Hideki Tojo

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Hideki Tojo
Hideki Tojo
In office
October 18, 1941 – July 22, 1944
Vice President(s)   Unknown
Preceded by Fumimaro Konoe
Born December 30, 1884
Tokyo, Japan
Died December 23, 1948
Tokyo, Japan
Signature

Hideki Tojo (Kyūjitai: 東條 英機; Shinjitai: 東条 英機; Tōjō Hideki (help·info)) (December 30, 1884 – December 23, 1948) was a General in the Imperial Japanese Army and the 40th Prime Minister of Japan; he served as prime minister during much of World War II, from October 18, 1941 to July 22, 1944. He was sentenced to death for war crimes after the war and executed by hanging after accepting full responsibility for his actions in World War II and advocating peace in the end.[citation needed]

Contents

[edit] Biography

Tojo was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1884. He was the third son of Hidenori Tojo, a Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Tojo's two older brothers died before his birth. In 1909 he married Katsuko Ito, with whom he had three sons and four daughters.

In 1905 he graduated from the Imperial Military Academy and entered service as a Second Lieutenant in the infantry. He rose through the ranks of the Army, graduating with top grades from the Army College in 1915. After graduation, he taught at the school and served as an infantry officer.

During the 1920s, Tojo was also member of the Tosei-Ha ("Control Group", so-called by its rivals) along with Kazushige Ugaki, Gen Sugiyama, Koiso Kuniaki, Yoshijiro Umezu, and Tetsuzan Nagata. They attempted to represent the more conservative moderates in opposition to the extremist group Kodaha (Imperial Benevolence Group) led by Sadao Araki. Both factions derived from the Double Leaf Society, a 1920s militaristic group with fanatical ultranationalistic beliefs.


By 1935, Tojo was a major general commanding the Kempeitai of the Kantogun (also known as the Kwantung Army) in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and by 1937, he was Chief of Staff of that force. In 1938, Tojo served as Vice-Minister of War. From December of 1938 to 1940, Tojo was Inspector-General of Army Aviation. He was also in charge of the Japanese Secret Service before and during the Pacific War, and was in direct contact with Koki Hirota, leading the Black Dragons and other secret societies.

During the 2-26 Incident, Tojo and Shigeru Honjo, a noted supporter of Sadao Araki, came out against the Kodoha-inspired coup attempt. Emperor Hirohito himself was outraged at the attacks on his close advisors, and after a brief political crisis, and stalling on the part of a sympathetic military, the rebels were forced to surrender. In the aftermath, the Toseiha was able to purge the Army of radical officers, and the coup leaders were tried and executed. Following the purge, Tosei and Kodo elements were unified in their conservative but highly anti-political stance under the banner of the Kodoha military clique. With Tojo in a leadership position, Kodoha would help push Japan into the Second World War.

During Tojo's tenure at the Home Ministry, he led the Keishicho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department). Appointed War Minister in 1940, he was instrumental in leading Japan into the Axis Alliance with Germany and Italy. In July 1940, he was appointed War Minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet, and remained in that post in the third Konoe Cabinet. When Prime Minister Konoe was unable to secure an agreement with the United States, Tojo's faction drove him into retirement. In 1941, Tojo was appointed Prime Minister by Emperor Hirohito and took command of the entire Japanese military.

At various times during his premiership, Tojo held the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Education, Home Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Munitions. As Education Minister, he continued militaristic and nationalist indoctrination in the national education system, and reaffirmed illiberal policies in government, in accordance with outlines traced by Sadao Araki, his ideological and political precursor.

Late in the war, in February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of Chief of the Army General Staff. However, following a series of military disasters, culminating in the fall of Saipan, he was abandoned by his backers and forced to resign on July 18, 1944. He retired to the first reserve list and went into seclusion.

Tojo's nickname was "Razor" (Kamisori).

[edit] Military service

Tojo became the Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade in August 1934; the Commanding General of the Military Police in the Kantogun in September 1935; Lieutenant General in December 1936; Chief of Staff of the Kantogun in March 1937; the Vice-Minister of War in May 1938 (during the first Konoe Cabinet); and the Inspector General of Army Aviation in December 1938.

In July 1937, he personally led the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade in Operation Chahar. When the China Incident occurred, the section stationed in Manchukuo moved to Hopei and fought near Peking against Chinese forces. Then the Brigade was ordered to participate in the offensive in Chahar Province. The Brigade marched via Chengde and Dolonnor and reached Zhangbei in five days. The distance of this march was 700 km. Units were assigned to certain infantry divisions.

[edit] Rise to office of Prime Minister

 The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.
Tōjō in military uniform
Tōjō in military uniform

As German forces surged through Europe, the Japanese Army likewise pushed for war. The signal for war in the Pacific was given on August 26, 1941, at a session of the Black Dragon Society in Tokyo. At this meeting, War Minister Hideki Tōjō ordered that preparation be made to wage a total war against the Armed Forces of the United States, and that Japanese guns be mounted and supplies and munitions concentrated in the Marshall and Caroline Islands (Japanese mandates since World War I) by November, 1941. Approving Tōjō's war orders, former Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, head of the Black Dragons' secret service, discussed the advantages and consequences of a conflict with the United States. Many of those at the meeting considered December 1941, or February 1942, the most suitable time for Japan to attack.[citation needed]

Japan had invaded Indochina in July 1941 and, on August 1, the U. S. had in response imposed economic sanctions, freezing Japan's assets in the U. S. and imposing a total embargo on oil and gasoline exports. Tōjō was one of the advocates of war with the West, but Emperor Showa preferred to keep negotiating with the U. S. in hopes of avoiding conflict. The prevailing opinion within the Japanese Army at that time was that continued negotiations could be dangerous but Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tōjō, although the emperor himself was skeptical. On October 13, he declared to Koichi Kido: '"There seems little hope in the present situation for the Japan-U. S. negotiations. This time, if hostilities erupt, I might have to issue a declaration of war."[1]

On September 6, a deadline of early October was fixed in Imperial conference for negotiations. On October 14, the deadline had passed with no progress. Prime minister Konoe then held his last cabinet meeting, where Tōjō did most of the talking:

For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations. Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked...The heart of the matter is the imposition on us of withdrawal from Indochina and China...If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined.[2]

On October 16, Konoe, politically isolated and convinced that the emperor no longer trusted him, resigned. Later, he justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita:

Of course his majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war is a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: "You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much." Thus, gradually, he began to lead toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward war. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: "My prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more." In short, the Emperor had absorbed the views of the army and navy high commands.[3]

At the time, Prince Higashikuni was said to be the only person who could control the Army and the Navy and was recommended by Konoe and Tōjō. Hirohito rejected this option, arguing that a member of the imperial family should not have to eventually carry the responsibility for a war against the Occident. Following the advice of Koichi Kido, he choose instead Tojo, who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution. [4] The Emperor summoned Tōjō to the Imperial Palace one day before Tōjō took office. Tōjō wrote in his diary, "I thought I was summoned because the Emperor was angry at my opinion." Tōjō was given one order from the Emperor: To make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial conferences. Tōjō, who was on the side of the war, nevertheless accepted this order, and pledged to obey. On November 2, Tōjō and Chiefs of Staff Hajime Sugiyama and Osami Nagano reported to Hirohito that the review had been in vain. The Emperor then gave his consent to war. [5]

On November 3, Nagano explained in detail the Pearl Harbor attack to Hirohito. [6]. The eventual plan drawn up by Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff envisaged such a mauling of the Western powers that defense perimeter lines--operating on interior lines of communications and inflicting heavy Western casualties--could not be breached. In addition, the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was under orders from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to be prepared to return to Japan on a moment's notice, should negotiations succeed.

Numerous theories about political forces at work during this process include conspiracy theories about a concerted effort within the military-industrial complex of Japan and the right wing to derail negotiations and forge ahead with plans for colonialism and war.

On November 5, Hirohito approved in Imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the West and had many meetings with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month. On December 1, another imperial conference finally sanctioned the "War against the United states, England and Holland". [7]

Tojo did his best to keep negotiating. However, the results were not encouraging. For Japan, the Hull Note was the last straw. On the night of December 7, Tojo was said to have sat on a futon with his back straight and his knees together, sobbing. He might have regretted his move to go to war, or his failure to obey the Emperor.[citation needed]

[edit] General Tojo, diplomatic actions and politics

Japanese leaders had come to believe that the wars in Europe had so weakened Western Imperial forces that the Japanese Empire could expand into East Asia at will. The Japanese military hierarchy planned a line of defense based on islands stretching from Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago to the Kuriles north of Japan, intending to swallow the insular possessions of France, Britain, Netherlands, Australia, the Portuguese, and the United States, while also forcing China's acquiescence in the decades-long conflict that began with the notorious "Twenty-One Demands".

The East Indies were central to the Japanese strategy. Without it, embargoes would bankrupt the country. Japan only had two years' worth of oil reserves for non-military use, one year's worth if she went to war.

[edit] Invasion of Australia

Prime Minister Tōjō was concerned that there were no contingency plans for Yamamoto's invasion plan for Australia. Tōjō believed Japanese merchant and transport fleets were extended to their limits and the Americans could readily divert their B-17s to Sydney to destroy the invading forces.

Emperor Hirohito decided to postpone the invasion plan until Japanese forces had taken Burma and joined forces with the rebel Indian National Army. The outcomes of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway ensured the invasion plan for Australia never took place.

General Tojo was an ardent supporter of the North Strike Group and declared his intention to realize operations from Manchuria and nearby areas against the Russians in the Soviet Far East, Outer Mongolia and Siberian lands, as well as against the Kwantung Army. He was a fanatical anticommunist since his time leading Kempeitai forces in Manchuria.

[edit] Capture, trial and execution

After Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945, U. S. General Douglas MacArthur issued orders for the arrest of the first forty alleged war criminals, including Tōjō. Soon, Tōjō's home in Setagaya was besieged with newsmen and photographers. Inside, a doctor named Suzuki had marked Tōjō's chest with charcoal to indicate the location of his heart. When American military police surrounded the house, they heard a muffled shot from inside. It was September 8, 1945, 4:17 pm. Major Paul Kraus and a group of military police burst in, followed by George Jones, a reporter for the New York Times. Tōjō had shot himself in the chest with a .32-caliber Colt, but despite shooting directly through the mark, the bullet missed his heart. At 4:29, now disarmed and with blood spreading on his shirt, Tōjō began to talk, and two Japanese reporters recorded his words. "I am very sorry it is taking me so long to die," he murmured. "The Greater East Asian war was justified and righteous. I am very sorry for the nation and all the races of the Greater Asiatic powers. I wait for the righteous judgment of history. I wished to commit suicide but sometimes that fails."[8]

He survived and was arrested. After recovering from his injuries, Tōjō was moved to the Sugamo Prison. He was tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for war crimes and found guilty of the following crimes:

  • count 1 (waging wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law)
  • count 27 (waging unprovoked war against the Republic of China)
  • count 29 (waging aggressive war against the United States)
  • count 31 (waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth)
  • count 32 (waging aggressive war against the Netherlands (Indonesia))
  • count 33 (waging aggressive war against France (Indochina))
  • count 54 (ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and others)

He was sentenced to death on November 12, 1948 and executed by hanging on December 23, 1948. In his final statements he apologized for the atrocities committed by the Japanese military and urged the American military to show compassion and repentance toward the Japanese people, who had suffered devastating air attacks and the two atomic bombs.[9]

Many historians criticize the work made by MacArthur and his staff to exonerate Emperor Showa and all members of the imperial family from criminal prosecutions. According to them, MacArthur and Brigadier-general Bonner Fellers worked to protect the Emperor from the role he had played during and at the end of the war and attribute ultimate responsibility to Tojo. [10]

According to the written report of Shûichi Mizota, the interpreter of admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Fellers met the two men at his office on 6 March 1946 and told Yonai that : "it would be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that the Emperor is completely blameless. I think the forthcoming trials offer the best opportunity to do that. Tôjô, in particular, should be made to bear all responsibility at this trial." [11]

The sustained intensity of this campaign to protect the Emperor was revealed when, in testifying before the tribunal on 31 December 1947, Tôjô momentarily strayed from the agreed-on line concerning imperial innocence and referred to the Emperor's ultimate authority. The American-led prosecution immediately arranged that he be secretly coached to recant this testimony. Ryukichi Tanaka, a former general who testified at the trial and had close connections with chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan, was used as an intermediary to persuade Tôjô to revise his testimony. [12]

[edit] Legacy

Tōjō is often considered responsible for authorizing the murder of more than 8 million civilians in China, Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, and other Pacific island nations, as well tens of thousands of Allied POWs. Tojo is also implicated in government-sanctioned experiments on POWs and Chinese civilians (see Unit 731). Like his German colleagues, Tōjō often claimed to be carrying out the orders of the Emperor, who was granted immunity from war crimes prosecution. The culpability of the Showa Emperor himself is a subject of some controversy.

Tōjō's commemorating tomb is located in a shrine in Hazu, Aichi, and he is one of those enshrined at the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. He was survived by a number of his descendants, including his granddaughter, Yuko Tōjō, a right-wing activist who claimed Japan's was a war of self-defense and that it was "unfair" that her grandfather was judged a Class-A war criminal. Tōjō's second son, Teruo Tōjō, who designed fighter and passenger aircraft during and after the war, eventually served as an executive at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

Under current Japanese law, Tojo is not considered a war criminal.[citation needed]

Hideki Tojo has accepted full responsibility in the end for his actions during the war. Here is passage from his statement, which he made during his war crimes trial. :

It is natural that I should bear entire responsibility for the war in general, and, needless to say, I am prepared to do so. Consequently, now that the war has been lost, it is presumably necessary that I be judged so that the circumstances of the time can be clarified and the future peace of the world be assured. Therefore, with respect to my trial, it is my intention to speak frankly, according to my recollection, even though when the vanquished stands before the victor, who has over him the power of life and death, he may be apt to toady and flatter. I mean to pay considerable attention to this in my actions, and say to the end that what is true is true and what is false is false. To shade one's words in flattery to the point of untruthfulness would falsify the trial and do incalculable harm to the nation, and great care must be taken to avoid this.

[edit] Will

“ Japanese gentlemen, Now, the Imperial edict of the end of the war is only merely carefully caught, whatever there may be. However, the allies provoke Greater East Asia War and I am only who fought unavoidably because of national survival and national self-defense. Although our country was unluckily defeated by that countries, reason's being in our country firmly is being unable to deny. Japan is the divine land. I wish you gentlemen are sure of the fate of the Empire and wait for the time of conquering this difficulty by making a devotion effort. I wish the sun being rejuvenated. ”

[13]

[edit] See also

[edit] Footnotes

  1. ^ Kido Koichi nikki, Bungei Shunjûsha, 1990, p.914
  2. ^ (Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2000, p.417, citing the Sugiyama memo)
  3. ^ Akira Fujiwara, Shôwa tennô no ju-go nen sensô (The Shôwa Emperor's Fifteen Years War), Aoki Shoten, 1991, p.126
  4. ^ Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Harper Collins, 2000, p.418, Terasaki Hidenari,Shôwa tennô dokuhakuroku, Bungei Shunjûsha, 1991, p.118
  5. ^ (Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and war, University of Hawai'i press, 1998, p.47-50, Bix, ibid. p.421)
  6. ^ (Wetzler, ibid. p. 29, 35)
  7. ^ (Wetzler, ibid. p.28-30, 39)
  8. ^ (John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, Random House, 1970, p. 871-2))
  9. ^ (Toland, ibid, p. 873))
  10. ^ Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, 2000, p.583-585, John Dower, Embracing defeat, 1999, p.324-326
  11. ^ Kumao Toyoda, Sensô saiban yoroku, Taiseisha Kabushiki Kaisha, 1986, p.170-172, Bix, ibid. p.584
  12. ^ Dower, ibid. p.325, 604-605
  13. ^ From "To the fellow Japanese people"《日本同胞国民諸君》

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Shigenori Togo		 Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
1942		 Succeeded by
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Persondata
NAME Tojo, Hideki
ALTERNATIVE NAMES 東條 英機 (Kyūjitai); 東条 英機 (Shinjitai); Tōjō Hideki (transliteration)
SHORT DESCRIPTION Prime Minister of Japan
DATE OF BIRTH December 30, 1884
PLACE OF BIRTH Tokyo, Japan
DATE OF DEATH December 23, 1948
PLACE OF DEATH Tokyo, Japan
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