End-to-end auditable voting systems
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End-to-end auditable (E2E) systems are a form of Independent Verification. E2E systems usually use cryptography to store copies of voted ballots. These systems may provide the voter with receipts to allow them to verify that their vote is included in the tally, all votes were cast by valid voters, and the results are tabulated correctly. These systems, sometimes referred to as receipt-based systems, do not permit a voter to prove to others how she voted.
[edit] Overview
The Election Assistance Commission list E2E systems as a form on Independent Verification system in the 2005 Voluntary Voting System guidelines.[1] E2E systems can use electronic cryptography, as does the VoteHere VHTi system. This system involves the voter choosing a number with which the system does some verifiable shuffling.[2] In 2004, David Chaum proposed a solution that allows a voter to verify that the vote is cast appropriately and that the vote is accurately counted using visual cryptography.[3] After the voter selects their candidates, a DRE machine prints out a specially formatted version of the ballot on two transparencies. When the layers are stacked, they show the human-readable vote. However, each transparency is encrypted with a form of visual cryptography so that it alone does not reveal any information unless it is decrypted. The voter selects one layer to destroy at the poll. The DRE retains an electronic copy of the other layer and gives the physical copy as a receipt to ensure the ballot is not later changed. The system guards against changes to the voter's ballot and uses a mixnet decryption[4] procedure to ensure that each vote is accurately counted. Sastry, Karloff and Wagner pointed out that there are issues with both of the Chaum and VoteHere cryptographic solutions.[5] Chaum has since developed Punchscan, which has stronger security properties and uses simplier paper ballots.[6] The ThreeBallot voting protocol, invented by Ron Rivest can in principle be implemented on paper; the goal in its design was to provide some of the benefits of a cryptographic voting system without using cryptography.
[edit] Examples
[edit] References
- ^ 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Election Assistance Commission
- ^ Jim Adler, Andy Neff, et al
- ^ Chaum, David (2004). "Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections". IEEE Security and Privacy 2 (1): 38-47. DOI:http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852.
- ^ Reusable anonymous return channels
- ^ Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, and David Wagner. Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems perspective. Proceedings of the Fourteenth USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 2005), August 2005.
- ^ Steven Cherry, Making every e-vote count, IEEE Spectrum, Jan 2007.
