Talk:Gando

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You have new messages (last change).

Contents

[edit] 제목

Map of Korea WikiProject Korea invites you to join in improving Wikipedia articles related to Korea. Pavilion at Gyeongbok palace, Seoul
This article is part of WikiProject China, a project to improve all China-related articles. If you would like to help improve this and other China-related articles, please join the project. All interested editors are welcome.
??? This article has not yet received a rating on the quality scale.
More information about this article...

If possible, please add more and bigger pictures in the future. Dont scale them down. Or add them as side windows. Thank You.

[edit] Request

Could someone make a picture of a map showing and circling both Tumen Rivers?

[edit] Boundary agreement of 1909

Japan didn't cede Gando to China. Qing all along exercised effective control over the region.

[edit] Very strange claims

About this map:

Image:RegisMap.gif

How is the red line the boundary between Joseon and Manchuria? Does Joseon include the "Manchews"? (The top part of the red line can be clearly seen as the boundary between the "Mongols" and "Manchews".) Also, the boundary is definitely not on the Yalu River, which everyone can agree with. How can the red line be taken then as the border of Joseon? -- ran (talk) 04:48, Apr 27, 2005 (UTC)

And this one.

Image:ThreeMaps.jpg

The first map doesn't seem to have any understanding of the geography of Asia north of the Yellow Sea (Hokkaido is part of the mainland??). The second and third one basically show Korea with its present boundaries. So how do they strengthen Korea's claims to Gando? -- ran (talk) 04:50, Apr 27, 2005 (UTC)

And this one.

Image:CatholicismenCoree.gif

This is not just Gando... it's pretty much the entire eastern half of Manchuria. This region never had a Korean majority. What exactly does this prove, other than that the Roman Catholic Church had a poor understanding of the ethnic composition of the region? -- ran (talk) 05:05, Apr 27, 2005 (UTC)

Okay, I'm going to edit out the maps. If anyone disagrees, please discuss here. -- ran (talk) 04:58, Apr 27, 2005 (UTC)


The original map doesn't contain the red line. Here's a link to a scan of the original map. [1] And here's a version that seems to be based off the same information as well. [2] Very large size (1.9 mb) version of the latter. [3]--Yuje 06:34, Apr 27, 2005 (UTC)

Yes... it does seem to be added. In that case the claim that the red line is the boundary of Joseon should be considered patently false. What do you think? -- ran (talk) 16:45, Apr 27, 2005 (UTC)


[edit] Evaluating the Claims

In 1712, Joseon of Korea and Qing of China agree to set the boundaries of the two countries at Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The Yalu (鴨綠) / Amnok (압록) River boundary is of little dispute, but the interpretation of the Tumen causes problems. On the original document, Tumen is written as 土門 (토문), which would refer to a small river that joins the Songhua (松花) / Songhwa (송화) River. However, Qing officials would later claim that Tumen (豆滿) / Duman (두만) River is the boundary on record. This confusion is brought up as the two names sound identical, and neither name is actually of Chinese origin (only using Chinese homophones). The two rivers can be seen in the following picture.

According to the article, the dispute arrose from the disagreement on which Tumen river is the boundary. According to it, 土門 is the correct boundary but 豆滿 was claimed by Qing. However, until I see more information, I have my doubts on this. 豆滿 is not pronounced as Tumen in Chinese, but Douman, and the article on the Tumen River shows that the Chinese characters for the river are actually 图们, not 豆滿, so it seems unlikely that the Qing would claim 豆滿 as correct. --Yuje 06:28, Apr 28, 2005 (UTC)

The first map is definitely wrong. The original map did not have the red line there or note it as the Korean-Chinese border. It shows the red-lined land as being "Manchews". The other maps are too small and lack too much detail to tell if it had any land north of the Tumen river or not. I'm not sure about the Catholic map.--Yuje 08:18, Apr 28, 2005 (UTC)

豆滿 is apparently the Korean Hanja for the Tumen River. -- ran (talk) 19:33, Apr 28, 2005 (UTC)
This highlights the ethnic make-up of Gando, as the Roman Catholic church does not create a diocese covering regions of more than one nation.

Regarding this claim, the Catholic Encyclopedia shows a list of the dioceses in existence at around 1910 or so.[4] A single diocese was made covering India and Indochina, and single one for all of Africa, a single one for the entire Malay Archipelago, one for all Polynesia, and one that combined the Philippines with Hawaii. So as far as I know, this claim isn't factually correct. Catholic dioceses could and did encompass territory of different states and nations. Not sure about the boundaries, but the other information about the existence and founding of the apostalic vicariates seems correct. --Yuje 08:42, Apr 28, 2005 (UTC)

So what do you think should be done? I think the maps should be removed, and the article rewritten to make it more NPOV. -- ran (talk) 19:33, Apr 28, 2005 (UTC)
I think there should be a map which shows the location of both Tumen rivers. The first is inaccurate, and the three on the next show too little detail for use in showing the described area. The first, 土門, is apparently a very small or minor river though, as I can't find it on any maps or atlases. The only maps I've seen which clearly identity area and location of Gando are administrative maps for Manchukuo (where it's under the Chinese name Ch'ien Dao or Japanese name Kando). I'm also unsure whether or not the territory was ever actually adminstered by Korea, or whether ownership was disputed at the time of the Gando Convention. According to the Korean claim, Gando was settled by Koreans and transferred to China by Japan, but according to the Chinese claim, the area was Chinese the entire time and the Japanese never had a legitimate claim to the land and made up the name Gando as a pretext to claim and invade the area. --Yuje 23:09, Apr 29, 2005 (UTC)

But that's the thing. The only map we have showing the "other" Tuman River is the first one.. hardly a precise map. -- ran (talk) 23:52, Apr 29, 2005 (UTC)

There are just so many maps on Commons showing the Tumen River as the border between Korea and Manchuria: commons:Historical maps of Korea

This, together with the fact that no one has yet specified what / where the other Tuman River is supposed to be, means that most of what is in this article cannot be justified.

I'm going to do a bit of rewriting. -- ran (talk) 21:12, May 22, 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Further information found

I just found a journal article that goes into greater detail over the history of the region. Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909–1937 ERIK W. ESSELSTROM, found in Modern Asian Studies Volume 39 - Issue 01 - February 2005. There's a link here, if you are able to access it through a university account) [[5]]

Here's a relevant section on the history of Jiandao between 1906-1909 (the date of the Gando Convention.

In the aftermath of the establishment the Korean protectorate in
1906, numerous Korean resistance fighters fled to the neighboring
region of Jiandao to escape capture by Japanese police and military
forces in Korea. The Japanese army in Korea set up a temporary field
office in Jiandao in 1907 to prosecute their mission of eradicating
opposition to the protectorate, and it was out of this background
that the Gaimush¯o established its first consular police forces in
Jiandao. However, it was not accomplished without some resistance
from the Chinese government. Indeed, by 1909 the Jiandao problem
had become a major issue in Sino-Japanese relations.10 The treaty
agreement reached in that year attempted to resolve the conflict
by providing for the establishment of a Japanese consulate-general
in Longjincun through which the Japanese Foreign Ministry could
exercise its jurisdiction over Korean residents in the immediate
region. Along with the consulate-general, four sub-consulates were
set up in Juzijie, Toudaogou, Hunchun, and Baicaogou. From their
opening each of these facilities was staffed with a consular police
staff; forty-two officers staffed the consulate-general in Longjincun,
and roughly six officers each at the four sub-consulates. In accordance
with the 1909 treaty, local Chinese authorities also established their
own police forces in the same areas. The duty with which all of these
Japanese and Chinese police were charged was the maintenance of
public security for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese residents alike in
various local Jiandao region ‘commercial settlements,’ or sh¯obuchi. It
surely did not come as a surprise to anyone when these Chinese
and Japanese police forces clashed over issues regarding who had
jurisdiction where.11

Aside from local skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese police
from time to time, the overwhelming Korean resident majority in the
Jiandao region was the fundamental source of Sino-Japanese conflict
in the area. On the issue of jurisdiction over the Koreans, the Chinese
side maintained that Japanese authority was limited to the sh¯obuchi
areas, outside of which the Chinese held the only legitimate police
power. The Japanese side however reasoned that the consular police
had a legitimate right to enforce law and order wherever Japanese
residents resided. The Koreans in Jiandao were considered to be
imperial subjects and the consular police thus had a duty to protect
them and their interests. The problem with this logic was that most
Koreans did not live in the sh¯obuchi settlement areas. However, since
nothing in the 1909 treaty specifically limited the scope of consular
police authority, the Foreign Ministry refused to back down in this
conflict over legitimate police jurisdiction.

Clashes between Chinese and Japanese police in Jiandao continued
sporadically over the next few years. However, when the Japanese
government presented the Yuan Shikai regime with its infamous
Twenty-One Demands in 1915, the deadlock over police authority
in Jiandao was broken. In the new treaty agreements that were
negotiated out of the original demands, the 1909 Jiandao treaty was
abrogated in favor of a new treaty that gave the consular police a
much stronger hand in the region. As a result the number of consular
police in the Jiandao region grew to just over one hundred men after
1915.12 The two sides, however, viewed the 1915 treaty differently.
The Chinese never fully recognized the claims that Japan made to
jurisdictional sovereignty over Japanese residents in the Manchurian
interior.13

From the description given by this journal, it appears that Japan never fully administrated Jiandao/Gando and thus wasn't in a position to simply hand it over to China in 1909. Control was at best, shared with the Chinese government.


That the problem of resistance in exile to Japan’s colonial rule of Korea
is inextricably linked to the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 is
not an entirely new idea. Thirty years ago, Nakatsuka Akira advanced
this notion in a brief article.96 However, Nakatsuka’s argument
focused on plans by militant leaders in the KoreaGovernment-General
to stage a ‘Jiandao incident’ of sorts in the summer of 1931. Their
aim was to provide a pretext for a border incursion by the Japanese
Army in Korea that would solve the problem of Korean resistance
in Jiandao once and for all. Once they had occupied the region, the
plan was to abolish the consular police and make Jiandao a part of
formal Korean colonial territory.97 What the present discussion does,
that Nakatsuka did not do, is recognize the agency of the Jiandao
consular police in energizing their own escalation of hostilities, without
the initiative of Japanese armies in Korea or Manchuria. This is a
significant distinction.

It also appears that though Japan never formally administered Jiandao/Gando as part of its Korean colonial territory, they did have plans to stage an incident to use it as a pretext to annex Jiandao/Gando.--Yuje 11:04, May 30, 2005 (UTC)

Here's an article from The South Atlantic Quarterly 99.1 (2000) 193-215 by Hyun Ok Park [6]

(relevant sections quoted)

Jasm within their new territory in dependent relations to the metropole.5 
Contrary to this state-to-state dependent relationship between the mpanese 
colonialism, often thought to mirror European colonialism, was driven by 
Japan’s impetus to modernize itself and become like the West and its productive 
forces, to achieve material wealth and access to world power. [End Page 194]  
Drawing on the trial and error of the European experience, Japan planned its 
colonial projects ahead and tied them more centrally to the metropole’s 
interests. Like its European counterparts, Japan wielded military violence 
over the colonized subjects and then enshrouded these proceedings in terms 
of its enlightenment project for, and moral superiority over, the colonized.3 
I argue that these conventional views that regarded Japanese colonialism as 
mirroring European colonialism elide the significance of their crucially 
distinct geographic and racial politics. European colonialism tended to colonize 
countries one by one and rule each as a separate entity. In Africa the British 
not only integrated kingdoms, villages, languages, and tribes to redraw 
territorial boundaries and establish new states but also established new 
institutions of governance, education, and communication that, in turn, were 
supposed to engender a new sense of identification with the new territory and 
the state. This creation of territorial boundaries and the state institutions 
is, as Anthony D. Smith argues, the process of transporting the notion of 
nation and territoriality to the non-West.4  By this process of “diffusion” 
of Western science and rationality, the colonized elites then imagined their 
new independent nation and nationalietropole and each colony, Japan envisioned 
an organic unity of its metropole and the colonies by trying to implement a 
cascading process of territorial expansion through territorial osmosis. Japan 
first actualized its strategy when it turned Korea into a gateway to colonize 
Manchuria, then paired Korea and Manchuria for the next round of the infiltration 
into the rest of China. Korean migrants of Manchuria served as “molecules” in 
the diffusion of Japan’s power from Korea to Manchuria. Japan imagined Korean 
migrants as fluid agents who would pass through the membrane of Korea’s borders 
into Manchuria, where the solvent concentration (or resistance to Japan’s 
intervention) was higher. Japan hoped that the migration and settlement of 
Koreans in Manchuria would equalize the resistance of China against Japan’s 
territorial ambition, resolving into a gradual diffusion of Japan’s power. A 
vast majority of Korean migrants (about 1 million by 1930, 1.5 million by 1945) 
were landless peasants who escaped poverty and debt and came to Manchuria to 
seek new land or job opportunities. No matter if the Korean migration did not 
result from the organized project of the colonial state of Korea or metropolitan 
Japan; all that counted for Japan was its own claims on Koreans of Manchuria as 
its subjects. In [End Page 195]  one region of Manchuria, Jiandao (a district of 
Manchuria and currently the Korean Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture bordering Korea), 
where the number of Koreans swelled to more than two-thirds of the total population, 
both Japan and China considered Japan’s exercise of the authority over Koreans to 
be equal to Japan’s control over the region. China feared that Japan was making 
yet another Jiandao out of Manchuria.

The predicament for China was that Koreans could not be evicted immediately. 
Since the late nineteenth century, China had granted Koreans customary rights 
to reside in and cultivate sparsely populated Jiandao. When Chinese migration 
slowed from North China to this previously protected birthplace and hunting 
ground of the Qing dynasty, China had hoped that Korean settlement would create 
a buffer from the threat of Russian imperialism. Even after the rapid increase 
in Chinese migration to Manchuria in the 1910s and 1920s, Chinese local governments 
and landowners welcomed Koreans for their special skill in cultivating rice, a 
lucrative cash crop. China also signed with Japan the 1909 Jiandao Treaty that 
consolidated the rights of Koreans in Jiandao while striving to preclude similar 
advantages of Koreans in other parts of Manchuria. China confronted Japan’s 
colonial ambition implanted in Korean migrants by attempting to regain its 
sovereignty over these migrants. As I will explain later, the tension between 
China and Japan translated into their conflict over Koreans, especially over 
the issue of citizenship. It was through this contestation that Japan found a 
leeway to expand its military and police power and override Chinese authority in 
Manchuria. Koreans’ migration to Manchuria resulted from the colonial 
exploitation of Korea, as did their migration to metropolitan Japan and its 
other colonies, including Sakhalin. But Koreans in Manchuria found a different 
place in Japan’s empire as colonial agents. 

The migration of Korean peasants is an important and yet neglected mechanism in 
the study of the Japanese intervention in Manchuria. So far, historians have 
mainly approached the migration of Korean peasants in terms of its significance 
to either Korea or Japan. This migration was seen as lessening the rising tension 
between landlords and landless peasants within Korea. For this purpose Japan 
implemented in the late 1930s a policy to relocate Korean peasants from the 
southern Korean peninsula to Manchuria. In addition, the migration of Koreans 
to Manchuria was seen as not only solving problems but bringing immediate 
political and economic benefits to Japan. In his 1929 report to the governor-general 
of Korea, the Japanese [End Page 196]  consul in Jiandao wrote that “in face of the 
growing number of landless peasants in Korea we need to hinder them from going to 
Japan. They should be relocated to Manchuria to prevent the increase of the rate 
of unemployment of unskilled Japanese. Furthermore, the migration of Koreans to 
Manchuria would benefit Japan, since the more Koreans would cultivate rice and 
other grains in Manchuria, the more it would ease the problem of population 
growth and the subsequent food shortage in Japan.”6 Apart from this dual 
contribution to both Korea and Japan, I argue that Korean migrants in Manchuria 
took up another role in that they were an integral part in Japan’s scheme to 
extend its power through nonmilitary means, especially before 1931. A Japanese 
report in 1929 captures this strategy, noting that “Koreans comprise the majority 
of the population in Jiandao and cultivate more than half of the arable land. 
If Koreans were assimilated into Japanese, Jiandao would become another Korea. 
If Japan relocates Koreans to other neighboring regions of Jiandao and allows 
them to own land, those regions of Manchuria would become yet another Jiandao. 
This process would constitute a concrete circle of Japanese power [in Manchuria].”7 
In the literature on the Japanese empire this specific role of the Korean 
migrants as a medium of territorial osmosis is unexplored.

........


n Jiandao, key political players included Japanese, Chinese, and Korean radical 
nationalists, who developed overt, confrontational relationships with one another. 
Nationalist movements such as the right recovery movement and national economic 
development programs influenced the relationship between the local government 
and Japan in Jiandao. But the most intense conflicts between Japan and China 
revolved around the issue of sovereignty over Koreans, materializing in three 
forms of dispute: spatial categories of Manchuria, judicial authorities, and 
sovereignty over Koreans. If each of these contentions is understood separately 
from the other two, they can be interpreted as Japan’s ad hoc violations of China’s 
sovereignty over the region. Understood as a whole, they were three concerted 
efforts that underscored Japan’s systematic attempt to seize control over the region. 
When the Korean population swelled to about 500,000 inhabitants in the 1920s (half 
of the total Korean population of Manchuria, or two-thirds of the Jiandao population), 
Japan’s claim on Koreans was equal to its claim over Jiandao itself.

Japan ignored China’s administrative categories of province, district, and 
[End Page 207] county. Instead Japan used vague geographic terms, such as South, 
North, and occasionally East Manchuria. South Manchuria comprised Fengtian province 
and the western part of Jilin province, while North Manchuria referred to Heilongjiang 
and some northern parts of Jilin province. Jiandao was included sometimes in South 
Manchuria and sometimes in East Manchuria. Imprecise and evasive categories served as 
discursive politics of space, used by Japan to interpret the 1915 Treaty on South 
Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia to its advantage. The 1915 Treaty provided Japan 
with a number of privileges, such as rights to lease land, open businesses, invest 
in joint ventures, and operate mines. The most disputed element of the treaty was 
the extraterritoriality of Japanese citizens in South Manchuria and East Inner 
Mongolia. Asserting that Jiandao was part of South Manchuria, Japan contended that 
Koreans, as Japanese subjects, held extraterritoriality in Jiandao and that Japanese 
consulates held full authority over them. Both the People’s Republic in Beijing and 
the local government under Zhang Zuolin’s control disagreed, maintaining that Jiandao 
was not part of South Manchuria and that the 1909 Jiandao Treaty, which affirmed 
Jiandao as a Chinese territory and placed Koreans under Chinese jurisdiction, was 
still valid. No satisfactory resolution was reached. Japan continued to assert its claims.

Before Japan signed the Jiandao Treaty, Koreans in Jiandao had been allowed to 
reside, cultivate land, or own property without being naturalized as Chinese citizens. 
[End Page 208] Indicating the unresolved territorial disputes between Korea and China 
over the region, Koreans in Jiandao had been called “people of the region between 
[Korea and China]” (in Chinese, Jianmin). While the Jiandao Treaty set a definite 
territorial boundary between China and Korea, it was anything but a clear resolution 
on the sovereignty over the region. The resolution on territory proved to be too 
limited to sustain Chinese sovereignty because the status of the Koreans turned out 
to be too ambiguous. The treaty sustained the previous rights of Koreans to reside, 
cultivate land, and own property without a clear statement of their citizenship. When 
Koreans comprised two-thirds of the population, the ambiguous citizenship of the 
Koreans became a liability for China in its attempt to retain its rule. For the 
same reason, it offered Japan a new opportunity to claim its sovereignty over Koreans 
and, by extension, over the region itself.

That Qing China would have granted Koreans rights to settle in China (second quoted paragraph) also seems to provide evidence favoring the Chinese side that Jiandao/Gando is Chinese territory. Later paragraphs show more ambiguity and note that the Jiando Koreans were called "people between China and Korea". --Yuje 12:12, May 30, 2005 (UTC)


Here's another article that explains the Tumen river dispute. The South Atlantic Quarterly 99.1 (2000) 219-240 Looking North toward Manchuria Andre Schmid [7]

{text about how the official boundary was demarcated jointly by Chinese and Korean officials)

Outside official circles the events of 1712 were less than welcomed. Grumblings 
[End Page 225]  about the stele’s position spread, especially among scholars 
alienated from the corridors of power. Over the next century these men continued to 
blame Pak Kwon and Yi Sonbu for dereliction of duty—specifically, for not accompanying 
Mukedeng to the summit—only their critique did not stop there. Some, as Cho Kwang 
has shown, targeted the basic policy adopted by the court to propose the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers as demarcation lines. The lands on the northern side of the Tumen River, 
complained scholars such as Sin Kyongjun (1712–81), had been too readily abandoned.29 
ccording to Chong Tongyu (1744–1808), it was commonly believed that Mukedeng’s mission 
had resulted in “our country losing much of our old land (ku’gye).”30 Yi Kyukyong 
(1788–?) wrote, “Setting territorial boundaries is a matter of great importance for 
the nation. . . . so how is it that one can just listen to another’s words, withdraw 
and sit quietly?” Singling out the two officials, he complained that they had allowed 
Mukedeng to erect the stele single-handedly “without a single word of argument” and 
thus “lost” (shil) over three hundred ri of land.31 In the travel account of So Myongan 
describing his visit to Mt. Paektu in 1766, the lost area grew to 700 ri. “What a pity 
that in one morning we looked on with folded hands and lost it,” he wrote.32 Though 
these officials were disgruntled with the final disposition of lands, their complaints 
nevertheless were based on the same interpretation of the events as that of court 
officials: that Mukedeng’s mission had resulted in the demarcation of a linear border 
dividing their lands from Manchuria.

The border did not become a bone of contention again until almost 150 years later—the 
second moment pointed out in Chang Chiyon’s work. In the 1870s Qing authorities began 
to open Manchuria, shut off from Han migration since the earliest years of the dynasty. 
In various stages between 1878 and 1906 the entire expanse of Manchuria opened to 
settlement; the Tumen River valley received its first legal Han settlers in 1881.33 
When these Qing settlers arrived, however, they quickly discovered that many more 
Koreans had already begun farming much of the best land.34 By 1882 the presence of 
large Korean communities in the region came to the attention of the general of Jilin, 
Ming An, who proceeded to lodge a protest with the Choson court, laying down a 
number of conditions: so long as these Koreans paid taxes to the court, registered 
their households with local authorities, recognized the legal jurisdiction of the 
Jilin authorities, and shaved their heads in the Manchu style—in short, become Qing 
subjects—they were welcome to stay; otherwise they should return to Choson territory. 
Seoul responded by urging [End Page 226] Ming An not to register their subjects, for 
within one year they would all be returned home—an agreement that seemed to accept 
Qing land claims. For the farmers themselves—people who had fled famine conditions 
and labored for more than ten years to bring land under cultivation—a move off the 
lands hardly proved a favorable scenario. Few left. By April of the following year 
the head of the Huichun Resettlement Bureau had again demanded of local Choson 
authorities that by the conclusion of the fall harvest the farmers be returned to 
the other side of the river.

In response local farmers challenged the key assumption inherent to the Qing demand, 
namely that the farmers had settled beyond the Choson frontier. Their position 
centered on an interpretation of the stele erected by Mukedeng more than two centuries 
earlier. The farmers contended that they had never crossed any boundary and were 
in fact within Choson territory. Their argument skillfully played off the ambiguity 
surrounding the character engraved on the stele to represent the first syllable 
in the name of the Tumen River. They argued that Qing officials had failed to 
distinguish between two different rivers, both called something like Tumen but 
written with a different character signifying the first syllable. One, the character 
on the stele, indicated earth; the second, a character not on the stele, signified 
what today is considered the tu for Tumen River, meaning diagram. The river behind 
which the Qing officials demanded the farmers withdraw was the latter. As argued 
by the farmers, though the pronunciation was nearly identical, the different 
characters signified two distinct rivers. The first Tumen River delineated the 
northernmost extreme of Choson jurisdiction, while a second Tumen River flowed 
within Choson territory. Qing authorities mistakenly believed the two rivers were 
one and the same, the petition suggested, only because Chinese settlers had 
falsely accused the Korean farmers of crossing the border. In fact their homes 
were between the two rivers, meaning that they lived inside Choson boundaries. 
The way to substantiate their claims, they urged, was to conduct a survey of the 
Mt. Paektu stele, for in their opinion the stele alone could determine the 
boundary.35

According to the author, the dispute started out as an attmept by illegal Korean squatters in Manchuria to avoid being resettled in Korea by attempting to reclassify their land as Korean territory. The rest of the article goes on to note how after the end of the Japanese colonial period, this issue was revived as a nationalistic issue, and the latter interpretation was used for irredentist purposes. --Yuje 12:34, May 30, 2005 (UTC)

... whoa, thanks for all of the research and hard work that you've put into this.
I'll certainly try to help you out on this one, and on revising the Gando Convention article along similar lines. -- ran (talk) 02:22, May 31, 2005 (UTC)


Image:gandos.gif —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Breathejustice (talk • contribs).

And here's an administrative map used by the Japanese for Manchukuo. Not surprisingly, the borders it shows for Gando (shown as 間島 on the map) are far smaller, and happen to correspond with approximate area covered by Yanbian.--Yuje 07:42, 23 July 2006 (UTC) .

[edit] Jurchens and Gando

According to Breathejustice (talk • contribs),

In A.D. 1107, the Goryeo's general of Korea, Yoon Kwan, conquest Jurchens who lived in Gando and Manchu 2. So, after conqeust of Jurchens, Goryeo of Korea established nine castles in Gando and Manchu. However, after rising power, Jurchen established Qing dynasty in China and. In Joseon dynasty, there was a contract to make a border between China and Korea at Sukjong_of_Joseon

Yet according to the source, Koryo's actual northern frontier is shown on the map here, [8], which is in the northeastern part of the Korean peninsula and south of the Tumen river, nowhere near Gando, and not even in Manchuria. Furthermore, the source continues on about the Jurchen-Koryo war:

To secure his military success in the northeast, General Yun Kwan ordered nine fortresses built at strategic locations throughout the area. The royal court tried to ensure future control of the territory by starting a campaign to encourage people from the south to move and settle in the region around the Hamhung Plain. Despite good intentions however, the campaign was doomed to failure almost from the start. The remote and rugged landscape of the northeast coast made the territory difficult to hold and defend. Furthermore, long communication lines made it virtually impossible for the court at Kaesong to react fast enough to repel the Jurchen who repeatedly mounted retaliatory attacks in the area. The occupation plan eventually failed. Alternating between diplomatic appeals and the nearly unending attacks, the chronic and indecisive warfare between Koryo and the Jurchen soon exhausted both sides. Ultimately, Koryo returned control of the northeast region to the Jurchen.[9]

(emphasis mine) So not only did Koryo not conquer the Jurchens, but they actually failed and left the Jurchens in overall control of the that area at the conclusion of the conflict. So Breathjustice, why are you making claims that are explicitly contradicted by your own sources?--Yuje 08:38, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Breathejustice's additions

North Korea and South Korea recognize the land as the illegal occupation by China because Japan has sold the land to China when Korea was a colony of Japan.

However, South Korea claim that Gando is Korean territory.

Where? North Korea has already signed a treaty with China demarcating the border. Maps made by South Korea (the 대한민국 전도 daehan minguk jeondo) do not show any part of Manchuria as a part of Korea. When did either North or South Korea begin claiming Gando?

Joseon officials did allow its subjects to move to Manchuria. So, the west side of Gando. Therefore, the west side of Gando was a buffer state between Josen and Qing.

What? How does this logic work? If you move enough people into the border region of a neighbouring country, that region automatically becomes a "buffer state"? And why a "state"? Was Gando independent?

On the original document, Tumen is written as 土門 (Tomoon), which would refer to a small river that joins the Sunghua (松花) / Songhwa (송화) River. However, Qing officials would later claim that Tumen (豆滿) / Duman (두만) River is the boundary on record.

I've asked before and I ask it again: where is the new, separate "Tomoon" river? Which modern river does it refer to? You don't even know which river it is -- so what claims are you going to make from it? as -- ran (talk) 09:31, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

    • North Korea and South Korea recognize the land as the illegal occupation by China ..., This is a joke! Gando has never been the parts of morden Korea. 218.102.202.202 07:19, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Goguryeo, China and Korean

Ran has wrote as follwos

--> so that China now regards that part of Goguryeo's history as its own cultural heritage.

However, Goguryeo is not chinese history.

-- —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 69.216.58.94 (talk • contribs).

That's the point: China now regards that port of Goguryeo's history as its own cultural heritage. It is clearly stated that this is the opinion of China.

And once again, about the following edits you made:

south Korea that claim the region as a historical part of Korea.

Has the national Government of South Korea claimed its as national territory? Does the latest Daehan Minguk Jeondo include the region as a part of Korea? No, they do not. Hence this statement is simply false.

In 1909, in order for Japan to receive railroad concessions in Manchuria, Japan ceded the territory of Gando - a portion of Korea's Chosun Kingdom - to China because Korea was a colony of Japan. The agreement established the current border between China and North Korea[10].

The source Yuje provided gives a far more detailed explanation of the situation, and contradicts the Asiatimes article. The many maps provided, like the Dongguk Daejido, Daedong Yeojido etc., MADE BY KOREA from the 1700's to the 1800's, also contradict the Asiatimes article.

This highlights the ethnic make-up of Gando, as the Roman Catholic church does not create a diocese covering regions of more than one nation.

I already said that this is false. Read the ecclesiastical province article. There is no rule against creating diocese spanning multiple nations and multiple states.

-- ran (talk) 23:48, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

In the ecclesiastical province article, it reads:

Most countries are constituted a province or divided into several, except those with a small population and/or quite small numbers of Roman Catholics; thus when a nation that was part of another province achieves independence, it is likely within a few years to have at least one see raised to Metropolitan rank.

In other words, there is NO SUCH RULE. If there were very few Catholics in Manchuria and Korea back in the early 20th century, then there is no reason why an ecclesiastical province cannot include both eastern Manchuria and northern Korea. -- ran (talk) 02:13, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] The actual terms of the Gando treaty

Since what the terms of the actual Gando Convention (in 1909) were was in despute, I decided to do a bit more research on it. I found a detailed summary in Diplomatic Affairs and International Law, 1909, by Paul S. Reinsch, published in The American Political Science Review 1910. It gives a detailed summary of the world's foreign disputes and treaties for the year of 1909. But thanks to the magic of the internet, even a 96-year old article is still accessible today, and it's available online at this linke [11] Here's what it says about Gando (Gando being named here as Chientao from the Wades-Giles of the Chinese romanization):

Korea is ally of USA, nothing from USA toward Gando is reliable.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 203.218.71.17 (talk • contribs).
(from pg. 32) [first two points of the treaty relate rights to the South Manchuria railway line and control of Manchurian coal mines by the railway corporation] Finally, there was a territorial dispute concerning Chientao, a district adjoining the northern boundary of Korea. Japan, in behalf of Korea, made a claim to this territory and argued that it was illegally occupied by China; but even if she were to recognize Chinese sovereignty, Japan asserted her right of jurisdiciton over the Korean inhabitants. China denied both claims on the ground that Chientao had always been Chinese territory and that the Korean residents there had recieved a right to occupy land only upon surrendering their nationality. After long and ardous negotiations, these matters were finally adjusted in two conventions between China and Japan, signed at Peking on September 4. In the Manchurian [pg 33] convention, the Chinese government for the time gave up the idea of constructing the Fa-ku-men Railway. The collieries of Fu-shun and Gen-tai are acknowledged to belong to the Japanese government, but a tax upon the product is to be paid to China equal to the lowest tax levied in any part of China. Collieries adjoining the Antung-Mukden Railway, and the southern Manchurian Railway, with the exception of those mentioned, shall be exploited jointly by Japanese and Chinese subjects according to the principles agreed upon in 1907. The Japanese government withdraws its objection to the extension of the Peking Railway to the city walls of Mukden. In the Korean covention, Chinese sovereignty over Chientao is recognized. It is provided that four towns are to be opened as treaty ports for the residence of foreigners. Koreans residing outside of these towns are to be subjects to Chinese jurisdiction, but Japanese consular officials are given the right to be present at trials of Koreans. The building by China of a railway from Kirin to the Korean boundary is provided for.

From the terms described in detail here, it seems that Japan did not in fact sell any land as claimed by Breathejustice, nor did it cede any territory, only the territorial claims it previously made. Nice to get some more details and facts on the matter. Oops, there I go being a historical revisionist Chinese nationalist again. Even better would be the actual Japanese or Chinese text of the treaty, but I haven't been able to find that yet. --Yuje 13:53, 26 July 2006 (UTC)



Here's a Korean version, with the original Hanja

前文 : 淸日 兩國은 圖們江이 善隣의 好意에 비추어 朝鮮과 淸의 國境임을 서로확인 한다.
① 제 1조 : 江源地方에 있어서는 定界碑를 起點으로 하여 石乙水로써 兩國의 境界로 한다.
② 제 2조 : 그 대가로 淸은 龍井村, 局子街, 頭道溝, 百草溝를 外國人의 居住 및 貿易을 위하여 開放하고, 日本은 이들 地域에 領事館 또는 領事館 分館을 설치한다.
③ 제 3조 : 淸은 종래와 같이 圖們江 以北의 墾地에 있어서 韓人의 居住를 承認하고 이 韓人雜居區域의 境界는 별첨의 地圖에 標示한다.
④ 제 4조 : 이 韓人雜居區域內 韓人은 淸의 管轄에 服從하며 이들에게 淸人과 同一하게 待遇하여야 하고 단, 人命에 관한 중대한 事項은 먼저 日本 領事館에 通報하여야 한다.
⑤ 제 5조 : 韓人雜居區域內의 韓人所有의 土地와 家屋은 淸의 人民의 財産과 같이 保護하여야 하며, 圖們江을 통한 쌍방 人民의 往來를 자유롭게 한다. 단, 兵器를 携帶한 자는 公文 또는 照會없이 越境할 수 없다. 그리고 韓人雜居區域내에서 産出된 米穀은 韓人의 搬出을 許可한다. 그러나 凶年이 든 경우에는 이를 禁止할 수 있으며 땔감을 위한 伐木은 舊習에 따라 照辨할 수 있다.
⑥ 제 6조 : 淸은 장차 吉長鐵道를 연장하여 朝鮮의 會寧에서 朝鮮鐵道와 連結하여야 한다.
⑦ 제 7조 : 이 協約은 調印 후 즉시 效力을 발생하며 2개월 이내에 日本의 間島統監府派出所 및 文武의 人員은 撤收한다.


The above translation is pretty accurate, yet it forgets one simple matter: Gando was a land disputed, with no clear conclusion.

There should be cleanups about the original dispute that happened. The word 圖們江 is thought to be the Duman river by the Chinese, while it was considered a river heading north to the Songwa river. This was the problem which started the whole conflict.

What the Koreans mean by selling Gando is that the Japanese, running the Korean Empires foreign affairs, sets the 圖們江 as the Duman river, regardless of the actual stance of the Korean government.

The problem of the Gando Treaty is that Japan nullified all official treaties made during its imperial age, thereby setting the status of Gando up in the airs again. Although the current Chinese government has the lands, Koreans wants to open the dispute again, since the original Gando Treaty is considered nullified by one of the signing country (Japan.)

--General Tiger 13:17, 15 September 2006 (Korean Time)

Thanks for providing the text. Do you happen to have the Chinese and Japanese versions as well? Are you sure the treaty was nullified? I remember the South Korean lawmakers making a big protest about it, but I don't remember them actually passing it into law, which would be required for ratification or nullification. Anyway, it's another problem left over from history, and the inaccurate maps from the era don't help. On this image, it seems to show the 土門 River heading northeast, while this one seems to show a 吐門 River heading directly east and into the 黑龍江 River (Amur River). When looking at a satellite picture, it's hard to tell, but it seems like there might be a river that looks like the one in the first picture, and following the approximate location of the modern border, but it doesn't lead into the Songhua. The second picture, on the other hand, doesn't seem to match up very well with the satellite photo at all, and none of the rivers there seem to head east towards the Amur river. --Yuje 05:54, 15 September 2006 (UTC)


I'll try to find the Chinese and Japanese version of the Gando Treaty. About the treaty nullifications: there were several treaties and statements, and I'll try to add those as I can.
Here's one: The [[Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea] nullified all the treaties concluded on behalf of the Korea. Here it said "It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." This means that the Eulsa Treaty, which allowed the Gando Treaty to be enacted, is nullified at the same time.
Oh, and I say that we look for more maps: I believe that I can get some goods ones, except that they may be considered biased. And a thing about that river: it has been suggested that time has made that river go underground, and then come up to the Songhwa river. It was in a seris of articles in the Joseon Ilbo, but I need someone to access the record of old articles.
--General Tiger 11:50, 16 September 2006 (Korean Time)
So the modern argument is that they currently can't find the existence of such an alternate river, but that it historically existed but is now underground? Am I understanding it right? It sounds familiar to me, because a similar claim have been made back in the 1880's back when the land dispute originated. Even back then, they apparently couldn't find the alternate Tumen river, and it was argued that the river was underground. The farmers who lived there were the ones who originated the argument that there were two Tumen rivers but that the Chinese government moved the border south by claiming another river. But then again, it seems that from Korean maps in the 1850's and 1860's (before the dispute), even the Koreans considered the current Tumen river as the border Image:Haehaejoa_jundo_1850.jpg, Image:Daedongyeojido 1861.jpg, so the argument that the Qing officials stole land by claiming a different river do seem exaggerated.--Yuje 09:37, 19 September 2006 (UTC)
I'll try to find that article and some maps. Will take awhile, since its the midterms here. --General Tiger 09:38, 23 September 2006 (Korean Time)


[edit] Fxxk off all shameless Korean

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org../../../g/a/n/Talk%7EGando_c320.html"