Gulf of Tonkin Incident

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Chart showing the US Navy’s interpretation of the events of the first part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident
Chart showing the US Navy’s interpretation of the events of the first part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was an alleged pair of attacks by naval forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (commonly referred to as North Vietnam) against two American destroyers, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy. The attacks occurred on 2 August and 4 August 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. Later research, including a report released in 2005 by the National Security Agency, indicated that the second attack most likely did not occur, but also attempted to dispel the long-standing assumption that members of the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson had knowingly lied about the nature of the incident.[1]

The outcome of the incident was the passage by Congress of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), which granted Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose government was considered to be jeopardized by "communist aggression". The resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for escalating American involvement in the Vietnam Conflict.

Contents

[edit] Background

Main articles: Vietnam War, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, and Operation 34A

The Vietnam Conflict had begun in 1961, when the Hanoi-backed National Liberation Front took up armed struggle against the American-backed regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem. The U.S. also began providing direct support to the South Vietnamese in the form of military and financial aid and military advisors, the number of which grew from 600 in 1961 to 16,000 by the end of John F. Kennedy's presidency in 1963.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration. While Kennedy had originally supported the policy of sending military advisors to Vietnam, he had begun to alter his thinking due to the military ineptitude of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms. Shortly before his assassination in November 1963, he had begun limited recall of American forces. Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military escalation in Vietnam as a means to challenge the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of containment was to be applied to prevent the "fall" of Southeast Asia under the precepts of the domino theory. After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more American forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia.

According to the U.S. Naval Institute[2], a highly classified program of covert attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) known as Operation 34A, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964 the program was transferred to the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (SOG). For the maritime portion of the covert operation, Tjeld-class fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. Although the crews of the boats were South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval of the plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC in Honolulu. After the coastal attacks began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva Accords, but the U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South Vietnamese attacks against the DRV. The Maddox, although aware of the operations, was not directly involved in these attacks.

Veterans of U.S. Navy SEAL teams stated that U.S.-trained South Vietnamese commandos were active in the area on the days of the attacks. Deployed from Da Nang in Norwegian-built fast patrol boats, the Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN, 'soldiers that fight under the sea') made attacks in the Gulf area on the nights of 31 July and 3 August.

On July 31, LDNN commandos in "Nasty" fast attack boats attacked a radio transmitter on the island of Hon Nieu. On 3 August, they used a shipboard cannon to bombard a radar site at Cape Vinh Son. The North Vietnamese responded by attacking hostile ships visible in the area. While US officials were less than honest about the full extent of hostilities that led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, critical claims that a naval commander fired weapons solely to create an international incident tend to overlook circumstances and opportunistic responses that suggest a less intentional motivation.[citation needed]

[edit] The Incident

Photograph taken from the USS Maddox August 2, 1964 and showing North Vietnamese patrol boats
Photograph taken from the USS Maddox August 2, 1964 and showing North Vietnamese patrol boats

Daniel Ellsberg, who was on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from the ship, reports that the ships were on a secret mission (codenamed Desoto) near North Vietnamese territorial waters. On 31 July 1964, the American destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began an electronic intelligence collection mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Admiral George Stephen Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his flagship USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31). The ship was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles from the North's coast and four miles from Hon Nieu island. [1] When the SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was 120 miles away from the attacked area. [2]

On 2 August the Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese P-4 patrol torpedo boats 28 miles away from the North Vietnamese coast in international waters.[3] The Maddox evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch guns, forcing the patrol craft away. U.S. aircraft launched from Ticonderoga then attacked the retiring P-4s, claiming one as sunk and one heavily damaged. In fact, none of the four vessels was sunk. The Maddox, suffering very minor damage from a single machine gun bullet, retired to South Vietnamese waters where she was joined by the destroyer Turner Joy.

On 4 August, another Desoto patrol on the North Vietnam coast was launched by Maddox and the Turner Joy. This time their orders indicated that the ships were to close no more than 11 miles from the coast of North Vietnam. [4] The destroyers received radar and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by the North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of enemies. It was highly unlikely that any North Vietnamese forces were actually in the area during this "battle". Captain John J. Herrick even admitted that it was nothing more than an "overeager sonarman" who "was hearing his ship's own propeller beat."

Although information obtained well after the fact indicated that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, U.S. authorities and all of the crew at the time said they were convinced that an attack had taken place. As a result, planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities (Operation Pierce Arrow).

[edit] Differing views of the Incident

There are differing views about whether the 2 August incident was provoked by the U.S. One view is that the actions of the Maddox were provocative to the North Vietnamese because they coincided with the covert South Vietnamese raids. Since the Desoto patrols were conducted in order to gather just the sort of electronic emissions that the SOG 34A raids would provoke, it was a reasonable assumption that the two were "piggybacked." The destroyer's presence also may have been mistaken by the North Vietnamese as a sign that it was also involved directly in the raids.

Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the confirmed 2 August attack. He claimed that DRV radar had tracked Maddox along the coast, thus being aware that the destroyer had not actually attacked North Vietnam. Yet they ordered their patrol boats to engage it anyway. He also noted that orders given to Maddox to stay eight miles off the DRV coast put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed only a five-mile nautical limit as its territory. In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions all over the world, and the USS John R. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident.[5]

[edit] Later statements

On 4 August 1964, squadron commander James Stockdale was one of the U.S. pilots flying overhead during the second alleged attack; unlike the first attack, this one was believed to have been a false alarm. In the early 1990s, he recounted: "[I] had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there… There was nothing there but black water and American fire power." Stockdale said his superiors ordered him to keep quiet about this. After he was captured, this knowledge became a heavy burden. He later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him to reveal what he knew about this terrible secret.

In 1995, retired Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, meeting with former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, categorically denied that Vietnamese gunboats had attacked American destroyers on 4 August, while admitting to the attack on 2 August.[6][7] However, the first engagement was initiated by Maddox entering North Vietnamese waters on an intelligence gathering mission, along with coordinated attacks on North Vietnamese military targets by the South Vietnamese navy and the Laotian air force. A taped conversation of a meeting several weeks after passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was released in 2001, revealing that McNamara expressed doubts to President Lyndon B. Johnson that the attack had even occurred. Taking into consideration documents and transcripts released by the U.S. National Security Agency and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, the consensus is that this second attack never happened.

In the Fall of 1999, retired senior CIA engineering executive S. Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August 1964 to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an imagined one. He asked for further details on time, weather and surface conditions. No further details were forthcoming. In the end he concluded that there were no torpedo boats on the night in question, and that the White House was interested only in confirmation of an attack, not that there was no such attack [8] In October, 2005 the New York Times reported that Robert J. Hanyok, a historian for the U.S. National Security Agency, had concluded that the NSA deliberately distorted the intelligence reports that it had passed on to policy-makers regarding the 4 August incident. He concluded that the motive was not political but was probably to cover up honest intelligence errors. [9]

Mr. Hanyok's conclusions were initially published within the NSA in the Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition of Cryptologic Quarterly, about five years before they were revealed in the Times article. According to intelligence officials, the view of government historians that the report should become public was rebuffed by policymakers concerned that comparisons might be made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq war that commenced in 2003.[10]

Reviewing the NSA's archives, Mr. Hanyok concluded that the NSA had initially misinterpreted North Vietnamese intercepts so as to make it appear there was an attack on 4 August. Midlevel NSA officials almost immediately discovered the error, he concluded, but covered it up by altering documents, so as to make it appear the second attack had happened. Robert McNamara, said in October 2005 that he believed intelligence reports regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident were decisive to the war's expansion.

On 30 November 2005, the NSA released the first installment of previously classified information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including Mr. Hanyok's article, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.

The Hanyok article stated that intelligence information was presented to the Johnson administration "in such a manner as to preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events." Instead, "only information that supported the claim that the communists had attacked the two destroyers was given to Johnson administration officials."

[edit] Southeast Asia Resolution

Main article: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Lyndon Johnson, who was up for election that year, launched retaliatory air strikes and went on national television on 4 August. Although the Maddox had been involved in providing intelligence support for South Vietnamese attacks at Hon Me and Hon Ngu, Defense Secretary McNamara denied, in his testimony before Congress, that the U.S. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the Gulf. He thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in international waters. He also claimed that there was "unequivocable proof" of an "unprovoked" second attack against the Maddox.

As a result of his testimony, on 7 August, Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J. RES 1145), titled the Southeast Asia Resolution, which granted President Johnson the authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a declaration of war. The Resolution gave President Johnson approval "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." Both Johnson and President Richard Nixon used the Resolution as a justification for escalated involvement in Indochina.

[edit] Interpretation

The "Gulf of Tonkin Incident" defined the beginning of large-scale involvement of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. Historians have shown that the second incident was, at its best interpretation, an overreaction of eager naval forces, or at its worst, a crafted pretext for making overt the American covert involvement in Vietnam.

Vietnam's Navy Anniversary Day is August 5, the date of the second attack, Vietnamese time, where "one of our torpedo squadrons chased the U.S.S. Maddox from our coastal waters, our first victory over the U.S. Navy". [11]

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent4.htm Pentagon Papers]
  2. ^ Pentagon Papers
  3. ^ Pentagon Papers
  4. ^ Pentagon Papers
  5. ^ Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat — Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) P. 42
  6. ^ "McNamara asks Giap: What happened in Tonkin Gulf?". (November 9, 1995). Associated Press
  7. ^ CNN Cold War - Interviews: Robert McNamara, retrieved January 23, 2007
  8. ^ S. Eugene Poteat, "Engineering in the CIA: ELINT, Stealth and the Beginnings of Information Warfare", The Bent of Tau Beta Pi, Fall 1999
  9. ^ Shane, Scott (December 2, 2005). "Vietnam War Intelligence 'Deliberately Skewed,' Secret Study Says". New York Times. 
  10. ^ "Robert J. Hanyok: His NSC study on Tonkin Gulf Deception". (October 31, 2005). New York Times.
  11. ^ Pike, PAVN, p. 110

[edit] External links

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