Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdallah Mahdi

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Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdallah Mahdi is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 678. Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1980, in The Shaira [sic], Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Identity

The two official lists of the names and nationalities spell captive 678's name differently:

  • His name is spelled Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdullah Mahdi on the official list released on April 20, 2006.[2]
  • His name is spelled Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdallah Mahdi on the official list released on May 15, 2006.[1]

Both official list his nationality as Yemeni. Amnesty International lists his nationality as Saudi Arabian.[3]

[edit] Mental health

Fawaz Mahdi is believed to be mentally ill and is in need of medical treatment.[3]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home.  The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair.  The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair.  A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely.  In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press.  Three chairs were reserved for them.  In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held.  And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret.  In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Mahdi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[4]

He was determined by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) to be an enemy combatant despite the fact that the CSRT itself (and also Fawaz' lawyer and he himself) observed that he suffers a form of mental illness, and that the only evidence for determining his status was his own statement.[3]

[edit] Testimony

  • Mahdi denied being an enemy combatant.
  • He denied knowing anything about al Qaida until after he turned himself in.
  • He denied swearing an oath to engage in Jihad or an oath to Usama Bin Laden.
  • He stated that he accused himself to his interrogators in order to hasten his execution - rather than face continued detention.
  • Mahdi said that he traveled to Afghanistan to engage in Jihad because he was mentally ill, and his friends and Mullah told him that fighting in Jihad was the way to cleanse his soul.
    “I was there because I was told only the Jihad places had magic things inside.”
  • He acknowledged being trained at the al Farouq training camp. But he left the training camp early because the training was so cruel.
  • He acknowledged going to fight against Ahmed Masood, as part of the Abu Hassan Group, but he didn’t know they were US allies. He said he never fired his weapon. He said when his superiors ordered his unit to withdraw he used that opportunity to escape and surrender.

[edit] witness

Mahdi called a witness, who is not otherwise identified in the transcript, who testified that he saw Mahdi receiving treatment in a hospital for what he described as “magic things”. The witness said he too was being treated for mental problems.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Mahdi were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[5]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention

a.Mahdi is a member of al-Qaida.
  1. Mahdi signed an oath of loyalty to Usama Bin Laden.
  2. Mahdi trained at the al Farouq training camp.
b. Mahdi engaged in hostilities against the US or its coalition partners.
  1. Mahdi admitted that he went to Afghanistan to fight in the Jihad.
  2. Mahdi was assigned to the Abu Hassan Group of fighters. This group was responsible for a 50M by 100M sector on the front.
  3. Madhi was captured in 2001 three days before Ramadan by Northern Alliance forces near the village of Mulla Qoli.
c. Madhi stated that he has had a mental illness, which he called a “magid illness”, for several years. Madhi claimed that this “magic illness” caused “bad thoughts” and made him feel as though someone was inside him, controlling his thoughts and actions.
d. Based upon a review of recommendations from U.S. agencies and classified and unclassified documents, Mahdi is regarded as a continued threat to the United States and its allies.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. Mahdi stated during his CSRT he did not sign an oath of loyalty to Usama Bin Laden. He accused himself in front of his interrogators of many things to hasten assumed execution rather than going to prison.
b. Mahdi is severely, psychiatrically ill. Since his arrival in June 2002, he has been seen over 70 times by psychiatric professionals. As a part of his psychiatric care, he has been treated and evaluated by three different psychiatrists. Each doctor concluded that Mahdi is seriously mentally ill. Each doctor concluded Mahdi has a psychotic disorder.

[edit] International support

On December 10, 2005, the anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a letter-writing appeal to explain Mahdi's case to US authorities and request that he be either liberated or else charged with a criminal offense was launched by Amnesty International.[3]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  3. ^ a b c d USA: Legal concern/Fear of torture/Health concern: Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdullah Mahdi. Amnesty International (25 November 2005). Retrieved on 2006-10-24.
  4. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdallah Mahdi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 23-25
  5. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdallah Mahdi, Administrative Review Board, November 22, 2004 - page 67
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