Farewell Dossier

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The Farewell Dossier was a collection of documents containing intelligence gathered and handed over to NATO by the KGB defector Colonel Vladimir Vetrov (code-named "Farewell") in 1981-1982, during the Cold War.

An engineer, Vetrov was assigned to evaluate information on Western hardware and software gathered by spies ("Line X") for Directorate T. However, he became increasingly dis-illusioned with the Communist system and defected at the end of 1980. Between the spring of 1981 and early 1982, Vetrov handed over almost 4,000 secret documents to the French DST, including the complete list of 250 Line X officers stationed under legal cover in embassies around the world.

This information led to a mass expulsion of Soviet technology spies. The CIA also mounted a counter-intelligence operation that transfered modified hardware and software designs over to the Soviets, resulting in the spectacular trans-Siberian incident of 1982. The details of the operation were declassified in 1996.

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[edit] Aftermath

A direct result of intelligence from the Dossier was the mass expulsion of nearly 150 Soviet technology spies around the world. The French alone expelled 47 Soviet spies, most of who were from Line X. This caused the collapse of a desperately-needed information program at a time when it was particularly crucial.

[edit] Trans-Siberian Pipeline Incident

The American intelligence community participated in a more subtle response, instigating an operation of disinformation and faulty technology transfer. The most famous incident was the sabotage of the new trans-Siberian pipeline, which delivered natural gas from the Urengoi gas fields in Siberia into the West.

The Soviets needed sophisticated control systems to automate the operation of the pipeline's valves, compressors, and storage facilities. As the United States was unwilling to provide the necessary technical infrastructure to operate the pipeline, a KGB operative was sent to infiltrate a Canadian software supplier in an attempt to steal the needed software.

The CIA was tipped off by Farewell and informed the Canadians about the attempted theft. The U.S. then delivered doctored software through Canadian software firms into Russian hands. This software, designed to run the pumps, turbines, and valves, was a Trojan Horse programmed to malfunction after a period of smooth running. The malfunction would reset the pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures that were far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints, and welds. (Reed p. 268-269)

The result was the greatest non-nuclear explosion ever seen from space, rated at around three kilotons by the Air Force Chief of Intelligence (Reed p. 269.) There were no casualties of the pipeline explosion, but significant damage was made to the Soviet economy. In time, the Soviets came to realize that they had been stealing faulty technology, but this only exacerbated the situation. As they did not know which technology was sound and which was doctored, all became suspect.

[edit] External links and references

[edit] Further reading

  • Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, New York, 1989) pp. 311-327
  • Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War (Ballantine, New York, 2004)