Federalist No. 51

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James Madison, author of Federalist No. 51
James Madison, author of Federalist No. 51

Federalist No. 51 is an essay by James Madison, the fifty-first of the Federalist Papers. It was published on February 6, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. The title is "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments." One of the most famous of the Federalist Papers, No. 51 addresses means by which appropriate checks and balances can be created in government and also advocates a separation of powers within the national government. One of its most important ideas is the pithy and often quoted phrase, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."

The Federalist Papers, as a foundation text of constitutional interpretation, are frequently cited by American jurists. Of all the essays, No. 51 is the fourth-most cited.[1]

Contents

[edit] Purpose

  • To "form a more correct judgement of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention (referring to the Constitutional Convention)".
    • This is done by informing the reader of the safeguards created by the convention to maintain the separate branches of government, and to protect the right of the people.

[edit] Main Points

[edit] Appointment of Members

"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own: and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others"

Madison stresses that in order to maintain liberty, it is best that no governmental branch be involved with the appointment of the others. If the principle were rigorously applied to, all branches of government would then be directly elected by the people.

In the case of the judicial department, it is improper to follow this method. Members of the judicial branch need to be insulated from political pressure - this is essential to their job. It would be harmful to subject the judicial branch to elections, which would potentially lead to improper political motivations by judges who are supposed to be impartial and/or non-partisan.

[edit] Dependency

Madison's only key point here is that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on the members of the other departments.

[edit] Encroachment

The great security against a concentration of power in the same department consists in giving those who administer the department the necessary constitutional means to prevent encroachment.

[edit] Legislature

In a republican form of government, the legislative branch is the strongest and therefore must be divided into different branches, be as little connected with each other as possible, and render them by different modes of election. (Before the Seventeenth Amendment, the House of Representatives was chosen directly by the people, while the Senate was chosen by state legislatures.)

[edit] Usurpations and Security

The government is guarded from usurpations because it is divided into distinct and separate departments.

In America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments (state and federal), and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments (judicial, executive, and legislative), and therefore a "double security arises to the rights of the people. The governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself".

[edit] Notes

  1. ^  Ira C. Lupu, "The Most-Cited Federalist Papers." 15 Constitutional Commentary 403-410 (1998)

[edit] External links

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Federalist Papers | List of Federalist Papers
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Related topics: Anti-Federalist Papers | United States Constitution