Cox Report

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U.S. Representative Chris Cox (Republican-California) chaired the Committee that produced the report.
U.S. Representative Chris Cox (Republican-California) chaired the Committee that produced the report.

The Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, commonly known as the Cox Report after Representative Chris Cox, is a classified U.S. government document reporting on the People's Republic of China's covert operations within the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.

Contents

[edit] Special committee investigation

The report was the work product of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. This special committee, created by a 409-10 vote of the U.S. House of Representatives on June 18, 1998, was tasked with the responsibility of investigating whether technology or information was transferred to the People's Republic of China that may have contributed­ to the enhancement of the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles or to manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

The Chairman of the Committee was Republican Rep. Chris Cox of California, whose name became synonymous with the committee's final report. Four other Republicans and Democrats served on the panel, including Representative Norm Dicks, who served as the ranking Democratic member. Cox's chairmanship was widely regarded by Washington insiders to be a platform from which to launch his bid for the 2000 Republican presidential nomination.

A similar investigation had already begun in the U.S. Senate under the leadership of Senator Fred Thompson (Republican-Tennessee). Thompson had opened his hearings on China's influence in America's 1996 presidential and congressional elections 11 months earlier (on July 8, 1997).

[edit] Findings of the Report

The redacted version of the report used this image, published previously by U.S. News & World Report, to illustrate the classified design of the W87 warhead.
The redacted version of the report used this image, published previously by U.S. News & World Report, to illustrate the classified design of the W87 warhead.

The Cox Report contained five major allegations about China and nuclear weapons.

1.) China stole design information regarding the United States seven most advanced thermonuclear weapons.

2.) These stolen secrets enabled the PLA to accelerate its design, development and testing of its own nuclear weapons.

3.) China's next generation of nuclear weapons would contain elements of stolen U.S. design information and would be comparable in effectiveness to the weapons used by the United States.

4.) Small warheads based on stolen U.S. information could be ready for deployment in 2002 also enabling China to integrate MIRV technology on its next generation of missiles.

5.) These thefts were not isolated incidents, but rather the results of decades of intelligence operations against U.S. weapons laboratories conducted by the Ministry of State Security. In addition, the report alleged that the illegal activity likely persisted despite new security measures implemented as a result of the scandal.

The report's basic findings were as follows, quoted from the above document's opening summary:

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons. The Select Committee judges that the PRC's next generation of thermonuclear weapons, currently under development, will exploit elements of stolen U.S. design information. PRC penetration of our national nuclear weapons laboratories spans at least the past several decades and almost certainly continues today.
The PRC has stolen or otherwise illegally obtained U.S. missile and space technology that improves PRC military and intelligence capabilities.

The committee's final report was approved unanimously by all 9 members. The redacted version of the report was released to the public May 25, 1999.

The Chinese government called all allegations "groundless", and maintains that its nuclear technology was indigenously developed and was not the result of espionage.[1]

[edit] Aftermath

The Cox Report's release prompted major legislative and administrative reforms. More than two dozen of the Select Committee's recommendations were enacted into law, including the creation of a new National Nuclear Security Administration to take over the nuclear weapons security responsibilities of the United States Department of Energy. At the same time, no person has ever been convicted of providing nuclear information to the PRC, and the one case that was brought in connection to these charges, that of Wen Ho Lee, fell apart.[citation needed]

Two of the U.S. companies named in the report – Loral Space and Communications Corp. and Hughes Electronics Corp. – were later successfully prosecuted by the federal government for violations of U.S. export control law, resulting in the two largest fines in the history of the Arms Export Control Act. Loral paid a $14 million fine in 2002,[2] and Hughes paid a $32 million fine in 2003.[3] Both companies' illegal actions led to China improving the reliability of its intercontinental ballistic missiles.[citation needed]

[edit] Criticism

An analysis by the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resources Defense Council found that the Cox Report had inflated the SLBM JL-2's range,[4] classifying it 12,000km rather than the conventional 8,000km figure used by the U.S. DoD. The findings from the analysis allege that the report used this inflated figure to inappropriately speculate on how the PLA could change its basic nuclear policy and doctrine.

[edit] Damage Assessment

In response to the allegations contained in the report, the CIA appointed retired U.S. Navy Admiral David Jeremiah to review and assess the reports findings. In April 1999, Admiral Jeremiah released a report challenging the Cox Report's main allegation that stolen information had been used to develop or modernize Chinese missiles and/or warheads.[5]

[edit] U.S. Complicity

Jonathan D. Pollack[3], an expert on Chinese technological and military development, criticized the report for failing to disclose the context in which U.S.-Sino relations dating back to the 1970s had fostered the enhancement of Chinese power as a counter balance to the Soviet Union. Thus the environment in which these illegal transfers of technology took place may have been relaxed or even complicit.

[edit] W-77 & W-88 Usefulness

Richard L. Garwin, a former U.S. weapon's designer remarked that stolen information regarding the W-77 and W-88 warhead would not appear to directly impair U.S. national security since to develop weapons based on this technology would require a massive investment in resources and not be in their best strategic interests with regards to their nuclear program.[6]

[edit] Independent Analysis

In December 1999, a group of physicists and scholars from Harvard, the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory released a personal assessment of the Cox Report unaffiliated with any institutions. Their analysis refuted all five major conclusions of the report[7]demonstrating how the writers of the report lacked scholarly rigor in their research and a lack of understanding with regards to Chinese policy making.

[edit] References

  1. ^ "China rejects nuclear spying charge", BBC, April 22, 1999
  2. ^ Mintz, John, "2 U.S. space giants accused of aiding China Hughes, Boeing allegedly gave away missile technology illegally", Washington Post, January 1, 2003
  3. ^ Gerth, Jeff, "2 Companies Pay Penalties For Improving China Rockets", New York Times, March 6, 2003
  4. ^ The Federation of American Scientists & the National Resources Defense Council Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning November 2006 24 [1]
  5. ^ "DCI Statement on Damage Assessment", Central Intelligence Agency, April 21, 1999
  6. ^ Richard L. Garwin, “Why China Won’t Build U.S. Warheads,” Arms Control Today, April/May 1999.
  7. ^ The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, December 1999, pp. 11-12[2]

[edit] External links

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