Consociationalism

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Consociationalism is a form of government involving guaranteed group representation, and is suggested for deeply divided societies.[1] According to Rupert Taylor "consociationalism advances a system of consensual multi-ethnic power sharing as opposed to majority rule."

Consociationalism was first formulated by Arend Lijphart to explain the qualitatively different political systems of the Netherlands, Switzerland, South Africa, Nigeria, and Belgium. The Netherlands, as a consociational state is divided into 4 non-territorial pillars: Calvinist, Catholic, Socialist and Liberal. In their heyday, each comprised tightly-organised groups, schools, universities, hospitals and newspapers, all divided along a pillarised social structure. The theory, according to Lijphart, focuses on the role of social elites, their agreement and co-operation, as the key to a stable democracy.

When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, it is known as confessionalism, as is the case in Lebanon.

Contents

[edit] Goals

  • Governmental stability
  • Survival of arrangement - power sharing institution
  • Survival of democracy
  • Avoidance of violence

[edit] Characteristics

  • Grand coalition - Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society because they recognise the dangers of non-cooperation.
  • Mutual veto - Consensus among the groups is required to confirm the majority rule. Mutuality means that the minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority. If one group blocks another on some matter, the latter are likely to block the former in return.
  • Proportionality - Representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30% of the overall society, then they occupy 30% of the positions on the police force, in civil service, and in other national and civic segments of society.
  • Segmental autonomy - Creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-based community laws.

[edit] Favourable conditions

  • Multi-axis balance of power - The presence of 3 or more disparate groups, all constituting minorities, yields equilibrium.
  • Multi-party system - One party cannot impose its will to the exclusion of the others. Thus, it becomes necessary to build coalitions.
  • Small size - The elite members of society are more likely to be familiar with each other within the context of a smaller society.
  • Overarching loyalty - The disparate groups share a feeling of belonging to the same political environment.
  • Segmental isolation - Close contact would mean a higher likelihood of conflict.
  • Tradition of elite accommodation - Good environment created
  • Leader-follower relationship - The elites are firmly in control and have the support of followers.

[edit] Criticism

[edit] Brian Barry

Barry believed the claim that "policies of accommodation by segment elites explained stability in the Netherlands" was tautological, since "accommodation" includes the requirement that elite leaders settle issues between polarized blocs. He believed that the requirements for consociational democracy were extensionally equivalent to those for stable democracy. "Lijphart’s definition of consociational democracy is too overloaded to do any substantial explanatory work". He believed that Switzerland, through the use of binding referenda and successful challenges to elite decisions, did not fit the consociational democracy model. He further believed that in the true examples of consociational democracy, the Netherlands and Belgium, segments were not defined by ethnicity. "In Belgium the parties involved in consociational arrangements do not represent Flemish and Walloon sentiments."

[edit] Rinus van Schendelen

van Schendelen argued that Lijphart used evidence selectively. Pillarisation was "seriously weakening," even in the 1950s, cross-denominational co-operation was increasing, and formerly coherent political sub-cultures were dissolving. He argued that elites in the Netherlands were not motivated by preferences derived from the general interest, but rather by self-interest. They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation between segments but to improve their parties' respective power. He argued that the Netherlands was "stable" in that it had few protests or riots, but that it was so before consociationalism, and that it was not stable from the standpoint of government turnover. He questioned the extent to which the Netherlands, or indeed any country labelled a consociational system, could be called a democracy, and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn’t somehow ruled out by definition. He believed that Lijphart suffered severe problems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages, whether particular cleavages were segmental, and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting.

[edit] Lustick on Hegemonic Control

Control is considered hegemonic if it makes an overtly violent ethnic or national contest for state power either unthinkable or unworkable for subordinated communities. What is necessary is control of the relevant coercive apparatuses. Thus ethnic minorities in Fiji (after 1987), and South Africa (until 1990-1) were able to sustain hegemonic control because of their control of security and policing systems. In liberal democracies, hegemonic control appears less feasible than in authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracies with statist conceptions of citizenship permit, and indeed facilitate, nationalist or ethnic organisation and mobilisation. Ethnic contests for state power become eminently thinkable and workable within liberal democratic or open institutions. Consider how Irish nationalism was facilitated by the democratisation of the United Kingdom, or how nationalism was encouraged by glasnost in the Soviet Union.

[edit] Other criticism

Critics point out that consociationalism is dangerous in a system of differing antagonistic ideologies, generally conservatism and communism. They state that specific conditions must exist for three or more groups to develop a multi-party system with strong leaders. This philosophy is dominated by elites, with those masses that are sidelined with the elites having less to lose if war breaks out. Consociationalism cannot be imperially applied. For example, it does not effectively apply to Austria or Switzerland. Critics also point to the failure of this line of reasoning in Lebanon, a country that reverted back to civil war. It only truly applies in Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands, and not in more deeply divided societies. If one of three groups gets half plus one of the vote, then the other groups are in perpetual opposition, which is largely incompatible with consociationalism.

Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class, institutionalizing and entrenching the former. Furthermore, it relies on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. It focuses on intra-state relations and neglects relations with other states. It assumes that each group is cohesive and has strong leadership. Although the minority can block decisions, this requires 100% agreement. Rights are given to communities rather than individuals, leading to over-representation of some individuals in society and under-representation of others. Grand coalitions are unlikely to happen due to the dynamics of ethnic competition. Each group seeks more power for itself. Consociationalists are criticized for focusing too much on the set up of institutions and not enough on transitional issues which go beyond such institutions. Finally, it is claimed that consociational institutions promote sectarianism and entrench existing identities.

[edit] Positives

Problems of instability can be overcome by a system of rewards. In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stage. Development of a coalition of leaders would lead to complete inclusion of the population in theory, related to unanimity and consensus. Consociationalism helped achieve peace and inclusiveness during the transition to democracy in South Africa. In South Africa, the elites recognised the potential for economic collapse and reformed the system.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Lijphart 1969,1978

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

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