Cynic

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The Cynics (Greek: κῠνικός, Latin: cynici) were an influential school of ancient philosophers. They rejected the social values of their time, often flouting conventions in shocking ways to prove their point. A popular conception of the intellectual characteristics is the modern sense of "cynic," implying a sneering disposition to disbelieve in the goodness of human motives and a contemptuous feeling of superiority. Properly speaking though, it is possible to be a (philosophic) cynic without feeling superior.

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[edit] Origin

Their name is thought to be derived either from the building in Athens called Cynosarges, the earliest home of the school, or from the Greek word for a dog, "cyno" («κύων»,kýōn), in contemptuous allusion to the uncouth, aggressive, mordant manners adopted by the members of the school. Whichever of these explanations is correct, it is noticeable that the Cynics agreed in taking a dog as their common badge or symbol, as early as the tombstone of Diogenes of Sinope.

The importance of the school's principles lies not only in their intrinsic value as an ethical system, but also in the fact that they form the link between Socrates and the Stoics, between the essentially Greek philosophy of the 4th century BC and a system of thought which has exercised a profound and far-reaching influence on medieval and modern ethics. From the time of Socrates in unbroken succession up to the reign of Hadrian, the school was represented by men of strong individuality. The leading earlier Cynics were Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes, and Zeno; in the later Roman period, the chief names are Demetrius (the friend of Seneca), Oenomaus and Demonax. All these men adhered steadfastly to the principles laid down by the Cynic School's founder, Antisthenes.

[edit] Antisthenes

Antisthenes was a pupil of Socrates, from whom he imbibed the fundamental ethical precept that virtue, not pleasure, is the end of existence. He was, therefore, in the forefront of that intellectual revolution in the course of which speculation ceased to move in the realms of the physical and focused itself upon human reason in its application to the practical conduct of life. "Virtue," says Socrates, "is knowledge": in the ultimate harmony of morality with reason is to be found the only true existence of man. Antisthenes adopted this principle in its most literal sense, and proceeded to explain "knowledge" in the narrowest terms of practical action and decision, excluding from the conception everything except the problem of individual will realizing itself in the sphere of ordinary existence. Just as in logic the inevitable result was the purest nominalism, so in ethics he was driven to individualism, to the denial of social and national relations, and to the exclusion of scientific study and of almost all that the Greeks understood by education. This individualism he and his followers carried to its logical conclusion. The ordinary pleasures of life were for them not merely negligible but positively harmful inasmuch as they interrupted the operation of the will. Wealth, popularity and power tend to dethrone the authority of reason and to pervert the soul from the natural to the artificial. Man exists for and in himself alone; his highest end is self-knowledge and self-realization in conformity with the dictates of his reason, apart altogether from the state and society. For this end, disrepute and poverty are advantageous, in so far as they drive back the man upon himself, increasing his self-control and purifying his intellect from the dross of the external. The good man (i.e. the wise man) wants nothing: like the gods, he is self-sufficing; "let men gain wisdom—or buy a rope"; he is a citizen of the world, not of a particular country.

In logic Antisthenes was troubled by the problem of the One and the Many. A nominalist to the core, he held that definition and predication are either false or tautological. Ideas do not exist save for the consciousness which thinks them. "A horse," said Antisthenes, "I can see, but horsehood I cannot see." Definition is merely a circuitous method of stating an identity:

"a tree is a vegetable growth" is logically no more than "a tree is a tree."


[edit] Supporters

Cynicism appears to have had a considerable vogue in Rome in the first and second centuries AD. Demetrius and Demonax are highly praised by Seneca and Lucian respectively. Thus, Cynicism in Rome was both the butt of the satirist and the ideal of the thinker.

Cynicism emphasizes two principles: the absolute responsibility of the individual as the moral unit, and the autocracy of the will. These principles led Epictetus to commend Cynics as "athletes of righteousness". Furthermore, Cynicism is important as the precursor of Stoicism. The closeness of the connection is illustrated by Juvenal's epigram that a Cynic differed from a Stoic only by the absence of tunic. Zeno was also a pupil of Crates, from whom he learned the moral worth of self-control and indifference to sensual indulgence.

This entry has been edited from the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.

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