Double-aspect theory
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In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of the same substance. The theory's relationship to neutral monism is ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements to determine whether the group is mental, physical, both, or neither, double-aspect theory requires the mental and the physical to be inseparable and irreducible (though distinct).[1] Notable double-aspect theorists include Baruch Spinoza, Gustav Fechner, Arthur Schopenhauer, George Henry Lewes, and Thomas Nagel. David Chalmers explores a double-aspect view of information.
The Scientist-theologian John Polkinghorne argues for "dual aspect monism" "there is only one stuff in the world (not two - the material and the mental) but it can occur in two contrasting states (material and mental phases, a physicist might say) which explain our perception of the difference between mind and matter"[2]
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ Leopold Stubenberg. "Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ John Polkinghorne Science and Christian Belief p 21
