar Mengal, Sardar Ataullah Mengal (also a former chief minister who was sacked and arrested in his time), and the secretary general of the Balochistan Nationalist Party. The federal interior minister of Pakistan, Mr. Faisal Saleh Hayat, has warned the agitating Baloch tribesmen that the government is poised to launch a 'crash program' against 'subversive elements' in the province.

A hastily formed four-party Baloch alliance, led by the Bugti and Mengal groups in Quetta, has condemned the spate of arrests of Baloch nationalists in Turbat, Gwadar, Kalat, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Nushki. They have been joined by the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM). This alliance accuses Islamabad of having launched an 'unannounced military operation' in Balochistan in which over 200 activists of various nationalist parties have been unjustly detained.

[edit] Old grievances

The causes of grievances in Balochistan are twofold. On one side there are tribal leaders who want no development in the area; on the other side is the government, who is reluctant to go against tribal leaders. Natural gas development in the city of Sui has never benefited the people of Balochistan. Huge royalties are paid to Sardar of Sui, but the money fails to reach the area's poor; Gwadar is in the clutches of a land-grab mafia of Pakistan; the federal government earns billions from gas extracted from the province, but gives only a fraction back to Balochistan for development, and this fraction is largely improperly spent; the provincial autonomy promised in the 1973 constitution is nonexistent, etc.

Balochistan remains a neglected backwater of Pakistan largely due to internal and external politics. Baloch internal politics have been factionalized by federal interference and meddling in the pursuit of dubious strategic regional interests. The province's drought-stricken pastoral economy cannot even provide for its small population. This state of affairs has lasted fifty-seven years. No federal government has ever thought of bringing development to Balochistan, and talk of tribal chiefs obstructing progress is being called nonsense by the Balochs. Government neglect has strengthened the ranks of the nationalists and increased their clout.

The danger in Balochistan is twofold. The nascent but alienated middle class in the few towns of Balochistan is now rallying behind the nationalists and accepts the sardars spearheading PONM as genuine leaders. At the same time, the developmental lag in the province is sufficient to substantiate the anti-center stance of the PONM. That is why any military action in the province will completely lack local support. Locals may support military action if it is against the sardars who are eating their resources, but this is unlikely as the federal government does not want to create any more problems in Balochistan. Even the PONM is not representing all of Balochistan, as its ideology is very narrow and its leader rarely delivers.

Some intellectuals of Balochistan even blame their own so-called true representatives such as the PONM, claiming that their policy of confrontation leads to more problems. According to this claim, the leaders keep repulsing any progress in favor of their own politics and the right to continue calling themselves leaders. There are only two or three tribes who are really against the federal government; other tribes (which number more than 100) are in favor of progress.

The other destabilizing factor relates to the ongoing battle against the combined forces of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the area. The Pashtuns in Balochistan also have serious problems with the federal government's policy on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier. This could be troublesome, since Pashtun nationalism has also been responsible for the internationally-reported presence of the Taliban in the province.

Critics are of the view that development of the Gwadar sea port would benefit Balochistan the most. But nationalists believe this will loosen their grip on the province.

[edit] Solutions

The problem of Balochistan is concurrent list of subjects enlisted in 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used this list to show smaller provinces that he believed in provincial autonomy and these will be waived off after 10 years. If these subjects would have been given to provinces in 1973 there was no problem in Pakistan. The solution lies in waiving of this concurrent list and moderinizing Balochistan.

[edit] Recent development projects

 The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.

Some development projects are underway in Balochistan, including the Gwadar deep sea port. Many Baloch claim that the port will bring an influx of people from nearby provnices such as NWFP and Punjab, making the local population of Baloch into a minority.[citation needed]. Even today the pashtuns are increasinly replacing baloch as the majoirty of the province. They also claim that the employment of the port will also go to these outsiders because of the lack of education in the province.[citation needed] The Coastal Highway was also constructed on the coastline between Gwadar and Karachi, and has reduced traveling time considerably.[citation needed] Making it much easier for a large populas to migrate there.

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

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