Talk:Colombian armed conflict (1960s–present)
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Contents |
[edit] Modified Peace Plan
Assumptions:
DRUGS
- Colombia's violence is not because of drugs. Violence in Colombia existed long before drugs. Drugs only exacerbate the violence, but drugs are not the major root cause of the violence.
POVERTY
- Colombia's violence is rooted two issues: poverty and political tolerence (But see question below.)
- If Colombia's poverty is not reduced, Colombia will never be peaceful.
- Violence only exubates the poverty. Poverty cannot be effectively reduced until the violence is stopped.
US
- America's current role in Colombia is far more detrimental then beneficial to peace in Colombia and the prospects of long-term peace. American meddling in Colombia occured before the war on drugs. America is in Colombia to enforce political stability and the status quo.
FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)
- Instead of attacking the FARC directly, the AUC (paramilitary) are attempting to destroy the support for the FARC and the ELN by massacring and killing the activist members of the peasant population.
- The right-wing paramilitaries are as culpable (guilty) of drug dealing as much (or more) than the left wing FARC.
- Both the FARC and the paramilitaries are responsible for the high murder rate. Both have committed war crimes.
- The FARC and AUC are the major players in Colombia. The ELN and other smaller groups are minor bit players. The ELN may have a role in the peace process, but others can be dealt with separately.
PRESIDENT AND MILITARY
- The current president's aggressive actions against the FARC, supported by the US, although hurting the FARC, will not lead to long-term peace.
- The FARC will never be completely destroyed with the current military size.
- Local power brokers, including politicians, businessmen, land owners, right wing drug barons and the military actively condones and even supports the right-wing paramilitaries actions in the massacre of activist members of the peasants and other undesirables in Colombia.
HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:
1st: Temporarily give the FARC a semi-autonomous region of the country. Set a future time table for local referendums overseen by the UN, in all regions. These referendums will allow for each region to determine if people of each region want to continue to be part of the FARC or continue to be part of the Colombia government. Strict monitoring by international observers is crucial, it is essential that these elections are considered free and fair by both parties. Give strong security assurances that the same fate of the UP will not befall the FARC. (See question below)
2nd: America's role in the region would change dramatically:
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- A. All American aid would be funneled through the UN.
- B. The US would pull out all American troops, except Embassy personal.
- C. America would recognize the FARCs status to exist, conditional on the renouncing of kidnapping, and the return of current captives (similar to the PLO in Palestine).
- D. In return, the FARC would not attack American Multi-nationals in the country.
- E. Drug erradication programs will cease immediatly.
3rd: A general amnesty would be given to both the FARC and paramilitaries. A truth commission would be set up, similar to what has been established in East Timor (although stronger) and Cambodia.
4th: UN (regional South Americans) troops would be sent into the region to act as peace keepers and to guard the borders of the new autonomous regions. (See question below)
5th: The money funneled through the UN would be used to:
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- A. The UN would disband the paramilitaries—the military would be trained only in police work, not in "counter-insurgency" any longer. After a gradual yet massive demobilization and/or disarming process. The military aid would be diverted to support the rule of law—police training, judicial training, etc. (See question below)
- B. Drug eradication programs would end, the money used on this program would be replaced by financial aid to poor farmers and financial incentives to stop the drug trade on a micro level (similar to successful micro-bank programs in India—the money would be given to the woman, etc.)
5th: After the general amnesty, any massacre or incursion by either side will be dealt with harshly by the UN and ICJ. International observers would be sent to particulalry vulnerable areas. (Not NGO's, which have been targeted by the FARC, but un international observers). This is a massive new role for the UN, unparalleled in its 50+ year history. It will represent a new dawn for world peace keeping. (It would also never be accepted by the current Bush administration)
Signed: Travb 05:37, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Questions
[edit] Political intolerance
You wrote: Without the existence of political intolerance and the resulting political violence (initially a Conservative Party vs. Liberal Party affair, but later more openly revealed as an Establishment vs. Anti-establishment one, after the Conservative and Liberal elites formed the National Front in 1958), poverty alone would not have led to the current conflict. See the rest of the region for examples of that.
- This begs the question, why is their political intolerence?
- What is the underlying cause of the political intolerence? It isn't poverty, what is it?
- You say see the rest of the region, you mean other countries in the region have poor people and their is not the political upheavel like Colombia?
- Why hasn't Colombia had any longer term dictators like most other south american and central american countries? (I understand their was one military dictator in all of the history of Colombia, but he stepped down after less than a decade.) Why is Colombia different?
[edit] Demilitarized zone
I was shocked by how small the Demilitarized zone was.
Is it viable to make the Demilitarized zone an atonomous region when it is in the middle of the country, is very small, and shares no borders with other countries? The FARC would be at the mercy of the Colombia government.
[edit] Nationality of UN peacekeepers
- In regards to UN peace keepers, what regional South Americans does Colombia not get along with Colombia historically? Panamanians? Venezualians? Would UN soldiers from other non-European, non-North American countries be better as UN peace keepers? Like Asians or Africans?
[edit] Role of the military
- Is the possibility of a Costa Rica plan viable in the foreseeable furture? Costa Rica disbanded their military. Since then they have been the most peaceful country in the region, nicknamed the "Switzerland" of Central America. This idea is probably not ever possible.
[edit] "Soft" Spanish version of Plan Colombia
I keep reading that there was a "Soft" Spanish version of Plan Colombia and that America "hijacked" it.
nevermind, got my answer The original format of Plan Colombia (written by President Pastrana) was focused primarily on economic development, human rights and judicial reform. It was a prospect of change for Colombian civil society and an ambitious attempt to dig to the root of Colombian’s strife. http://www.cjpf.org/drug/prospectsforpeace.pdf
Signed Travb 05:22, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
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- It is pretty much for sure, I dug up a million sources see plan colombia I will comment on your ideas soon. thank you again.Travb 08:23, 23 February 2006 (UTC)
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- Yes, I've seen your edits. Btw, Pastrana has authored a recent book "La Palabra Bajo Fuego" ("The Word Under Fire") in which he gives his version of the events that happened during his presidency, obviously including this subject among other things, so I'll try to get a few quotes from there as well (though they might not agree 100% with the other existing interpretations). Juancarlos2004 19:35, 23 February 2006 (UTC)
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- Thats okay, I am not looking for the "correct" answer--I know their are different opinions on such a complex issue.Travb 20:32, 23 February 2006 (UTC)
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[edit] Comments on Modified Plan
Assumptions:
- DRUGS
Agreed.
- POVERTY
Agreed.
- US
Mostly agreed. Maybe I would specify that America enforces political stability and the status quo because, as obvious as it may be, it tends to be favorable to current US political and economic strategy/interests.
- FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)
Agreed.
- PRESIDENT AND MILITARY
Mostly agreed. I have problems with the term "right wing drug barons" as drug barons aren't necessarily "right wing", believe it or not. They are relatively apolitical as a group, in the sense that their personal political ideologies differ, and they are secondary to the needs of their business, if not irrelevant, which allows them to engage in relationships of joint partnership, bribery and/or intimidation with individuals of all political colors.
Take Pablo Escobar, for example. He came from a poor background and was far more of a populist than a right-winger, given his tendency to use sizable sums of money for what could be termed "good works" in and around Medellín, many of which did provide considerable benefits to the poor. He also resented the "ruling oligarchy" and was also politically linked to part of the Liberal Party (which isn't precisely "the left", but has usually been closer to it than the alternative). Even later drug lords have also occasionally spoken about their supposed personal desire to use their fortunes for "social justice", as long as they are left alone and are allowed to continue their work without suffering persecution/extradition.
In other words, I'd differentiate the right-wing element (which, of course, has been involved in paramilitarism in its own right) from that of the drug barons.
HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:
- 1st:
Agreed.
- 2nd:
Point D could be better worded as referring to "American nationals and enterprises in the country", don't you think?
Point E should focus on ending fumigations immediately (or as quickly as possible, in practice), since they are the bulk of the current drug erradication policy. However, I don't really see continuing with manual erradication or crop substitution as being equally flawed in this context, and could actually still play a limited role, even as a temporary alternative or a stopgap measure (unless the worlwide issue of the legality of the drug trade were to be resolved at the same time as this peace plan was put into practice...which would be a very good idea, but seems too ambitious).
- 3rd:
Agreed.
- 4th:
Agreed.
- 5th:
A. Agreed.
B. Fundamentally agreed. Some limited programs (which should be vastly expanded) dealing with this already exist, see above.
- 6th:
Changed 5th to 6th (due to typo). Agreed in that giving the UN such a role wouldn't be accepted by the current US administration (plus the UN itself still needs to be reformed in order for it to properly resolve its current problems and many limitations, let alone those of its member states)...but surprisingly enough, it apparently wouldn't be unwelcome by most Colombian administrations (including the present one which, believe it or not, even spoke of bringing / setting up UN peacekeepers early on, but the suggestion pretty much fell on deaf ears, for several reasons...).
[edit] Response to Questions
[edit] Political intolerance
- This begs the question, why is their political intolerence?
- What is the underlying cause of the political intolerence? It isn't poverty, what is it?
- I'd say it's more than one thing, really...but mostly what I'd call a byproduct of the historically high degree of geographical fragmentation and isolation of the country's political and socio-economic structure, together with the weakness and limited reach of the central government, which allowed local disputes/vendettas at all levels to get out of control far too often (even when they weren't being voluntarily supported by national party leaders and politicians, local powers could well fight each other on their own terms with relative impunity, without counting on the state as a positive mediator, except rarely...which made the absence of the state something to be resented, and justified local alliances and "mini-crusades" of all sorts).
- I would tend to believe that such a situation made a mentality of "every man for himself" quite widespread in practice, and helped increase the natural fear of change that is inherent to the status quo of most countries in the region (if not all). Over time, as perhaps too much violence has accumulated, it has also led to increased indifference among the urban population as to the fate of their rural peers (those who have been cursed with the shorter end of the stick), as many have gotten used to the current state of affairs and find it perfectly normal.
- Those are the fundamental reasons I'd mention, as far as the "big picture" goes. Still, it also seems that even if just a few circumstantial events had developed differently (say, the fate of Gaitán in 1948), even those reasons could well have led to a better (even if only slightly different) outcome, as I don't believe in absolute historical determinism (for me, history isn't set in stone). That's basically my current hypothesis.
- You say see the rest of the region, you mean other countries in the region have poor people and their is not the political upheavel like Colombia?
- That was pretty much the point I was trying to make, yes.
- Why hasn't Colombia had any longer term dictators like most other south american and central american countries? (I understand their was one military dictator in all of the history of Colombia, but he stepped down after less than a decade.) Why is Colombia different?
- I think that Colombia is different for many reasons, but it would take too much time to attempt to list them here ;).
- Suffice to say that the state's all too evident historical weaknesses and the availability of international examples (both in the 50's and 70's) made the top civilian power structure more "sensitive" to the dangers and risks of military rule, which meant that the military was kept on a short leash for most of the 20th century (through the severe limiting of its size and its share of the national budget, more than any other mechanism). The military did plan to make several coups here and there, but most attempts were easily contained.
- General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the one dictator you are talking about, could have changed all that and set a new precedent, but it seems he was a bit too naive. Among other things, he trusted the Church and his immediate subordinates too much and didn't seriously manage to carve a "third party" movement to support and defend him (kind of like Juan_Perón's in Argentina, I guess), trusting that his authority and relative personal popularity alone would carry him through if he attempted to continue making the most of his position.
[edit] Demilitarized zone
I was shocked by how small the Demilitarized zone was.
Is it viable to make the Demilitarized zone an atonomous region when it is in the middle of the country, is very small, and shares no borders with other countries? The FARC would be at the mercy of the Colombia government.Travb
- I wouldn't think that the FARC has any special attachment to the exact "territorial demarcation" of the old demilitarized zone, beyond the fact that most of its internal and surrounding rural area is definitely under its influence. Basically, even inside the former DMZ one could well expect many rural voters to support becoming part of a FARC autonomy, while most urban voters would reject it, so the shape of the resulting autonomous region(s) would definitely be different.
- Btw, the FARC's current demand, in order to restart peace talks with Uribe, is to demilitarize the entire departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, which seems mostly a way to taunt Uribe and would be subject to haggling with other potential presidents, since it is politically suicidal to do that at this point in time.
- But even if that specific demand were to become more viable later on, I also doubt that anyobody would agree to demilitarize any land directly connected to the international border, simply due to PR. Therefore, I don't think that point will be too important. Remember that the FARC aren't seeking independence as a state or as a people, and that they basically survived Pastrana's Operation Thanatos mostly unscathed when the Army entered the former DMZ.
- What does that tell us? That the FARC already knows (due to this and many other experiences) how to take care of itself in times of grave danger and how not to be "at the mercy of the Colombian government" when the heat's turned on.
- It also tells me that the existence of a reasonably large segment of rural land within any proposed demilitarized zone or autonomous region(s), located throughout relatively friendly territory, seems to be the key factor that defines the FARC's perception of safety, in this context, more than any available connection to an international border or the definition of any specific DMZ shape/size.
[edit] Nationality of UN peacekeepers
* In regards to UN peace keepers, what regional South Americans does Colombia not get along with Colombia historically? Panamanians? Venezualians? Would UN soldiers from other non-European, non-North American countries be better as UN peace keepers? Like Asians or Africans? Travb
- Until relatively recently, and even then any international tension has clearly been almost exclusively due to the ongoing conflict, Colombia has pretty much maintained good diplomatic relations with almost all of its neighbors (most of which keep repeating the mantra that they're willing to do "everything possible" in order to help Colombia reach a negotiated peace), so I don't see an specific need for non-regional peacekeepers (except for obvious cost/manpower reasons, which may likely require additional resources/participation).
- Historically we've only had a bit of trouble with Venezuela due a touchy maritime border dispute that still remains open (due to the egoism and foolishness of both sides, IMHO). but even so, the current Venezuelan government has been, surprisingly, less hostile to Colombia (and the current administration) than previous Venezuelan presidents, and has expressed pretty much the same "good will" as most of the others.
[edit] Role of the military
Is the possibility of a Costa Rica plan viable in the foreseeable furture? Costa Rica disbanded their military. Since then they have been the most peaceful country in the region, nicknamed the "Switzerland" of Central America. This idea is probably not ever possible.Travb
- Unlikely, though I'm clearly not an expert on the history of Costa Rica. Properly answering that question would require understanding exactly why did Costa Rica do so and in which context, before trying to apply such a model to Colombia. The idea itself, however, may be good, but will only be practically applicable after the war itself has begun to be seriously scaled-down, if not already ended. Juancarlos2004 02:20, 22 February 2006 (UTC)
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- Thank you Juan. I got the photo of the Palace of Justice siege scanned and copied, I had to take too photos and make it one. I am going to post all of the graphs and photos that I copied off. I will let you know a link, and post it here.Travb 05:16, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
[edit] President Uribe after AUC too?
Is the president really going after the AUC as stated in this article?
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- Soon after that, in May 2002, the former liberal politician of conservative leanings Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose father had been killed by left-wing guerrillas, was sworn in as Colombian president. He immediately began taking action to crush the FARC, ELN, and AUC, including the employment of citizen informants to help the police and armed forces track down suspected members in all three armed groups.
From what I understand, many of the AUC consider Uribe "their man"Travb 08:26, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
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- Well, IMO, yes and no. The AUC definitely did consider Uribe "their man" in 2002. The fact that they tend to share a common social and ideological background, and the main objective of fighting the guerrillas, is fairly well known and is easy to prove.
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- But that's where some differences begin to emerge. As far as all public evidence shows, Uribe actually wants to fight the guerrillas by increasing the power of the state and reining in local powers, which is why he wants to demobilize the AUC and bring all counterinsurgency efforts under the control of the central government, in order to make them more effective and, obviously, to secure US aid. If that implies fighting the paramilitaries in the process, then so be it.
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- According to CERAC, between 2002 and 2004 the AUC drastically lowered its attacks (until the first half of 2005, which saw a rapid increase) and fundamentally isn't killing people through massacres as much (increasingly preferring individual murders). In other words, they reduced their violent activities, though they still continued committing crimes. The report also shows that under Uribe government forces would have actually fought the AUC more than under any previous presidents in recent memory (even if its not that much, compared to how much the guerrillas are being fought, it's significantly more than what was being done earlier on). See here: [1].
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- Uribe, also in part due to US pressure, has recently demanded that several of his political allies sever their ties to the paramilitaries, and some political candidates suspected of such ties have been driven from the "top tier" political parties that support him (fundamentally a political move, since we all know that the justice system in Colombia is so subpar that most of these guys aren't under investigation, only under public suspicion, whether guilty or innocent. In other words, nobody can prevent them from still running for office in lower profile outfits, but the fact that they were publicly exposed as "suspicious" gives the urban electorate more of a choice in the matter).
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- The recent capture and prosecution of other individuals thought to be close to the paramilitaries isn't exactly making them happy either, as well as the fact that Uribe hasn't been willing to compromise on the issue of extradition (beyond assuring the paramilitaries that they will not be extradited if they fulfill the requirements of the demobilization and reintegration process, they have no legal protection against it). For other details, see here: [2].
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- So the relationship between Uribe and the AUC isn't a simple one, as you can see. Juancarlos2004 18:47, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
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- Juancarlos2004 wrote: So the relationship between Uribe and the AUC isn't a simple one, as you can see. Nothing in Colombia is simple. That video I mentioned, was so simplistic it made me gag:
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- (2002). World History of Organized Crime - Disc 2 [DVD]. History Channel. Volume two contains "China," "India," and "Colombia."
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- Horribly simplistic video, perfect for Americans: you have a bad guy (the FARC and drug dealers) and you have a good guy (America and the Colombian government). So simplistic.Travb 22:45, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
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[edit] EU Terror List
The FARC were added to the EU's list in June 2002 and the ELN in April 2004, not in 2005. See European policies on Colombia by An Vranckx (2005) here: [3] or [4]. Apparently, the document that you linked to is showing the September 2005 inclusion of other organizations on the list, not the FARC's and ELN's. Juancarlos2004 19:22, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
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- I guess you are talking to me? I didnt add anything to the article about the EU.Travb 22:40, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
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- I thought I was, but now I've noticed that I spoke too soon (I wasn't comparing the differences between the latest versions properly). I apologize for the misunderstanding. Juancarlos2004 00:45, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
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[edit] Peace Plan ideas from Camilo Azcarate
Before negotiations, there should be:
- interactive problem-solving workshops,
- negotions are set up outside of Colombia,
- a strict set of previously agreed ground rules, and
- all parties should be included. (p 4)
[edit] (1) Interactive problem-solving workshops
These workshops will bring together in a confidential, academic environment nonofficial but influential representatives of the parties (level one) or representatives having different perspectives about the conflict (level two).
This group will be overseen by a panel of social scientists.
The goal of these workshops is not to resolve the conflict but to jointly analyze its causes and the basic needs and reasons for the conflict.
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- Past use of conflict resolution: Conflict Resolution Workshops have been used in conflicts such as Ireland, Cyprus, Somalia, Sri-Lanka, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
[edit] (2) Negotions are set up outside of Colombia
Mediators will met the parties in a neutral place outside of Colombia.
Low-profile, nonofficial, non-Colombian mediators can be more fruitful than high profile mediators. The mediators must be respected by both parties and have some form of influence over both parties.
[edit] (3) A strict set of previously agreed ground rules
Example of ground rules: ‘freezing’ or threatening to walk away from the process to get a concession from the other is unacceptable and should mean the termination of the process.
Another series of ground rules needs to address the effect of violent events away from the table. All three peace processes in Colombia ended after a violent event by one of the parties (or one of its factions) away from the table. The reason for this provision is that allowing outside events to have a direct and immediate impact on the peace process means all the violent actors and factions within the parties have the power to stop the process by escalating the conflict.
Confidentiality should also be considered as an important ground rule for the proceedings, at least in the first stages.
[edit] (4) All parties should be included
Most peace processes have started as initiatives of institutions such as the church, civic movements, and the like that later have been largely excluded from the table.
The only two peace initiatives in Colombia that showed some actual results had an active participation by these groups.
This was the case in the 1989 agreement with the M-19, EPL, and other groups.
That was also true for the Viana agreements with the ELN in 1998.
[edit] (5) Shape public opinion
How to stop public opinion from negatively influence the peace process is to:
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- (1) Educate members of the community with influence on public opinion about the real nature of a peace process. The problem-solving workshops proposed above can achieve such an education goal.
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- (2) Public education campaigns to educate the larger public about the real long-term nature of any peace process.
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- (3) Lower the profile of the process, even considering a confidentiality ground rule.
Signed: Travb 03:05, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
- Seems interesting and appropiate enough, as an idea. Still, translating those concepts into practical possibilities and into ground rules that will be accepted by both parties is precisely where the problem is. Juancarlos2004 04:07, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
[edit] ELN peace talks, a model for FARC?
Signed: Travb 03:12, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
- I'd think not, at least not right now. The FARC adamantly opposes even talking to Uribe about peace (unless he demilitarizes the entire departments of Caquetá and Putumayo, which remains their condition for peace talks and which all presidential candidates have rejected: [5] ), and appears to see the ELN as either "weak" or "media hungry" for doing so. They also don't seem to like to hold talks outside Colombia and/or with the participation of third parties in anything more than an occasional observer role, given their reluctance to do so during the last talks (it was only until the final months of the talks that the UN and the Europeans were allowed to have more active and decisive role). Perhaps in some years they might change their position and accept something similar, if the circumstances allow it, but that's pure speculation at the moment. Juancarlos2004 04:04, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
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- Wow, what a mess. I never realized this project would be so hard. thanks Juancarlos2004, hope you like the 2 new tables on this page.Travb 05:00, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
[edit] NPOV?
The Quotes and Statistics sections of this article seem to draw primarily from people critical of the Colombian Government, President Uribe, and the US involvement. Many of the statistics and quotes are drawn from the same source, which appears to be partisan, as well as inconsistent with each other and with other statistics and quotes.
The article above those sections does not have a POV problem. Is it preferred to trim back or delete those sections, or should I dig up statistics and quotes which balance those already presented? User:Argyriou 02:13, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
- Hi, the quotes and statistics were all added by me. Your criticism is probably accurate: people critical of the Colombian Government, President Uribe, and the US involvement. Given the disaster that Colombia is today, and its appalling history, I think this are accurate statments. Who else is there to blame for Colombia's current state of affairs? Geography? Communists? The USSR? A spontaneous violence? Human nature?
- Is it preferred to trim back or delete those sections Any deletions of statistics or quotes will be reverted by myself.
- should I dig up statistics and quotes which balance those already presented? Absolutly. If you feel the current state of affairs is because of the FARC or a communist conspiracy, or whatever you feel is the root cause of the violence, please add as many statistics or quotes as you deem fit. All I ask is that they are all referenced, with page number if available, as my quotes and statistics are.
- User:Argyriou, Thank you for garnering opinions of others before major edits to the page. It shows real respect and maturity by you. I speak for every editor here, when I say welcome to this page, and we look forward to your future edits and improvements to this page. Travb 02:23, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
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- I will remove the quotes as the serve absolutely no purpose other than to bias the article. Torturous Devastating Cudgel 16:53, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
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- I have also tagged the section as all the information comes from Livingstone, and is hardly a neutral source. Torturous Devastating Cudgel 16:58, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
[edit] COLOMBIAN ARMED CONFLICT name change!
The Colombian Armed Conflict term results too general.. since the Civil Wars of the 19th century in Colombia are also considered armed conflicts, in fact Colombian Civil War redirects to Colombian armed conflict.
Through out the 19th Century Colombia went thru many Civil Wars (armed conflicts), Thousand Days War being one of those. Maybe put a date by it, like (1950- present) because is conflicting with other colombian armed conflicts. suggestions?--F3rn4nd0 
07:16, 20 October 2006 (UTC)
- I support Third Colombian Civil War - like Second Sudanese Civil War --TheFEARgod (Ч) 16:15, 1 December 2006 (UTC)
Hi I was wordering why the communists/marxists are repeatedly refered to as liberals? According to the liberal manifesto of oxford 1947, liberals declared there opposition to nationalization to my knowledge the cold war was defined as liberalism/capitalist/democracy against communism/marixist/authoritarianism FARC are marxists and PLC are a socialist party and so im changing the page to reflect this
