Glider Infantry Regiment

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The Glider Infantry Regiments were specialised airborne regiments unique to World War II. The concept of deploying infantrymen and materiel into combat using gliders was initially developed by the Germans, however it was the Allies who applied it to a greater degree. The British 6th Airborne Division and U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions landed some elements by glider on D-Day.

The gliders which were most widely used by these divisions were the Waco CG-4A and the Airspeed Horsa. Both of these aircraft used plywood extensively in their construction, with the CG-4A also using aluminium to provide greater strength in its framing.

Much like conventional gliders, these aircraft were towed behind a powered aircraft, usually a C-47, and were then released near the designated landing area called the Landing Zone or LZ.

The crews of these aircraft landed their aircraft in circumstances which would challenge the most seasoned pilot. They had but a few moments to pick a likely landing spot, avoid the other gliders making similar approaches, along with those already on the ground, avoid incoming enemy fire and then land the aircraft without crashing into any trees or ditches and do so softly so as to ensure that the aircraft and/or cargo were not damaged in the process.

Whilst airborne troops were already used in paratroop regiments, the ability to land a large number of troops in a small area, with weapons and vehicles, and to have those troops land in squads rather than spread out, proved to be of great advantage in combat. It allowed for fighting units to land together and move off the landing zone before ground troops reached them, and to better defend themselves when they did encounter the enemy as they could carry more equipment with them into battle.

Prior to the Battle of Normandy, Allied command feared that the losses suffered by glider groups would be as high as 50-70% before even encountering the enemy. This fear was based on expectations for high numbers of crash landings and encounters with anti-aircraft defences. The actual losses due to crash landings were only 10-15%.